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Militant Moralism: The Hegemonic Consequences of German Content Moderation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2024

Connor Donaldson*
Affiliation:
Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lexington, VA, United States

Abstract

Germany’s content moderation law—NetzDG— is often the target of criticism in English-language scholarship as antithetical to Western notions of free speech and the First Amendment. The purpose of this Article is to encourage those engaged in the analysis of transatlantic content moderation schemes to consider how Germany’s self-ideation influences policy decisions. By considering what international relations scholars term ontological security, Germany’s aggressive forays into the content moderation space are better understood as an externalization of Germany’s ideation of itself, which rests upon an absolutist domestic moral and constitutional hierarchy based on the primacy of human dignity. Ultimately, this Article implores American scholars and lawmakers to consider the impact of this subconscious ideation when engaging with Germany and the European Union in an increasingly multi-polar cyberspace.

Type
Student Note
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal

In May 2016, the European Commission unveiled a new Code of Conduct for combating illegal online hate speech.Footnote 1 Conceived of after the social media-organized terror attacks on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in ParisFootnote 2 and the coordinated bombing at the Brussels airport,Footnote 3 the Code of Conduct brought together some of the largest names in the technology industry—namely Facebook and X, previously known as Twitter—and committed them to European goals for combatting online radicalization and hate speech.Footnote 4 However, implementation of these voluntary protocols has been inconsistent.Footnote 5 Indeed, by 2021, Google’s YouTube, Meta’s Facebook, and Twitter removed less than half of all materials flagged as problematic.Footnote 6

Not content with the efforts of technology giants to stem the tide of hate speech and fake news on their platforms,Footnote 7 Germany’s then-Justice Minister Heiko Maas introduced the Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG) in the spring of 2017.Footnote 8 Colloquially known as the “Facebook Act,” NetzDG expanded the scope of mandatory content moderation take-downs and reporting while significantly increasing penalties for non-compliance.Footnote 9 The adoption of NetzDG has spurred substantial scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic, ranging from tacit praise to outright excoriation.Footnote 10 Yet, most American-based scholarship discussing NetzDG has approached the issue from a distinctly Anglo-centric perspective and has emphasized the conflicts between NetzDG and First Amendment jurisprudence.Footnote 11 Other scholarship has used NetzDG as an exemplar of or foil for proposed domestic reforms.Footnote 12

The purpose of this Article is to encourage those engaged in the analysis of transatlantic content moderation schemes to consider how Germany’s self-ideation influences policy decisions.Footnote 13 By considering what international relations scholars term ontological security, Germany’s aggressive forays into the content moderation space are better understood as an externalization of Germany’s ideation of itself, which rests upon an absolutist domestic moral and constitutional hierarchy based on the primacy of human dignity. Ultimately, this Article implores American scholars and lawmakers to consider the impact of this subconscious ideation when engaging with Germany and the European Union in an increasingly multi-polar cyberspace.

This Article will proceed in four parts. Section A briefly discusses the theory of ontological security and its impact on constructivist foreign relations theory. Section B then unpacks the moral philosophy of the German Idealist school that greatly influenced the development of German constitutional law and legal culture in the post-World War II era. Section C explores how the structure of the German constitutional system calcifies the moral philosophy of Kant and Hegel into an obligation for affirmative state action in furtherance of those morals. This social structure is subsequently imbedded within Germany’s ideation of itself and applies subconscious pressure to Germany’s domestic policy decisions. Section C continues by describing generally the supra-national consequences of Germany’s affirmative moral obligation, a framework of law and values that I have termed militant moralism.Footnote 14 Section D considers NetzDG as a case study of militant moralism, ultimately suggesting the realignment of content moderation scholarship toward a more ontologically aware constructivist perspective to improve policy outcomes in an increasingly multi-polar cyberspace.

A. Ontological Security in Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory

As an initial matter, it is worth considering what one means when they say “ontological security” within the context of foreign relations. Traditional notions of security have focused primarily on physical security of the self and, when abstracted to the level of the state, the continued existence of the state and the government.Footnote 15 Confronted with the rise of communism and fascism in the early twentieth century, foreign policy scholars expanded the notion of security to also include ideological security as a state-level consideration. However, it was not until the 1980s that scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Nicholas Onuf began exploring what is today called “constructivism.” At its most basic, constructivism seeks to understand a state’s actions in relation to that state’s ideational conception of the self and places a particular importance on those ideational factors which are commonly held within a society.Footnote 16 By extension, ontological security is the sense of stability achieved by the outward manifestation of that self-ideation to create a constructive conception of the whole person—or, in this instance, the whole state.Footnote 17 As such, ontological security becomes a useful conceptual tool to help scholars “identify the cognitive and normative maps that actors use to decide when to act, how, and why.”Footnote 18

For state actors, the formation of a stable self-identify functions to construct an “autobiographical identity narrative” which rationalizes the state’s behavior within the international system by providing an underlying meaning or purpose to those acts.Footnote 19 These narratives act to reinforce the practices and routines of the nation state and to self-justify and affirm their very creation.Footnote 20 But because these fundamentally domestic narratives do not exist in a vacuum, the externalization of these narratives through the policies they undergird can create conflict between states and by extension increase ontological insecurity, triggering a negative feedback loop that perpetuates international conflict.Footnote 21 Thus, when states enact policies, it is important to recognize not only the domestic and international context of said action, but also to consider how that action reflects these internalized pressures. Likewise, if scholars can better understand how a given state self-ideates, then scholars and politicians alike can better react and respond to those acts in a way that speaks to both the physical and ontological security of the state.Footnote 22

B. German Idealism and the Development of a Deontological View of Ethics

In order to examine the constitutional structure of the German Federal Republic and explore how its moral hierarchy has profound consequences in the geopolitics of cyberspace, it is important to begin by establishing a philosophical foundation by reviewing two core elements of German idealism which fundamentally influence the German constitutional order.Footnote 23 First, German Idealism—as expressed by the works of Immanuel Kant—embraces an absolutist view of universal norms rooted in a shared human dignity, distinguishing it from the dialectic American tradition that emphasizes personal liberty. Second, the moral absolutism espoused by German Idealism imposes a categorical imperative that compels both individuals and the State to act in furtherance of those established moral absolutes.

