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Between Heaven and Earth: A Political and Ideological Dilemma of the Belarusian Orthodox Church before and since the Belarusian Crisis
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 December 2024
Abstract
This article discusses the evolution of the Belarusian Orthodox Church's (BOC) role and influence in the society, its relationship with the state, and the internal schisms within the Church leadership. Belarusian politics and society has traditionally been Russian-oriented. Close linguistic and cultural relations with Russia were embedded in the official ideology of Belarusian state and national building policies, which from the onset singled out the ideas of Slavic unity and Belarus's special role in the Eastern Slavic civilization. In this regard, the BOC was an element of two machineries, the objectives of which growingly drifted apart. Aliaksandr Lukashenka's regime viewed the BOC as an important partner of the state and a control mechanism over the society. Russia, which lacked a well-defined policy of attraction towards Belarusian society, in turn mostly relied on the regime and domestic social institutions, specifically the BOC, in maintaining its influence. The two crises, regional (2014) and domestic (2020), significantly upended the “in-between” position of the BOC and raise questions about its ideational and institutional cohesion. Moreover, officially as an autonomous Exarchate functioning under the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the BOC has had to balance its position within the ROC that during this time has sought stronger status abroad. The relationship between BOC and ROC leadership grew more complex after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and after Russia's invasion to Ukraine in 2022, when the ROC leadership chose to support the political regime. The open conflict between the national, now autocephalic Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Moscow Patriarchate have revealed the intra-Orthodox (post-)colonialism in the region but also further complicated the ways the BOC can position itself within the Belarusian society.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Footnotes
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Dr. Mikhail Suslov for his valuable comments during the writing process, the interviewees for their invaluable input, Dr. Harriet Murav, Dr. Dmitry Tartakovsky and anonymous reviewers for their patience and suggestions, and Olli Hulkko for his kind assistance.
References
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16 For example, Orthodox Churches have become integral to state-building in Romania, Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine as a source of state legitimacy and a powerful social institution that can support the transfer or embeddedness of particular sets of norms and rules. See Wimmer, Andreas, Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart (Princeton, 2018)Google Scholar.
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22 The key to explaining the complex relationship is the ROC having an “eschatological” approach to international politics: if a Russian foreign policy priority is to guard the national interest, “the avowed priority of the ROC is the salvation of mankind.” Nicolai N. Petro, “The Russian Orthodox Church,” in Andrei P. Tsygankov, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy (Abingdon, Eng., 2018), 217–32, here 221.
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25 Mikhail Suslov and Dmitry Uzlaner, Contemporary Russian Conservatism: Problems, Paradoxes, and Perspectives (Leiden, 2019); Curanović, “Domestic Lobbyists and Conservatism in Russian Foreign Policy,” 49.
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27 Sidorov, “Post-Imperial Third Romes”; Alicja Curanović, The Sense of Mission in Russian Foreign Policy: Destined for Greatness! (London, 2021).
28 Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 17.
29 See “Patriarkh Kirill nazval Rus΄ naslednitsei Vizantii,” Vesti.ru, last modified May 24, 2021, at https://www.vesti.ru/article/2566096 (accessed May 3, 2024).
30 Sidorov, “Post-Imperial Third Romes,” 319, 321.
31 Curanović, The Sense of Mission, 54, 65.
32 Jardar Østbø, The New Third Rome: Readings of a Russian Nationalist Myth (Stuttgart, 2016), 224–28.
33 The ROC considers practically the whole former Soviet Union as belonging to its canonical territory (Armenia and Georgia excluded). The term refers to the area where a Church operates: historically, it defined the territories between the Churches’ jurisdictions. As Mikhail Suslov points out, within the ROC, “canonical territory” may have several interpretations—those that encompass non-Slavic countries and groups, and those that view the territory primarily in “ethnic” terms. In Patriarch Kirill's use, “Holy Rus΄” forms the geographical “core” of the canonical territory of the ROC, reinforced with the Russian-speaking Orthodox diaspora abroad. Mikhail D. Suslov, “‘Holy Rus΄: The Geopolitical Imagination in the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church,” Russian Politics & Law 52, no. 3 (2014): 67–86, here 69–70.
34 Makrides, “Orthodox Christianity in the Context of Postcolonial Studies,” 359–60.
35 Arkady Moshes, “Crimea 2.0: Will Russia seek reunification with Belarus?,” FIIA Comment 21, last modified November 19, 2018, at https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/crimea-2-0 (accessed May 3, 2024).
36 ROC representative, interview, September 22, 2021.
37 Svetlana Solodovnik, “Rossiia: Ofitsial΄naia tserkov΄ vybiraet vlast΄,” Pro et contra (May-August 2013), 6–26, here 7–8.
