INTRODUCTION

This paper looks at the ideologies of political Islam and post-Islamism in the Malaysian context. In conducting a historical survey of Malaysian politics, I postulate that while Abdul Hadi Awang and his party Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) are Islamists, Anwar Ibrahim is a post-Islamist. The battle between the two was both intense and sharp, and the results show that there will certainly be sequels to come. Although Anwar finally managed to become prime minister, the aftermath of the 15th general election (GE15) and the results of state elections in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan on 12 August 2023 illustrate that political Islam is growing in strength. This is most evident in the fact that PAS currently has a whopping forty-three seats in the Malaysian parliament, controls four states, and has significant numbers of seats in the state assemblies of Perak, Selangor and Pahang.

Over the years, there has been much debate about what is commonly referred to as political Islam, or Islamism. According to Andrew March, political Islam should be understood “in the broadest sense possible as the range of modern political movements, ideological trends, and state-directed policies concerned with giving Islam an authoritative status in political life”. The goal of political Islam is to “create an ‘Islamic state’ or to fuse ‘religion and state’ (din wa dawla)” (March 2015, p. 17.10).

The core business of political Islam is undoubtedly centred on aspects of morality. It focuses on how to use political tools and means to regulate people according to the teachings of Islam as understood by these players. Furthermore, it is not monolithic. As March put it, “political Islam by and large belongs to the right of the political spectrum, but it would be a mistake to see it as a single movement or ideology. Islamist trends range from left-leaning populist protest movements to ultraconservative movements devoted more to social control over morality than to economic redistribution” (ibid., p. 17.2).

The agents of political Islam themselves maintain that Islam is a way of life, and thus should be the only governing factor and core principle in every aspect of life, including governance (Meijer 2009). This idea has led to a power struggle between the Islamists and those they dub as secularists.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • During the 15th general election (GE15) in 2022 and the state elections in 2023, the clash between Anwar Ibrahim and PAS reached new heights. This can be viewed as a battle between political Islam and post-Islamism.

• • Political Islam as embodied by PAS pursues the establishment of an Islamic state, while post-Islamism as represented by Anwar Ibrahim is a way of balancing the ambitions of Islam with secular approaches.

• • While PAS has been consistent in espousing political Islam since its establishment, Anwar Ibrahim’s approach to the role of Islam in politics has changed since his early days in UMNO. Evolving from an Islamist involved in state-led Islamization to a post-Islamist, he now espouses democratic values and multiculturalism.

• • GE15 and the 2023 state elections witnessed fierce competition between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim. Both sides either escalated or downplayed crucial topics such as the implementation of hudud law and RUU355, the myth of Islam and Malays being under threat, the claim that states under PAS are discriminated against, and the takfiri denouncements of non-Muslims as election candidates or potential leaders of the country.

• • The results of GE15 and the 2023 state elections between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim, who is now prime minister, show that there will certainly be sequels to come. The elections illustrate that political Islam is growing in strength. This is most evident in the fact that PAS currently has a whopping forty-three seats in the Malaysian parliament, and controls four states. The only way Anwar Ibrahim can remain in power is through assistance from PAS’ old nemesis, UMNO, a party heavily tainted by corruption.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Over the past decade, app-based driving services like ride-hailing and delivery have become an integral part of business, employment and daily life in Vietnam. This growth, however, has been accompanied by tensions and conflicts between ride-hailing platforms and traditional taxi companies, xe ôm (motorbike taxi drivers), the authorities and the drivers working for these platforms.

• • Most drivers on these services are male and work long hours for low wages. Their working conditions are precarious because platforms classify them as partners rather than employees, denying them basic rights and benefits. Although platforms offer bonuses, organize events to celebrate drivers’ contributions, and provide training courses, these do not address the fundamental exploitation in the employment relationship.

• • The Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) has not taken sufficient action to protect drivers or taken a stance on whether they should be classified as contractors or employees. The Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is working towards securing social protection for drivers and increasing their representation in labour associations. While some members of the VGCL have argued that app-based drivers are actually workers and should be afforded the same rights and benefits as all workers, this is as yet not the formal position of the confederation.

• • Drivers have taken to organizing strikes and protests to demand better treatment from the platforms. Their methods of activism are rooted in both traditional Vietnamese labour activism and global trends of platform protest.

• • The emergence of the gig economy in Vietnam is a challenge to sustainable development. Policymakers and practitioners are called upon to ensure that platform work contributes to improved livelihoods and decent lifestyles for all.

INTRODUCTION

The platform economy consists of three broad categories of companies: those that “provide digital services and products to individual users, such as social media”; those that “mediate exchange of goods and services, such as e-commerce or business-to-business (B2B) platforms”; and digital labour platforms, which “mediate and facilitate labour exchange between different users, such as businesses, workers, and consumers”. Digital labour platforms can be classified into two main types: “gig work platforms” or “location-based platforms” which refer to work that is done in a specific location (e.g., driving or domestic services); and “cloudwork” or “online web-based platforms” which refer to work that can be done remotely from anywhere in the world (e.g., online private tuition, data entry or translation).