I. German Idealism Embraces an Absolutist View of Human Dignity

The concept of human dignity has deep historical and religious roots.Footnote 24 But the works of Immanuel Kant are among the most prominent and influential philosophical treatments of the question of fundamental human rights.Footnote 25 Developed in response to the two dominant schools of moral philosophy prominent in the late eighteenth century, Kant fundamentally sought to bridge the divide between rationalism and empiricism.Footnote 26 The Kantian contribution to moral philosophy was to recognize that the empiricist school revealed the instrumental principles sought by the rationalist school.Footnote 27 Thus, the basic aim of Kant’s moral philosophy was to elucidate the fundamental principles that applied to humanity across all times and cultures.Footnote 28 The mutual respect commanded by such shared humanity creates the supreme limiting condition to personal freedom.Footnote 29 So limited, the individual is compelled to act “as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.”Footnote 30 By extension, Kant finds that human dignity, as an objective end unto itself, must therefore constitute the supreme limiting condition on all subjective ends—establishing a universal and absolute law of humanity.Footnote 31

Recognizing universal human dignity as the lynchpin of a moral political order,Footnote 32 subsequent thinkers like Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel emphasized that a system of rights could not be fully recognized individually.Footnote 33 Rather, a moral political order required mutual self-consciousness—the absolute recognition of the inherent human dignity of a community.Footnote 34 Beyond the theoretical formality of universality described by Kant, rights must be codified through a cultural mechanism that infuses the Geist of society.Footnote 35 Mutual self-consciousness serves this role, infusing the essence, purpose, and product of the state.Footnote 36 Through this mechanism, the state becomes the embodiment of fundamental rights and human freedom.Footnote 37 Community, therefore, becomes a necessary pre-condition for the development of a just society—and places special emphasis on such socio-political manifestations in constructing such a society.Footnote 38

In contrast to the liberal philosophy of theorists like John Locke or Thomas Hobbes, human dignity in a Kantian or Hegelian sense cannot be secured absent the development of supra-individual institutions whose communitarian impulses crystalize the dignity of the individual into a normative structure to protect human rights.Footnote 39 Abstract rights of freedom and property remain abstract unless formalized in a societal structure.Footnote 40 At the most basic level, the role of the state is to formalize the universal principles and thus protect the rights of the individual against the potential of abuse by his or her fellow man.Footnote 41 This philosophical posture alters the role of the state from the Lockean understanding by expanding the opportunity for positive rights—enforced by the state—to achieve maximal human happiness and flourishing.Footnote 42

This fundamental desire to maximize human happiness leads naturally to a comparison of the German Idealist school with the utilitarian philosophy espoused by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Similar to Kant and Hegel, Mill’s philosophy embraces a form of communitarian awareness.Footnote 43 However, this communitarianism is not rooted in the universal values espoused by Kant, but rather by the shared benefit of the community’s collective interest.Footnote 44 In stark contrast to the duty-based position of Kant, utilitarianism represents a consequentialist approach to ethics.Footnote 45 Rather than recognizing the universality and primacy of human dignity as an end unto itself, Mill’s morality turns on the usefulness or worth of an action as determined by its utility.Footnote 46 Ultimately, the distinguishing feature of Kantianism is that the actions of an individual are morally determined by the relationship between the action and the corresponding right, rather than the individual and the corresponding outcome.Footnote 47

II. German Idealism Imposes Positive Obligations onto the State and its Citizens to Act in Furtherance of Universal Norms

Beyond recognizing the existence and primacy of individual human dignity that is preserved through communitarian recognition, German Idealism—informed by both Kant and Hegel—moves beyond the liberal conception of fundamental rights by imposing positive obligations on both the individual and the community to act to preserve and further those rights.Footnote 48 Each joint in the communitarian superstructure of moral values is linked to a corresponding political right.Footnote 49 This bond “imposes an obligation on the state to ensure that it becomes an integral part of the general legal order.”Footnote 50 This deontological approach to moral philosophy is encapsulated by Kant’s Categorical Imperative—an objective, unconditional principle that the individual is obligated to follow.Footnote 51

Conceptually, the rules that govern a society are distinct from the underlying moral principles, with the underlying principle commanding an overarching obligation for both the individual and the community.Footnote 52 Because the underlying principle is objective—and thereby obligatory—the formulation of this principle creates a command that necessitates action.Footnote 53 As applied to human dignity, this Categorical Imperative obligates individuals to reject any violation of human dignity and imposes a duty upon the state to protect human dignity even when the violation stems from private action.Footnote 54 Because the fundamental principles are the ultimate expression of rational thought, conflict between the rule and the principle cannot be rationally balanced; the obligation to the principle is reflexive.Footnote 55 Consequently, the development of a moral society requires the establishment of a hierarchy of principles built upon the primacy of human dignity and the positive duty to reinforce this hierarchy.Footnote 56

C. The Basic Law and the Externalization of Moral Obligation

The Basic Law, adopted in May 1949 as a temporary constitution for Allied-occupied West Germany, is an expressive document that encapsulates the political and social trends of its era.Footnote 57 The abuses of National Socialism and its strain of legal positivism led to a brief re-emphasis of natural law theory and deontological moral theory in democratic West Germany.Footnote 58 Neo-Kantianism was embraced by Gustav Radbruch,Footnote 59 whose scholarship was deeply influential in the formation of the Basic Law.Footnote 60 An examination of the character and structure of the Basic Law reveals a document that embodies the deontological principles discussed in Part II. In this sense, the Kantian Categorical Imperative is transformed into a political force of national ideation as discussed in Part I, with hegemonic consequences—both domestic and foreign.

I. The Basic Law Embraces the Deontological Principles of German Idealism

The Basic Law—as a document of political philosophy—embodies the theories of the German Idealists like Kant and Hegel.Footnote 61 This influence can be seen in the text’s first lines.Footnote 62 The fundamental principles espoused in the document “define a way of life to which the German people, as a nation, are committed.”Footnote 63 From a Hegelian perspective, this actualization of the German post-War Geist breathes moral life into the constitutional document.Footnote 64 To borrow a phrase from Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen,Footnote 65 the Basic Law represents the Grundnorms “ that govern and legitimate the entire legal order.”Footnote 66 Far from being a mere set of abstract principles, the Basic Law serves as a moral compass, directing the German state as it emerged from the horrors of World War II. This necessary connection between law and morality is often attributed to Radbruch, whose influential theory “serves as a sort of naturalist pressure release valve” against gross injustice.Footnote 67 In this substantive and directive posture, the Basic Law embodies the spirit of the Hegelian dialectic,Footnote 68 synthesizing the lessons learned during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and enabling Germany to emerge from that period as a liberal, democratic state.Footnote 69

The structure of the Basic Law lays out an inviolable hierarchy of principles that permeate German society and subject the generally positivist state to supra-positive notions of justice.Footnote 70 This order primarily affects public law.Footnote 71 But the communitarian nature of the Basic Law means that the hierarchy of principles is indirectly superimposed onto private law as well.Footnote 72 More than merely embodying a shared culture, the Basic Law integrates the fundamental values of the German people into a common consciousness—the very supra-individual structure called for by the Idealists.Footnote 73 This activation of moral principles within the constitutional structure is well-documented within the study of ontological security.Footnote 74 Indeed, these narratives “establish the foundation not only for what once was, but for what ought to be.”Footnote 75 As such, this re-anchoring of national identity upon Idealist moral principles encourages the German state to engage in affirmative acts in furtherance of these principles.

