Introduction
In April and May 2023, India rescued some 3,800 of its nationals from the escalating military conflict in Sudan. “Operation Kaveri” showcased the Indian government’s “commitment to ensuring the safety and security of all Indians abroad” (Times of India 2023), as the country’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, put it. About the same time, record numbers of Turks living in Germany participated in the two rounds of presidential elections in their country of origin. Being home to “nearly 1.5 million eligible voters, Germany was a major focal point for campaigning” (Politico 2023) for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan, which has traditionally fared well in overseas voting in Germany and did so again this time around.Footnote 1 A few weeks earlier, two people were arrested in New York City based on the allegation of “operating an illegal overseas police station … for a provincial branch of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” According to the US Department of Justice (2023), the office’s purpose was to “monitor and intimidate dissidents and those critical of its [the PRC’s] government.”
Those examples illustrate that the interaction of states with their national communities abroad can manifest in very different ways. In some cases, states actively support and protect their communities abroad. In other cases, states co-opt and exploit their communities abroad in that they reach out to them in order to tap into, and thus benefit domestically, from their economic and financial potentials or, as in the previous case, to garner political support. In yet other cases, states repress or coerce communities abroad, thus conceiving the latter not as an asset but as a possible challenge or threat that needs to be controlled.
The goal of this volume is to explore the drivers for such activities by states toward a diverse set of their nationals abroad, including tourists, migrants, and diaspora groups. Following the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2019: 49, 132, 216), those groups can be conceived as follows. A tourist is:
A person who does not reside in the country of arrival and is admitted to that country temporarily (under tourist visas if required) for purposes of leisure, recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, health or medical treatment, or religious pilgrimage. A tourist must spend at least a night in a collective or private accommodation in the receiving country and the duration of his or her stay must not surpass 12 months.
In turn, migrant is “an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons.” Lastly, diaspora is defined by the IOM as “migrants or descendants of migrants whose identity and sense of belonging, either real or symbolic, have been shaped by their migration experience and background. They maintain links with their homelands, and to each other, based on a shared sense of history, identity, or mutual experiences in the destination country.”Footnote 2
In this volume, we use the term “national communities abroad” to refer to those aforementioned groups collectively. The term is deliberately broad in scope, in both temporal and legal terms. In temporal terms, the addresses of states’ actions could reside permanently in other countries, or they could be there temporarily for reasons of work or tourist travel. In legal terms, states’ actions could aim at their citizens holding national passports (e.g., tourists or first-generation migrants), at people with dual or multiple citizenship, or at diasporas more broadly including second- and third-generation migrants who no longer hold citizenship of their parents’ or grandparents’ home state. Hence, the group under examination in this volume is broader than what Latha Varadarajan (Reference Varadarajan2010: 6) calls the “domestic abroad,” which is “produced through state policies and initiatives aimed at institutionalizing the relationship between nation-states and their diasporas,” since it also includes members of a national community who stay abroad only temporarily, most notably for tourist travel. Having thus cast the net deliberately wide, it is for the individual country chapters to ascertain whether, and for what reason, states develop “multi-tier policies” (Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas2015) through which they treat specific groups among their national communities abroad differently or whether they engage with diverse groups simultaneously and more or less equally in terms of instruments and intensity as well as over time or across space (i.e., states or regions).
While states interactions with their communities abroad is by no means a new phenomenon (e.g., Leira Reference Leira2018: 150–153), we suggest that this activity is a highly relevant question today and, if anything, is likely to gain in relevance in the future even further. For starters, the number of international tourists has increased significantly over the last three decades. While there were 436 million tourists in 1990, the number had risen to 1.5 billion in 2019 (UNWTO 2008, 2020).Footnote 3 The number of international migrants has also risen sharply during the same time period. In 1990, the “international migrant stock” comprised of some 153 million people. In 2020, this number had increased to 281 million (UN 2020), which in turn has led “migrants’ states of origin … taking an increasingly strong and proactive interest in these transnational connections” (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019: 3).
In addition to those quantitative increases, several political developments point to the current and future relevance of the topic under examination. Indeed, there has been a change in the perception of communities abroad on the part of states “from at best ignoring and at worst vilifying their expatriates, to a world where expatriate populations have the potential to be a vital resource for homeland populations and politicians” (Leblang and Glazier Reference Leblang, Glazier and Kennedy2022: 36) – a perspective which aligns with a “neoliberal art of government [where] the population is perceived as a resource of productive forces to be mobilised for governmental purposes” (Tsinovoi and Adler-Nissen Reference Tsinovoi and Adler-Nissen2018: 213) and also connects to “fundamental shifts in the way in which nations are configured” (Varadarajan Reference Varadarajan2010: 6). At the same time, states do not always perceive communities abroad as assets but at times also as challenges or outright threats that need to be countered, with ensuing “extra-state practices [being] bound to increase in intensity, fostered by technological change, rising global levels of cross-border mobility, as well as a growing climate of illiberalism” (Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas and Kennedy2022: 315). Either way, states are and will be required to engage with their communities abroad. The evolution of a global migration regime centering around organizations such as the IOM and the World Bank has lent additional impetus for the creation of “diaspora institutions” through which states interact with their national communities abroad (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019: 38),Footnote 4 as has the increasing global acceptance of dual citizenship which, in addition to social and emotional attachments, also extends the legal links of communities abroad to their country of origin (Vink et al. Reference Vink, Schakel, Reichel, Chun Luk and de Groot2019). Against those backgrounds, it seems highly pertinent to explore why and through which practices states engage with their national communities abroad.
