INTRODUCTION

On 14 May 2023, the Move Forward Party won the General Election in Thailand with 151 seats and the votes of over 14 million Thais. This was an unexpected victory, even to the party's leadership.

Key to the Move Forward Party's victory was political fandom, in the manifestation of Dom Som. This term refers to the supporters attached to the Move Forward Party and its leader Pita Limjaroenrat. “Dom” is the abbreviation of “Fandom” and “Som” is orange, the colour of the Move Forward Party. The fandom phenomenon has long existed in different industries such as music, movies and sports; political fandom is however relatively new to Thailand. In the same way as sports fans engage with their teams or pop-culture fans engage with celebrities, political fans have a strong emotional attachment to a politician or a political party (Erikson 2008). It includes aspects of affection and activities on an individual or community level (Dean 2017).

Thailand's political fans actively participated in offline and online activities, beyond the conventional form of political support. The Dom Som promoted the Move Forward Party by creating hashtags, editing viral videos, liking and sharing content and casting Pita as the protagonist of a fictional narrative. They also discredited other parties or candidates by creating memes, finding digital footprints or trolling on social media. Election campaigning turned into a pop-culture battle, as illustrated by the social buzz over a particular choc mint drink endorsed by Paetongtarn Shinawatra versus the orange-black coffee endorsed by Pita.

This transcendence of politics into pop culture, where celebrity status and fandom can capture the popular imagination led virtually all political parties to pursue it in order to increase their popularity during the 2023 General Election. Nonetheless, it was the Move Forward Party's political fandom strategy that proved most effective. This research addresses how Move Forward Party's leader and prime minister candidate Pita Limjaroenrat was able to achieve celebrity status, while the party itself managed to establish a strong fandom that helped clinch the elections. From policy formulation to communication and marketing of candidates, the Move Forward Party was able to affect the perception and behaviour of voters through its fandom strategy.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The concept of political fandom, the state of being fans of a politician or of a political party, played a crucial role during Thailand’s General Election in 2023. Fandom contributed to the popularity on social media of politicians, such as Pita Limjaroenrat, the Move Forward Party’s leader and prime ministerial candidate.

• The strategies involved in achieving celebrity status for politicians are varied. This paper provides a case study of the factors behind the success of Pita and the Move Forward Party and contrasts these with reasons why Pita’s key political opponents were less effective.

• It argues that the digital age and the transcendence of politics into pop culture, where celebrity status and fandom can drive electoral outcomes, signify a profound shift in democratic participation, political engagement and the very fabric of Thai politics.

• While fandom has become a stream in participatory democracy, it also highlights the polarized and temperamental nature of Thailand’s contemporary hyper-partisan political scene.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The emphasis on cultural connectivity in China’s growing presence and involvement in Southeast Asia highlights the importance China places on people-to-people exchanges as part of its global engagement strategy.

• The remarkable ascension of China over the recent decades has precipitated a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of a “discourse war” with Western powers, as expressed in the latter’s “China threat” narrative.

• In response to such challenges, China has made substantial investments in cultural diplomacy, to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives.

• This article examines Chinese cultural diplomacy in the realm of entertainment, specifically “The Melody of Spring: Transnational Spring Festival Gala” hosted in Nanning, Guangxi, and disseminated globally each Chinese New Year.

• Against the legacy of China-Indonesia bilateral relations as well as Indonesia’s treatment of its Chinese minority, this study explores China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power in contemporary Indonesia.

• Through the case study of the “Transnational Spring Festival Gala”, this article posits that China’s cultural dissemination as an instrument of soft power has yielded little influence on the Indonesian public and has limited impact on the formation of a transnational imagined community.

INTRODUCTIONAn energy transition is underway in Southeast Asia. This process is dependent on an uninterrupted supply of the minerals and metals that are essential to produce low-carbon technologies. These raw materials are termed ‘critical minerals’ (CMs), owing to three broad features: their necessity as inputs in low-carbon technology, the lack of viable substitutes, and significant supply constraints. The demand for CMs such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, rare earth elements (REEs), copper, and silicon3 is expected to increase exponentially in the coming decades. To meet the global net zero target by 2050, mineral inputs will need to increase sixfold by 2040, compared to current levels. According to scenarios developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the demand for minerals used in electric vehicles (EVs) will increase thirty times compared to current levels, while mineral requirements for low-carbon energy generation will triple by 2040.

The development of CMs is impeded by several supply constraints. Currently, a handful of countries dominate the CMs market, with China playing an outsized role in both the upstream and downstream parts of the supply chain. For example, China currently extracts 65 per cent and processes 85 per cent of the world's REEs. The largest amount of copper, nickel and cobalt are extracted in Chile, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), respectively. Yet, as shown in Figure 1, China dominates the processing of all three minerals, as well as alumina and lithium.