All political rights, in this context, are simultaneously preserved and limited by the architectonic moral principles that inform the Basic Law.Footnote 76 This interwoven network of rights and privileges gives the Basic Law its depth and force. As described by the late legal scholar and Federal Constitutional Court Judge Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, the purpose of this linkage between political rights and moral principles “is aimed at realizing and fulfilling the value expressed in and through such rights.”Footnote 77 To achieve these lofty ends, the state and the citizens are subsequently obligated under this structure to not merely defend these principles, but to advance them whenever possible.Footnote 78 In doing so, the Basic Law advances “an objective ordering of values” upon not only German society, but upon their global interactions.Footnote 79

II. The Deontological Element Distinguishes German Constitutional Law from the American Constitutional Tradition

The effects of this deontological philosophic tradition on German domestic affairs are well-documented—particularly with respect to two interrelated phenomena: Freedom of expression and militant democracy.Footnote 80 In both instances, the objective order of values prescribed by the Basic Law dictate the occasional suppression of what American scholars often see as fundamental liberty interests.Footnote 81 This tension between Germany and some of its fellow democracies reflects a conscious and deliberate choice on the part of German society to weigh the various social costs and benefits on a different scale.Footnote 82

Germany’s stance toward the freedom of expression is in stark contrast with the American tradition. Article 5 of the Basic Law enshrines a broad conception of free speech: “Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures . . . there shall be no censorship.”Footnote 83 This first clause parallels similar American protections: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the Press . . . .”Footnote 84 While the freedom of expression in the United States is not absolute,Footnote 85 the protection is robust and scrutiny of laws abridging this fundamental right is strict.Footnote 86 Generally, beyond “[t]hose few categories of speech that the government can regulate or punish—for instance, fraud, defamation, or incitement,”Footnote 87 a restriction of speech must be narrowly drawn and serve a substantial interest to avoid running afoul of First Amendment protections.Footnote 88 The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment”Footnote 89 that the government may not restrict speech simply because such speech is offensive or disagreeable.Footnote 90

By contrast, the second clause of Article 5 immediately places freedom of expression in Germany within the broader communitarian framework: “These rights shall find their limit in the provisions of general laws, in the provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor.”Footnote 91 Under the Basic Law, the purpose of the state as a political entity is to “facilitate peaceful debates as well as solutions and ultimately decisions in accordance with procedural standards of argumentation and public discourse.”Footnote 92 This value of speech is thus balanced against any competing interests and can be overcome through a showing that the expressive speech’s harm to a higher fundamental principle outweighs the speech’s benefit.Footnote 93 However, such an analysis is not utilitarian in nature. Rather, the state action supports and maintains the freedom of humanity by hindering actions that themselves hinder the freedom of others.Footnote 94 Accordingly, for types of speech that harm others—like slander, libel, or antisemitism—the corresponding strength of the constitutional protection for that speech is inverted and an obligation arises to restrict that speech through direct state coercion to a degree necessary to maintain a maximal amount of human freedom.Footnote 95 Importantly, this balancing is not objective; the Federal Constitutional Court is generally more protective of speech that advances governmental interests.Footnote 96

The obligations imposed by the Basic Law diverge from the American tradition most sharply over political expression. The legal superstructure of the German political system is often described as a militant democracy, one which obligates the State to actively oppose persons and groups who seek to use the rights and institutions enshrined in the Basic Law to subvert or destroy the democratic order.Footnote 97 This constitutional mandate, born from understandable political concerns facing West Germany during de-Nazification and the Cold War, persists as a sort of moral originalism, embracing the value determinations of the founding fathers of modern Germany and obligating state action in furtherance of said values.Footnote 98 Although the modern socio-political milieu of Germany is different than that of 1949, the militant nature of German democracy remains strong.

III. The Categorical Imperative Imbedded Within the Basic Law has Spill-over Effects on German Foreign Policy Where Such Acts Serve to Increase Ontological Security

As discussed in Section C.II above, the deontological nature of German constitutionalism has direct consequences on domestic politics that distinguish this feature from American constitutional traditions. This structural imperative burdening the state and its citizens, however, does not subside at Germany’s borders. Perhaps unintentionally, the Categorical Imperative imbedded within the Basic Law has supplanted nationalism with a self-assuring form of moral supremacy: Militant moralism.

The similarity of this term to the well-known—and previously discussed—militant democracy is intentional. However, the analogy is more abstract. By militant moralism, this Article does not suggest that the text of the Basic Law—taken literally—creates an explicit directive to the German state to advance the cause of human dignity beyond the traditional boundaries of the Westphalian nation-state. Nor, for its militant defense of domestic democratic norms, has Germany engaged in any sort of exportation of liberal democratic values akin to the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003.Footnote 99 Yet, the same structural imperative that empowers the German commitment to the liberal democratic order suffuses German foreign policy with deeply moralistic undertones rooted in the primacy—and universality—of human dignity.Footnote 100

Militant moralism is, in a sense, an internal animating force behind the oft-studied Brussels Effect, whereby domestic laws and regulations are externalized through market mechanisms to establish globalized standards.Footnote 101 In looking to the internal motivations behind the European Union’s (EU) hegemonic regulatory scheme, Anu Bradford adopts a skeptical position advanced by then-Czech President Vlàclav Klaus that the EU’s global agenda is rooted in competitive concerns for domestic industries.Footnote 102 Specifically, Bradford points to the domestic interests of a small number of influential EU member states—Germany and France—as the preliminary source of this regulatory putsch.Footnote 103 By entrenching these domestic influences into EU legislation, the Brussels Effect then amplifies and globalizes these policy preferences.Footnote 104 Importantly, Bradford suggests that the hegemonic consequences of the Brussels Effect are both incidental and ancillary to this primary motivation.Footnote 105

The deontological nature of the Basic Law suggests that, beyond these domestic economic concerns, at least some of the policy advanced by Germany in the EU and beyond is influenced by militant moralism. In advancing this position, Germany legitimizes its regulatory preferences by claiming that policies are normatively desirable based on the universality of the commanding underlying values.Footnote 106 This position is one that re-enforces Germany’s self-identity and increases its ontological security in the foreign policy sphere by giving this narrative extraterritorial effect.Footnote 107 This sort of moral posture gives structure to the German regulatory scheme, which is then amplified across the EU. Rather than establishing a de jure globalized norm of human dignity through international agreement, the spill-over effects of militant moralism encourage the same sort of de facto convergence of global regulatory policy advanced by Bradford.Footnote 108

Overwhelmingly, the influence of militant moralism on German foreign policy is directed at the promotion of societal structures that are considered by liberal democracies to have positive social capital. The Federal Foreign Office emphasizes Germany’s commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights as central pillars of their foreign policy.Footnote 109 A far cry from the nationalism and militarism that has defined much of its history, the modern German state takes an overwhelmingly antimilitarist approach to national security concerns—preferring diplomatic solutions to open conflict.Footnote 110 Unsurprisingly, there is little to no pushback from American scholars against these exercises of soft hegemony—perhaps because such values are shared between Germany and much of the English-speaking world. The impact of militant moralism on German foreign policy and the need for a new, holistic, and ontologically aware approach to dealing with these policy determinations is best illustrated when state power is directed at the demotion of societal structures that hinder human freedoms. As discussed below, the concentration of state action against undesirable speech—like hate speech and misinformation—is antithetical to the traditional liberty-centric values of the American political tradition which values the primacy of the freedom of expression.Footnote 111 Consequently, when moralistic policies are amplified and exported through the Brussels Effect or related phenomena, the clash between European and American law takes on distinctively geopolitical tones which require a conscious consideration of the ontological narrative driving those policies to effectively counteract.