At this point, two caveats are in order. First, while this volume emphasizes the activities of home states towards their national communities abroad, this is by no means to suggest that the latter are nothing but passive recipients of the home states’ actions. To the contrary, communities abroad can exercise agency towards their countries of origin on a range of issues. The latter include providing information on their locations in governmental data bases in order to enable states to come to their support (Melissen and Caesar-Gordon Reference Melissen and Caesar-Gordon2016), influencing home states politics for example through extra-territorial voting (e.g., Brand Reference Brand2010), and contributing to the home state’s economic development through remittances, trade, and investments (Fernandes Reference Fernandes and Kennedy2022). Communities abroad can also actively mobilize against their home state and thus play key roles concerning the initiation, perpetuation, or termination of political and at times also military conflict in their home state, thereby ultimately posing a challenge to regime survival (e.g., Shain Reference Shain2007: ch. 4; Koinova Reference Koinova2013; Betts and Jones Reference Betts and Jones2016; Kopchik et al. Reference Kopchik, Jenne, Cunningham and Saideman2022; Bird 2023).
Second, while this volume emphasizes host states’ interactions with their national communities abroad, there are a number of additional actors out there who enable or interfere in such interactions. They include: the host states of communities abroad whose sovereignty is infringed by home states’ outreach to its communities (Tindall Reference Tindall2012: 106); third states with whom the home state might join forces, for example in crisis situations (Melissen and Okano-Heijmans Reference Melissen and Okano-Heijmans2018: 143); international governmental organizations such as the European Union (Bicchi and Schade Reference Bicchi and Schade2022) or institutions that belong to the “global migration regime” (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019); and an array of non-state actors, including both national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs and INGOs) and private security contractors (e.g., Tsinovoi and Adler-Nissen Reference Tsinovoi and Adler-Nissen2018). The country chapters contained in this volume will highlight the agency of national communities vis-à-vis their home states as well as the influence of other actors on home states’ interactions with their communities abroad whenever appropriate.
This volume connects to and expands on different strands of literatures that have explored states’ engagement with their national communities abroad. For starters, there are conceptual works on the general motivations as well as on the specific factors that condition whether and how states reach out to their communities abroad (e.g., Délano and Gamlen Reference Délano and Gamlen2014; Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2014; Koinova and Tsourapas Reference Koinova and Tsourapas2018). In turn, aspects specifically related to “support” have been discussed, for example under the heading of states’ general “duty of care” (e.g., Melissen and Okano-Heijmans Reference Melissen and Okano-Heijmans2018; Græger and Leira Reference Græger and Leira2020) or, more specifically, with respect to granting access to social protection to their citizens abroad (Vintila and Lafleur Reference Vintila, Lafleur, Lafleur and Vintila2020; Lafleur and Vintila Reference Lafleur, Vintila, Lafleur and Vintila2020a). Conversely, concerns of “co-optation” and even more so “repression” have been explored prominently in the literature on “transnational authoritarianism” (e.g., Glasius Reference Glasius2018; Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas2021a, Reference Tsourapas and Kennedy2022). The aforementioned discussions on the general motives on the part of states to engage with their communities are complemented by Gamlen’s (Reference Gamlen2019) “new institutional explanation” for why states set up “diaspora institutions” to engage with their national communities abroad in the first place, which he suggests has happened in response to the rise of a global migration regime.
Empirically, scholarship has analyzed the activities of a range of individual countries towards its communities abroad (e.g., Brand Reference Brand2006; Allison Reference Allison2009; Délano Reference Délano2011; Hernández Joseph Reference Hernández Joseph2012; Rifawan et al. Reference Rifawan, Darmawan dan and Relaksana2017; Græger and Lindgren Reference Græger and Lindgren2018; Gaur Reference Gaur, Irudaya Rajan and Saxena2019; Asis Reference Asis2020; Hameed Reference Hameed2021; Katigbak and Roldan Reference Katigbak and Roldan2021; Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas2021b; Arkilic Reference Arkilic2022), with special emphasis being placed on China (e.g., Wang Reference Wang2013; Zerba Reference Zerba2014; Boni Reference Boni2019; Baum Reference Baum2020; Ghiselli Reference Ghiselli2021). Other works examine the impact or the specific activities of international organizations (e.g., Geyer Reference Geyer2007; Ianniello Saliceti Reference Saliceti2011; Mwagiru Reference Mwagiru2012; Moraru Reference Moraru, Govaere and Poli2014; Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019). Yet other publications focus on specific substantive themes, such as child abduction (Haugevik Reference Haugevik2018), the protection of low-skilled workers (Okano-Heijmans and Price Reference Okano-Heijmans and Price2019), access to social protection (Lafleur and Vintila Reference Lafleur and Vintila2020b, Reference Lafleur and Vintilac), or consular support in the aftermath of catastrophic events or emergencies (Tindall Reference Tindall2012).
What sets this volume apart from the aforementioned scholarship is its comparative approach across countries, covering both Western and non-Western states, combined with its multidimensional approach in terms of substantive areas of states’ interactions with their national communities abroad comprising diplomatic and consular, economic and social, and security-related activities. In so doing, it heeds several interrelated calls in the literature. One is to engage in “comparative work” (Délano and Gamlen Reference Délano and Gamlen2014: 47) when analyzing states’ interactions with their citizens abroad. Another concerns the exploration of the reasons as to why some states do actively interact with communities abroad while others do not, thereby exploring the reasons for convergence or divergence in state behavior towards different groups of their communities abroad, in different substantive domains, and over time (Koinova and Tsourapas Reference Koinova and Tsourapas2018: 312). A third one concerns the examination of “non-Western practices in the duty of care” (Melissen and Okano-Heijmans Reference Melissen and Okano-Heijmans2018: 141) as well as in other substantive areas in addition to “support” (Brand Reference Brand2006: 1–2). A final one relates to focusing on the policies and politics of home or sending states as opposed to the immigration policies by host states (Brand Reference Brand2006: 5). In so doing, the volume contributes to the aforementioned discussions on (sending and home) states’ migration and diaspora policies and politics and on transnational authoritarianism. In addition, by examining a critical albeit understudied component of states’ external affairs, the volume contributes from a comparative perspective (Brummer Reference Brummer, Curini and Franzese2020) to our understanding of the drivers and outcomes of foreign policy, and to the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) more broadly (e.g., Alden and Aran Reference Alden and Aran2017; Brummer and Oppermann Reference Brummer and Oppermann2024).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section explores the general motivations and objectives as to why states interact with their national communities abroad (“support, co-opt, repress”). Then, the chapter discusses key practices and tactics that states can employ in this interaction along three substantive dimensions, namely: diplomacy and consular, economy and social, and security. Next, possible drivers that condition whether, how, and for what reason states interact with their communities abroad are presented. This is followed by a discussion on how the countries covered in this volume were selected. The concluding section presents the plan of the book and briefly summarizes the individual chapters.
