Han-Centrism, Han Privilege and Minority Prejudice

Although the People's Republic of China (PRC) advocates multiculturalism, Chinese ethnic nationalism has a Han-centric dimensionFootnote ¹¹ which claims that “the Han culture is the world's most advanced and its race is one of the strongest and most prosperous,” such that “the interests of the Han race are equivalent to the interests of China as a whole and the welfare of its people.”Footnote ¹² Such Han-centric narratives seem to run counter to the government's “official” multicultural nationalism, as proclaimed by the 1982 Constitution, which sees the PRC as “a unified multiethnic state founded by the Chinese people of all ethnic groups.”Footnote ¹³ Yet the idea that Han culture is related to Chineseness is deeply entrenched in the PRC's historical and patriotic education,Footnote ¹⁴ where the image of Han superiority is intertwined with the Marxist ideology of progress, and other ethnicities are urged to follow the example of the Han.Footnote ¹⁵ By extension, the Chinese nation (guojia 国家) is believed to be the home of the Han people and the revival of Han culture is seen as necessary for China's continued development.Footnote ¹⁶ Distinguishing the Han from the “other,” ethnic minorities continue to be portrayed as the “backwards periphery” in contrast to the Han's “progressive, modern core.”Footnote ¹⁷ Han-ness is an unmarked category against which other minzu 民族 (ethnic minority) groups are compared. For example, in the PRC's textbooks and national stage performances, Han Chinese don Westernized suits and dresses, while ethnic minorities are depicted in distinctive ethnic garb and performing ethnic songs and dances, essentially juxtaposing the “normal” and “modern” Han with the “culturally backward” and “unlearned” minorities.Footnote ¹⁸

Han culture is then conflated to mean Chinese culture and thus the Han are seen as the dominant, paradigmatic ethnic group in China.Footnote ¹⁹ Some cultural conservatives even go so far as to advocate the superiority of Han culture over other, Western cultures.Footnote ²⁰ Within this Han-centric narrative, to be Chinese is essentially to be Han and Han culture represents the authentic character of the nation; to pollute or deviate from the Han identity will only tarnish Chinese exceptionalism and impede China's rise.Footnote ²¹ This almost racialized understanding of ethnicity, together with the understanding that ethnic identity is stable, given and mutually exclusive, has given rise to a “great Han mentality” within China that forms the basis of a deeply rooted discriminatory bias against the non-Han.Footnote ²²

Despite the PRC's many formalized safeguards to protect multiculturalism and ethnic minority identities, cultures and languages,Footnote ²³ the government continues to exploit the Han-centric sentiment, which is deeply embedded within the population, whenever ethnic minorities challenge government policies, such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, or during territorial disputes with other countries in the region.Footnote ²⁴ This is particularly pertinent in the context of Muslim populations in China. Their minority status and the Muslim identity are both constituted as the “other” in a Han-centric world-view: just as minorities are construed as backwards and peripheral, Muslims are perceived as suspicious, alien and potentially violent. This is where Han-centric and Anglo-centric world-views collude: fundamentally, both dominant groups see themselves as modern and forward thinking, yet they cast minority, racialized and othered identities as the civilizational antithesis of themselves.