D. Content Moderation & NetzDG: Militant Moralism on the March

The final section of this Article explores how NetzDG and Germany’s expansive content moderation scheme embodies the militant moralism derived from the Basic Law in an effort to promote both the physical and ontological security of the German state. More than a mere incidental benefit of Germany’s domestic policy objective, this Article argues that the foreign policy consequences of militant moralism are the ultimate objectives to help reposition Germany as a major player in an increasingly multipolar cyberspace. Given this shift toward multipolarity, this Article concludes by recommending that American scholars move away from First Amendment-based critiques of Germany’s policies and instead adopt an explicitly constructivist mode of analysis which better accounts for the moral and philosophical aspects of these acts.

I. NetzDG Defends the Deontological Values of Germany’s Militant Moralism

Faced with the proliferation of hate speech and radicalization on social media platforms, NetzDG was passed in October 2017.Footnote 112 Rather than establishing a public administrative body to regulate online speech, NetzDG is designed to co-opt the private administrative body within companies like Facebook and imposes a substantial burden on these private actors to remove unlawful content.Footnote 113 Under such a “regulated self-regulation” scheme, the brunt of costs is shifted to the social media companies, thereby reducing the financial obligation on the state.Footnote 114 The law, which applies to social media companies with more than two million domestic users, imposes harsh penalties for failing to remove unlawful content from their platforms.Footnote 115 NetzDG distinguishes between two types of content: (i) Manifestly illegal content and (ii) illegal content.Footnote 116 For manifestly illegal content, NetzDG requires providers to identify and remove the content within twenty-four hours of being reported.Footnote 117 For other unlawful content, the providers must remove the content within seven days.Footnote 118 In a departure from existing EU regulation, NetzDG modifies the actual knowledge requirement that immunizes social network providers from secondary liability into constructive knowledge with a twenty-four hour clock.Footnote 119

Despite opposition from civil liberties groups and the European Commission,Footnote 120 NetzDG went into effect in January 2018.Footnote 121 This forced most major social media companies—including U.S.-based Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter—to alter their content moderation strategies.Footnote 122 In 2019, the Federal Office of Justice (BfJ) levied a €2 million fine against Facebook for underreporting complaints.Footnote 123 However, the threat posed by hate speech and radicalization only became more pronounced. Following the murder of Christian Democratic Union politician Walter Lübcke by a right-wing extremist who disagreed with Lübcke’s pro-refugee policies, the Bundestag introduced legislation to scale up the reporting requirements for providers and increase the enforcement power of the BfJ.Footnote 124 This attack, coupled with racially-motivated violence directed at immigrant communities in Halle an der Saale and Hanau, underscored the real world consequences associated with online hate speech.Footnote 125 In an effort to increase compliance, NetzDG was updated to increase the ease of reporting alleged content violations,Footnote 126 lower the threshold reporting requirements for social media providers,Footnote 127 as well as increasing the power of the BfJ in overseeing enforcement of the Act.Footnote 128

Looking to the purpose and effects of NetzDG, the links between the law and the underlying moral values encased within the Basic Law become apparent. In identifying what qualifies as “unlawful content,” the Act cites various sections of the Criminal Code identifying speech which falls beyond the protections of freedom of expression.Footnote 129 Such balancing of the freedom of expression against the communitarian interests of the state is expressly endorsed by Article 5 of the Basic Law.Footnote 130 In defending the law’s intent and scope, scholars have argued that the perpetuation of hate speech threatens “the peaceful coexistence of a free, open, and democratic society.”Footnote 131 The rise of right-wing, anti-migrant speech in recent years has begun to challenge the very notions of communitarianism and universal human dignity that undergird the Basic Law. In this sense, NetzDG embodies an approach to protecting and promoting human dignity and preserving the democratic order. This determination is influenced by the dignity-oriented Basic Law and the concept of Informationelle Selbstbestimmung.Footnote 132 In combination, the rights of human dignity and informational self-determination create a moral super-structure that encourages the state to pursue the policy aims of NetzDG.

II. NetzDG Advances German Ontological Interests in a Multipolar Cyberspace at the Expense of American-Style Free Speech on the Internet

For its multifarious domestic effects, NetzDG has also sent ripples through the global content moderation space. In terms of scope and impact, NetzDG has become a poster child of content-based regulation.Footnote 133 Despite Europe's historically strong intermediary protections,Footnote 134 the implementation of NetzDG has resulted in the proliferation of intermediary regulatory schemes targeting illegal hate speech.Footnote 135 This is the latest development in what Jack Balkin has described as new-school regulation, whereby nation-states “threaten, coerce, or co-opt elements of the Internet infrastructure in order to get the infrastructure to surveil, police, and control speakers.”Footnote 136 These attempts to coax, cajole, or coerce compliance are guided by a philosophical framework that champions the globalization of fundamental human rights like human dignity and self-determination.Footnote 137

The consequences of Germany’s deviation from European Commission guidance are most immediately felt within the wider European community. Since 2018, both France and Austria have adopted similar domestic regulations against hate speech.Footnote 138 In 2019, then candidate for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyden called for a new “Digital Services Act” (DSA) and a modernization of the e-Commerce Directive.Footnote 139 Since her election to the presidency, von der Leyden and other German officials have played a central role in drafting the DSA, which aims to require companies like Facebook and Google to increase the censorship of “vitriol, misinformation, and illicit content on their sites.”Footnote 140 The final text of the DSA, adopted in April 2022, embraced the spirit of NetzDG nearly word-for-word, implementing a centralized set of content-moderation compliance schemes against all internet intermediaries beginning in February 2024.Footnote 141 Beyond the EU, at least thirteen countries have adopted or proposed legislation modeled after NetzDG.Footnote 142 Taken in concert, these domestic and supranational trends within and across national regimes have positioned Europe as an influential hub for content moderation regulation—with Germany leading the way.Footnote 143

The proliferation of NetzDG-style laws across the globe underscores the hegemonic draw of such regulation and increase the significance of Germany as a central player in the geopolitics of cyberspace. Although a presumption against extraterritoriality is an established norm of international law, the Brussels Effect amplifies and propagates NetzDG across the globe, effectively creating a unilaterally-established global norm.Footnote 144 The hegemonic consequences of NetzDG are best illuminated when contrasted against the United States’ best domestic equivalent, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.Footnote 145 In the United States, social network providers are immunized against any information shared on their platform.Footnote 146 Section 230 further protects companies from civil suit arising from any voluntary actions—taken in good faith—to restrict access to objectionable content regardless of whether such content is constitutionality protected.Footnote 147 Since its passage in 1996, Section 230 has represented the dominant approach to content moderation globally, reflecting a more general trend toward the least-restrictive regulatory scheme in cyberspace.Footnote 148 However, as Kenneth Waltz notes, unipolarity is “the least durable of international configurations.”Footnote 149 Ultimately, the unipolar momentFootnote 150 in cyberspace devolved into a largely bipolar framework between the liberal West dedicated to freedom of expression—as represented by the United States and the EU—against the authoritarian East—as represented by China—diametrically opposed to freedom of expression.

