The contemporary youth-led movements and protests in the Global North and South have rekindled the popular image of youths as agents of change. Indonesia is no exception, as Indonesian millennials have taken the initiative to push progressive agendas, especially after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998. This development has been tracked meticulously by various scholars whose works have raised hopes that the involvement of Indonesian millennials in politics will have positive impacts. Contrary to their views, however, we argue that Indonesian millennials need a stronger organizational foundation to play the role of driver of progressive agendas. Based on an online survey involving 206 progressive youth organizations in Indonesia and 82 semi-structured interviews, we found that although some of these organizations have managed to establish basic organizational mechanisms (statutes, annual plans, evaluation mechanisms), they are still not well connected to potential social bases, especially in university campuses and in provinces other than those where they are based. The absence of a broad social base potentially undermines their social justice agendas since an agenda without strong social support comes across to political elites and policymakers as mere empty bluster. We contend that our study contributes to conversations on the role of Indonesian youth in politics and the Indonesian youth social movement in the post-authoritarian era.

INDONESIAN YOUTHS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE

History often portrays youths as agents of change. Such an image stems from their involvement in critical moments such as large-scale protests, regime changes or revolutions. As youths have been at the centre stage of these moments throughout historical periods, every generation tends to produce its own narratives of how heroic youths spark social change.

The millennial generation is not an exception. Born between the early 1980s and late 1990s, the millennial generation witnessed pivotal social disruptions in which they carried on the struggle for gender equality, civil liberty, environmental justice and racial justice, reproducing the popular narrative of youths as agents of change. As they grow into adolescence and consume information through multiple social media platforms, they realize that when their freedom and basic rights are undermined, they must take up the baton for transforming their society. Combined with wanting to redress society's economic grievances, millennials seek transformations of the existing political and social order that they find repressive and impeding their hopes for a better future.

Millennials or Generation Y—those born between 1981 and 1996—represent the population cohort who are moving into the prime of their careers and lives. It is this generation that is being groomed to take up leadership roles in various sectors of society. How millennials mature and develop, the values they hold and the capabilities they acquire will be crucial determinants of the outlook for a nation going forward. Millennials may not be digital natives, but they have grown up amid what is known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution—the current era where virtually every industry is being transformed by the exponential pace of technological change and digitalization. Unprecedented technological changes and what is known as hyper-globalization have caused disruptions to cultural and societal norms. The values and work ethics of millennials are shaped by their exposure to digital social media (Smith and Nichols 2015; Tulgan 2016). These characteristics—their exposure to technology and their world views, among others—place a huge gap between millennials and previous generations. As Hoffman (2017) and Tulgan (2016) have noted, millennials are the most misunderstood among the generations, particularly by their parents’ and grandparents’ generations, the Generation X and baby boomers.

In Indonesia, those from the millennial generation are slated to take up positions as leaders in various important spheres of society—from the political, economic and business spheres to the education, arts and culture sectors. Experiencing the prime of their lives amid the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the COVID-19 pandemic, millennials have acutely experienced disruptions to their family and working lives as well as ways of doing business.

Indonesia's demographic changes call for understanding the intergenerational gap that is at the core of the so-called millennial disruptions. The gap is a complex one—it exists not only between different generations but also between the millennials living in rural areas and those living in urban areas, as well as between rich and poor millennials. Several phenomena might indicate where to look in order to understand what has changed and how such change has disrupted our lives. Firstly, technology has created closer relationships between those separated by distance while making strangers of those living in close proximity to one another. Consequently, family and people-to-people relations have changed to the extent that the well-known solidarity of the Indonesian people, gotong-royong, has been completely redefined by the millennials. Millennials use different tools to empower and help each other.

From the positive youth development perspective, Indonesian millennials are in a transitional phase to adulthood, vulnerable to identity crises. Pressures from social and cultural constructs present various challenges to their well-being during this transitional phase. This chapter explores the religious identity of millennials drawing upon several concepts from youth studies. Data was collected at Karangdjati Monastery in the student city of Yogyakarta from 2020 to 2022 amid the pandemic. The data collection method involved participatory observation of a purposive sample of ten informants. A narrative model was used to analyse their life histories. The main finding was that the informants were interested in Buddhism because of its universal appeal and inclusive nature regardless of one's faith, the absence of formal conversion orders, and its Ehipassiko principle of critical thinking. The main argument in this paper is that Indonesia's state power, which requires that every citizen should have a religion that should be stated on their national identity card and that they should practise its teachings, causes a sense of exclusion for Indonesian millennials who practise religious teachings flexibly. To overcome the spiritual disruption they experience, some millennials negotiate their identity by converting or reconstructing a hybrid identity as a process of self-discovery.