Although some scholars argue that Han privilege, along the lines of white privilege, has yet to emerge in China in the absence of awareness and any protest movement similar to the civil rights movements of the West,Footnote ²⁵ Han-centrism and Han chauvinism are not new concepts. Research has shown that the nationality policy of the PRC continues to be formulated from a Han-centric perspective.Footnote ²⁶ Moreover, privilege does not have to be visible to be entrenched. Just as white supremacy and privilege are built upon the invisibleness of whiteness,Footnote ²⁷ Han norms permeate society and become value-neutral and the standard against which deviance is measured. The privilege embedded in a dominant group's existence is such that it “often goes unnoticed for those who benefit from it, but, for those who don't, [it is] often blatantly and painfully ubiquitous.”Footnote ²⁸ It is also important to consider positive and negative forms of privilege. Positive privileges are supposed to be shared with everyone (such as equal access to education) and are more likely to be formalized within state policy; however, it is the negative forms of privilege that need to be identified and addressed, because they allow the dominant group to be dismissive of the disadvantaged others and to be “ignorant, oblivious, and arrogant, often without realizing that that is what they are doing.”Footnote ²⁹ Such negative forms of privilege are particularly noticeable in China, where Han-dominated discussions on topics such as race and Muslims are awash with casual discriminatory and derogatory terms. As this paper will demonstrate, dismissive and aggressive narratives surrounding minorities are not only about othering the out-group but also about strengthening in-group pride and the dominance of the majority.Footnote ³⁰

Uyghurs: Civilization, Securitization and Confessions

From the Chinese state's perspective, the relationship between the dominant group (the Han) and peripheral peoples such as the Uyghurs is akin to a civilizing mission, where one group, the civilizing centre, engages with the peripheral group from a position of superiority in order to “lead them to modernity.”Footnote ³⁴ Han-friendly policies encourage Han migration and settlement in Xinjiang, and research has shown that Han people perform better in job markets and educational contexts there in comparison to their Uyghur counterparts.Footnote ³⁵ By responding favourably to Han demands, the Chinese state has fostered “a political discourse justifying Han settler presence in minority areas.”Footnote ³⁶ More recently, the securitization of Xinjiang and the Uyghur population in general has received increasing international attention.Footnote ³⁷ However, owing to domestic propaganda and censorship, the Chinese public and grassroot commentators tend to treat international concerns with scepticism.

When discussing Uyghurs and Xinjiang, Islamophobic bloggers typically oscillate between presenting Xinjiang as a heterotopia and embracing Sinicized, or “reformed,” Uyghurs, and issuing severe warnings about the constant threat of terrorism and the harsh consequences for those who deviate from the Sinicized path. The emphasis is on the ongoing threat of terrorism in the region, which accords with official securitization narratives. One article opens by lamenting how terrorism is the scar that mars Xinjiang:

The author's depiction of Xinjiang as a pure, unspoiled heterotopia echoes a common theme found in state ethnicity narratives.Footnote ³⁹ The use of stereotypical and reductionist cultural symbols that set Xinjiang apart from the mainstream and the modern reinforces the widespread and deep-rooted assumptions of Han superiority, a trope often presented in tandem with the Chinese state's civilizing effort in the region.Footnote ⁴⁰ Expressions of gratitude, and indeed panegyrics, are written by both Uyghur and Han authors as they seek to justify the harsh measures of control deployed in the region by highlighting the economic reforms and infrastructural advances made by the CCP. One Uyghur special force agent (tejing 特警) wrote:

Similarly, the mayor of Hotan 和田市, a Uyghur cadre, wrote:

There is, of course, no way to verify whether these posts were actually written by the Uyghurs authorship was attributed to. However, the true identity of the authors of these posts matters less than the message that they convey: Uyghurs can and ought to welcome reform. The moralistic and paternalistic appeal in these writings feeds into the narrative that Uyghur-populated regions were backward before the reform. The Chinese state, embodied by the Han majority, brought modernity to the periphery and so deserves the Uyghur people's gratitude and loyalty. To reject Han culture and influence, by implication, is to sow the seeds of discontent among the peripheral populations, which signals a sinister intent. Instead of showing an awareness of the policies that favour the Han settlers and their deeply embedded privileges in peripheral regions, the authors choose to focus on the supposed decline of Han influence in Xinjiang, which they argue is directly related to the rise of extremism and terrorism and could become a vicious cycle leading to a dangerous future:

By focusing on the issue of declining Han populations in regions such as Xinjiang, these authors assert that the Han have a natural dominance in peripheral regions, and perpetuate the idea that if Han numbers decline, so will Han culture and identity, which is used synonymously with the idea of being Chinese. The declining Han influence means less successful Sinicization, which then becomes a security issue for the state, as the Muslim other is seen as fundamentally disloyal to the Chinese nation. These articles typically end with a call to arms, the aggression of which is beyond even the state narrative:

Fearmongering, served with a hefty helping of xenophobia, is a common tactic used by these bloggers when discussing Xinjiang:

Such arguments and narratives support the alleged need to exclude and contain Uyghurs, using biopolitical terms, “where the Uyghur people as a whole have come to symbolize an almost biological threat to society that must be quarantined through surveillance, punishment, and detention.”Footnote ⁴⁶ However, it is important to note that the authors do not assign distrustfulness and otherness to the Uyghurs based on their ethnicity; indeed, in order to keep state secularization concerns in line with ethnic harmony narratives, they emphasize the contrast between the purity of the Uyghur ethnicity and the toxicity of Islam. These “Uyghurs at risk” narratives are not only presented from an outsider's perspective but also through the “confessional” blogs in which Sinicized, “model” Uyghurs voice their concerns about the need to separate religion from ethnicity.

Using a more belligerent tone, some Han authors warn about extremist practices infiltrating everyday life by positioning Islamic practices as being the opposite of “normal.” In an attack on an article that questioned the increasing Sinicization of Muslims in Xinjiang, one blogger wrote:

Such views align with official media narratives that also make broad generalizations and voice concerns about young impressionable Muslims who do not know any better. An excerpt from Xinjiang ribao, which was re-posted by one of the anti-terrorist accounts, argues that:

The context of “Hijrah” is never explained in these articles, nor the meaning of the word as the author understands it. It is simply implied that “Hijrah” is a foreign idea that lures Chinese Muslims away from the motherland. It can refer to anything from a pilgrimage to migration to the holy land, all of which are described as “terrorist ideas.” This type of “normal versus abnormal” frame narratively divides Xinjiang into a three distinct realms: the heterotopic, “traditional” and backward world of un-Sinicized Uyghurs, who are pure at heart but vulnerable to radicalization; the abnormal, sinister and unlawful world of extremist Islamic influences that pose both a threat and a temptation to these Uyghurs; and the modern and “normal” world where the Han and Sinicized Uyghurs live together in harmony, free from the threat of terrorism. Indeed, in the Uyghur “confessional” posts, religion, Islam and extremism are used synonymously, with the “reformed” Uyghur authors deliberately emphasizing their choice of secularity and Party membership, differentiating themselves from the heterotypic “you”:

In a similar vein, another author argues that all religions are extreme unless tamed by a strong state, and that the “Sinicization of religion must make sure all religions are guided towards being right and normal (zhengchang zhengque 正常正确).”Footnote ⁵¹ To align with the state discourse on ethnic harmony, the authors construct a narrative where the Uyghur ethnicity is seen as naturally “pure” and “blameless,” whereas religion is fundamentally foreign and can act as an instigator of instability. These narratives often highlight how Xinjiang used to be free from religious influence and that Uyghurs are not meant to be religious at all:

It is worth noting that in contrast to their attitude and narrative strategies regarding the Hui, these authors are not acting as agents of secularization for the Uyghur community. They reiterate official state narratives and leverage them as a foundation for their own arguments. Their narrative focus here is more to do with showing that the existing state strategy in Xinjiang is effective. By constructing a victim and villain narrative such as this, the authors are able to further their Islamophobic claims without contradicting state ethnic harmony narratives. So long as the Uyghurs are portrayed as having no agency in their wrongdoing, then they can be Sinicized and “reformed.”Footnote ⁵³ Indeed, efforts to secularize and Sinicize Uyghurs in the name of containing domestic terrorist threats in Xinjiang have been frequently lauded by these authors. Furthermore, suggestions are made that such strategies should be adapted for use elsewhere to contain other Muslim populations of concern, such as the Hui.

