The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries. Research on previous bombings and explosions has shown that head injuries, including traumatic brain injuries (TBIs), are among the most common injuries.

The objective of this study was to identify diagnosed and undiagnosed (undetected) TBIs among persons hospitalized in New York City following the 11 September 2001 WTC attacks.

The medical records of persons admitted to 36 hospitals in New York City with injuries or illnesses related to the WTC attacks were abstracted for signs and symptoms of TBIs. Diagnosed TBIs were identified using the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification diagnosis codes. Undiagnosed TBIs were identified by an adjudication team of TBI experts that reviewed the abstracted medical record information. Persons with an undiagnosed TBI were contacted and informed of the diagnosis of potential undetected injury.

A total of 282 records were abstracted. Fourteen cases of diagnosed TBIs and 21 cases of undiagnosed TBIs were identified for a total of 35 TBI cases (12% of all of the abstracted records). The leading cause of TBI was being hit by falling debris (22 cases). One-third of the TBIs (13 cases) occurred among rescue workers.More than three years after the event, four out of six persons (66.67%) with an undiagnosed TBI who were contacted reported they currently were experiencing symptoms consistent with a TBI.

Not all of the TBIs among hospitalized survivors of the WTC attacks were diagnosed at the time of acute injury care. Some persons with undiagnosed TBIs reported problems that may have resulted from these TBIs three years after the event. For hospitalized survivors of mass-casualty incidents, additional in-hospital, clinical surveys could help improve pre-discharge TBI diagnosis and provide the opportunity to link patients to appropriate outpatient services. The use and adequacy of head protection for rescue workers deserves re-evaluation.

Due to the fact that most high-rise structures (i.e., >75 feet high, or eight to ten stories) are constructed with extensive and redundant fire safety features, current fire safety procedures typically only involve limited evacuation during minor to moderate fire emergencies. Therefore, full-scale evacuation of high-rise buildings is highly unusual and consequently, little is known about how readily and rapidly high-rise structures can be evacuated fully. Factors that either facilitate or inhibit the evacuation process remain under-studied.

This paper presents results from the qualitative phase of the World Trade Center Evacuation Study, a three-year, five-phase study designed to improve our understanding of the individual, organizational, and environmental factors that helped or hindered evacuation from the World Trade Center (WTC) Towers 1 and 2, on 11 September 2001.

Qualitative data from semi-structured, in-depth interviews and focus groups involving WTC evacuees were collected and analyzed.

On the individual level, factors that affected evacuation included perception of risk (formed largely by sensory cues), preparedness training, degree of familiarity with the building, physical condition, health status, and footwear. Individual behavior also was affected by group behavior and leadership. At the organizational level, evacuation was affected by worksite preparedness planning, including the training and education of building occupants, and risk communication. The environmental conditions affecting evacuation included smoke, flames, debris, general condition and degree of crowdedness on staircases, and communication infrastructure systems (e.g., public address, landline, cellular and fire warden's telephones).

Various factors at the individual, organizational, and environmental levels were identified that affected evacuation. Interventions that address the barriers to evacuation may improve the full-scale evacuation of other high-rise buildings under extreme conditions. Further studies should focus on the development and evaluation of targeted interventions, including model emergency preparedness planning for high-rise occupancies.

General hospitals in Israel are required to develop standards of procedures (SOPs) to facilitate the management of mass-casualty incidents (MCIs). These SOPs represent the initial step in a continuous process, providing guidelines for hospitals to manage MCIs in an organized and efficient manner. Evaluation of the preparedness levels of hospitals in dealing with MCIs is required in order to promote an effective response, and to identify factors that might impact the quality of SOPs. The aim of this study was to identify the characteristics of hospitals that have an impact on the preparation of SOPs.

An evaluation tool was developed to assess the SOPs from 22 hospitals during the management of a MCI. The results of the evaluations were analyzed, in relation to the size, trauma capabilities, ownership, geographic location, urban versus rural status of the hospitals, the proximity to other hospitals, participation in drills during the year prior to the evaluation, and number of actual MCIs the hospital managed in the past three years.

The evaluation scores of the SOPs of 11 of the 22 hospitals (50%) were very high, so their SOPs did not require modifications.The SOPs of four hospitals (18%) were rated highly, requiring only minor modifications. The SOPs of four hospitals (18%) received poor ratings, requiring major modifications, and three hospitals (14%) were found to have incomplete SOPs and received very poor ratings.No significant differences were found between the ratings of SOPs in relation to the different characteristics of the hospitals analyzed. A low correlation between the level of SOPs and the number of MCIs that the hospital managed was found (r = 0.266, NS).