BACKGROUND

During the very long spiritual journey of the visudhi, I cried when I heard Venerable Pannavaro say, “There is no conversion order in the Tipitaka.” So, visudhi is interpreted as a lifestyle conversion from behaviour that was tainted with defilements (Kilesa) to behaviour that is in tune with the Buddhist lifestyle in coping with suffering and being happy. (Carini [female, b. 1996], May 2022).

Carini, the Buddhist name given by Venerable Sri Pannavaro Mahathera of the Vihara Mendut on Saturday, 7 May 2022, was one of twenty-seven youths at a formal Buddhist procession that day at the vihara (monastery). The vihara in Magelang, Central Java, was founded in 1977 and is one of the pioneers of the Indonesian Theravada movement. The majority at the procession that day were millennials and Generation Zs from Karangdjati Vihara, Yogyakarta. Throughout the procession, Carini burst into tears. She had endured long-term bullying from her friends of the Abrahamic faiths, who threatened her for her conversion after she had graduated from her master's studies in the United Kingdom. In addition, her parents were bullied in her neighbourhood for allowing their children to convert from Islam to Buddhism.

Indonesia's population increasingly comprises younger age groups. This segment of the population is currently exposed to and becoming the target consumer market for the rapid development of multiple new financial products in the past decade or so, a consequence of the digital revolution and relentless technological innovation. One question that arises amid this development is: are Indonesia's younger generations financially illiterate or are they so literate that they become less risk-averse in managing their portfolios? This study involved conducting a survey of 142 participants, mostly students at the University of Indonesia. It distinguishes financial awareness from financial ownership and associates these two variables with different age groups. The study finds that there are differences in awareness (or literacy) and ownership of financial products among different age groups. Those from Generation Y have higher awareness about most financial products, including the high-risk asset types such as cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens, than the Generation X, but they tend to buy the less risky asset types, except insurance products. Although higher financial awareness is associated with higher financial ownership, this study also shows a significantly weaker relationship between awareness and the level of ownership of financial products for Gen Z compared with Gen X. It indicates that Gen Z youths, despite being generally more knowledgeable of various financial products, do not necessarily own more of these products.

INTRODUCTION

Based on the population census of 2020, Indonesia's population is dominated by those from Generation Z. Applying the categorization of generational cohorts used by the Pew Research Center (2019), about 74.93 million or 27.94 per cent of Indonesia's population represent Generation Z; 69.38 million or 25.87 per cent represent Generation Y (millennials) and 58.65 million or 21.88 per cent represent Generation X (BPS 2020). As young generations dominate the population, it bears raising the question of how they perceive financial products that have become intrinsically intertwined with technology and digitalization today.

Financial inclusion has generally been more pervasive among the younger generations, namely Gen Y and Gen Z. Indonesia's Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (Financial Service Authority, or OJK) has developed the Financial Literacy Index, which gauges financial understanding and literacy among Indonesians. OJK's 2019 survey shows that Indonesia's younger population achieved a score of 44–47 per cent—a higher score compared with the score of 38.03 per cent for all age groups on average (OJK 2020).

The art industry has been influenced in recent times by the emergence of the phenomenon of non-fungible tokens (NFTs), that is, unique objects validated by digital encryption technology. Indonesian millennials have been quick to harness the potential of NFT technology as a means of showcasing and marketing their artistic creations. However, research on the impact of NFTs on the Indonesian art ecosystem is limited. This chapter aims to fill that gap. Applying a qualitative method with a phenomenological approach, the researchers examined how millennial artists engaged with the NFT world. The study showed that access to the NFT digital art market and the NFT community has advantages for artists such as obviating the need to use intermediaries, allowing freedom of expression, fostering networking with their fellow artists and collectors, and even providing an inclusive space for female artists. Conversely, digital artists also face certain shortcomings, such as regulatory uncertainties surrounding NFTs, the volatile nature of cryptocurrency rates, the inherent risk of cybercrime and the potential for digital art theft. Nevertheless, the NFT trend epitomizes the zeitgeist of the digital era, where millennials actively seek validation and recognition from their digital communities.

