Fifty years ago, Yves Congar voiced concern over what he considered a serious point of confusion in the post-conciliar Church, namely, the meaning of “the sacred” in Christian faith and mission. This essay details Congar's diagnosis of the problem and explores the continued relevance of his constructive response, or, what he calls “sacred pedagogy.” For Congar, the world is not sacred in itself, because the body of Christ is the only sacred reality. Yet the world can become sacred, if we approach it “pedagogically,” as filled with signs that can lead us to grace. In the end, however, all present experience of the sacred will be transcended in the eschatological kingdom of God.

In The Spirit of Liturgy, Romano Guardini argued that liturgy is a playful activity. But one may ask, can liturgy really be analysed in light of the experience of play? This question opens up different theoretical problems, which range from a fundamental understanding of play and its celebratory spirit to a consideration of liturgy as an event of the divine Mystery. In this paper, I will therefore explore the nature of Christian ritual performance, drawing on a phenomenological analysis of the connections between play and liturgy in the process, before concluding that the liturgy – from a transcendental perspective – is in fact a playful activity. The argument will thus include a study of the particularity and difference of the original ritual patterns and the universe of play, thereby bringing into focus the interplay between the sense of rite and the experience of play. In such a way, I will show that play provides us with one of the possible ways of approaching the essence of the Christian ritual celebration as a transcendental experience of Mystery, as well as shedding light on the interrelation between homo ludens and homo liturgicus.

The proportion of older people in the population is rapidly increasing, both nationally and globally. This demographic shift poses some pressing practical challenges for governments as they seek to provide care for an ageing population; but in addition, it raises sociocultural and theological questions about how the role and significance of older people is understood in contemporary developed economies. In response to these challenges, the present paper attempts to identify the outlines of an emerging Catholic Social Teaching on old age in the encyclicals and words of the last three popes. Two key themes are identified which inform a distinctive Catholic perspective on old age. These are the continuing pilgrimage, role and contribution of older people to the end of life on the one hand, and their challenge to the values of a ‘throwaway culture’ on the other. The foundational significance of these themes for an emerging Catholic witness form the basis for the concluding recommendations.

This article explores St. Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of grace for the way in which it heals and moves the sinner towards justification. It exposits Thomas's use of the language of “impetration” to express a causal yet non-meritorious role for human action, and it applies this conception to the free will's movement in justification. It argues that Thomas understands the prayer of a sinner to illumine the way in which God's infallible and predestinating will unfolds through human actors without destroying their contingent nature. To that end, it first exposits critical points in Thomas's doctrine of grace, including the notions of habitual grace and auxilium, intact and fallen human nature, and operative and cooperative grace. It then introduces the language of impetration for the way in which it elucidates a valuable role for human action in justification. It concludes that impetration illustrates the on-going perfection of nature in such a way that God's grace draws human beings into the causal sequence of divine providence. The sinner's impetration captures the indispensable movement of the free will while recognizing that, in its appeal to divine mercy, it has already been graced by God and cannot earn the gift of justification.

This article examines the version of Christocentric exemplarism recently proposed by theologian Patrick Clark, whose Thomistic virtue ethics incorporates features of Linda Zagzebski's exemplarist moral theory. This article suggests that Clark and similar approaches to Christocentric virtue ethics would be better situated to appropriate Zagzebski's insights into exemplarity if it gave more prominence to the imitation of Jesus.

In a recent, provocative essay (“Inheriting Wittgenstein's Augustine,” New Blackfriars (February, 2018)), Philip Porter criticizes Augustine's habit of drawing analogies between the embodiment of concepts in language and the Incarnation of the Word as Jesus of Nazareth, suggesting that his distinctions encourage us to drive a wedge between God the Son and the human being, Jesus, whom he is. Porter worries that Augustine succumbs to the linguistic and then theological fantasy that we might peel away the word's flesh, to attain to the Word beneath. He proposes to dissolve this fantasy by way of a Wittgensteinian revision of Augustine's linguistic Christology, eschewing the distinction between the “verbum mentis” and the “verbum vocis,” the better to safeguard the unity of Christ. In what follows, I suggest that while Augustine is indeed tempted toward Christological error by an inappropriate extension of the linguistic analogy, Porter's proposed corrective both neglects important resources from the developed Chalcedonian tradition, and has as its unhappy outcome that “God is robbed of his transcendence, and creation of its true gratuity.”

In this article I discuss the surprising similarity between the interpretation of the story told in chapter 3 of Genesis put forward in several of his novels by Sebastian Faulks and my own interpretation set out in my book, The Fall and the Ascent of Man: How Genesis Supports Darwin. Faulks and I argue that Genesis 3 is about hominization, the achievement of human status by a proto-human couple by the acquisition of self-awareness. However, that is where the similarity ends. I consider Faulks's understanding of self-awareness to be seriously mistaken, reductive and incoherent, and I take issue with what I consider to be the consequences of this mistaken understanding.