Hui: Perceived Demands of the “Troublesome Ethnicity” and Han Victimhood

In contrast to the prevailing view held by the KMT in Republican China, CCP historians have classed the Hui as a distinct ethnicity (minzu) since the 1930s.Footnote ⁵⁴ Whereas Uyghur demands for more autonomy and closer ties to the Middle East are viewed as a security threat, the assimilated Hui have been held up as an example of a “model ethnic minority” by the Chinese state.Footnote ⁵⁵ The Hui are therefore not usually targeted by state securitization narratives and are often portrayed in state media as a cooperative and even patriotic ethnic group.Footnote ⁵⁶ Some observers argue that the Hui had until very recently enjoyed greater religious autonomy to the extent that they were able to advocate a Saudi-style Salafism that would have been unimaginable for the Uyghurs.Footnote ⁵⁷ In terms of average educational attainment and political representation at the highest state level, the Hui are also the most successful among all ethnic minorities.Footnote ⁵⁸ Ironically, whereas the Chinese state views the Hui as successful Muslims and the Uyghurs as primitive, Uyghurs regard the Hui as “fake” Muslims, calling them “watermelons” (green on the outside, red on the inside).Footnote ⁵⁹ Generally, the Hui are permitted more freedoms than the Uyghurs: they may wear religious dress, go on state-sponsored (albeit tightly controlled and monitored) pilgrimage and practise their religion openly, all of which makes them more visible in Chinese public life.Footnote ⁶⁰ In addition, a significant proportion of the increase in the number of mosques, which has risen by approximately 78 per cent between 1994 and 2010, is located in Hui regions.Footnote ⁶¹

Discussions in Chinese cyberspace reveal that the Hui are perceived to be less tightly controlled and monitored than the Uyghurs, thus creating a sense of discontent and suspicion among Islamophobic bloggers. In contrast to the Uyghurs, who are usually depicted as innocent victims of Islam, the Hui are portrayed in a far more negative light. Online content centred around the Hui often employs scaremongering and dog-whistling tactics designed to evoke fear, anger and resentment among its target audience, as authors seek to promote an awareness of the “risks” posed by the Hui. If the “confessional” blogs are meant to celebrate the Sinicization efforts of Uyghurs, then the aim of the writings on the Hui is to raise the alarm about the supposedly Sinicized ethnic group's chicanery and deceit. Whereas these Islamophobic narratives construct the Uyghurs as innocent sheep misled by religion, the Hui are depicted as wolves under the guise of sheep.

Online critics of the Hui are particularly aggrieved about the spread of halal and affirmative action in China's official ethnic minority policies. In far right or populist discourse in the West, halal is often considered to be synonymous with devianceFootnote ⁶² and “stealth jihad,”Footnote ⁶³ with halal certification seen as funding terrorist activities and the practice of halal as an activity that connects ordinary Muslims with terrorism.Footnote ⁶⁴ In Han-dominated Chinese cyberspace, halal is also a major source of contention, where Han authors claim that the expansion of halal encroaches upon their own culture and liberties. Even though the Chinese word for halal, qingzhen 清真, can mean more than halal itself, as it “involves much more than food ritually prepared according to Islamic dietary prescriptions,”Footnote ⁶⁵ the use of the word qingzhen (meaning “pure and true”), versus dazhong 大众 (“the masses”), in restaurant settings in Muslim-populated regions, for example, suggests the significance of qingzhen in symbolic boundary making.Footnote ⁶⁶ For Islamophobic bloggers, nuanced distinctions between qingzhen and halal are lost, as both terms represent something that they consider to be foreign and un-Chinese. Not only is qingzhen perceived and framed as an issue of inconvenience but it is also narratively portrayed in conspiratorial terms, pointing to how the visual presence of Islam in public space is a fundamental challenge to China's sovereignty and Han dominance.Footnote ⁶⁷ Within this narrative, the Hui are presented as a troublesome ethnic group because of their halal practices, which encroach on the freedom and space of other ethnic groups:

Although at first glance it appears that the author of the above passage is advocating for greater visibility of other, under-represented minorities, it is clear from the overall narrative that these minority groups are juxtaposed with the Hui to emphasize the problematic behaviour of the Hui. For instance, in another post attacking the halal practices of the Hui, the author argues that the Hui exhibit more “othering” behaviour than other, more “native” ethnic groups:

By referencing the Manchus and the Mongols, who are considered to have not “encroached upon Han liberties” by threatening the dominance of Han culture and identity, the authors are, in essence, advocating the idea that a “good” minority is an invisible minority, or a minority that does not impose upon the majority group's hospitality by demanding their own minor and othered status. Indeed, the posts warning of the Hui's “unreasonable halal demands” are often written from Han perspectives and focus on Han grievances and experiences. By contrast, when the topic of halal is raised in Uyghur-centric posts, it is usually in a Uyghur confessional form, with the Uyghur authors lamenting that they had imposed on Han hospitality and kindness by asking Han people to accommodate their food preferences. The authors of such posts often end by declaring that they are now enlightened and will do better in future.Footnote ⁷⁰ Compared to the narrative of innocence and misguidedness surrounding the Uyghurs, the halal practices of the Hui are seen as a form of transgression about which the Han need to be aware and vigilant.

The rhetorical devices used in Hui-related articles are also far more belligerent and sinister, contributing towards a culture of risk where Han audiences would perceive ethnic diversity as a threat. In another piece that specifically references Hui-dominated regions, one wrote:

Exaggerated rhetoric leading to unfounded conclusions about ethnic violence and implied suggestions that most Hui small business owners are thugs and essentially part of an underground organized crime gang feature frequently in these posts. In one, entitled “Beware of organized crime disguising [itself] as religion and ethnic minorities,” the author writes:

By adding a link to an article reporting on local conflicts between Hui ramen shop owners, the author further implies that Hui business owners band together, follow their own rules and operate as a distinct ethnic entity outside of the law. The Han author goes on to stress that local policing authorities “should not confuse ethnic unity with unity with criminals,” and goes as far as to argue that the Hui, if left unchecked, have the potential to subvert the Chinese (i.e. Han) state. Here, again, Han authors proclaim to tolerate minority practices and behaviour – but with the caveat that such behaviour must not challenge the political dominance of the Han. This is closely tied in with the “Han as underdogs” narrative in which authors dress their grievances against halal as a form of repression of their own freedoms. One author, for example, highlights that Han students in Ningxia University (in the Hui autonomous region) were upset by the lack of non-halal provision on campus:

The sense of outrage caused by halal being the main and usual option on offer frames a discursive attempt to depict Han food as the “normal” food, thus using concepts such as naturalness to legitimize and maintain privilege.Footnote ⁷⁴ Such cultures of privilege naturalize inequality and mean that the beneficiaries will seek to preserve their privilege when they feel their position is threatened.Footnote ⁷⁵ In this particular article, the author calls on the university's management, and the Party branch in particular, to intervene, and suggests that any “ambiguous attitude” towards Han student grievances would imply that these authorities were supportive of religious extremism. This type of narrative framing is common in other parts of the world, where anti-halal campaigns often use consumer rights as a way to legitimize their claims.Footnote ⁷⁶ However, the Chinese case is unique in that the authors see themselves as raising the alarm about the threat posed by the Hui, of which they believe the Chinese state is oblivious. During the Covid-19 lockdowns, for example, there were numerous posts decrying the “special treatment” received by those who requested halal options for their food:

Central to this victimhood narrative is the idea of Han sacrifice and Han accommodation of the unreasonable demands of minority groups, which serve only to embolden the “other's” push for greater dominance in the cultural and political sphere. Here, halal practices are used as a signifier of alienness and otherness to provoke and outrage sympathetic readers.