States’ Interaction with Their National Communities Abroad: Support, Co-optation, and Repression
As indicated by the examples presented at the outset of this chapter, states’ activities towards communities manifest in very different ways. At times states do something for their communities abroad. At other times states want to get something out of their communities abroad. At still other times states deliberately act against their communities abroad. We refer to those different types of actions as “support” (do for), “co-optation” (get something out of), and “repress” (act against). The following paragraphs introduce those different general types of states’ motivations in their interactions with their national communities abroad in greater detail. The next section then provides information on the specific practices and tactics that states employ in the pursuit of those objectives.
Support
States’ actions towards their national communities abroad can be grounded in a genuine ambition to support, assist, and protect said group, or specific members thereof. Activities in this regard include consular measures such as replacing passports or efforts to augment rights and protections for workers. Occasionally, they also entail military measures, such as evacuation flights during times of political turmoil or in the aftermath of natural disasters.
By engaging in activities such as the aforementioned, states fulfil their “duty of care” (Melissen and Okano-Heijmans Reference Melissen and Okano-Heijmans2018; Græger and Leira Reference Græger and Leira2020) towards their communities abroad, with special emphasis being placed on “citizens beyond the border” (Leira and Græger Reference Leira, Græger, Græger and Leira2020: 2). In this sense, Kristin Haugevik (Reference Haugevik2018: 168) refers to a state’s activities to assist and protect its citizens beyond its borders as “an extension of the social contract between state and subjects – a state’s responsibility for its citizens’ safety and well-being does not stop at the border.”
From this grows an expectation on the part of citizens that their country will come to their assistance and support in cases of need, acting either as “caretakers” in routine, low-profile situations or as “rescuers” in extreme and high-profile contexts (Haugevik Reference Haugevik2018: 168). By implication, if states refrain from coming to the support of their communities abroad, this could diminish their (domestic) legitimacy. At the same time, states might face a dilemma in this regard in that their activities might violate international norms pertaining to state sovereignty and nonintervention, which in turn might infringe on their own international status (Haugevik Reference Haugevik2018: 169). Another dilemma might arise for states in that past efforts to support and protect their communities abroad lead to expectations of similar activities in the future, which might even be abused by third parties, for example with regards to “hostage diplomacy” (Hess Reference Hess2022).Footnote 5 At any rate, the motivation of states to support should be particularly pronounced towards, albeit not categorically restricted to, those people among the national community abroad who hold formal citizenship, like tourists, expats, and first-generation migrants.
Co-optation
States also engage their national communities abroad in more instrumental and transactional ways. Rather than doing something for them, as is the case for “support,” states’ primary concern is to get something out of their communities by means of co-optation and exploitation. From this vantage point, national communities abroad are perceived as an asset that the home state can tap into “in pursuit of power” (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019: 10). States are driven by economic, political, and social considerations, which in turn can have implications for the overall legitimacy of the state’s political regime.
National communities abroad possibly hold huge economic and financial potential (e.g., Brand Reference Brand2006: 17; de Haas Reference de Haas2010).Footnote 6 One dimension concerns remittances, which for some countries is a key component of their national budgets and which has also been shown to contribute to regime survival (Ahmed Reference Ahmed2012).Footnote 7 Communities abroad could additionally serve as key sources for investments and donations in their country of origin. Further, states may seek to tap into the skills, knowledge, and expertise of their communities abroad, thereby reversing “brain drain” into “brain gain” (Kapur Reference Kapur2001).
In addition, states may seek to co-opt and exploit national communities abroad for political reasons, both foreign and domestic. States could mobilize their communities abroad, which are perceived as “a political leverage tool” (Arkilic Reference Arkilic2022: 3), to advance their foreign policy interests by influencing policy-making in the host states, most notably towards itself (i.e., the home state) and possibly also towards relevant third parties (foes and friends of the home state alike) (e.g., Brand Reference Brand2006: 16). This relates not only to members of national communities who reside permanently abroad but also to tourists who could, for example, be barred by their home state from entering certain countries, thereby “punish[ing] countries or territories whose actions or policies displease” the home state (Paradise Reference Paradise2022: 32). At the same time, states can seek to co-opt and instrumentalize communities abroad for domestic political reasons, including the retention of power, for example through overseas voting (e.g., Brand Reference Brand2010).
The aforementioned economic and political considerations can be complemented by a social motive in that states might seek to tap into their national communities abroad for reasons of national identity-building and national unity (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019: 11–12). Individually or jointly, home states’ ability to co-opt the economic, political, and social potential of their national communities abroad can be a key factor for shoring up or even augmenting regime legitimacy and in the final analysis securing regime survival.
Repression
A third type of state interaction with their national communities abroad manifests in acts of repression, coercion, and control of said group, or specific groups or individuals within that group. The underlying rationale for such actions is that at least parts of the national community abroad are perceived by their home state as representing a challenge or outright threat, most notably a political or military one. This perception reinforces the previously mentioned conceptualization of communities abroad as being more than merely passive recipients of their home states’ activities.
For example, communities abroad could stage protests against their home state in their host state, thereby threatening to undermine the former’s legitimacy. They could also support or even organize military challenges (e.g., Betts and Jones Reference Betts and Jones2016). Given the threats that emanate from such actions for regime legitimacy and ultimately regime survival, states perceive a need to counter those challenges.