38 Solodovnik, “Rossiia,” 13.
39 “Opening Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference After Tenth Meeting of Working Group on MFA-Russian Orthodox Church Interaction, Moscow,” Mid.ru, last modified November 20, 2007, at https://mid.ru/en/press_service/video/vistupleniya_ministra/1630688/ (accessed May 3, 2024).
40 Scholar, interview, August 25, 2021.
41 Solodovnik, “Rossiia.”
42 Jardar Østbø, “Securitizing ‘Spiritual-Moral Values’ in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 33, no. 3 (2017): 200–16.
43 The views of the ROC leadership might not represent the institution as a whole, its strictly hierarchical structure notwithstanding.
44 Boris Knorre, “Religion and the Russian Orthodox Church,” in Irvin Studin, ed., Russia: Strategy, Policy and Administration (London, 2018), 105–12, here 111.
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46 Nikolay Mitrokhin, “Zwischen allen Stühlen: Die Belarussische Orthodoxe Kirche,” Osteuropa, nos. 10–11 (December 2020): 223–40.
47 Activist, interview, August 31, 2021.
48 “Opyt patrioticheskoi deiatel΄nosti tserkvi v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoi Voiny i sovremennost΄,’” Church.by, last modified December 3, 2019, https://oroik.by/opyt-patrioticheskoj-deyatelnosti-pravoslavnoj-cerkvi-v-gody-velikoj-otechestvennoj-vojny-i-sovremennost/ (accessed June 11, 2024).
49 Although there is no direct citation, there are multiple sources that confirm this. Apparently, Metropolitan Pavel commented on the topic: “He is a normal Orthodox. He misspoke. We discussed it with him.” “Mitropolit o Lukashenko: On normal΄nyi pravoslavnyi chelovek, a ne pravoslavnyi ateist,” Nasha Niva, last modified May 14, 2014, at https://nashaniva.com/?c=ar&i=128263&lang=ru (accessed May 3, 2024).
50 Priest, interview, August 31, 2021.
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52 Oushakine, “How to Grow out of Nothing”.
53 Both the BOC and Lukashenka participated in the Pan-Slavic movements, such as Sobor of Slavic Peoples. Orthodoxy was seen as a defining feature of Pan-Slavism and the Church actively supported its re-unification ideas. Belarusian Pan-Slavic organizations such as the website Zapadrus.su regularly promoted Orthodox values and Orthodox traditions in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine underlying unity of this religion with the Russian national and imperial ideology. Yet, their marginalization sped up in 2000s. See Veera Laine, Aliaksei Lastouski, and Ryhor Nizhnikau, “Ideational Travels of Slavophilia in Belarus: From Tsars to Lukashenka,” in Suslov, Čejka, and Ðorđević, eds., Pan-Slavism and Slavophilia in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Mikhail Suslov, Marek Čejka, and Vladimir Ðorđević (London, 2023), 101–22.
54 Priest, interview, August 31, 2021.
55 Ia.I. Treshchenok, “Dve belorusskie national΄nye idei (katolicheskii natsional-separatizm i pravoslavnaia national΄naia ideia),” Sobor.by, undated, at http://sobor.by/zametki.php (accessed May 3, 2024).
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59 Ibid. Moreover, he stressed that “Nation building in a country where the overwhelming majority of believers are Orthodox is unthinkable without active participation in the public life of the Orthodox Church. . . . The Orthodox faith is the basis of the fraternal unity of the peoples of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. Concern for the preservation of national identity does not hinder the development of cooperation with fraternal countries.”
60 “Monitoring SMI: Fal΄shivyye notki,” Credo Press, May 19, 2011.
61 Sergei G. Musienko, ed., Belarus: Independence as National Idea (New York, 2015).
62 “Chto takoe belorusskaia national΄naia ideia? Kakoi smysl stoit za etim slovosochetaniem, v chem ee vazhnost΄ dlia obshchestva i gosudarstva?,” Belarus segodnia, last modified June 20, 2014, at https://www.sb.by/articles/a-khto-tam-idze-165992.html (accessed May 3, 2024).
63 Musienko, Belarus.
64 Ibid.
65 “Chto takoe belorusskaia national΄naia ideia?”
66 Musienko, Belarus.
67 “Chto takoe belorusskaia national΄naia ideia?”
68 Musienko, Belarus.
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70 From the beginning of the conflict in 2013, it was clear that the ROC interpretation differed from that of the state leadership in terms of desired outcome of the crisis. The ROC aimed—but failed—to keep the conflict from affecting the “spiritual connections” between the nations and the unity of the Holy Rus lands. On the day of “reunification” of Crimea in March 2014, the references to the peninsula's “sacred” meaning to all Russians were made by President Vladimir Putin, and not publicly echoed by the ROC leadership. Patriarch Kirill did not attend the celebrations that year or later. In public, the state and ROC leadership did not contradict each others’ line.