The tool developed to evaluate the quality of the SOPs of hospitals to manage MCIs was logistically feasible and capable of differentiating between hospital SOPs. The comprehensiveness and completeness of the SOPs appears to be unrelated to the characteristics of the hospitals included in this study. Of particular note was the lack of a significant correlation between the SOP rating and the number of actual MCIs managed by a hospital.

Mildly injured and “worried well” patients can have profound effects on the management of a mass-casualty incident. The objective of this study is to describe the characteristics and lessons learned from an event that occurred on 28 August 2005 near the central bus station in Beer-Sheva, Israel. The unique profile of injuries allows for the examination of the medical and operational aspects of the management of mild casualties.

Data were collected during and after the event, using patient records and formal debriefings.They were processed focusing on the characteristics of patient complaints, medical response, and the dynamics of admission.

A total of 64 patients presented to the local emergency department, including two critical casualties. The remaining 62 patients were mildly injured or suffered from stress. Patient presentation to the emergency department was bi-phasic; during the first two hours following the attack (i.e., early phase), the rate of arrival was high (one patient every three minutes), and anxiety was the most frequent chief complaint.During the second phase, the rate of arrival was lower (one patient every 27 minutes), and the typical chief complaint was somatic. Additionally, tinnitus and complaints related to minor trauma also were recorded frequently.

Psychiatric consultation was obtained for 58 (91%) of the patients. Social services were involved in the care of 47 of the patients (73%).Otolaryngology and surgery consultations were obtained for 45% and 44%, respectively. The need for some medical specialties (e.g., surgery and orthopedics) mainly was during the first phase, whereas others, mainly psychiatry and otolaryngology, were needed during both phases. Only 13 patients (20%) needed a consultation from internal medicine.

Following a terrorist attack, a large number of mildly injured victims and those experiencing stress are to be expected, without a direct relation to the effectiveness of the attack. Mildly injured patients tend to appear in two phases. In the first phase, the rate of admission is expected to be higher. Due to the high incidence of anxiety and other stress-related phenomena, many mildly injured patients will require psychiatric evaluation. In the case of a bombing attack, many of the victims must be evaluated by an otolaryngologist.

A mass-casualty incident (MCI) can occur in the periphery of a densely populated area, away from a metropolitan area. In such circumstances, the medical management of the casualties is expected to be difficult because the nearest hospital and the emergency medical services (EMS), only can offer limited resources.When coping with these types of events (i.e., limited medical capability in the nearby medical facilities), a quick response time and rational triage can have a great impact on the outcome of the victims. The objective of this study was to identify the lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist attack that occurred on 05 December 2005, in Netanya, a small Israeli city.

Data were collected during and after the event from formal debriefings and from patient files. The data were processed using descriptive statistics and compared to those from previous events. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

Four victims and the terrorist died as a result of this suicide bombing. A total of 131 patients were evacuated (by EMS or self-evacuation) to three nearby hospitals. Due to the proximity of the event to the ambulance dispatch station, the EMS response was quick.The first evacuation took place only three minutes after the explosion. Non-urgent patients were diverted to two close-circle hospitals, allowing the nearest hospital to treat urgent patients and to receive the majority of self-evacuated patients. The nearest hospital continued to receive patients for >6 hours after the explosion, 57 of them (78%) were self-evacuated.

The distribution of casualties from the scene plays a vital role in the management of a MCI that occurs in the outskirts of a densely populated area.Non-urgent patients should be referred to a hospital close to the scene of the event, but not the closest hospital.The nearest hospital should be prepared to treat urgent casualties, as well as a large number of self-evacuated patients.

Hurricane Ivan, a strong category-3 hurricane, struck Grenada on 07 September 2004 and devastated the country. Grenada is a small, developing country, whose socio-economic environment and health service is typical of most countries located within the Caribbean hurricane belt. Previous reports describing the consequences of hurricanes on health-related issues have focused mainly on the experience of wealthier countries.

The objective of this study was to document the types of patients and medical problems faced by a hospital surgical service as a result of a forceful hurricane in a developing country and to help surgical divisions in developing countries prepare for strong hurricanes.

This is a retrospective study using medical records from the surgical ward of the Grenada General Hospital. Patients admitted to the surgical ward during the month following Ivan were assessed with respect to diagnosis, age, gender, and length of hospitalization. The patients admitted during the same period the previous year were used as a control group.

The effects of the hurricane included a significant increase in the proportion of patients seen for diabetic feet, gunshot wounds, and infections due to wounds. The median length of the treatment time increased by 25%. In 2004, the total number of patients was 185 and in 2003, there were 167 patients admitted.