The recent literature on “transnational authoritarianism” and ensuing “extraterritorial authoritarian practices” (e.g., Glasius Reference Glasius2018; Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas2021a; Wackenhut and Orjuela Reference Wackenhut and Orjuela2023) suggests that this need is particularly pronounced in non-democratic regimes. The latter do not ascribe certain (citizen) rights to their communities abroad but conceive of them, or rather certain parts, as “outlaws” or “traitors” (Glasius Reference Glasius2018: 186). The home state thus perceives a need to act against parts of their communities abroad in order to prevent political dissent or military challenges from arising. Overall, states, and authoritarian ones in particular, “seek to reap the material benefit of free movement while ensuring that migrant and diaspora groups pose little political or security threat to their survival” (Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas2021a: 621).
Specific State Practices towards Their National Communities Abroad
After having outlined the general types of states’ interactions with their national communities abroad, the ensuing question concerns the specific activities that they may undertake. The following paragraphs introduce various practices and tactics that states employ to support, co-opt, and repress their national communities abroad.Footnote 8 The discussions are structured along three substantive dimensions that reflect core domains of statecraft (e.g., Goddard et al. Reference Goddard, MacDonald and Nexon2019). Those dimensions are: diplomatic and consular; economic and social; and security. The discussions show that rather than being confined to a specific substantive dimension, the aforementioned motives of support, co-opt, and repress cut across them.
The Diplomatic and Consular Dimension
Diplomatic and consular measures are a key building block in states’ interaction with their national communities abroad. Typically undertaken by “classical” diplomatic institutions of states (foreign ministries, embassies, consulates), they include a range of measures of support, such as replacing lost or stolen passports for tourists or offering assistance in legal matters, including instances of “hostage diplomacy.” Diplomatic and consular practices can also be connected to the other two motivations in terms of co-optation and repression, for example by providing the infrastructure for overseas voting, by politicizing certain consular activities, or through the deliberate withholding and thus exclusion of certain parts of the national community abroad from certain services.
States can undertake various diplomatic and consular activities in support of their national communities abroad. Corresponding action is regulated by international conventions, most notably the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. When enumerating the functions of diplomatic missions, the former convention states that: “Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law” (art. 3 para. 1b). In turn, the latter convention lists multiple “consular functions” (art. 5) that states may undertake to assist and support their citizens in the respective host states. Those include: the issuing of travel documents and visas; safeguarding the interests of minors; representing citizens before courts; as well as “helping and assisting” individual citizens in general. While not explicitly mentioned, diplomatic or consular support measures could also include supporting nationals in case of “hostage diplomacy” or the coordination and provision of emergency assistance after natural disasters or during times of violent conflict in the host country. Following Brand (Reference Brand2006: 7), “The extent and type of services offered by such government offices [like embassies and consulates] abroad are important indicators of a state’s interest and involvement in its expatriate communities.” Advances in communications technology have not only increased expectations by communities abroad towards their states for assistance (e.g., Melissen and Caesar-Gordon Reference Melissen and Caesar-Gordon2016: 322) but, while being demanding in terms of overcoming “communicative challenges” (Melissen Reference Melissen2020) and sometimes falling short (e.g., Katigbak and Roldan Reference Katigbak and Roldan2021: 364–365), have also generally enabled states to better live up those increased expectations (e.g., Bjola and Holmes Reference Bjola and Holmes2015; Manor and Adiku Reference Manor and Asiwome Adiku2021).
States exhibit considerable variation concerning the domestic legal foundations for conducting diplomatic and consular activities. While in some states such provisions are enshrined in foreign service laws (e.g., Germany) or even in constitutions (e.g., China), other states do not have such legal provisions (e.g., United Kingdom). In the latter cases, the provision of support to citizens abroad depends on voluntary efforts and essentially boils down to a policy decision (Geyer Reference Geyer2007: 2).
So far, the discussion has highlighted the supportive and essentially technical and by implication seemingly apolitical nature of diplomatic and consular activities. However, there is also an intrinsically political dimension to such activities (Melissen and Caesar-Gordon Reference Melissen and Caesar-Gordon2016: 322), which, in turn, opens up space for practices aimed at co-optation and repression.Footnote 9 An example of the politicization of seemingly innocuous technical undertakings comes in the form of “passportization.” The latter refers to issuing and distributing passports to a certain group of people and illustrates a process of co-optation of communities abroad (and of the latter’s political “creation” in the first place) for political ends. Such actions challenge the host states’ sovereignty and can serve as a possible precursor for future broader political or military actions by “creating” citizens who subsequently can be referenced as being in need of protection, as has been the case for Russian activities towards Georgia and Ukraine (Allison Reference Allison2009; Wrighton Reference Wrighton2018).
Diplomatic and consular institutions and activities can also be employed to tap into the potential of, and thus co-opt, communities abroad particularly for political purposes. Key in this regard is the extension of voting rights to communities abroad and the provision of the necessary infrastructure to that end, which may include turning embassies and consulates into temporary voting stations. Communities abroad are particularly interesting for those in power in their home states if they are large in size and likely to support their home state’s ruling government (Brand Reference Brand2010: 84; Wellmann Reference Wellmann2021). As Laurie Brand (Reference Brand2010: 86) argues, “domestic jockeying for electoral advantage” and the ensuing expectation “that those abroad would improve the electoral prospects of a particular party,” thus consolidating or further strengthening the regime, is among the main reasons for the extension of voting rights to communities abroad, which has been done by democracies and non-democracies alike.
In addition, there are several practices in the diplomatic and consular dimension that states can employ to repress certain groups or individuals among their communities abroad. Those pertain not only to “discretionary consular services,” by which Gamlen (Reference Gamlen2019: 248) refers to measures that “are not specifically condoned or prohibited by the Vienna Convention,” such as data collection or the intensity of legal support. In addition, though, they can also concern “core” diplomatic and consular activities (e.g., Glasius Reference Glasius2018: 191; Wackenhut and Orjuela Reference Wackenhut and Orjuela2023: 153) and manifest, for example, in the deliberate withholding of diplomatic support in legal matters or the denial of consular services (e.g., nonrenewal of passports). Another option is to exclude certain groups of people from overseas voting (e.g., based on profession or length of stay), which may be part of a larger drive of disenfranchising certain groups of communities both at home and abroad (Indian Express) and prevent “turning rights into ballots” (Finn and Besserer Rayas Reference Finn and Besserer Rayas2022).
