U.S. federal law enforcement has charged eleven men in connection with the July 7, 2021, assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse at his home in Port-au-Prince.Footnote ¹ Arrested between January 2022 and February 2023, the men include Colombian, Haitian, U.S., dual Haitian-Chilean, and dual U.S.-Haitian nationals. According to prosecutors, the accused hatched, developed, and advanced the plan while operating in the United States. Marking the culmination of the investigation, Attorney General Merrick Garland said that “[t]he Justice Department will not tolerate individuals plotting violent attacks from U.S. soil that undermine the rule of law abroad.”Footnote ² “These defendants thought they could secure Haitian immunity for their crimes,” stated Assistant Attorney General for National Security Matthew G. Olsen. “We will now deliver justice in a U.S. courtroom.”Footnote ³ A Haitian investigation has stalled, part of a broad breakdown in governmental authority there since the assassination that has led to a humanitarian crisis and a request in October 2022 by Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry, himself accused of participating in the plot, for an international intervention.

The Justice Department alleges that the eleven defendants, working with others in Haiti, some still at-large, planned to “remove President Moïse from office by either killing or kidnapping him in order to replace him with a candidate who would serve their political goals and financial interests.”Footnote ⁴ The men, four of whom were found in the United States and seven of whom were transferred from other countries (including Haiti), include: Frederick Bergmann, Antonio Intriago, Rodolphe Jaar, Joseph Joel John, Arcangel Pretel Ortiz, Mario Antonio Palacios, German Alejandro Rivera Garcia, Christian Emmanuel Sanon, James Solages, Walter Veintemilla, and Joseph Vincent.

The indictment alleges that in early 2021 Intriago and Ortiz, who operated the south Florida private security companies Counter Terrorist Unit Federal Academy and Counter Terrorist Unit Security (CTU), and Sanon, a Haitian-American doctor and pastor, entered into discussions about replacing President Moïse with Sanon, who had political aspirations. CTU soon agreed to support him. In March 2021, CTU made Solages its operative in Haiti, and in April several defendants, including Intriago, John (a former Haitian senator), Ortiz, Sanon, Solages, and Veintemilla, met in Florida and agreed on a scheme. They allegedly “planned to foment a public uprising aimed at ousting President Moise and installing Sanon as President.”Footnote ⁵ Veintemilla, who was the principal of the south Florida financial services company Worldwide Capital Lending Group, agreed to finance CTU's support of the conspiracy and provide CTU with a line of credit. Ortiz, Intriago and Veintemilla “expected to reap significant financial benefits should Sanon secure the Presidency, largely [through the award of government contracts for] sizeable infrastructure projects in Haiti . . . [and] for the provision of security forces . . . and military-type equipment to a Sanon-led Haitian government.”Footnote ⁶ The Haitians involved, including those not charged by the United States, anticipated political power and financial gain if the coup succeeded.

Realizing, eventually, “that Sanon had neither the constitutional [residency] qualifications nor the popular support of the Haitian people to become president[,] . . . [t]he conspirators shifted their support to . . . former Supreme Court judge [Wendelle Coq Thélot]” who then “contracted [with them] to serve their financial interests . . . [once the judge] was installed as President.”Footnote ⁷ Justice Coq Thélot, who remains wanted by Haitian authorities, also allegedly agreed to “provide immunity in Haiti to those who participated in the operation.”Footnote ⁸ Attempts to kidnap the president (in accordance with the original plot) failed, and the plan changed to using previously hired Colombian nationals to assassinate President Moïse. Intriago and Ortiz directed the conspiracy. Solages served as a CTU's contact in Haiti and coordinated with Sanon and Vincent. Rivera, Solages, Vincent, and others led the operation on the ground. Jaar and John worked to obtain weapons and provided additional support. Bergmann and Sanon allegedly helped fund the assassins’ lodgings and sent CTU-branded ballistic vests to Haiti. Others in Haiti not identified in the indictment were also involved. Moïse was killed, but the plot to take control of the government failed. Some of the assassins and conspirators were arrested in Haiti, some were killed by Haitian police, some escaped to other countries but were captured, and some fled and are still wanted.

Bergmann and Sanon have been charged in federal court with: conspiracy to commit export violations; submitting false and misleading export information; and smuggling ballistic vests from the United States to Haiti.Footnote ⁹ They could receive up to twenty years in prison. The other defendants were charged with: conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a conspiracy to kidnap or kill outside the United States, resulting in death; providing material support and resources to a conspiracy to kidnap or kill outside the United States, resulting in death; and conspiracy to kill or kidnap a person outside the United States.Footnote ¹⁰ They potentially face sentences of life in prison.