The results of this study indicate that preparations for future hurricanes should include securing the capacity to handle the increased needs for hospital care, and ensuring that stocks of medicines, such as insulin and antibiotics, are sufficient, properly stored, and easily available to patients (e.g., by storing medicine at hurricane shelters equipped with generators and cold storage facilities). Diabetics should be instructed to use proper footwear to reduce the risk of cuts from debris.

The coordination and integration of mental health agencies' plans into disaster responses is a critical step for ensuring effective response to all-hazard emergencies.

In order to remedy the current lack of integration of mental health into emergency preparedness training, researchers must assess mental health emergency preparedness training needs. To date, no recognized assessment exists.The current study addresses this need by qualitatively surveying public health and allied health professionals regarding mental health preparedness in Kansas.

Participants included 144 professionals from public health and allied fields, all of whom attended one of seven training presentations on mental health preparedness. Following each presentation, participants provided written responses to nine qualitative questions about preparedness and mental health preparedness needs, as well as demographic information, and a program evaluation. Survey questions addressed perceptions of bioterrorism and mental health preparedness, perceptions about resource and training needs, as well as coordination of preparedness efforts.

Overall, few respondents indicated that they felt their county or community was prepared to respond to an attack. Respondents felt less prepared for mental health issues than they did for preparedness issues in general. The largest proportion of respondents reported that they would look to a community mental health center or the state health department for mental health preparedness information. Most respondents recognized the helpfulness of interagency coordination for mental health preparedness, and reported a willingness to take an active role in coordination.

The current study provides important data about the gaps regarding mental health preparedness in Kansas.This study demonstrates the present lack of preparedness and the need for coordination to reach an appropriate level of mental health preparedness for the state.These findings are the first step to implementing effective distribution of information and training.

Medical systems worldwide are facing the new threat of morbidity associated with the deliberate dispersal of microbiological agents by terrorists. Rapid diagnosis and containment of this type of unannounced attack is based on the knowledge and capabilities of medical staff. In 2004, the knowledge of emergency department physicians of anthrax was tested. The average test score was 58%. Consequently, a national project on bioterrorism preparedness was developed. The aim of this article is to present the project in which medical knowledge was enhanced regarding a variety of bioterrorist threats, including cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax, botulinum, and smallpox.

In 2005, military physicians and experts on bioterrorism conducted special seminars and lectures for the staff of the hospital emergency department and internal medicine wards.Later, emergency department senior physicians were drilled using one of the scenarios.

Twenty-nine lectures and 29 drills were performed in 2005.The average drill score was 81.7%.The average score of physicians who attended the lecture was 86%, while those who did not attend the lectures averaged 78.3% (NS).

Emergency department physicians were found to be highly knowledgeable in nearly all medical and logistical aspects of the response to different bioterrorist threats. Intensive and versatile preparedness modalities, such as lectures, drills, and posters, given to a carefully selected group of clinicians, can increase their knowledge, and hopefully improve their response to a bioterrorist attack.

In recent years, government and hospital disaster planners have recognized the increasing importance of pharmaceutical preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) events, as well as other public health emergencies. The development of pharmaceutical surge capacity for immediate use before support from the (US) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) becomes available is integral to strengthening the preparedness of local healthcare networks.

The Pharmaceutical Response Project served as an independent, multidisciplinary collaboration to assess statewide hospital pharmaceutical response capabilities. Surveys of hospital pharmacy directors were conducted to determine pharmaceutical response preparedness to CBRNE threats.

All 45 acute care hospitals in Maryland were surveyed, and responses were collected from 80% (36/45). Ninety-two percent (33/36) of hospitals had assessed pharmaceutical inventory with respect to biological agents, 92% (33/36) for chemical agents, and 67% (24/36) for radiological agents. However, only 64% (23/36) of hospitals reported an additional dedicated reserve supply for biological events, 67% (24/36) for chemical events, and 50% (18/36) for radiological events. More than 60% of the hospitals expected to receive assistance from the SNS within ≤48 hours.

From a pharmaceutical perspective, hospitals generally remain under-prepared for CBRNE threats and many expect SNS support before it realistically would be available. Collectively, limited antibiotics and other supplies are available to offer prophylaxis or treatment, suggesting that hospitals may have insufficient pharmaceutical surge supplies for a large-scale event. Although most state hospitals are improving pharmaceutical surge capabilities, further efforts are needed.