The Economic and Social Dimension
States engage in a host of economic and social activities towards their national communities abroad, which in turn can be tied to different motivations of states. Supportive measures may include efforts to shore up the rights of national communities in host states through the signing of legal agreements. The line between doing something in support of communities abroad and getting something out of them is rather blurry, however, since efforts to shore up the rights and statuses of communities abroad concomitantly contain the promise for the host state of reaping bigger returns, for example through higher remittances. At the same time, states could repress parts of their communities abroad by deliberately excluding them from certain services or by barring certain activities on their part. While foreign ministries are key for diplomatic and consular activities, a broader array of “diaspora institutions” tends to be involved in economic and social affairs, comprising both dedicated diaspora ministries and additional “parent ministries” (next to the foreign ministry) “like health, welfare, labor, culture, and religion” (Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2014: 75) that feature departments dealing with communities abroad (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019: 42–48; also Lafleur and Vintila Reference Lafleur, Vintila, Lafleur and Vintila2020a: 27).
States can undertake a variety of activities to assist and support their national communities abroad in economic and social terms. They pertain, for example, to extending domestic benefits and services such as family or unemployment benefits, health care, social assistance, and pensions to their national communities abroad, thereby offering “deterritorialized social security as protection policy” (Lafleur and Vintila Reference Lafleur, Vintila, Lafleur and Vintila2020a: 8). Importantly, though, the extent to which benefits and services are “portable” depends on whether a home state can enter agreements with host states where its communities reside.
Another key issue is the protection of the rights of “worker-citizens” (Okano-Heijmans and Caesar-Gordon Reference Okano-Heijmans and Caesar-Gordon2016) abroad. This aspect is particularly salient for low-skilled workers who are not supported by their sending company (should there be one in the first place) and who also typically receive limited, if any support from their employers in the host state (Okano-Heijmans and Price Reference Okano-Heijmans and Price2019). A major instrument in this regard is the conclusion of labor agreements or of (nonbinding) memorandums of understanding between the home state and the host states of its national communities in which commitments and responsibilities concerning the protection of workers are established (e.g., Brand Reference Brand2006: 6–7).
Agreements like those on social protection and workers’ rights are important not only for the individual members of the communities abroad in terms of support but also for the home state and its ability to co-opt and thereby materially benefit from its communities. Indeed, higher levels of protection of the rights of their communities abroad should increase the economic and financial benefit of the host state, for example through higher returns of remittances or investments by the communities abroad (e.g., de Haas Reference de Haas2010). Accordingly, states should focus their efforts of concluding such agreements with those states where large diaspora groups reside. However, the mere conclusion of agreements with host states is by no means a guarantee for the actual upholding of workers’ rights as problems of “non-payment of due wages, working hours longer than that specified in contracts, denial of weekly holidays, exit or re-entry visas, health and medical insurance as well as non-renewal of residence permits” (Hameed Reference Hameed2021: 447) can nonetheless persist.
In addition to benefiting economically and financially from them “from afar,” states can set up activities for their communities abroad that seek to incentivize the return especially of highly qualified individuals to their home state (Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2014: 76). Measures which aim at the permanent return can be complemented by activities that seek to “engage [members of the diaspora] in temporary or virtual return programmes” (Koinova and Tsourapas Reference Koinova and Tsourapas2018: 313).
Representing the flipside of the aforementioned activities to induce “brain gain” (Kapur Reference Kapur2001) by tapping into the potential of communities abroad, states could deliberately try to repress parts of their communities abroad by withholding or barring certain benefits and activities respectively. This could relate to actions both from and to the home state. The former entails the deliberate exclusion of certain groups of communities abroad from the provision of domestic benefits and services, thereby making the latter “non-portable” for political reasons. The latter includes, for example, the blocking of transfers of remittances to the country of origin.
The Security Dimension
Finally, states engage in various security-related measures towards their national communities abroad. As has been the case for the two preceding dimensions, states’ actions can be tied to different motivations and objectives. While certain measures are aimed at protecting and at times literally saving members of their national community abroad from natural disasters or man-made threats, with the latter emanating from both other state actors and non-state actors (e.g., Leira Reference Leira2018), others are driven by states’ ambitions to either co-opt or repress members of their national community abroad, which in the most extreme cases mean the elimination of certain individuals. Whereas the supportive activities are typically situation-specific and limited in time, the other practices tend to be more systematic and long term. Importantly, while “diaspora institutions” are crucial for diplomatic and consular as well as economic and social measures, they are less relevant in the security realm where states’ military or intelligence services play important roles.
Security-related measures of supportFootnote 10 are often times necessitated by extreme circumstances, such as civil conflict or interstate war, natural disasters, or, as has been the case recently, a global pandemic. In such situations, states often times engage in interministerial efforts to coordinate their support for affected members of their communities abroad. Examples are evacuation flights which are organized by foreign ministries and conducted using either civilian aircraft or by drawing on the states’ military. The latter is particularly relevant in situations of violent conflict where the use of force may be required to take members of the national community out of harm’s way.
In terms of travel and residency patterns, the geographical scope of security-related measures of support and protection is potentially global. Having said that, the ability of most states to project power across larger distances is rather limited or virtually nonexistent. By implication, inaction on the part of states may result not from a lack of will but a lack of capacity. At the same time, military activities sometimes become possible or are at least rendered easier by fortuitous circumstances, such as when military forces are already present in a country or region that succumbs to civil war or is affected by a natural disaster for other purposes which can then be used to extract nationals (e.g., Zerba Reference Zerba2014: 1107).