71 More than half of the parishes in Ukraine chose to stay under Moscow's jurisdiction, but for the ROC, the shift meant remarkable symbolic and financial losses. See Regina Elsner, “The End of Unity: How the Russian Orthodox Church Lost Ukraine,” BYU Law blog series, last modified March 3, 2022, at https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2022/03/03/the-end-of-unity/ (accessed May 3, 2024).
72 “Poslanie Predstoiatelia Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi Sviateishemu Patriarkhu Varfolomeiu v sviazi s antikanonicheskimi deistviiami, predprinimaemymi Konstantinopol΄skim Patriarkhatom na Ukraine,” Patriarchia.ru, last modified December 31, 2018, at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5333808.html (accessed May 3, 2024); “New provocation from the Patriarch of Moscow: ‘The Visit of Patriarch of Constantinople to Kyiv is Sinful,’” Orthodox Times, last modified August 29, 2021, at https://orthodoxtimes.com/new-provocation-from-patriarch-of-moscow-the-visit-of-patriarch-of-constantinople-to-kyiv-is-sinful/ (accessed May 3, 2024).
73 Scholar, interview, August 25, 2021.
74 “Nedolgii srok belorusskogo vladyki,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, October 21, 2015, https://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2015-10-21/4_belorussia.html (accessed June 11, 2024).
75 Mitrokhin, “Zwischen allen Stühlen.”
76 Activist, interview, August 31, 2021.
77 Lev Perchin, “Nedolgii srok belorusskogo vladyki,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 21, 2015, at https://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2015-10-21/4_belorussia.html (accessed June 11, 2024).
78 Serhii Hardun, “Pravaslaue iak padmurak belaruskai natsyi,” Belaruskaia dumka, no. 1 (2016): 23–29 at https://beldumka.belta.by/isfiles/000167_416780.pdf (accessed May 3, 2024).
79 “Povnii: natsional΄naia ideia rozhdaetsia iznutri naroda,” Belta, 2020, https://www.belta.by/society/view/povnyj-natsionalnaja-ideja-rozhdaetsja-iznutri-naroda-400698-2020/ (last accessed June 7, 2024).
80 “President Lukashenko met with the Synod of the Belarusian Orthodox Church,” Sobor, September 23, 2016, at http://www.sobor.by/videonews/Prezident_Aleksandr_Lukashenko_vstretilsya_s_Sinodom_Belorusskoy_Pravoslavnoy_Tserkvi (accessed June 11, 2024).
81 Scholar, interview, August 31, 2021.
82 Mitrokhin, “Zwischen allen Stühlen.”
83 Activist, interview, August 31, 2021.
84 “Interv΄iu Mitropolita Minskogo i Zaslavskogo Veniamina belorusskim telekanalam ONT i STV,” Patriarkhiia.ru, last modified January 10, 2022, at https://pravoslavie.ru/143863.html (accessed May 3, 2024).
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86 “Lukashenko: belorusy prizyvajut strany i natsii vozvodit΄ mosty a ne steny,” Belta, 2020, https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-belorusy-prizyvajut-strany-i-natsii-vozvodit-mosty-a-ne-steny-450695-2021 (last accessed June 5, 2024).
87 See for example, foreign minister Uladzimer Makei's letter to the EU in April 2022. “MFA comments on Makei's ‘secret’ letter to EU diplomats”, April 27, 2022, at https://soyuz.by/politics/mfa-comments-on-makei-s-secret-letter-to-eu-diplomats (accessed June 11, 2024)
88 “Monitoring SMI: Protesty i religiia,” Credo Press, September 4, 2020, https://credo.press/232816/. This link requires a login.
89 Malanka, “Muzykal΄nye festivali, vstrechi s OMoNom: Chem zaniat glava BPC vo vremia voiny,” last modified April 14, 2022, at https://malanka.media/news/6401 (accessed May 6, 2024).
90 Nataliia Vasilevich, “Belorusskie khristianskie reaktsii protiv rossiiskogo vtorzheniia v Ukrainu,” Church.by, last modified March 11, 2022, at https://belarus2020.churchby.info/belorusskie-hristianskie-reakczii-protiv-rossijskogo-vtorzheniya-v-ukrainu/ (accessed May 6, 2024).
91 In June 2021, on his visit to Zhyrovichy Monastery, Lukashenka brought up the idea and said that “letters had been sent” to Constantinople: “Lukashenka zayavil ob ugroze tserkovnogo raskola v Belorussii,” Ria.ru, last modified June 25, 2021, at https://ria.ru/20210625/avtokefaliya-1738569427.html (last accessed May 6, 2024).