It is from this bipolar framework that NetzDG emerges as a radical departure from the historic approaches of the United States and the EU to content moderation. However, NetzDG does not go so far as to realign German interests in cyberspace with Chinese content moderation strategies. Rather, it positions German content moderation policy as an attractive alternative to either the American or Chinese approach. The emergence of this multipolar cyberspace is not incidental.Footnote 151 The structure and function of NetzDG effectively creates a global regulation, the validity of which is reinforced via the Brussels Effect.Footnote 152 Daphne Keller has suggested that the emergence of this multipolar system has the potential to “create an unprecedented imbalance in the Internet ecosystem” toward the global dominance of European—and by extension German—content moderation policies.Footnote 153 The passage of the Digital Services Act—itself an extension of the fundamental policy determinations of NetzDG—will further enable an unprecedented influence of German cyber-hegemony over the global Internet.Footnote 154

The threat posed by this emergent multipolar space is not academic. Even within the limited time that NetzDG and similar anti-hate speech laws have been in effect, “calls to remove hate speech have quickly ballooned to cover expression that does not violate existing European law.”Footnote 155 Increasingly, these demands for cooperation reflect mounting pressures on platforms to alter their content moderation strategies in favor of global deletion.Footnote 156 This censorship creep, as described by Danielle Keats Citron, presents a real threat to the core American concept of freedom of expression.Footnote 157 Worryingly, authoritarian governments like Russia and Türkiye have adopted Germany’s content moderation policies as precedent for imposing their own highly restrictive moderation regimes aimed at stifling dissent.Footnote 158 A secondary consideration of NetzDG-style regulations is the impact of soft censorship on the democratic process.Footnote 159 As Derek Bambauer notes, shifting the regulatory burden onto private actors to enforce the government’s preferred speech limitations effectively insulates the decision making from any form of public accountability, increasing the potential for abuse.Footnote 160 In concert, the unopposed expansion of German content moderation in a multipolar cyberspace threatens the very fabric of the liberal democratic order and undermines American interests in a free and open Internet.

III. To Better Respond to NetzDG, American Scholars Must Account for Ontological Security When Challenging German Cyber-Policy

In response to the increasing cachet of Germany’s content moderation policies, most American scholarship discussing NetzDG has adopted a constitutional framework centered on the primacy of the First Amendment.Footnote 161 However, as Hannah Bloch-Wehba notes, imposing First Amendment standards on global platform governance assumes a unilateral approach to speech and privacy across the global Internet.Footnote 162 The emerging reality in cyberspace—contrary to this assumption—is one marked by multipolarity and great power politics.Footnote 163 To appropriately react to this evolution, content moderation scholarship in the United States would benefit by adopting a framework informed by international relations theory which is cognizant of the inherent desire for ontological security.

During the early days of the Internet, thought leaders sought to segregate and liberate cyberspace from the political considerations of real space in favor of the promise of self-regulation.Footnote 164 However, the intervening decades have belayed such efforts and underscored the influence of geopolitics on cyberspace.Footnote 165 Scholars like Jack Goldsmith, Timothy Wu, and Orin Kerr have all rejected cyber-exceptionalism to one extent or another.Footnote 166 Yet, American scholarship has not sufficiently adapted. Even scholars like Jennifer Daskal, who recognize the consequences of European content moderation schemes as a “new form of international rule-making,” do not take the subsequent step in adopting an equally international framework.Footnote 167

The underlying motivation for Germany’s data protection policies is not merely the preservation of personal autonomy but is best understood as a strategic deployment of national and supra-national law to challenge American and Chinese hegemony in cyberspace. Far from a mere policy consideration, cyber policy is increasingly central to the practice of government.Footnote 168 By focusing on American-based technology companies, Germany and the EU have torn down the distinctions between cyber space and real space and erected burdensome challenges that limit the strength of these companies in the European market.Footnote 169 Given the rise of multi-national corporations that blur the boundaries between states, the reactionary movement of German and EU law targeting these corporations and moving toward a more balkanized Internet should be conceived as a geopolitical act reasserting the dominance of the German moral tradition embodied by the constitutional provisions of the Basic Law. However, because Germany and the EU have couched these expansionistic policies in moralistic terms as protectors of fundamental rights, these unilateralist actions—that would be seen as highly aggressive if undertaken by a geopolitical rival—are instead perceived as little more than an expression of policy preference.Footnote 170 Further, because American scholars have not taken the time to recognize how these actions reenforce German notions of self-identity rooted within the Basic Law, challenges and criticisms leveled against the German government have thus far been ineffective. Without understanding and accounting for these moral superstructures that reinforce militant moralism, it seems unlikely that American cyber-policy can prevail. As cyberspace continues to evolve as a multipolar system of competing regulatory and governance options,Footnote 171 recognizing and adopting a constructivist frame of analysis when discussing content moderation is critical to preserving and advancing American policy objectives.

Without such changes, American technology companies will continue to be repurposed to magnify Germany’s favored policy solutions on a global scale without effective American resistance.Footnote 172 As the United States debates the proper role of social media companies in democratic society and considers overhauling content moderation laws, American scholarship must consider the strategic rebalancing of cyberspace against not only the proposals of illiberal regimes like China and Russia, but also against our erstwhile European allies, lest our current blindness to the geopolitical implications of Germany’s militant moralism leave us helplessly outflanked in the race for digital supremacy.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Professor Russell Miller for his guidance and mentorship at Washington & Lee University School of Law, and for the many student editors of the German Law Journal whose hands helped shape this work. He would also like to acknowledge his fiancée, Lidia, who put up with him writing revisions and edits while backpacking together through Central Europe.

Competing interests

The author declares none.

Funding statement

No specific funding has been declared in relation to this article.

References

1 European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, European Commission and IT Companies Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech (May 31, 2016).

2 Giles de Kerchove, Preparing to Counter ISIS 2.0: European CT Efforts Since Charlie Hebdo, Wash. Inst. for Near E. Pol’y (June 20, 2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/preparing-counter-isis-20-european-ct-efforts-charlie-hebdo.