In addition to activities to support and occasionally outright save members of their communities abroad, states have developed an extensive arsenal of security-related instruments and practices which they can employ to co-opt and, more importantly still, repress groups or certain individuals among their communities abroad. In this sense, Wackenhut and Orjuela (Reference Wackenhut and Orjuela2023: 147) refer to “a sizeable toolbox … to pursue their challengers and silence critique beyond their own borders, which includes assassinations, assaults, disappearances, renditions and unlawful deportations, abuse of Interpol’s system of ‘red notices’, digital threats, spyware, passport and document control, and coercion by proxy.” As indicated by the quote, recent technological advances have considerably expanded states’ ability “to monitor, discipline, and punish dissenters abroad” (Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas and Kennedy2022: 308), hence their reach across borders. Communities residing in open societies, where they can mobilize and express their positions against their home state’s regime freely, should be of particular interest to authoritarian states’ security services in terms of monitoring and surveillance (Brand Reference Brand2006: 218).Footnote 11
Drivers of States’ Interaction with Their National Communities Abroad
After having first outlined the general ways in which states might interact with their national communities abroad and the specific practices that states can employ in this regard, the ensuing question concerns the specific drivers which condition whether, how, and for what purposes states actually reach out to their national communities abroad. Possible explanatory factors can be grouped into four categories. While the first points to characteristics of the national community abroad, the others address characteristics of home states themselves. Thus, we place emphasis on utilitarian explanations which focus on material factors and instrumental considerations on the one hand and on governance explanations of states’ interactions with their national communities abroad which highlight multiple practices and channels of engagement on the other (Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2014: 82; Koinova and Tsourapas Reference Koinova and Tsourapas2018: 313–314).Footnote 12
First, certain characteristics of the national communities abroad can render activities of states more or less likely. This includes geographic location. That is, where national communities reside or travel abroad influences the extent to which states may be required to come to their assistance. If citizens travel or reside primarily in developed countries, on the whole the host states themselves should be better equipped to provide protective measures and also be less prone to succumb to civil conflict or become the location of interstate war. Conversely, the less developed a state is, the less state capacity exists in the host state for providing support and protection to any kinds of people, especially foreigners, and the likelihood of violent conflict also often times increases. As a result, the necessity for home states to come to the support of their citizens should increase.
Another factor relates to the domestic relevance of communities groups in economic terms. Not least spurred by economic globalization, home states increasingly consider their communities abroad as valuable assets (e.g., Délano and Gamlen Reference Délano and Gamlen2014: 44; Chaterjee and Das Reference Chaterjee and Das2021: 579). Indeed, migrants and diaspora groups more broadly can be a major economic factor in the home state, as indicated, for example, by remittances and investments. Moreover, diaspora groups can prove helpful in opening up host-state markets or for transferring knowledge back to their country of origin. Such manifest or expected material benefits should incentivize states to engage with, and co-opt, their citizens abroad.
Second, certain legal and institutional factors could be key drivers for state action. Regarding the former, the key question is whether states are legally obliged to assist their citizens abroad. More specifically, are such provisions established in state’s laws (e.g., the foreign service laws) or even national constitutions? The more formally binding the provisions are, the more likely states should become active. Conversely, if there are no legal provisions, interacting with national communities abroad essentially boils down to a policy decision (Geyer Reference Geyer2007: 2), which could lead to lower levels of engagement.
A similar logic applies with respect to “diaspora institutions” (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019: ch. 2). Here, the key question is whether states have specific ministries dedicated to the interaction with their national communities abroad. By setting up such an institution, states signal how important the issue is for them, and should engage in substantial and sustained activities accordingly. Alternatively, the task could be handled “merely” by subunits (e.g., departments or desks) of ministries with more encompassing mandates such as the foreign ministry or ministries dealing with economic and social affairs, or they could be handled by “other diaspora institutions” (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2019: 46) such as interdepartmental committees or advisory councils. The specific institutional set-up of diaspora institutions should be indicative of the political relevance and salience that states ascribe to their interactions with national communities abroad, which in turn should impact the intensity with which states engage in such actions, be it in terms of support, co-optation, or repression.
Third, states’ ability to engage with their national communities abroad can be conceived as a function of state capacity. States with greater political functionality are more likely to feature stable and capable institutions, both domestically (ministries, etc.) and abroad (e.g., diplomatic and consular network), which in turn are required to provide sustained and high-quality engagement with communities abroad, be it for purposes of support, co-optation, or repression. Similarly, greater economic prowess puts states in a better position to engage in diverse and durable activities towards their communities abroad. The same should be true for states with greater capacity in the security realm (military, intelligence, police) and ensuing activities most notably in terms of repression.
Thus, generally speaking, states with greater state capacity should be better able to employ a broader array of instruments in that regard, and do so in a sustained fashion, than states with lower capacity. However, it might be the latter who are particularly interested in or even dependent on such outreach activities. Indeed, states’ weakness at home might actually push them especially towards co-opting their national communities abroad to a much larger extent than is the case for states with high capacity. As Koinova and Tsourapas (Reference Koinova and Tsourapas2018: 315) put it, “To compensate for these limitations, they [weak states] engage diasporas abroad to fulfil missing functions and provide remittances to sustain livelihoods. Formal remittances and other capital contributions have been crucial to states’ survival.”
Finally, regime type can be another driver for states’ interaction with its national communities abroad. As a baseline, all regimes strive for legitimacy. In turn, the provision of support to nationals abroad can be among the means to accomplish this goal. Indeed, citizens expect support from their governments: While “travelling or residing abroad [they] will in many cases have a legitimate expectation that their home state will provide them with assistance if needed” (Haugevik Reference Haugevik2018: 171). If done successfully, the provision of support to communities abroad can consolidate or even augment a state’s legitimacy. Having said that, a state’s unwillingness or inability to come to the support of its citizens abroad could have the opposite effect by fostering the impression of “exploitative states that attempt to extract obligations without extending rights” (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2006: 23).
Still, while all regimes should have at least some interest in the well-being of their communities abroad, the extent to which states are politically required to engage in measures of “support” for reasons of legitimacy may vary depending on regime type. Indeed, different requirements could follow from being a democracy or an autocracy. However, the direction in which those requirements point is not clear. For example, based on generally higher levels of responsiveness and accountability democratic states might feel more compelled to look after their communities abroad than non-democratic regimes. Having said that, in non-democratic states the lack of participatory rights might make it even more crucial for the regimes to provide “at least” physical protection to their communities abroad.