INTRODUCTION

A non-fungible token (NFT) is defined as a one-of-a-kind digital object validated and protected using blockchain technology (Terry and Fortnow 2021). This technology is widely used to claim asset ownership, particularly in the form of creative works known as NFT art. Popkova (2022) adds that blockchain offers authentication of ownership, rarity and immutability of related objects. NFT art includes videos, images, games, audio, books, texts and photography. Even though the NFT market is highly volatile, the artwork becomes valuable when it is a unique collection (Frye 2021).

The NFT phenomenon is growing due to technological advancements and the ability of artists to monetize their artwork. However, new challenges emerge, such as concerns about the legal protection of these assets. Irrespective of this challenge, artists or creative industry players can monetize their digital assets to create new revenue streams (Ante 2021). This phenomenon has altered the buying and selling of digital artwork worldwide, which was initially distinct from the conventional art market. According to Horky, Rachel, and Fidrmuc (2022), when the conventional art market failed to transition to digital platforms, NFTs became a global phenomenon. Initially, the conventional art market made it difficult for digital artists to be a part of its ecosystem. Currently, owing to NFTs, digital artists have the same opportunity to monetize their artwork as established conventional artists do.

Indonesian participatory art discourse has not caught up with the development of its practices over the last twenty years, especially those by millennial artists. The discourse also tends to be Eurocentric and fails to notice participatory phenomena in Indonesia rooted in the heteronomous spirit of Indonesian art and other factors. The forms of participatory art in Indonesia have begun to emerge concretely in the art practices of a few young artists’ work as an output of resistance or antagonism towards restrictive homogenization and paternalistic culture in art schools due to the depoliticization of art during the New Order era. These expressions manifested in the form of practices that violate conventional norms of art medium and invite the participation of marginalized populations affected by the New Order's centralistic pembangunan (development) policies. This chapter specifically examines the art practice of a Yogyakarta-based millennial artist, Anang Saptoto, as an example of post-Reformasi participatory art that differs from participatory art practices during the New Order era. As a millennial artist, Saptoto, whose participatory work responds to local agrarian problems, inherits the distinctive artistic spirit of Reformasi, which departs from the spirit of decentralization and localization of information technology to achieve the desired goals. Saptoto's participatory art practice is marked by a rupture from the antagonistic nature of young artists during the New Order era. The non-antagonistic temperament manifests in Saptoto's flexibility in encountering more complicated challenges: the neoliberal economy and education regime, and a commercialized and depoliticized art sphere, among others.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses participatory art by millennials, which differs from that by previous generations. Millennial artists who practise participatory art cannot be subsumed under one rigid ideological category. They focus more on pursuing strategic solutions to achieve concrete results for marginalized communities. These artists who engage in activism unavoidably encounter more complicated challenges: the neoliberal economy and education regime, a commercialized and depoliticized art sphere, and regional feudalism, among others.

Participatory art substantially deconstructs the artist's role in creating art. Artists no longer monopolize the authorship of artwork; instead, they initiate cooperative authorship with the audience. The expanded role of the audience potentially cultivates their emancipation. This chapter aims to scrutinize the contemporary participatory art discourse and practice in Indonesia, especially by millennials. It argues that millennials develop participatory art practices while taking cues from an existing tradition that has emerged organically in Indonesia.

Digital technology opens up opportunities for small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) to penetrate the market and increase their access to middlemen and even to final consumers. This chapter is based on a quantitative study of MSME actors, including millennials from West Bandung District in West Java. The study used secondary data to examine the varying levels of digital competency among MSME actors from different generations. The results show a significant relationship between digital competence and the education levels of Generation X and millennial MSME actors: higher education levels among MSME actors from these two generations lead to higher digital competencies. This study also found that millennials with higher education have better digital competency levels in the areas of information management, collaboration, content and knowledge creation, and technical operation. Among MSME actors from Generation X, the tendency was for those with higher education levels to have better digital competency only in the area of information management. Due to the limited number of samples from baby boomers and Generation Z, this paper cannot make any conclusions about their digital competence.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of digital technology has increasingly driven interactions and transactions in the online space. The ability to use digital technology brings several essential benefits and conveniences, such as searching for information, communicating, transacting and accessing public services (Choi and Whinston 2000; Hanna, Rohm, and Crittenden 2011; Graham 2014). Digital technology has been adopted widely in various user environments. This tendency to use technology is closely related to motivation and skills (Gyr, Friedman, and Gyr 2010; Hanna et al. 2011; Deursen and Dijk 2011). Having physical access to devices like computers or laptops as well as other resources, such as software and an Internet subscription, is necessary to maintain connectivity and achieve adequate skills.