The U.S. prosecution contrasts with the Haitian investigation, which has all but collapsed.Footnote ¹¹ This has stemmed, in part, from the refusal of some Haitian officials to participate or continue to participate in the investigation.Footnote ¹² One investigative judge agreed to work on the case, but then withdrew citing personal reasons after his judicial clerk died.Footnote ¹³ The longest-serving investigative judge on the case stepped down after his car was shot at and he was accused of corruption.Footnote ¹⁴ His successor relinquished the case after reporting a similar fear for his safety and that of his family.Footnote ¹⁵ There were also efforts to interfere with the investigation, including break-ins at the offices of the investigating judges, tampering with evidence, and the removal of the chief prosecutor.Footnote ¹⁶ Secretary of State Antony Blinken remarked: “Haitian authorities have not adequately addressed the judiciary's calls for stronger security measures to protect judicial workers assigned to the case and to preserve the chain of custody of key evidence.”Footnote ¹⁷ Haitian government officials were suspects as well. Prime Minister Henry said he would do everything he could to bring justice, including turning over individuals to the United States, but he himself was accused of being involved.Footnote ¹⁸ Forty-five persons are currently detained in Haiti in connection with the assassination, including eighteen Colombians and twenty police officers.Footnote ¹⁹

Security and the rule of law, already tenuous, further declined following the assassination, and conditions worsened after the government cut fuel subsidies in early September 2022 and gangs blockaded the country's primary oil terminal.Footnote ²⁰ A March 2023 report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime concluded that “[v]irtually every metric of insecurity, from homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping to the killing of police and migration out of the country—is trending upward.”Footnote ²¹ A report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs found that “[n[early half the population is now hungry and, for the first time in Haiti's history, at least 19,000 people are threatened with starvation.”Footnote ²² Cholera is resurgent.Footnote ²³ More than 165,000 people are internally displaced.Footnote ²⁴ Many undocumented Haitians have attempted to enter the United States, with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol reporting approximately 160,000 encounters from July 2021 to June 2023 and the U.S. Coast Guard logging nearly 12,000 encounters from October 2021 to May 2023.Footnote ²⁵ Haiti has no elected president.Footnote ²⁶ Prime Minister Henry is viewed as illegitimate due to the circumstances of his appointment.Footnote ²⁷ There is no National Assembly, as regular elections have not taken place and the terms of its members have expired.Footnote ²⁸ Public corruption at all levels, including in the judiciary, is rampant.Footnote ²⁹ Most of the capital city of Port-au-Prince is controlled by gangs, as are other cities.Footnote ³⁰ Unable to act, the government has told the Haitian people that their safety is in their own hands.Footnote ³¹

The humanitarian crisis and the breakdown of public authority became so severe that, on October 6, 2022, the government, in a written resolution, asked that “a specialized armed force” from outside the country intervene.Footnote ³² “We are not requesting for an occupying force,” said Bocchit Edmond, Haiti's ambassador to the United States.Footnote ³³ “We're just requesting national assistance as a member of the international community who is facing such a tough time.”Footnote ³⁴ Two days later, UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposed the deployment of “a rapid action force to support the Haitian National Police.”Footnote ³⁵ The United States and Mexico, which was then a member of the Security Council, drafted two resolutions in response to the crisis. The first, adopted unanimously by the Council on October 21, established a sanctions regime targeting those that “threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti,” including by “[e]ngaging in, directly or indirectly, or supporting criminal activities and violence involving armed groups and criminal networks that promote violence.”Footnote ³⁶ The second, which has not been circulated, “would authorize a non-UN international security assistance mission [under Chapter VII of the UN Charter] to help improve the security situation and enable the flow of desperately needed humanitarian aid.”Footnote ³⁷ Brian A. Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, indicated that the multilateral force “would be largely a police force with a military component.”Footnote ³⁸ On December 14, State Department Principal Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel said that “there is a broad international consensus regarding the need to promote improved security conditions in Haiti” and “negotiations continue with partners and other [Security] [C]ouncil members to set defined and specific parameters for a mission and find the most effective means to support, enable, and resource it.”Footnote ³⁹ The United States does not want to deploy its own troops, and other countries, including Brazil and Canada, are also reluctant to do so given the operational challenges and the lack of consensus on a political transition.Footnote ⁴⁰ In April 2023, the Secretary-General “reiterate[d] the urgent need for the deployment of an international specialized armed force.”Footnote ⁴¹ As of June, the United States was still pushing for a multinational force that would provide “‘near-term support’ for the Haitian National Police by securing ‘a limited number of critical infrastructure sites in Port-au-Prince, such as the airport and ports,’ relieving the burden on the local police to focus resources on its battle with gangs.”Footnote ⁴²