In recent years, digital labour platforms have become an integral part of business and employment, as well as the epitome of the gig economy in Vietnam, and in the world. Against this backdrop, app-based driving has become a major focus for the international labour movement, labour scholars and policymakers worldwide. Workers, their unions, and researchers have long argued that the practices of platforms are, in many cases, “precariatising workers”, leading to “the pauperisation of labour”, and even contributing to “the extreme threat posed to the planet by the growth of contingent work, poverty, and enduring and expanding inequalities”. There have been numerous protests by platform workers around the world, and February 2020 saw the establishment of the International Alliance of App-based Transport Workers (IAATW), a network of app-based driver unions and associations. The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), which is the global union federation for transport workers, has made the impact of technology a central focus of its work, and the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN body responsible for labour issues, has announced plans to set international labour standards for platform work. In addition, there have been major regional and national-level campaigns and struggles, such as the proposed EU platform work directive, which, despite having been weakened from the original proposal, should make it easier for gig workers to be considered as employees.

In tandem, labour studies scholars have written extensively on various aspects of the gig economy and app-based driving. In Vietnam, however, research on this topic has been limited until recently.

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, or BNPT) argues that Islamist terrorists had previously focused on “hard power”, such as bombings of Western-related targets, or suicide bombings, to attain their objectives. But in recent years, due to state repression and dwindling public support, terrorists have abandoned this strategy, and now resort instead to “soft power”. Soft power here refers to the use of non-violent means to achieve one’s interests. Terrorists now use the Internet, including social media, or join community organizations which they utilize later on, to gain support for their cause. Be that as it may, the Internet has become a strategic tool not only for terrorists but for radical Muslims as well, who use it to disseminate their intolerant ideas of Islam. While terrorists use and advocate violence, radical Muslims promote non-violent religious extremism.

Between January and December 2022, BNPT identified some 600 social media accounts and websites that promoted religious radicalism. In that period, these websites and social media accounts posted more than 900 pieces with radical content, including expressions of intolerance and takfiri (the act of labelling others as apostates). The agency also found almost the same number of websites and social media accounts in the previous year.

Our research examines the role of moderate Muslim media websites in battling against Islamic online extremism. The NU Online, Islami.co, and IBTimes.id are affiliated with the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia (Nadhlatul Ulama [NU] and Muhammadiyah). These are among the most popular moderate Muslim media websites in Indonesia. This article looks at the websites’ effectiveness in battling online religious extremism. It also examines the challenges they face in dealing with religious extremism and how they have weathered those challenges. We argue that their efforts have not been very effective. This is due to structural and cultural problems impeding the websites’ operations. Two major challenges faced are limited funding for the outlets, as well as these outlets’ failure to connect with the urban young.

Many Indonesians, especially youth and students, seek knowledge, including learning about Islam, from the Internet, and many do so from radical social media accounts and websites.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • It is worrying that, in many cases in Indonesia, exposure to the Internet, especially social media, increases knowledge seekers’ religious radicalism. This exposure has not only resulted in increased radicalism but also compelled some individuals to turn to violence in the name of Islam.

• • Moderate online media institutions have not been effective in counteracting the online dissemination of extremist religious content. The content disseminated by radical websites is still being popularly consumed, albeit those moderate Muslim websites have put in considerable effort to counteract radical narratives.

• • This report argues that this ineffectiveness is due to structural and cultural challenges. The structural challenges include limited funding and sensitivity towards the policy of umbrella organizations. Cultural challenges include passiveness in corporate culture, alongside the “ivory tower” traditions among journalists which leaves them out of touch with Muslim communities.

• • The government of Indonesia can assist moderate Muslim media websites in fighting radical narratives, for example, through better funding to them.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

This chapter highlights public financial management reform experiences of selected ASEAN countries—Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia—and the OECD countries of New Zealand, France, Australia, Sweden and Estonia. It aims to draw lessons and implications for Cambodia’s reform program. No one country can provide Cambodia with one specific model to follow that meets its culture and structure of government; therefore, a variety of experiences is the best way to help inform its approach.

7.1 THAILAND: STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE-BASED BUDGETING

Thailand has made impressive strides in social and economic development over the last four decades. Strong, sustained economic growth prompted Thailand to become an upper-middle-income country in 2011 and made the country the second-largest economy in Southeast Asia after Indonesia. But before this growth, Thailand suffered a major shock as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. The crisis saw the country’s annual real GDP rate decline sharply by –1.3 per cent and –9.4 per cent in 1997 and 1998, respectively, down from its 9 per cent growth rate between 1986 and 1996. The crisis taught the country about the huge cost affiliated with weak economic management. It put tremendous pressure on the government’s fiscal balance and forced reforms in public sector financial management to enhance public sector efficiency.