There is growing academic and policy consensus on the need to develop sustainable and reliable supply chains for CMs, which is of great relevance to Southeast Asia. On the one hand, the region can become a major supplier of critical minerals, due to the existence of substantial deposits of bauxite, nickel, tin, REEs, cobalt, manganese and graphite. On the other hand, Southeast Asia is likely to become a significant consumer of critical minerals, owing to the region’s growing solar photovoltaic (PV) and electric vehicle industries. Malaysia and Vietnam are the world’s second and third-largest solar PV manufacturers and accounted for one-fifth of global shipments in 2020.9 Thailand has become the region’s leading producer of EVs, while the Philippines and Indonesia have undertaken initial steps to develop integrated battery and EV supply chains.10

INTRODUCTION

The cultural impact of China's growing presence and involvement in the region has generated significant discussion. Beijing's official narratives, particularly in the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have consistently emphasized not only physical connectivity but also cultural exchanges through people-to-people interactions (Kuah 2019). This highlights the importance China places on the deepening of cultural ties as part of its global engagement strategy. This is further demonstrated in China's recent launch of the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which purportedly features an alternative to Western modernization (Hoon and Chan 2023).

President Xi Jinping's vision of creating a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” is designed to closely intertwine with China's soft power approach, wherein cultural exchanges with partner nations and people-to-people connections play a pivotal role. The emphasis on human and cultural exchanges also extends to the discourse presented by both the Indonesian and Chinese governments when managing their bilateral relations. The overarching strategy is encapsulated in the phrase proposed by Xi Jinping to “tell China's story well” (讲好中国故事).

However, the remarkable ascension of China in recent decades has also engendered a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of the “discourse war” with Western powers (Shambaugh 2015). This frequently finds expression under the aegis of the “China threat” narrative (Pradt 2016). In response to this conundrum, China has invested substantially in cultural diplomacy and sought to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives (Chen, Colapindo, and Luo 2012).

Operating as an instrument of international relations, soft power conveys a modality of influence characterized by subtlety and allure, in contradistinction to coercion (Nye 1990). In tandem with material assistance and the China model of development paradigms, China's soft power strategy encompasses multifaceted endeavours. These include the establishment of the much-debated Confucius Institutes (CI) across the globe, the endowment of international academic exchange programmes, the instigation of international outreach endeavours and the expansion of its premier state television broadcaster, CCTV, across diverse linguistic contexts worldwide (Rawnsley 2012).

Concurrently, China's cultural diplomacy initiatives extend into the realm of entertainment as well. In the past two decades, the Chinese state has authorized the creation of patriotic and nationalistic television series, singing competitions and variety shows that coalesce artists from the broader cultural tapestry of China, spanning Taiwan, Hong Kong and the global Chinese diaspora.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The clean energy transition momentum is gathering pace globally, and in Southeast Asia as well. The transition is dependent on an uninterrupted supply of critical minerals and metals that are essential for the production of low-carbon technologies.

• The supply of critical minerals is impeded by several constraints. First is the dominance of a handful of countries in both the upstream and downstream parts of the supply chain. Second is the current geopolitical race to secure supplies leading to greater protectionist behaviours, exhibited through export bans and trade impediments.

• This study focuses on four selected critical minerals which are important to the region. Two criteria are used in determining a mineral having high significance: (1) There are significant deposits of it which can be tapped on to bolster Southeast Asia’s strategic position in the supply chains; and (2) It is an essential input in industries and sectors of importance in Southeast Asia. The four critical minerals examined in this study are: copper, nickel, bauxite (alumina), and rare earth elements (REEs).

• The study makes three recommendations to enhance ASEAN’s role in the critical minerals supply chains. The first addresses the insufficiency of investments in early-stage exploration and exploitation of critical minerals and, in the process, calls for an embracing of circular economy principles. The second appeals for investments at all stages, including in technology to tap into downstream activities beyond refining and purification, and in the manufacturing of component parts such as battery cell storage and permanent magnets. The third calls for improvements in sustainability management in the mining sector, which is generally extremely environmentally and socially damaging to communities.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

As explained in the introduction to this volume, political parties play an important role in shaping the demand for women's representation and participation in politics, while gendered cultural values and norms often influence whether women opt to participate in politics. In this chapter, we explore the ways that attitudes and experiences correlate with men and women's sense of political efficacy and their attitudes towards women's participation in politics in Myanmar as of 2019—i.e., before the 2021 coup. Though the 2015 election resulted in a higher proportion of female members of parliament (MPs) being elected (10 per cent) than at any other previous time in the country's history, women's parliamentary representation remained very low compared to other countries in the region and globally (Gender Equality Network 2017, pp. 10–11). To better understand the sources of women's political underrepresentation in Myanmar, we examine the experiences and attitudes that affect political participation through a nationwide survey conducted between September and December 2019. As detailed in Chapter One, our survey asked a total of 2,889 respondents in four states/ regions that cover a range of Myanmar's geographic and demographic characteristics (Mon, Mandalay, Ayeyarwady, and southern Shan) to reflect on their experiences and attitudes about politics and women's participation in politics.

We begin by analysing men and women's attitudes towards gender equality and gender roles. We find that men and women did not differ much in their overall opinions about gender roles in society. However, when we examine potential reasons why men and women held certain opinions about gender equality, we find that age, political knowledge, satisfaction with democracy, and early life experiences, such as witnessing violence against their mother, have different associations with expressions of support for gender equality among men compared to women.

Then, we turn to three attitudes related to women's participation in politics. First, we examine internal political efficacy, which refers to whether someone feels they are able to participate in politics, which is an important determinant of whether they engage in political behaviour, such as voting, contacting a government official, or running for political office (Finkel 1985). If women feel less politically capable of participating in politics than men, they also will be less likely to engage in politics. We find that men in Myanmar were more likely to express political self-efficacy than women, in general.