Beginning in the 1960s, subfields claimed a central place in the production and dissemination of economic knowledge. Generalists were replaced by economists who specialized in the study of international economics, public economics, labor economics, or econometrics. New infrastructure emerged, including field-specific societies and field-specific journals (Backhouse and Cherrier 2017; Cherrier 2017; Cherrier and Rebours 2023; Desmarais-Tremblay, Johnson, and Sturn 2023; Desmarais-Tremblay and Svorenčik 2021; Svorenčik 2021). Some of the earliest movers were those interested in social choice and the political economy of governance. In 1963, a coalition of economists and political economists established the Committee for Non-Market Decision Making; a preliminary conference led to the creation of the Public Choice Society, an annual conference, and a specialized journal, Public Choice (Buchanan 2003; Medema 2011).1 Public Choice was quickly followed by the Journal of Human Resources (1965), the Journal of Economic Education (1969), the Journal of International Economics (1971), the Journal of Public Economics (1972), the Journal of Econometrics (1973), the Journal of Urban Economics (1974), the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (1974), and the Journal of Comparative Economics (1977), all attached to newly formed societies and associations.

Warren Nutter’s work as director of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) Soviet growth project is his best-known contribution to economics and public affairs. Many histories of Sovietology note the oddity of Nutter’s selection as project director, given his apparent lack of prior experience studying the Soviet Union. This paper provides new context for Nutter’s selection to lead the NBER effort. From 1951 to 1952 Nutter was the acting chief of the Economic Capabilities Branch of the CIA’s Office of Research and Reports (ORR), and chairman of the Economic Analysis Subcommittee of the interagency Economic Intelligence Committee. In this capacity he managed at least three major research efforts, including an input-output analysis of the Soviet Union and contributions to two national intelligence estimates. Nutter may have been proposed as director of the NBER project by Robert Amory, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, in 1953. Nutter’s research for the CIA cultivated new analytic capacities for the agency and provided a foundation for his own work on the Soviet Union.

According to Adam Smith, the “wretched spirit of monopoly” dogged the East Indies trade. The regulations that governed the East Indies trade established legal barriers or restrictions to entry and sustained a mercantile community whose interests were “the opposite to that of the great body of the people” (WN IV, ch. iii, p. 494). The East Indies charter conferred a special privilege that shielded the English East India Company from all domestic competition in Asian trade. The East India Company was the complete incarnation of a mercantile system against which Smith had determined to launch “a very violent attack” in Wealth of Nations (Smith 1987, p. 251). Smith’s mistrust of trading bodies like the East India Company was compounded by its having assumed political powers commensurate with the sovereign while still in possession of its monopolistic franchise. Smith’s proposal was, first, to abolish the monopolistic franchise to rid society of “the unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile system” (WN IV, ch. vii, p. 606), and, second, to reform the East India Company’s administrative duties and functions in the Indian territories. The contention of this paper is that Smith’s call to abolish the East Indies monopoly was inseparable from his appeal for reform of the English East India Company.

Carl Snyder was one of the most prominent US monetary economists of the 1920s and 1930s. His pioneering work on constructing the empirical counterparts of the terms in the equation of exchange led him to formulate a 4% monetary growth rule. Snyder is especially apposite because he was on the staff of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Why, despite his pioneering empirical work and his position as an insider, did Snyder fail to effectively challenge the dominant real bills views of the Federal Reserve (Fed)? A short answer is that he did not possess a convincing version of the quantity theory that attributed the Great Depression to a contraction in the money stock produced by the Fed, as opposed to the dominant real bills view attributing it to the collapse of speculative excess.

The invitation is to discuss my JHET editorship, which ran from 2013 to 2018, in light of the once and future challenges of the journal. After accepting it, I gathered my recollections, perused back issues of the journal, and finally reviewed my correspondence and reports to the HES Executive Committee.

Recent studies have revalued Hazel Kyrk for her original works on consumption and the critique of neoclassical demand theory. Kyrk’s A Theory of Consumption (1923) opened up new perspectives for understanding the nature of consumption and revalued home economics as a central part of the economist agenda, taking distance from the first generation of home economists. This paper focuses on Kyrk’s post-1923 scientific production and professional activities. Our main purpose is to show her contributions to the quantitative foundations of consumption together with her attempt to feed contemporary research on consumers’ behavior with pragmatism, policy advice, and field knowledge. We selected specific issues: the education of consumers through information and a strategy of “critical consumption”; the analysis of strategic industries; the well-being of American families; and the importance of “invisible” objects (non-market activities) and their statistical processing.

The History of Economics Society (HES) initiated the History of Economics Society Bulletin (HESB) in 1979. Discussed at the 1978 meetings of the HES, the HESB was first conceived of as something “less” than History of Political Economy (HOPE)—i.e., an academic journal with a defined editorial line—but also “more” than just a newsletter for HES members (Caldwell 2021; Vaughn, this issue). Edited by Karen E. Vaughn (1979 to 1983) and William O. Thweatt (1984 to 1989), the HESB began by publishing short notes and abstracts of papers presented at the annual meetings of the HES. Research articles (i.e., peer-reviewed documents) appeared for the first time in 1988 and book reviews in 1989. A year after, the HESB became the Journal of the History of Economic Thought (JHET), a full-fledged society journal under the editorship of Donald Walker (1990 to 1998). First published directly by its editor and the HES, the JHET started producing four yearly issues in 1998 under contract with Carfax as publisher. Carfax was eventually purchased by Taylor & Francis (Medema, this issue), and a new contract was signed with Cambridge University Press, both during Steven Medema’s editorship (1999 to 2008).1

The History of Economics Society (HES) is neither the oldest nor the largest academic society of historians of economic thought.1 However, no one would deny—certainly not when celebrating its fiftieth anniversary—the vital role the HES has had in establishing and shaping the field of history of economics. The goal of this paper is to go beyond mere favorable impressions to an evidence-based history grounded in analyzing the attendees of the exploratory conference in 1973 and the fifty annual HES meetings that followed.