Ironically, there is some evidence that the state is promoting halal production and management because it wants to use the “brand” of Chinese Hui ethnicity in a “cultural ambassador” role in Sino-Muslim world trade.Footnote ⁷⁸ At the same time, the official media have also picked up on the so-called pan-halal problem, contributing towards the moral panic that halal, and by extension Islam, is becoming “a problem of excess” in some regions.Footnote ⁷⁹ This type of discursive focus assigns to halal, or pan-halal, sinister motives and the fostering of a “religious extremist atmosphere.” Authors indiscriminately assign to all halal-related activities, ranging from fierce competitive behaviour to everyday purchases, a connection to potential terrorist actions.Footnote ⁸⁰ Because the legal definition of halal and the discursive power of accepting or rejecting it lies with the state, these Islamophobic posts try to shape their own narrative to align with the state's grander narrative in order to lend themselves legitimacy.

Similarly, affirmative action has long been blamed by dominant groups for supposedly discriminating again them – otherwise known as “reverse discrimination.”Footnote ⁸¹ In recent years, resentment against unwarranted minority privileges (for example, in relation to college entrance requirements) has become an increasingly strong current in Han nationalism.Footnote ⁸² While all ethnic minorities in China benefit from affirmative action policies, the Hui come in for particularly harsh criticism in the Chinese cyberspace and, again, are portrayed as the most “troublesome” and “sneaky” of all ethnicities, unchecked in their quest for further preferential treatment and power:

Unlike the infantilizing language used to describe Uyghurs, the language in Hui-centric posts is often belligerent, aggressive and designed to whip up fear. In these articles, the Hui are often ominously referred to as “some people” or “certain groups” (mouxieren 某些人); sometimes the word Hui is censored, using asterisks or “xx,” to further support the oppressed-Han victim narrative. Labels such as “lazy, ungrateful and greedy” are often used to describe the Hui. In a purported “open letter” to the provincial mayor of Guizhou, for example, the author raises an alarm to “save the Han children!”:

Although Guizhou is home to numerous ethnic minorities, such as the Miao 苗族, Dong 侗族 and Tujia 土家族, it is the Hui who bear the brunt of attacks in many of these posts and who are often compared unfavourably with their counterparts. The victimhood narrative is even more evident here, as the authors appear to genuinely believe that their rights and privileges are being eroded by affirmative action policies. This kind of victim narrative is important because social problems are not fully constructed until victims are made apparent.Footnote ⁸⁵ The purpose of these Hui-centric pieces is to raise awareness of what the authors view as a dangerous imbalance in ethnic relationships in China. In another article decrying the educational affirmative policies in Ningxia, the author, writing from an emotionally distressed parent's point of view, claims that such policies are turning ethnic minority groups into social outcasts:

Similar to the moral panic created by antagonistic narratives on pan-halal, here the authors attempt to whip up anxiety about the subjugation of the Han by claiming that many Han parents are choosing to change their ethnicity to Hui in order to overcome the discrimination they are suffering at the hands of affirmative policies. In another article, the author claims that:

The authors of these Hui-centric posts appropriate anti-discrimination claims to argue that the Han majority are the ones at risk of being discriminated against, similar to how white nativists also turn anti-racist rhetoric on its head.Footnote ⁸⁸ They claim that the Hui are playing the “ethnicity card” in China, in a similar vein to how white nativists argue that ethnic minorities play the race card in the US.Footnote ⁸⁹ Despite affirmative action being open to all ethnicity minorities, these authors make a specific case against the Hui. The prominence of such claims is enhanced when viewed with other content posted by the account, such as the Hui being the most demanding of Muslim groups regarding halal restrictions, etc. These posts focus on Hui-dominated Ningxia where affirmative action for the Hui is seen as disadvantaging Han candidates, with one author describing affirmative policies as “shackles” for Han people, especially Han children.Footnote ⁹⁰ Decrying the perceived unfairness and “discrimination” against the Han, they are blind to the exemptions and advantages conferred by their dominant group privilege, including Han dominance in the labour market and the disadvantages suffered by minority groups either structurally or as a part of their day-to-day experience. There is an assumption that by virtue of being the dominant group in China, the Han should have privilege and decision-making power – including in decisions such as what food is served on flights and who has what access to which institution.