The expectations for the practices of co-optation and especially repression are more clear-cut. Indeed, the literature on transnational authoritarianism (e.g., Glasius Reference Glasius2018; Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas2021a) suggests that incentives to engage in such activities should be particularly pronounced in authoritarian regimes. Thus, practices to repress certain parts of their national communities abroad like “surveillance, threats, proxy punishment, enforced disappearances, coerced return, and lethal retribution” (Tsourapas Reference Tsourapas and Kennedy2022: 308) should be found primarily as part of non-democratic regimes.
Country Selection
This volume examines the interactions of a total of twelve countries located in four continents with their national communities abroad for purposes of support, co-optation, and repression. Five of the countries are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and six belong to the G77 (plus Russia). Hence, the volume heeds the calls found in the literature previously cited for both engaging in comparative work on states’ relations with their national communities living abroad and for including non-Western cases when doing so (Délano and Gamlen Reference Délano and Gamlen2014: 47; Melissen and Okano-Heijmans Reference Melissen and Okano-Heijmans2018: 141). All the states have in common large groups of their national communities living abroad. This can be illustrated by the number of citizens living abroad, which for the countries covered in this volume range from a minimum of some 3 million in the case of the United States to close to 18 million in the case of India (Figure 1.1). Measured in absolute numbers, the countries covered in this volume are all ranked among the top thirty worldwide. Incorporating tourists and members of the diaspora who do not hold formal citizenship of their country of origin increases the size of the respective groups still further.
Figure 1.1 Nationals living abroad
Large groups of national communities abroad should, in principle, render the issue of interacting with those communities in other countries sufficiently salient for governments to engage in corresponding activities, thus rendering them most-likely cases. Of course, whether this is actually the case is a matter for empirical examination, hence this is one of the key analytical goals of this volume. The volume only considers countries which exhibit a minimum functionality in terms of state capacity since this is deemed a prerequisite for any meaningful and sustained activities to interact with national communities abroad. Consequently, while also exhibiting large communities abroad, countries like South Sudan, Afghanistan, or Syria, which are barely functional as per, for example, the “Fragile State Index” (Fund for Peace 2022), are not considered.
In addition to those basic parameters, the countries covered in this volume exhibit a wide variation along the aforementioned drivers that possibly condition states’ engagement with their communities abroad. Starting with the characteristics of national communities abroad. Here, the twelve countries exhibit significant differences, for example in terms of the geographic location of their communities residing permanently abroad (Figure 1.1). At one end of the spectrum, Mexicans reside almost exclusively in developed states and in the United States in particular. The United Kingdom, Germany, and Türkiye exhibit similar distributions. At the other end of the spectrum, the vast majority of Indonesians and Egyptians residing abroad are located in less developed states (UN 2020). A similar pattern emerges with respect to tourist travel (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Main tourist destinations
| Country | Top five tourist destinations |
|---|---|
| India | Thailand, Saudi Arabia, United States, Sri Lanka, Malaysia |
| Mexico | United States, France, Colombia, Spain, Canada |
| Russia | Türkiye, Thailand, Ukraine, Spain, Italy |
| China | Thailand, Hong Kong, United States, Malaysia, France |
| Pakistan | Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Türkiye, United States, Malaysia |
| Philippines | Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, United States, Cambodia |
| United Kingdom | Spain, Italy, Ireland, United States, Greece |
| Indonesia | Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Türkiye |
| Germany | Austria, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, France |
| Egypt | Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Lebanon, United States, Jordan |
| Türkiye | Greece, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Ukraine, Italy |
| United States | Mexico, Canada, France, Italy, Spain |
The national communities abroad of the twelve countries under examination also differ greatly in terms of their economic relevance for the home countries. Figure 1.2 illustrates this based on remittances, which display huge variation in terms of both absolute numbers and share of GDP. Regarding absolute numbers, India ranks top among the countries analyzed in this volume with remittances of more than $83 billion in 2020. In contrast, Türkiye received around $800 million. A different pattern emerges, however, when the remittances are measures in terms of percent of GDP. Here, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Egypt top the list. In all three countries, remittances amounted to 8 percent or more of the respective GDP in 2020. Conversely, in countries like Türkiye but also China and the United States remittances made up 0.1 percent of GDP or less (World Bank 2022a).
The countries covered in this volume also show variation with respect to the legal provisions and the institutional set-up for interacting with their national communities abroad. Regarding legal provisions, the countries include those where corresponding obligations have been enshrined in constitutions (e.g., China, Türkiye) or in regular laws such as foreign service laws (e.g., Germany). At the same time, the volume includes cases where no legal provisions exist (United Kingdom) or where provisions are aimed at the protection of specific groups of the national community abroad, most notably migrant workers (e.g., Indonesia).
The countries covered in this volume show similar variation in terms of the “diaspora institutions” tasked with the interaction with the national communities abroad. On the one hand, there are countries where dedicated ministries have been set up to address the state’s interactions with its communities abroad. Cases in point are: the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis; the (albeit short-lived) Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs; the Philippine’s newly set up Department of Migrant Workers; or the Ministry of State for Emigration and Egyptian Expatriate Affairs. In the other countries, the engagement with citizens residing abroad is handled by departmental units, with the foreign ministry being the key parent ministry.
The countries covered in this volume also vary significantly in terms of state capacity. This concerns both the overall functionality of the states and the specific indicators concerning the three substantive domains of actions covered in this volume (in short: diplomacy, economy, security). Differences in the overall functionality of the states can be illustrated by their ranking in the “Fragile State Index,” as Table 1.2 illustrates.
