Augustine's rejection of pagan virtue in the City of God is often connected to his anti-Pelagian works and so exaggerated. However, Augustine's actual account of pagan virtue, both in the City of God and Contra Julianum, is much more nuanced than is commonly recognized. Augustine connects true virtue to true religio, its end in the beatific vision, and the grace without which it is impossible, and consistently highlights the connection between virtue and worship. Nevertheless, the category of the pagan virtues, habits sufficient to promote the flourishing of Rome, is an important part of Augustinian virtue theory. Attending to the presence of pagan virtue in the City of God shines light on why Augustine repeatedly claims that his theology, and not that of Julian, is most opposed to Manichean claims. The City of God provides useful context for interpreting Augustine's theology of grace in the anti-Pelagian works, and so avoiding an over exaggerated theology of the Fall.

In this paper, I explore the axiological status of work. I engage with a number of prominent natural law theorists who consider it a basic human good and explain why their arguments fail. In the process, I put forward a novel argument against the very possibility of work being considered a basic good. I conclude that whilst work may be very important to us psychologically and instrumentally it should not be considered a basic human good.

I present a short summary of the traditional pagan and Christian legacy claiming that hell is above all a place of pain and the objections that have been addressed to it. Then I proceed to my main point:tracing a philosophical thread from Plato to Aristotle and then from Augustine to Aquinas, and citing a psychological experience of everyday life, I maintain that: 1) either there is no pain in hell, or 2) hell is not the worst thing that can happen to a human being. Then I present four possible objections to my thesis and attempt to counter them. In the last section I point to some practical consequences on the pastoral level that could ensue from a different doctrine on the nature of hell.

Modern theodicies often offer definitive explanations for the unsolvable problem of human suffering. This philosophical enterprise was challenged by David B. Burrell's book, Deconstructing Theodicy: Why Job Has Nothing to Say to the Puzzle of Suffering (2008). His observations about the book of Job and the way it militates against theodical speculation are compelling, but there is a missed opportunity with his exegesis of Job 42:6. The Hebrew of Job's last words can be translated in at least five distinct (and legitimate) ways. Using this grammatical characteristic, this paper argues that the ambiguity in 42:6 creates an “unfinalizable” quality that allows sufferers to be unsilenced and participate in the meaning-making process. Situating the addendum with philosophical ruminations on theodicy, the argument turns to an exegetical section that comments on Burrell's discussion in “Denouement and Epilogue” and analyzes the Hebrew grammar of Job 42:1-6. This addendum compliments Burrell's deconstruction of theodicy, adding a further pool of resources for sufferers to remain unsilenced and narrate their own questioning of God.

Pusey is often characterised as obscurantist and conservative in his rejection of the higher literary criticism of the Bible in the later part of the nineteenth century. Much of the criticism of Pusey has focused on a limited assessment of Pusey as a scriptural scholar and on unfair psychological analysis. This article examines Pusey's epistemology more deeply and concludes that he had a breadth of vision which commends itself to the modern world as a critique of reason rather than a rejection of reason. Pusey's role as a biblical scholar is reassessed within the broad context of the Oxford Movement.

It is commonly held that that the dominance of logical positivism, in the early part of the twentieth-century, hindered Newman's philosophical recognition. However, commentators also argue that Newman's writing began to gain wider recognition following Wittgenstein's reference to “H Newman” (1969) in the posthumous publication of On Certainty. This essay explores whether or not this version of the history of Newman's philosophical reception rings true – exploring whether or not the reference to “H Newman” really marks a watershed for Newman's philosophical legacy.

Aquinas’ fifth way for demonstrating the existence of God shows a confidence in its argument that is not generally shared by the contemporary reader. Natural entities that lack awareness (or perhaps self-awareness) act in an end-directed manner; this implies a fundamental relation to goals they do not consciously choose; this in turn points to the existence of a governing mind. The article tries to make sense of this argument against the background of philosophical naturalism that is assumed by much contemporary thought. It addresses the question of what kinds of end-directed activity fall under the scope of the argument, and why Aquinas thinks that these imply a governing mind. The article notes the unusual structure of the argument, suggesting that it should be understood (as should all of the five ways) as an attempt to wake the reader up to something so fundamental that it is usually overlooked. The main difficulty for the contemporary reader is to recover an Aristotelian sense of what it means for something to exist. If readers can achieve this, they may come to appreciate why an argument that seems enormously controversial in the present day seemed reasonably obvious to Aquinas.

Promoting ecological awareness and sustainability of God's creation is now considered as a primary task of the CST. However, from its beginning with Rerum Novarum, CST emphasizes the promotion of social justice and equity, and highlights the dangers of economic inequalities between richer and poorer nations and the need for distributive justice. To that effect, human development was its central theme, which is favored by the dominion mandate and is known nowadays as the Anthropocene. Important documents like Gaudium et Spes and Populorum Progressio are illustrative for this anthropocentric stance, while less attention is given to the wellbeing of nonhuman creatures and natural ecosystems. Nevertheless, from Octogesima Adveniens onwards, the CST starts to look into environmental issues. Pope Francis' Laudato Si' in 2015 introduces a significant shift by referring to nonhuman creatures as ‘our fellow creatures’, thereby extending ‘intrinsic value’ to all nonhuman creatures. In his integral ecology, he promotes a sustainable and integral development that favors the wellbeing of both human and natural environments. In this article, we assess Laudato Si's view on sustainability and integral development in confrontation with the wider framework of the Planetary Boundaries's concept of sustainable development.