3 European Commission Press Release, supra note 1.

4 Id.

5 Mark Scott, Social Media Companies Remove Less Hate Speech in 2021, Politico (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/facebook-google-hate-speech-social-media-european-commission-transparency/.

6 Id.

7 See Katrin Bennhold, Germany Acts to Tame Facebook, Learning from Its Own History of Hate, Independent (June 15, 2018) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/facebook-germany-online-hate-censorship-social-media-a8374351.html (discussing the rise of hate speech in Germany leading up to the passage of NetzDG).

8 Netzdurchsetzunggesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017, BGBl. I at 3352 (Ger.).

9 Germany: Network Enforcement Act Amended to Better Fight Online Hate Speech, Libr. of Cong. (July 6, 2021), https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-07-06/germany-network-enforcement-act-amended-to-better-fight-online-hate-speech/.

10 See, e.g., Patrick Zurth, The German NetzDG as Role Model or Cautionary Tale? Implications for the Debate on Social Media Liability, 31 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1084 (2021).

11 Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. Rev. 27, 58 (2019) (“[M]any of these critics simply object on normative grounds to the European approach, which appears to prioritize individual privacy rights equally highly or perhaps even above press freedoms and the free flow of information. This balance simply would not pass muster under U.S. constitutional law, which privileges First Amendment freedoms above privacy rights.”)

12 See, e.g., Imara McMillan, Enforcement Through the Network: The Network Enforcement Act and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 Chi. J. Int’l L. 252 (2019); Laura E. Moon, A New Role for Social Network Providers: NetzDG and the Communications Decency Act, 28 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 623 (2019); Brittany Finnegan, The Cost of Free Speech: Combating Fake News or Upholding the First Amendment?, 75 U. Mia. L. Rev. 572 (2021).

13 For an overview of ontological security and its effects on state action, see Jennifer Mitzen & Kyle Larson, Ontological Society and Foreign Policy, Oxford Rsch. Encyclopedias, Pol. (2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.458.

14 This is based on the German notion of militant democracy and should not be confused with two unrelated ideas: Militant morality or militant ethics.

15 See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What the State Makes of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 Int’l Org. 391, 391–93 (1992).

16 Id. at 394.

17 See Jennifer Mitzen, Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma, 12 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 341, 342 (2006).

18 See Viktoria Akchurina & Vincent Della Sala, Love and Fear in the Neighborhood: Emotions and Ontological Security in Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Working Paper Version 1, 2019), https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/apsa/article-details/5d6ab79f74958f00198216d9.

19 Jelena Subotić, Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change, 12 Foreign Pol’y Analysis 610, 614 (2016).

20 Akchurina & Della Sala, supra note 18, at 6.

21 See generally Amir Lupovici, Ontological Dissonance, Clashing Identities, and Israel’s Unilateral Steps Toward Palestinians, 38 Rev. Int’l Stud. 809 (2012).

22 For more on this topic, see Subotić, supra note 19, at 616–17 (discussing how political actors strategically utilize these narrative templates to advance and justify domestic policy objectives).

23 Although it would be an overstatement to say that the Basic Law is a Kantian document, the influence of Kant’s work—particularly the primacy of human dignity—is clear and profound. For more, see Edward J. Eberle, Dignity and Liberty: Constitutional Visions of Germany and the United States 7 (2002).

24 See, e.g., Dignity: A History (Remy Debes ed., 2017); Andrew Fagan, Human Rights, Internet Encyclopedia of Phil. (2021), https://iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/#H2 (tracing the origins of human rights to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics).

25 Guy Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U. Int’l L.J. 277, 285 (2008) (“The concept of human dignity has deep roots in many religions, as well as in moral and political philosophy. Human dignity played a historical part in the development of religious and philosophical approaches to human rights. Immanuel Kant is probably the most prominent and influential among philosophers who dealt with human dignity.”).

26 Will Dudley, Understanding German Idealism 3–6 (2007).

27 Robert Johnson & Adam Cureton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/.

28 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals 27 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Start Publ’g 2012) (1785) (“Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand, men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it . . . we do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, yea, even wise and virtuous.”).

29 Id. at 62.

30 Id. at 59.

31 Id. at 62.

32 Carmi, supra note 25, at 280.

33 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 110 (A.V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1807) (“Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.”).

34 Lewis P. Hinchman, The Origins of Human Rights: A Hegelian Perspective, 37 West. Pol. Q. 7, 18–19 (1984); Hegel, supra note 33, at 112 (“They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”).

35 David T. ButleRitchie, Organic Constitutionalism: Rousseau, Hegel, and the Constitution of Society, 6 J.L. Soc’y 36 (2005).

36 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of rights § 257 (S.W. Dyde trans., George Bell & Sons 1896) (1821).

37 Id. at § 260.

38 Hinchman, supra note 34, at 20.

39 Id. at 22.

40 Hegel, supra note 36, § 36.

41 See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory, 10 Can. J.L. & Juris. 5, 12 n.9 (1997).

42 David Abraham, The German Duality of State and Society, 4 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 345, 345–46 (1996).

43 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 80–81 (Dover Publ’ns 2007) (1863) (describing the shared community of interest between the individual and their membership in human society).

44 Id. at 81–82.

45 Christopher Bennett, Utilitarianism, in What is This Thing Called Ethics? 55, 59 (2010).

46 See Mill, supra note 43, at 82 (“To give any meaning to Kant’s principle, the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest.”).

47 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 62 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).

48 See id. at 51 (“[T]he Categorical Imperative is a Law either of Command or Prohibition, according as doing or not doing of an action is represented as a Duty.”).

49 Id. at 56 (“The conformity of an Action to the Law of Duty constitutes its legality; the conformity of the Maxim of the Action with the Law constitutes its morality.”).

50 Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 Emory L.J. 837, 859 (1991).

51 See Kant, supra note 47, at 50 (“An Imperative is a practical Rule by which an Action, otherwise contingent in itself, becomes necessary.”); see also Kant, supra note 28, at 40 (“The categorical imperative would be that which represents an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.”).

52 Mattias Klatt, Contemporary Legal Philosophy in Germany, Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie 519, 529 (2007).

53 Kant, supra note 28, at 39.

54 Carmi, supra note 25, at 285.

55 Klatt, supra note 52, at 531.

56 Andrew Arato, A Reconstruction of Hegel’s Theory of Civil Society, in Hegel and Legal Theory 302, 307 (Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, & David Gray Carlson eds., 1991).

57 See Carmi, supra note 25, at 283 (drawing comparisons between the Basic Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as a foundational right).

58 Klatt, supra note 52, at 520.

59 Radbruch, a neo-Kantian legal philosopher and statesman, was one of the foremost legal scholars in Germany in the Weimar period. His seminal work, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht posited the so-called “Radbruch Formula,” which calls upon a judge to apply the positive law of statutes up until the point that the injustice of the positive law reaches such a degree that it must yield to justice. For more, see Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, 26 Oxford J. Legal Studs. 1, 7 (Bonnie Paulson & Stanley Paulson trans., 2006).