92 Veniamin said: “In the current situation, the resumption of this topic (granting “autocephaly” to the BOC] cannot be interpreted otherwise than the desire of some forces to weaken the spiritual component of the Belarusian people, repeat the sad history of our brotherly Ukraine, and divide the fraternal peoples of Belarus and Russia along religious lines. The very subject of discussion of autocephaly for the BOC is unacceptable to us. This is a betrayal of our faith and the covenant of the holy fathers. ‘Just as it is impossible to separate the Holy Trinity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—this is One God—so it is impossible to divide Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. This together is Holy Russia. Know, remember and do not forget,’—bequeathed the Monk Lawrence of Chernigov…” Episkop Borisovskii i Mar΄inogorskii Veniamin, “Liubov΄iu i uedineniem spasemsia,” Sayt Borisovskoi eparkhii, last modified August 16, 2020, at https://borisoveparhia.by/poslaniya-slova-publikatsii/lyubovyu-i-edineniem-spasemsya.html (last accessed May 6, 2024).
93 Nevertheless, even if the idea would get support from Bartholomew I, there would be significant theoretical and practical obstacles. The experience from Ukraine shows that the actual creation of an “autonomous” Church from an existing one is not easy in practice. The situation in Belarus is in many respects not comparable to that of Ukraine in the spring of 2018, and not merely because the BOC enjoys much more limited autonomy with its status as Exarchate. In Ukraine, too, the initiative (and the preceding similar attempts) to create a “national” church came from the secular power. Interview with a scholar, August 25, 2021; Martin Solik, Ján Fil΄akovský, and Vladimir Baar, “Belarusian and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches and National Identity: Comparison,” Political Sciences/Politické Vedy, no. 2 (2017): 116–63, here 155.
94 Curanović, “Domestic Lobbyists and Conservatism in Russian Foreign Policy,” 55. Moreover, since 2022, politicians in Moldova, Latvia, and Lithuania have also initiated debates over local Orthodox Churches’ status, and in the latter case with support from the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. The smaller share of Orthodox believers in these countries notwithstanding, the signal for the Moscow Patriarchate is clear. See Paul Goble, “Clash of Moldova's Two Orthodox Churches Complicates Chisinau's Turn to the West,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, no. 133, last modified August 17, 2023, at https://jamestown.org/program/clash-of-moldovas-two-orthodox-churches-complicates-chisinaus-turn-to-the-west/ (accessed May 6, 2024).
95 “Moscow Patriarch Stokes Orthodox Tensions with War Remarks,” Religion News Service, last modified March 8, 2022, at https://religionnews.com/2022/03/08/moscow-patriarch-stokes-orthodox-tensions-with-war-remarks/ (accessed May 6, 2024).
96 “Predstaviteli RPTs vystupili za prekrashchenie voiny v Ukraine,” TRT na russkom, last modified March 2, 2023, at https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti/predstaviteli-rpc-vystupili-za-prekrashenie-vojny-v-ukraine-8108422 (accessed May 6, 2024).
97 Sergei Chapnin, “The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: War and ‘Another Autocephaly,’” Public Orthodoxy, last modified May 31, 2022, at https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/05/31/the-orthodox-church-in-ukraine-war-and-another-autocephaly/ (accessed May 6, 2024); Meduza, “‘My hotim chetko pokazat΄, chto ne iavliaemsia chastiu RPTs, glava kotoroi blagoslovliaet voinu’ Ukrainskaia pravoslavnaia tserkov΄ ob<”>iavila o nezavisimosti ot Moskovskogo patriarkhata. Vot chto eto znachit,” last modified May 30, 2022, at https://meduza.io/feature/2022/05/30/my-hotim-chetko-pokazat-chto-ne-yavlyaemsya-chastyu-rpts-glava-kotoroy-blagoslovlyaet-voynu (accessed May 6, 2024).
98 The schism over Ukraine has driven the ROC deeper into isolation globally. In 2019, the ROC cut ties with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria and all Africa, after its Patriarch Theodore II had recognized the autocephaly of the newly established Orthodox Church of Ukraine. These signs were still moderate compared to the outrage towards the ROC after Russia's invasion to Ukraine. In May 2022, EU ambassadors agreed upon including Patriarch Kirill on the sanctions package, but because of Hungary's objection, the decision was not made. The World Council of Churches, the main Christian ecumenical group with a global focus, encounters growing pressure from its member Churches to expel the ROC from the Council.
99 Ryhor Nizhnikau, “Belarus and the War: Gradual De-Sovereignization of the Country,” Ponars Eurasia Memo, May 23, 2024, at https://www.ponarseurasia.org/belarus-and-the-war-gradual-de-sovereignization-of-the-country%EF%BF%BC/ (last accessed June 7, 2024).
100 ROC representative, interview, September 22, 2021.