Various studies have indicated that despite the availability of infrastructure and access to digital technology, individual or organizational gaps in digital utilization are not solely attributed to physical access but also to skills and competencies (Livingstone 2003; Deursen and Dijk 2011; Dijk 2012). Users require adequate skills in utilizing digital technologies, particularly for productive purposes. The digital divide has shifted from inequality in the possession of information and communications technology (ICT) devices to skills and usage (Deursen and Dijk 2011; Dijk 2012).

This chapter explores the involvement of Indonesian millennials in politics and investigates the potential for their rise to disrupt the hold of the existing political elites and introduce fresh political ideas, values and practices. The analysis distinguishes between two distinct paths in millennials’ involvement in politics: rising through the political dynasty route and rising with no familial connections in politics. Millennials from political dynasties often rely on their family connections to secure positions of power, perpetuating the dominance of existing political elites and raising concerns about a political oligarchy. In contrast, millennials with no family background in politics rely on their entrepreneurial achievements or connections to religious and traditional leaders. These non-dynastic leaders offer an alternative perspective and the potential to challenge the established political order, inspiring voters and fostering a more diverse and democratic political landscape. However, significant challenges persist for millennials seeking political office. The centralized party system, where a small group of party elites control the recruitment process, presents obstacles to accessing grassroots networks. This creates a barrier to meaningful millennial participation in politics and the potential impact they can make. Creating an inclusive and democratic political environment that empowers millennials to positively shape the future of Indonesian politics requires addressing systemic challenges and preventing the domination of politics by entrenched elites and dynasties.

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's most recent direct local elections (pilkada langsung) were held on 9 December 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the pandemic, the election drew the highest voter turnout nationally, at 76.09 per cent, compared with previous direct local elections (Kompas 2021a). In addition to the complexity of holding elections amid the pandemic, the phenomenon that has received the most public attention is the emergence and victory of the millennial generation in running for regional head (kepala daerah) positions. Perludem (2021) noted that at least twenty elected regional heads and seventeen elected deputy regional heads were below 34 years of age, which means that 13.7 per cent of the regions have since been led by young millennials (those born between 1981 and 1996).

The rise of young millennials in Indonesia's local politics mirrors the wave of young millennials leading at the national level. A significant number of millennials are now in parliament as well as in the national government.

This chapter explores how Muslim millennials construe the “haram fatwas” on cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin. The term “haram fatwas” in this context refers to the legal opinions (fatwas) issued by Indonesia's religious authorities that deem cryptocurrencies to be impermissible under Islamic law (haram). Muslim millennials are presented with a dilemma in which their religious ideals clash with their interest in trading for financial gain. On the one hand, religious authorities forbid them to profit from trading in cryptocurrency, while, on the other hand, they believe that trading in cryptocurrencies may increase their asset values multiple times. This chapter demonstrates that when confronted with a delicate interaction between religion and economics, millennials tend to be secular and simply think about the profit margin. Furthermore, some of them compensate for having compromised their faith by donating the bulk of their cryptocurrency trading profits. For them, this is a means to atone for their sins after partaking in religiously forbidden activities. Data for this chapter was derived from statements made by millennials in open Telegram groups. The data helped to provide a comprehensive understanding of Indonesian millennials’ perceptions of the fatwas forbidding cryptocurrencies and the cryptocurrency trading context in general.

INTRODUCTION

Cryptocurrency fever has afflicted the Indonesian millennial generation, that is, anyone born between the 1980s and 1996 (Irawanto 2019). Aside from an increase in searches for the word “crypto” on Google Trends Indonesia from 2020 to 2022, conversations about this asset are becoming more common on YouTube and Telegram. Millennials produce almost all the content on cryptocurrencies (Allcot 2021). Notable channels include those run by millennials like Kevin Sailly, Andy Senjaya, Ngomongin Uang (Glenn Ardi), Felicia Putri Tjiasaka, and Kasisolusi (Deryansha). Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the millennial generation has become one of the most important agents in the growth of cryptocurrencies in Indonesia. This trend is similar to that in the United States, where 49 per cent of millennials feel comfortable with cryptocurrencies (Royal 2021). One possible explanation is that millennials are regarded as the generation that fully utilizes the Internet (Vogels 2019). Use of the Internet involves everyday tasks like interacting with others, shopping, working and earning money.