Many emergency departments (EDs) in the United States experience daily overcrowding, and a rapid influx of evacuees fleeing a disaster area can pose a substantial burden. Some of these evacuees may require ED care. However, others lack an alternative to the ED to address non-emergent medical concerns (prescription refills or outpatient referral).

The objective of this study was to describe a successful multidisciplinary Hurricane Katrina Evacuation Center, explain the services offered, and determine the center's effects on referrals to local EDs.

Data were collected concerning the number of patients utilizing the medical evaluation center and compared to the total number of evacuees to determine the proportion that utilized medical care. The data concerning patients given prescriptions was obtained by the estimation of the two medical directors of the Center, and therefore, is inexact.

During the five weeks the center was operational, 631 of 716 evacuees (88%) requested medical evaluation, and >80% of those had prescriptions written. Only four (<1%) patients were transported to local EDs.

An evacuee evaluation center provides a convenient non-ED alternative for evacuees to address their non-emergent medical concerns and can be used to ease their transition to a new location.

Management of mass-casualty incidents should optimize outcomes by appropriate prehospital care, and patient triage to the most capably facilities. The number of patients, the nature of injuries, transportation needs, distances, and hospital capabilities and availabilities are all factors to be considered. Patient maldistributions such as overwhelming individual facilities, or transport to facilities incapable of providing appropriate care should be avoided. This report is a critical view of the application of the START triage nomenclature in the prehospital arena following a train crash in Los Angeles County on 26 January 2005.

A scheduled debriefing was held with the major fire and emergency medical services responders, Medical Alert Center staff, and hospitals to assess and review the response to the incident. Site visits were made to all of the hospitals involved. Follow-up questions were directed to emergency department staff that were on duty during the day of the incident.

The five Level-I Trauma Centers responded to the poll with the capacity to receive a total of 12 “Immediate” patients, 2.4 patients per center, the eight Level-II Trauma Centers responded with capacity to receive 17 “Immediate” patients, two patients per center, while the 25 closest community hospitals offered to accept 75 “Immediate” patients, three patients per hospital. These community hospitals were typically about one-half of the size of the trauma centers (average 287 beds versus 548, average 8.7 operating rooms versus 16.6). Twenty-six patients were transported to a community hospital >15 miles from the scene, while eight closer community hospitals did not receive any patients.

The debriefing summary of this incident concluded that there were no consistently used criteria to decide ultimate destination for “Immediates”, and that they were distributed about equally between community hospitals and trauma centers.

The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) is the standard measure used to quantify the level of consciousness in patients with head injuries.Rapid and accurate GCS scoring is essential for adequate assessment and treatment of critically sick and injured patients. This study sought out to determine the precision and reliability of the GCS among a cohort of Latin American Critical Care Transport Providers.

The study consisted of a cross-sectional design using an Internetbased examination. The evaluation consisted of four focused clinical scenarios with a classification based on severity. For measurement of intra-rater reliability the first and fourth cases were identical. Five minutes were allocated for each scenario. For categorical variables, chi-square testing and Fisher's exact testing were used to assess associations. For all tests, statistical significance was set at the 0.05 level.

A total of 62 providers participated, including 17 physicians and 45 advanced providers (nurses and paramedics). No statistically significant differences were observed between physicians and advanced providers in the correct classification of the individual scenarios. Five of the 17 physicians (29.4%) answered all cases correctly, while none of the 45 advanced providers did (p <0.001). When evaluating the duplicated cases (Cases 1 and 4), five physicians (29.4%) and 11 advanced providers (24.4%) correctly classified the cases. This difference was not statistically significant.

This study demonstrated a poor precision and poor reliability in the use of the Glasgow Coma Scale within the study subjects.

The purpose of this research was to determine the preparedness of emergency medical services (EMS) agencies in one US state to cope with a massive epidemic event.

Data were collected primarily through telephone interviews with EMS officials throughout the State. To provide a comparison, nine out-ofstate emergency services agencies were invited to participate.

Emergency medical services agencies from nine of the 23 counties (39%) provided responses to some or all of the questions in the telephone survey. Seven of the nine out-of-state agencies provided responses to the survey. Most of the EMS agencies do not have broad, formal plans for response to large-scale bio-terrorist or pandemic events.

The findings indicate that EMS agencies in this state fundamentally are unprepared for a large-scale bioterrorism or pandemic event.The few existing plans rely heavily on mutual aid from agencies that may be incapable of providing such aid. Therefore, EMS agencies must be prepared to manage a response to these incidents without assistance from any agencies outside of their local community. In order to accomplish this, they must begin planning and develop close working relationships with public health, healthcare, and elected officials within their local communities.