60 Klatt, supra note 52, at 520.

61 See Carmi, supra note 25, at 290 (“James Whitman observes that German constitutional scholars had developed, in the 1950s, a powerful body of Kantian thought on the nature of human dignity.”).

62 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. I, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (“Human dignity shall be inviolable”); see also Carmi, supra note 25, at 325 (“The German Constitutional Court has purposely structured its constitutional jurisprudence with the supreme Grundwert, human dignity, at its core.”).

63 Kommers, supra note 50, at 861.

64 See Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought 221 (1990); see also Hegel, supra note 36, § 257.

65 One of the foremost legal philosophers of the early twentieth century, Kelsen’s neo-Kantian legal positivism as set for in Reine Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law) argues that the continued existence of the positive legal order requires an ethical guarantor. The Grundnorm (basic norm) is the legal basis for the entire hierarchy of laws to follow. See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1960).

66 Kommers, supra note 50, at 848.

67 Klatt, supra note 52, at 534.

68 Dialectics describes a method of philosophical argument involving a contradiction between two opposing sides, typically people. Hegel’s innovation was to abstract the opposing sides depending on the subject matter. For more, see Julie E. Maybee, Hegel’s Dialectics, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=hegel-dialectics.

69 In an extended metaphor describing his dialectic, Hegel writes:

The plant . . . does not lose itself in mere indefinite change. From the germ much is produced when at first nothing was to be seen. But the whole of what is brought forth, if not developed, is hidden, and ideally contained within itself. But this coming without itself has an end in view. Its completion fully reached, and its previously determined end, is the fruit.

G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 22 (E.S. Haldane trans., Kegan, Paul, Trench, Truebner, & Co. 1892) (1837). Similarly, the constant challenges of the Weimar Republic and the moral desolation of the Third Reich help to shape the maturation of German constitutional law.

70 Kommers, supra note 50, at 846.

71 Id. at 848.

72 Ronald Krotoszynski Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1549, 1562 (2004) (noting the expansive interpretation of the Basic Law’s hierarchy to encompass private law as well as public law).

73 See Kommers, supra note 50, at 861; see also BVerfGE, 1 BvR 400/51, Jan. 15, 1958, at 15–16 (“The concept of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law has decided in favor of a relationship between individual and community in the sense of a person’s dependence on the commitment to the community, without infringement upon a person’s individual value.”).

74 See Subotic, supra note 19, at 612 (“Narratives can also be mobilizational, created to establish and promote specific collective values, and encourage a sense of groupness and solidarity.”).

75 See id. (citing James V. Wertsch, Narratives as Cultural Tools in Sociocultural Analysis: Official History in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, 28 Ethos 511, 518 (2000)).

76 See Kommers, supra note 50, at 857; see also Kant, supra note 28, at 39 (“All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it [an obligation].”).

77 E.W. Böckenförde, State, Society, and Liberty 190–91 (1991).

78 Kommers, supra note 50, at 857–62.

79 Krotoszynski, supra note 72, at 1555.

80 See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 657, 674 (1980); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 72, at 1590–93.

81 See Krotoszynski, supra note 72, at 1598 (“German constitutional law intentionally subordinates the freedom of expression in order to promote values associated with dignity, community, and support for democratic self-government.”).

82 Krotoszynski, supra note 72, at 1552–54.

83 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 5., translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0031.

84 U.S. Const. amend. I.

85 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (explaining that states may constitutionally regulate certain categories of speech); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (describing the reasoning for excluding certain categories of speech from First Amendment protections).

86 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 453 (1969) (holding that an Ohio law criminalizing advocacy for criminal syndicalism violated the protections of the First Amendment).

87 Matal v. Tam, 137 U.S. 1744, 1765 (2017).

88 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1980).

89 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

90 See, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509–14 (1969).

91 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 5(2), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0031.

92 Böckenförde, supra note 41, at 7.

93 See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 72, at 1582 (“When the dignity interest involves a specific individual, however, the Federal Constitutional Court usually finds that reputation (even of a dead person) trumps the Article 5 interest in freedom of expression.”).

94 Frederick Rauscher, Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/kant-social-political/.

95 Kant, supra note 47, at 62.

96 Kommers, supra note 50, at 861.

97 Id. at 854.

98 Id. at 855.

99 See, e.g., Shibley Telhami, Exporting Democracy to the Middle East, Brookings Inst. (Mar. 1, 2007), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/exporting-democracy-to-the-middle-east/.

100 See Jochen Bittner, The World Used to Fear German Militarism. Then It Disappeared., N.Y. Times (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/opinion/the-world-used-to-fear-german-militarism-then-it-disappeared.html (“Moralism has become the new nationalism.”).

101 Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2012) (“Unilateral regulatory globalization occurs when a single state is able to externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of standards.”).

102 Id. at 39 (quoting Václav Klaus, Renaissance: The Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe 16 (1997)).

103 Bradford, supra note 101, at 40.

104 Id.

105 See id. at 6 (“The EU’s external regulatory agenda has thus emerged largely as an inadvertent by-product of that internal goal rather than as a result of some conscious effort to engage in regulatory imperialism.”); see also id. at 42 (“While the primary objective of European regulatory activity has been to create a guard the single market, this activity has had the ancillary effect of establishing the EU as a global regulatory hegemon.”).

106 Bradford, supra note 101, at 37 (citing TEFU art. 3(5)).

107 See Subotić, supra note 19, at 615 (“A constructed narrative reaches a tipping point threshold when a critical mass of social actors accepts and buys into it as a social fact. This state narrative then becomes an uncontested ‘rhetorical commonplace.’ It becomes hegemonic.”).

108 See Bradford, supra note 101, at 8 (“Instead, we typically see only a de facto regulatory convergence whereby much of global business is conducted under unilateral EU rules even when other states continue to maintain their own rules.”) (internal quotations omitted).

109 Germany’s Foreign and European Policy Principles, Federal Foreign Office (Oct. 9. 2019), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik.

110 See id.; see also Daniel Flemes & Hannes Ebert, The Contested Use of Force in Germany’s New Foreign Policy, E-Int’l Relations (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/09/the-contested-use-of-force-in-germanys-new-foreign-policy/.

111 See Danielle K. Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1035, 1038 (2018); see also Jacob Mchangama & Joelle Fiss, Germany’s Online Crackdowns Inspire the World’s Dictators, Foreign Pol’y (Nov. 6, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/06/germany-online-crackdowns-inspired-the-worlds-dictators-russia-venezuela-india/.

112 Ben Knight, Germany Implements New Internet Hate Speech Crackdown, Deutsche Welle (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/germany-implements-new-internet-hate-speech-crackdown/a-41991590.

113 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2011, 2030 (2018).