In contrast, in Uyghur-centric narratives, Sinicized Uyghurs are welcomed and the affirmative policies for Uyghurs are discussed in patronizing and paternalistic tones, rather than from an antagonistic standpoint. While halal is still an issue, it is discussed as a “past transgression” and there is expressed approval of how it is controlled in Xinjiang.Footnote ⁹¹ Owing to the heightened sensitivity surrounding the topic of Uyghurs in China, these Islamophobic accounts strategically align themselves with the state's narrative on this issue in order to seek a form of paternalistic protection. They discuss and promote the state's narrative of reform and re-education in Xinjiang, aiming to portray it as a successful model for counter-terrorism strategies. Conversely, owing to the comparatively lower level of state attention directed at the Hui population, these accounts exhibit a more confrontational attitude towards the Hui community.

The animosity towards the Hui could in part stem from inter-group competition. According to official statistics, the Hui are the most economically successful Chinese Muslim minority groupFootnote ⁹² and benefit from their political advantages over the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.Footnote ⁹³ In contrast, the Han are more economically powerful than the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.Footnote ⁹⁴ However, compared to the dominant Han, the Hui remain a marginalized group with relatively little influence in the political and economic affairs of China; their influence over the regional economy and security, as claimed in Hui-centric blogs, is vastly exaggerated.Footnote ⁹⁵ When comparing the thematic overtones of the kind of content produced by these accounts, we can see that the Hui warning posts rhetorically mirror the Uyghur “confessional” posts: they appeal to the grander narrative in order to legitimize their claims. The authors are careful to appear to follow the official line, because overt hostility is likely to result in their accounts being banned or suspended.

In contrast to how “confessional” blogs strip away agency from the Uyghurs, the Hui-centric warning posts aim to promote awareness of the Hui's deceit and how the Hui's intra-group cohesion and non-conforming identity should be viewed as a threat to China's ethnic harmony and the country's political stability. The Uyghurs are portrayed as innocent, unsophisticated and at risk of being misled but having the potential to reform. The Hui, on the other hand, are depicted as being subversive, manipulative, brimming with political ambition, and keen to exploit affirmative action policies and ethnic harmony narratives for their own gain. They are portrayed as betraying the trust and the goodwill of the Han, who have long made accommodations for them. Hui-centric authors describe the Hui as “two-faced people,” a term regularly used in the CCP's official narrative to denote those who publicly proclaim loyalty to the Party while secretly working against it in private. The similarity of the Hui to the Han in terms of their appearance makes the former's lifestyle and religious differences even more of a betrayal: they should be the most Chinese (i.e. similar to Han) ethnic group, and if they choose not to be, then their non-conformity must be driven by motives of treachery. If the Uyghurs can be forgiven for being “confused” about the nature of their relationship with their Muslim neighbours, the Hui cannot. Any attempts to promote Islamic or Hui culture are treated with suspicion. For example, one author wrote the following in response to news that some schools in a Hui community in Hebei were introducing books that explain the practices and traditions of the Hui:

Another post contends that the Hui have long since been Sinicized and so any attempts to gain a distinctive identity are duplicitous. Because these authors perceive ethnic minority practices as fundamentally backward and barbaric, and foreign influences such as Arabic culture as sinister, their narrative allows no interpretation other than assigning such actions treacherous intentions.

