Given the relative economic resources of Germany and its enemies, and its inefficient constitutional structures, scholars have often viewed German defeat as the likely outcome of World War I. Even the close-run offensives of summer 1914 and spring 1918 did not, on closer scrutiny, have much chance of delivering a decisive strategic advantage to Germany. Focusing on strategic decision-making, Holger Afflerbach takes issue with the interpretative schema of an almost inevitable German defeat: “This war could have ended in a draw . . . and the German leadership had to commit very serious mistakes to lose it” (6). He concludes that, from the German perspective, “catastrophic strategic mistakes” (423) hobbled the war effort. The editor of Moriz von Lyncker's papers, Afflerbach is deeply versed in the high politics of Imperial Germany and an adept guide to the different characters, personal intrigue, and competing strategic visions that informed military and diplomatic decision-making.

German military leaders had entered the war confident of victory, but the offensive in the West came to a halt with defeat at the Battle of the Marne. Erich von Falkenhayn, who replaced Moltke as Chief of the General Staff, quickly recognised that the war would now become one of attrition. Henceforward, Afflerbach argues, German leaders were particularly sensitive to the anxiety that time and the relative resources of the Central Powers and the Entente were working against Germany. This strategic pessimism, combined with a persistent belief in the operational superiority of German forces, “would provoke a number of spectacular strategic errors” (85). Afflerbach identifies several key mistakes. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare that brought the United States into the war in April 1917 undid any advantage to Germany from the collapse of Russian power in early 1917. Continued American neutrality, combined with Russia dropping out of the war, would have “guaranteed a tolerable end to the war for the Central Powers” (247). Instead, poorly informed about the United States and its military potential, German leaders believed submarine warfare would quickly threaten Britain with starvation. Again in early 1918, having secured a peace (of sorts) in eastern Europe with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Erich Ludendorff planned a spring offensive, an “enormous gamble” (349), based on a newly acquired fear of American military mobilization and an unfounded belief in the possibility of a decisive breech through Entente lines. The German spring offensives made substantial ground but lacked the mobility to exploit these gains for decisive strategic advantage. Even worse, the offensive wasted soldiers’ lives and surrendered excellent defensive positions that might have enabled Germany to hold out for a negotiated settlement with its tiring French and British enemies.

Diplomatic and political errors compounded Germany's strategic problems. German leaders missed opportunities to explore a negotiated settlement. In contrast to other scholars, Afflerbach argues that Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's December 1916 peace initiative was genuine. However, the Proclamation of Polish Independence in November 1916 proved an “unmitigated disaster” (210) and destroyed any possibility of negotiations with Russia. At the very least, Bethmann Hollweg's initiative might have served to exacerbate growing tensions between the Entente and the United States, but the decision for unrestricted submarine warfare undid any chance of this. In the negotiations with the Soviets at Brest-Litovsk, Max Hoffmann demonstrated great skill in exploiting the principle of self-determination to expand German influence and control over nascent nation-states in eastern Europe, but the “fundamental dishonesty” (319) of German strategy proved short-sighted as Brest-Litovsk bolstered the Entente and American perception that Imperial Germany was irredeemably militaristic.

Why did German leaders make such a succession of misguided decisions? The people in charge mattered, and Afflerbach offers deft sketches of vain men unaware of their own limitations. Personal flaws sharpened the structural problems of the German constitution. Limited by his bureaucratic instincts, Bethmann Hollweg was unable to speak out effectively against the generals’ and admirals’ dash to unrestricted submarine war in early 1917, because he considered the issue as largely one for military and naval control. Throughout, Afflerbach adds telling details – for instance, Wilhelm II had only met Bethmann Hollweg's successor, Michaelis, once before his appointment as Chancellor and “thought him small, a dwarf” (290). The constitutional structures of Imperial Germany required careful managing of Wilhelm II's personality. John Röhl has long made this argument, and Afflerbach expands this line of analysis into World War I. The Emperor proved a disastrous leader. He was more than a figurehead, particularly with his power of appointment, but he proved incapable of taking timely decisions, so that “outright chaos” (291)characterised high politics. These flaws had been evident as early as the July Crisis, when Wilhelm II had dithered, indulging in speech-making and depriving others from contributing to the discussion and decision.

Other belligerents displayed similar issues – deeply flawed leaders, vicious rows between civilian and military leaders, and a lack of strategic coordination. These flaws contributed to the defeat of the Habsburg and Romanov regimes and arguably laid the basis for the collapse of liberal Italy in the early 1920s. Tens of thousands of French and British soldiers died in ill-conceived offensives between 1915 and 1917. However, their access to economic resources in North America and their empires ensured that the costs did not prove fatal to the French or British regimes. In the German context, poor decisions determined the fate of the regime, which did not have access to the same level of resources to compensate for strategic errors. In addition, German leaders’ own perception of their long-term economic weakness relative to the Entente and the United States led them to gamble on military solutions to underlying strategic problems. Holger Afflerbach's deep insight into German high politics refreshes the debate about the outcome of the war by reminding scholars of the importance of decision-making and the dreadful human costs of miscalculation.