Despite millennials’ enthusiasm for cryptocurrencies, the Indonesian authorities have been prohibiting cryptocurrencies since 2015. This is particularly the case with Bitcoin, the first and most popular cryptocurrency.

Life course events related to the transition to adulthood have been a critical part of social transformation within society. One's birth cohort or generation is argued to be one of the important determinants in explaining attitudes, beliefs and behaviours towards life course events. Therefore, to have a thorough understanding of the demographic behaviour of a society, it is important to examine generational differences in life course trajectories. Taking advantage of longitudinal information from the RAND Corporation's Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), this study examines generational differences in the occurrence and timing of marital unions, labour market entry, and first adult migration of Indonesians. By using descriptive and regression analysis, this study compares whether the life course transitions experienced by Indonesians in their mid-twenties have changed between the current young adult generation, the millennials, and older cohorts, i.e., Generation X and baby boomers. The study found distinctive characteristics in the transition to adulthood for each generation. Moreover, remarkable variations in educational attainment across the generations have had critical effects on the demographic behaviour patterns of young Indonesians. The findings of this study can provide insights into societal changes in Indonesia and act as a basis for designing social policies to anticipate potential future trends.

INTRODUCTION

Life course transitions are an integral part of an individual's life cycle. People face various options at critical stages in their life trajectories. Their choices might be shaped by distinctive attitudes, beliefs and behaviours and create societal changes over time. Major life course events, such as getting married, entering the labour market and moving out from the parental home constitute critical phases of transition to adulthood and play important roles as markers for social transition and intergenerational change in a society (Berngruber and Bethmann 2022).

An individual's birth cohort or generation may act as an important determinant of the shifts in the patterns of transition to adulthood. Birth cohorts reflect structural changes over time in a country, including changes in the governmental system and economic development (Vidal and Lutz 2018). Therefore, cohort effect explains how each generation has different behaviours due to variations in the temporal situations they experience. However, birth cohorts may not be sufficient to explain changes in people's behaviours over time. Variations in people's attitudes and behaviours can also be influenced by period and life course effects (Duffy 2021).

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

INTRODUCTION

The Ba‘Alawi ( بَاعَلَوِي or the descendants of ‘Alawi) trace their lineage from Prophet Muhammad through Ahmad Al-Muhajir who migrated from Basra, Iraq, to Hadramaut, Yemen, in 320H. They thus have their ancestral roots in the valley of Hadhramaut. Since the early nineteenth century, large numbers of people left Yemen and traversed the Indian Ocean, resulting in a Hadhrami diaspora across South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Africa (Ho 2010, p. xxii). They played an important role in commercial activity and the spread of Islam, and over the years became well-respected for their religious knowledge. In Southeast Asia, some of them even attained political influence through marriage to local ruling families. Most Hadhramis in the region are concentrated in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

Where Indonesia is concerned, there are pockets of Hadhrami communities in Java, and various provinces across Kalimantan and Sulawesi. While their exact numbers are unknown, there are statistics showing over 13,000 Indonesian Ba‘Alawis as of 2017 (Kumparan, 13 January 2017). However, this number is only reflective of those living in the greater Jakarta region, and should therefore be smaller than the actual figure. Popular estimates on online news sites say they could number around 1.2 million (Andi 2023). The Ba‘Alawi in Indonesia are commonly referred to as the habaib, the plural of habib, which means “beloved one”, and the term is often used as an honorific for male religious scholars of Ba‘Alawi lineage. Ba‘Alawi males often have the title “Syed” in front of their names, while females have the title “Sharifah”. While this is the common practice, it is rare for Indonesian male Ba‘Alawis who are often just known as habib.

There are several Indonesian habaib who are well-known to the general Muslim community, most of whom are religious scholars. For example, Habib Ali Al-Habsyi (1839–1913) is the author of Simth Ad-Dhurar, a well-known book of life stories and praises of Prophet Muhammad which are regularly recited by traditionalist Muslims. There is also Habib Hasan Baharun (1934–99) who established an Islamic boarding school in East Java, specializing in Arabic language and the propagation of Islamic teachings.