The contrast in narratives, between the subversive Hui and the innocent Uyghurs, is particularly striking when the authors themselves compare the two ethnicities in posts. In many Hui-centric warning posts, the authors openly praise the de-radicalization process in Xinjiang and express support for the same policies to be implemented in inland Muslim-populated regions such as Ningxia. Discussing the pan-Halal issue in Ningxia, one writes:

Similarly, in response to an academic's critique of China's current ethnic policies, another author offered this rebuff:

Together, these Hui-centric warning posts sound the alarm against a future in which the Han lose their dominant group privileges and have to bow to the whims of ethnic minorities and “unbalanced” ethnic policies. Indeed, one commentary goes so far as to liken the living conditions of the Han in Hui autonomous regions to the conditions in concentration camps in Nazi Germany.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ With their “wake-up calls,” the authors clearly disagree with the state narrative that depicts the Hui as the model minority and a bridge to the Arab world.Footnote ¹⁰¹ This is a typical secularization tactic, where the “concerned parties,” posing as Han patriotic flag wavers, are the securitizing actors, attempting to convince both society (the core of which they see as represented by the Han majority) and the state of the threats posed by the Hui.Footnote ¹⁰² Using conspiracy and fearmongering tactics, these authors are calling for extraordinary measures to be used against the Hui, just as they have been used against the Uyghurs.

In order to lend legitimacy to their claims, these authors take particular care not to challenge state policies outright and instead they argue that these policies have been abused and misused. There are two parts to this constructed narrative. The first depicts the Han as a long suffering, benevolent and accommodating dominant group, whose efforts at creating ethnic harmony are being undermined by the ungrateful and manipulative Hui minority group. Second, the emphasis is made that the authors do not have a grievance against affirmative policies per se but rather the beneficiaries of these policies, who are greedy and ungrateful. For example:

This kind of reversal tactic is similar to those used by white nativists who contend that being against immigration is not about being racist; rather it is about being patriotic and upholding the law. They also argue that affirmative action amounts to reverse racism and victimizes the majority race.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Whereas white nativists focus on their love for their own race to avoid the charge of instigating hatred towards another race,Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Han-centric authors draw attention to the abuses of the Han's generosity and kindness in order to make the claim that it is the Hui who are “asking for too much.” In one online article, the author claims that the Hui will never be “grateful” for the help that they have received, openly calling into question their loyalty to the Chinese nation.Footnote ¹⁰⁶

Like much of the misinformation circulating on the internet, these warning posts do not substantiate their claims with credible sources or data. Instead, the legitimacy of their grievances and subsequent demands rests on how convincingly the author can suggest that the Hui are a threat to national security and political stability. Frequent accusations of disloyalty are levelled at the Hui, who are described as “two-faced people” who resort to subterfuge to achieve their own political ends and who, ultimately, represent a ticking time bomb for the Chinese state.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Together with the “confessional” blogs on Uyghurs, these narratives appeal to the grander narrative on state security and sociopolitical stability for paternalistic protection, and contribute to the further securitization of ethnic minorities in China.

As agents in the securitization process, these grassroots accounts do not have the same influence as state actors in effecting change.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Consequently, they rely on seeking paternalistic protection through state narratives. The context of their securitization tactics reflects the contrast between how the state perceives the security threats posed by the Uyghurs and those posed by the Hui. These accounts largely refrain from exacerbating tensions with the Uyghurs, as this is a highly charged topic and any deviation from the official narrative could backfire. Conversely, they appear to believe the state overlooks the security issues concerning the Hui, thus they feel compelled to raise awareness and alert others, employing harsher and more aggressive language while doing so. The authors of these accounts consider the state's securitization of Uyghurs as sufficient justification for their own actions, while the task of addressing the imagined Hui problem falls to them. Figure 1 presents a summarized diagram of the narratives found in these posts and their intertwining relationship.

Figure 1. Summary of Key Narratives of Sampled Articles