As a response to the crisis, the government launched the Public Sector Management Reform Plan (PSMRP). Its vision was for a medium-term institutional transformation to “New Public Management”, which focused on improving performance and accountability. The “New Public Management” agenda encompassed five areas: (1) the role, mission and administration of public sector reform; (2) budgets becoming “performance-based”; (3) human resource management reform; (4) legal reform, and (5) value changes.

Performance-based budgeting (PBB) was introduced with a sophis-ticated framework, a new concept in the Thai public sector. It included the devolution of budget control, a medium-term expenditure framework, a focus on outputs and outcomes, and monitoring and evaluating performance indicators.

Before the reform, Thailand’s budget system was centralized, input controlled, inflexible, and distorted by government agencies, which were inefficient in both allocation and operation. The linkages among planning, budgeting, and sectoral policy were weak. The fiscal planning process only focused on annual budgeting, not using a medium-term approach. There was no adequate information technology to support the budget process. Transparency and accountability were also challenging issues.

The components of public financial management in Cambodia are: (1) revenue management, (2) public expenditure management, (3) public investment management, (4) public debt management, (5) state property management, (6) public procurement management, (7) public accounting system, (8) FMIS, and (9) control system. This chapter will explain how the PFMRP efforts modernize each component.

4.1 REVENUE MANAGEMENT

Government revenue refers to the money received by a government from both taxes and non-tax sources. Government revenues and expenditures are the two primary components of the government budget and essential tools of the government’s fiscal policy. Without sufficient revenues and proper management of them, the government would not be able to provide adequate public services to its citizens, from fire brigades and police to environmental protection and telecommunications.

Cambodia has achieved significant revenue growth in recent years. However, the recent global COVID-19 pandemic is providing a monumental challenge to the country’s ability to sustain the government’s recent levels of revenue, particularly in key sectors such as tourism and garment manufacturing exports.

4.1.1 Key Objective in Domestic Revenue Mobilization

Strengthening domestic revenue mobilization (meaning revenue generated within the Cambodian economy) has played a key role in transforming Cambodia from a low-income to a lower-middle-income country in 2015. Its role will be even more critical as the RGC works towards achieving an upper-middle income by 2030 and high-income status by 2050. As the country’s income per capita increases, Cambodia’s external financing is expected to be reduced in the medium to long term. This requires Cambodia to work harder to mobilize both short- and medium-term revenue to achieve high economic growth and maintain a robust economic system that is sustainable, resilient to crisis, and responsive to development needs.

The government launched a highly successful Medium-Term Revenue Mobilization Strategy 2014–18, which substantially increased domestic revenue. Through this effort, the share of current revenue to GDP increased significantly from 10.3 per cent in 2004 to 15.0 per cent in 2013 and continued to grow to 22.0 per cent in 2018. This growth rate is even more remarkable in recent years, with an average growth of approximately 1.4 per cent per year from 2013 to 2018 (Figure 4.1).

INTRODUCTION

On 30 December 2022, many Indonesians breathed a sigh of relief, as their government lifted all remaining COVID-19 measures that day, including restrictions on social gatherings, mandatory mask-wearing indoors, and mandatory use of the COVID-19 tracking app PeduliLindungi (“to care and protect”) in public venues. According to President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), the situation was now “under control”, and the Indonesian population had built sufficient immunity to the virus. Indeed, a study from July 2022 conducted by the Health Ministry and the University of Indonesia found that 98.5 per cent of the population had antibodies against COVID-19, either from vaccination or past infections.

Still, President Jokowi advised the people to remain vigilant and to mask up in crowded places as a precaution. On 30 January 2023, the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Director-General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, also called on the global community to exercise constant vigilance, since new virus variants were continuing to emerge, while the efficacy of administered vaccines was gradually waning. Moreover, the lagging vaccine uptake in low- and middle-income countries remained a source of concern. Despite the WHO declaring the COVID-19 pandemic officially over on 5 May 2023, Tedros urged the world to stay alert for a possible resurgence, and to heed and act upon the lessons learned from the COVID-19 emergency.

On Indonesian social media, Jokowi’s announcement in December 2022 and the WHO’s announcement in May 2023 led to a surge of posts on the topic, with thousands of netizens welcoming the news. But not all reactions were positive. Some doubted the wisdom of lifting restrictions or declaring the pandemic to be over, arguing that doing so could lead to public laxness. Others found reason to criticize Jokowi’s government or administrators, accusing them of mismanagement, corruption, or other faults unrelated to the news. There were also netizens posting and sharing variants of conspiracy theories that had circulated since the start of the pandemic—alluding, for example, that “Big Pharma” would profit even more in an endemic phase of COVID-19; or mocking China, which was just experiencing a surge in cases, for lagging behind, and warning of Chinese citizens trying to illegally enter Indonesia; or claiming that COVID-19 was a “hoax” to begin with and that vaccination must be halted immediately.