114 Alex Rochefort, Regulating Social Media Platforms: A Comparative Policy Analysis, 25 Comm. L. & Pol’y 225, 247 (2020).

115 See NetzDG § 3(2)–(3); see also Rochefort, supra note 114, at 245.

116 NetzDG § 3.

117 NetzDG § 3(2).

118 NetzDG § 3(3).

119 Compare Council Directive 2000/31 of June 8, 2000, The Electronic Commerce Directive, art. 14., 2000 O.J. (L 178) with NetzDG § 3(2).

120 Oliver Noyan, Germany’s Online Hate Speech Law Slammed by Opposition, Commission, Euractiv (May 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/5BVV-84TA.

121 Knight, supra note 112.

122 Balkin, supra note 113, at 2030.

123 Germany Fines Facebook for Underreporting Hate Speech Complaints, Deutsche Welle (July 2, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/germany-fines-facebook-for-underreporting-hate-speech-complaints/a-49447820.

124 Janosch Delcker, Germany’s Balancing Act: Fighting Online Hate While Protecting Free Speech, Politico (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-hate-speech-internet-netzdg-controversial-legislation/.

125 Targeted Steps to Combat Hate Crimes, Office of the Chancellor (2021), https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/bekaempfung-hasskriminalitaet-1738462.

126 NetzDG § 3(2).

127 NetzDG § 2.

128 NetzDG § 4(a).

129 See NetzDG § 1(3) (listing the relevant sections of the Criminal Code).

130 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 5(2).

131 Zurth, supra note 10, at 1102.

132 Michael J. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 349, 359 (2015) (describing an individual’s right to informational self-determination and the right to control how they are portrayed to the public).

133 Balkin, supra note 113, at 2015.

134 See Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 119.

135 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 43.

136 Balkin, supra note 113, at 2015–16; see also Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 62 (describing the “collateral censorship” of state coercion of private companies to censor speech that the government could not itself lawfully sanction).

137 See, e.g., Rochefort, supra note 114, at 256 (linking content moderation to fundamental concepts of privacy that undergird the right to informational self-determination).

138 See, e.g., France’s Watered-Down Anti-Hate Speech Law Enters into Force, Universal Rts. Grp. (July 16, 2020), https://www.universal-rights.org/blog/frances-watered-down-anti-hate-speech-law-enters-into-force/; First Analysis of the Austrian Anti-Hate Speech Law (NetDG/KoPlG), European Digit. Rts. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://edri.org/our-work/first-analysis-of-the-austrian-anti-hate-speech-law-netdg-koplg/.

139 Ursula van der Leyden, A Union That Strives for More: My Agenda for Europe, in Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019–2024 13 (2019), https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020-04/political-guidelines-next-commission_en_0.pdf.

140 Adam Satariano, An Experiment to Stop Online Abuse Falls Short in Germany, N.Y. Times (Sept. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/23/technology/online-hate-speech-germany.html.

141 Andreas Steffens & Dirk Distelrath, Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA), KPMG (last accessed 2/22/2024), https://kpmg.com/de/en/home/insights/2023/03/digital-services-act-dsa-and-digital-markets-act-dma.html.

142 Jacob Mchangama & Joelle Fiss, The Digital Berlin Wall: How Germany (Accidentally) Created a Prototype for Global Online Censorship, Justicia 6–16 (Nov. 2019), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Analyse_The-Digital-Berlin-Wall-How-Germany-Accidentally-Created-a-Prototype-for-Global-Online-Censorship.pdf.

143 See Monika Zalnieriute, An International Constitutional Movement for Privacy in the Times of Mass-Surveillance, 23 Int. J. Law Info. Tech. 99, 118 (2015).

144 See, e.g., Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Fourth Year of Forgetting: The Troubling Expansion of the Right to be Forgotten, 39 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1011, 1040–45 (2018).

145 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).

146 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).

147 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2018).

148 See Citron, supra note 111, at 1039–40.

149 Kenneth Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, 25 Int’l Sec. 5, 27 (2000).

150 International relations scholars broadly consider the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union—during which American hegemony was at its zenith—as a “unipolar moment” in geopolitics. See Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affs. (Jan. 1, 1990), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1990-01-01/unipolar-moment.

151 Tyson Barker, Europe Can’t Win the Tech War It Just Started, Foreign Pol’y (Jan. 16, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16/europe-technology-sovereignty-von-der-leyen/ (noting that Germany’s political and foreign policy elite are casting cyberspace in explicitly geopolitical terms).

152 See Kate Klonik, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1651 (2018).

153 Daphne Keller, The Final Draft of Europe’s “Right to be Forgotten” Law, Stan. L. Sch. Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (Dec. 17, 2015), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/12/final-draft-europes-right-be-forgotten-law.

154 Nunziato, supra note 144, at 1048–49.

155 Citron, supra note 111, at 1039.

156 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 29.

157 Citron, supra note 111, 1039–40.

158 Mchangama & Fiss, supra note 142, at 7–8.

159 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 63.

160 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 863, 905 (2012) (arguing that soft censorship suffers significant legitimacy concerns in democratic societies); see also Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 901, 923–24 (2008) (describing how soft regulation via public-private partnerships facilitates the avoidance of public oversight).

161 See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Speech Across Borders, 105 Va. L. Rev. 1605, (2019); Diana Lee, Germany’s NetzDG and the Threat to Online Free Speech, Yale L. Sch. Media, Freedom & Info. Access Clinic (Oct. 10, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/germanys-netzdg-and-threat-online-free-speech; Selina MacLaren, Is There a First Amendment Right to Tweet?, JSTOR Daily (Mar. 31, 2021), https://daily.jstor.org/is-there-a-first-amendment-right-to-tweet/.

162 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 66.

163 Barker, supra note 151 (recognizing the increasing acceptance of a Westphalian understanding of cyberspace).

164 See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Elec. Frontier Found. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence; see also Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 39 (“In suggesting that the Internet would be a new place or territory, beyond the jurisdiction of any territorially-based sovereign, cyber-exceptionalists predicted that the Internet could escape these disagreements by permitting online communities to create rules and norms to govern themselves.”).

165 See, e.g., Paul Mozur, China Presses Its Internet Censorship Efforts Across the Globe, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/technology/china-technology-censorship-borders-expansion.html.

166 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1200–01 (1998); Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met, 3 Green Bag 2d 171, 172 (2000); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 Geo. L.J. 357, 361–62 (2003).

167 See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 179, 233 (2018) (associating the perpetuation of European content moderation policies to the mechanism underpinning the Brussels Effect).

168 Jonathan Lancelot, Cyber-Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and a Fragmented International System, Small Wars J. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyber-realpolitik-us-foreign-policy-and-fragmented-international-system.

169 Citron, supra note 111, at 1045.

170 Zalnieriute, supra note 143, at 17.

171 See Carol M. Glen, Controlling Cyberspace: The Politics of Internet Governance and Regulation 5 (2018).

172 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 29.