Table 1.2 State fragility
| Category | Countries |
|---|---|
| Sustainable | Germany |
| More stable | United Kingdom, United States |
| Warning | Indonesia, China |
| Elevated warning | Mexico, Russia, India, Türkiye |
| High warning | Philippines, Egypt, Pakistan |
In addition, the countries exhibit considerable differences in terms of the density and reach of their diplomatic and consular networks as indicated by the ranking in the “Global Diplomacy Index.” China tops the list, followed by the United States (2nd), Türkiye (5th), Russia (6th), United Kingdom (7th), Germany (8th), India (12th), Mexico (14th), Indonesia (23rd), Pakistan (32nd), and the Philippines (41st) (Lowy Institute 2021).Footnote 13
Moreover, the countries vary greatly in economic terms, as indicated, for example, by different classifications by the World Bank, including high, upper middle-, and lower middle-income countries (Table 1.3). They also differ markedly in their ranking on the “Human Development Index.” Here, countries range all the way from “very high human development” to “low human development (Table 1.4).
Table 1.3 World Bank country classification
| Category | Countries |
|---|---|
| High-income economies | Germany, United Kingdom, United States |
| Upper middle-income economies | China, Mexico, Russia, Türkiye |
| Lower middle-income economies | Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines |
Table 1.4 Human development
| Category | Countries |
|---|---|
| Very high human development | Germany (9th), United Kingdom (18th), United States (21st), Türkiye (48th), Russia (52nd) |
| High human development | China (79th), Mexico (86th), Egypt (97th), Indonesia (114th) |
| Medium human development | Philippines (116th), India (132nd) |
| Low human development | Pakistan (161st) |
The countries covered in this volume also exhibit huge differences with respect to military capabilities (Figure 1.3). This concerns, for example, the active military manpower, as indicated by the “Global Firepower” ranking (Global Firepower 2022). It also relates to the countries’ military spending, where there are also significant differences in terms of both expenditures in absolute terms and in terms of share of GDP (SIPRI 2022).
Finally, this volume’s countries show variation in regime type. The sample includes both “strongly democratic” and “strongly autocratic” countries as well as countries placed in-between, as indicated, for example, by the countries’ “Polity” scores (Marshall and Gurr 2020) (Figure 1.4). What is more, the countries exhibit variation within the democratic and autocratic groups. Regarding democracies, the volume entails both parliamentary (e.g., United Kingdom) and presidential (e.g., United States) systems. And in terms of variation among autocracies (e.g., Geddes Reference Geddes1999), it includes both party-based (China) and military (Egypt) types.
Plan of the Volume
To ensure comparability of findings across the chapters and coherence throughout the volume, each of the twelve country studies adheres to an identical structure consisting of six sections. Following brief introductions, the chapters present information on the respective countries’ national communities abroad, for example with respect to overall numbers, main geographical locations, and possible waves in which outward migration has occurred. Next, the chapters provide detailed discussions on the activities of the countries along the three substantive dimensions previously introduced, thus diplomatic and consular, economic and social, and security activities. Discussions focus primarily but not exclusively on developments since the end of the Cold War. Each chapter ends with a conclusion that highlights the key motivations and practices of the respective countries towards their national communities abroad, together with a brief outlook on expected changes, or lack thereof, in the foreseeable future.
The line-up of the chapters is based on the absolute numbers of nationals living abroad (see Figure 1.1). Thus, Nicolas Blarel starts out with a discussion on India’s activities towards its national communities abroad, for which he detects fundamental changes over time that more recently has led to a “re-engagement” by the Indian state (Chapter 2). Daniel Hernández Joseph and Jorge A. Schiavon follow with their discussion of Mexico, where the engagement of its nationals abroad – almost all of whom reside in a single country, namely the United States – not least through consular measures is a “foreign policy priority” (Chapter 3). In his chapter on Russia, Ethan Larson emphasizes the extent to which the country’s past – referred to as “empire’s echo” – informs its perception of, as well as drives its actions towards its national communities abroad, especially in the post-Soviet space (Chapter 4).
Examining China, Andrea Ghiselli characterizes the country’s activities towards its national communities abroad as being “low cost and low key,” which is striking given the prominence that the country ascribes to the protection of its nationals overseas and of its overseas interests more broadly (Chapter 5). Sahar Khan, in her exploration of Pakistan, emphasizes the crucial economic role that the country’s national community abroad widely understood plays through remittances and investments, which makes efforts to “tap into the diaspora’s economic potential” not only expedient but outright necessary (Chapter 6). In a similar vein, Ma. Divina Gracia Z. Roldan emphasizes in her discussion of the Philippines the crucial economic role of overseas Fillipino workers, which the country considers as “valued human assets” (Chapter 7).
In stark contrast, James Strong suggests for the United Kingdom that while the country provides “good information” to its nationals about the risks they may face abroad and how to mitigate them, it tries to avoid offering further support (“limited liability”) unless it really cannot help it, in which case it does offer a “powerful safety net” (Chapter 8). Reversing emphasis yet again, Ann Marie Murphy and Amy Freedman emphasize in their chapter on Indonesia that the country is strongly engaged with its national communities abroad, particularly when it comes to “protecting migrant workers,” which is expedient not only for economic but also for domestic political purposes (Chapter 9). Conversely, Klaus Brummer and Kai Oppermann argue that Germany, whilst having the material wherewithal to do much more towards its national communities abroad, is for the most part only “supportive in times of crisis” (Chapter 10).
In her chapter on Egypt, Kelsey P. Norman argues that the country has taken a bifurcated approach in its engagement with the national community abroad, which not only refers to categorizing the latter in temporary and permanent migrants but also in terms of actions in the form of “cultivating loyalty” on the one hand and “repressing when necessary” on the other (Chapter 11). In her discussion of Türkiye, Yasemin Akbaba argues that the roles, policies, and services of the country’s institutions and what they do to protect Turkish citizens abroad have shifted in response to changes in the nature and volume of emigration, which has led to “reimagining the home state” (Chapter 12). For the United States, Drew A. Hogan and Ronald R. Krebs contend that despite its unmatched capabilities, the country has shown little inclination overall to engage its national communities abroad directly, thus making the country a “(mostly) hand-off superpower” (Chapter 13). The concluding chapter (Chapter 14), by Šumit Ganguly and Klaus Brummer, presents core findings in terms of the drivers of states’ interactions with their national communities abroad and ends with suggestions for future research.