Abolition of slavery in British colonies led to the facilitation of Indian indentured migration by the British government. This form of migration came about when the discourse of economic freedom and individual liberty strongly resonated in British political economy circles, following the work of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. We analyze how unfreedom in indentured labor was rationalized when the rhetoric of freedom was essential to the dominant intellectual milieu. We consider why free labor was deemed unfeasible in the plantation colonies. We also consider the constraints that asymmetric information and unequal bargaining posed to freedom within the institution of indenture. We conclude that indenture represented an uneasy compromise between the problems of slavery and the unattainable goal of free labor.

Frank H. Knight is rightly regarded as having identified the distinction between risk and uncertainty and their respective roles in the entrepreneurial process in his 1921 Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Less well appreciated is his recognition of the work of Fred Manville Taylor in this work, even though throughout Knight made several laudatory references to Taylor’s Principles. This article will examine through the various editions of Taylor’s textbook parallels between Taylor and Knight in their respective understandings of the risk-uncertainty distinction and the emphasis each placed on the role of the entrepreneur.

Ludwig von Mises’s methodological apriorism is often attributed to the broader Austrian School of economics. However, there is considerable controversy concerning the meaning of Mises’s justification of his apriorism. There are inconsistencies within and across Mises’s methodological writings that engender confusion in the secondary literature. This confusion is aggravated by the fact that his apriorism cannot be interpreted as an artifact of his historical milieu. The two prevailing families of interpretation both treat Mises’s apriorism as anachronistic, albeit in divergent senses. I conclude that the primary and secondary literatures on Mises’s apriorism indicate its inconsistency and incoherence. We have no idea what justification Mises intended when he asserted the a priori nature of the fundamental propositions of economics. If this is right, then, whatever method(s) they follow, Austrian economists cannot (deliberately) follow Mises’s apriorism, because no one knows well enough how Mises meant to justify it to follow it purposefully.

The literature on John Maynard Keynes’s activity as an investor has substantially grown in the last decade (e.g., Chambers and Dimson 2013; Accominotti and Chambers 2016; Chambers and Kabiri 2016; Cristiano, Marcuzzo, and Sanfilippo 2018; Marcuzzo and Rosselli 2018; Marcuzzo and Sanfilippo 2016, [2020] 2022). The contribution of the present paper is to investigate a specific feature of Keynes’s investment activity on his own account: his preference for American rather than British Investment Trusts. While this feature has also been observed in his investments on behalf of King’s College (Chambers and Kabiri 2016), we focus here on his personal portfolio, and we also provide a set of possible explanations for his preference. We maintain that some reasons have to do with the different structure and characteristics of the Investment Trusts in the two countries. Others relate more closely to the kind of investment policy typically adopted by the American Investment Trusts, which was much more in line with Keynes’s own approach to investment—especially regarding the stocks selection. We also attribute a role to his epistemological approach, i.e., the view that, although a full and perfect knowledge is not reachable by individuals due to the radical uncertainty characterizing the environment (“we simply don’t know,” Keynes 1937) and to the limitations of the human mind, reliable information remains, however, a guide for rational decision making, also in financial markets. Following this approach, as we will show, Keynes preferred to delegate his investment choices in the US stock market to those professionals—the managers of the Investment Trusts—who possessed, in his opinion, the wider set of reliable information on that market, while keeping for himself the investment choices in the UK stock market.

Classical political economists developed several different explanations for what they saw as an inherent tendency for the rate of profit to decline over time. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, some British advocates of colonization developed a corollary to those theories, suggesting that exporting capital to colonies could help arrest and reverse the decline. That argument was championed by the English political economist and promoter of colonization projects Edward Gibbon Wakefield, and it was systematized by John Stuart Mill. Ironically, the view that capital export and colonization played crucial roles in sustaining the rate of profit in advanced economies was later adopted by some Marxist theorists. Parallels between Karl Marx and J. S. Mill may help explain the remarkable theoretical continuity on this topic between nineteenth-century British advocates of colonization and early twentieth-century Marxist critics of colonialism.

My first acquaintance with the History of Economics Society (HES) occurred in the summer of 1990 when I attended its seventeenth annual meeting. Organized by the then HES president and now recently deceased Stanley “Todd” Lowry at Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia, it marked the beginning of my experience with US higher education. Later that summer, I began a two-year post-doctoral fellowship at Harvard University. The economics department still hosted a history of economics seminar—the Kress seminar—though its actual connection with the seminar was tenuous.1 Following the Lexington meeting, the paper I presented was accepted for publication in volume 7 of Perspectives on the History of Economic Thought—a book series that published selected papers from the HES conference. It was my first publication in English. From then on, I kept attending the HES annual meeting regularly and with enthusiasm. I met a number of stimulating people and made some good friends there. It was always refreshing to find myself in the United States following nine months of teaching and research in France.