This article aims to account for the variation in the time it takes for WTO Members to bring compliance following adverse panel rulings. It seeks to answer the question: under what conditions do defendants swiftly implement adverse rulings of WTO panels? I demonstrate that defendants are more likely to comply without delay when the targeted measures involve firms that are integrated into regional and global value chains. When a dispute touches upon the interests of these firms and targets import-restricting measures, they are triggered to mobilize and press for compliance because they rely on foreign imports. In effect, the mobilization of these firms changes the domestic political conditions in favor of timely implementation. I show the plausibility of my argument in a comparative design with four case studies in which the US and Canada acted as defendants in WTO disputes. I control for a number of political factors and also consider legal sources of variation – i.e. the complexity of the form of implementation – that may impact WTO Members’ record of compliance.

Pessimism abounds in international economic law. The World Trade Organization (WTO) faces an uncertain future following its Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in 2015. International investment law is under attack in countries around the world, while mega-regional agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are beset by world events, from the United States’ federal election to the unexpected Brexit outcome. Yet the appetite of numerous States to continue forging plurilateral trade and investment deals provides some cause for hope. Viewed alongside other institutional developments including consensus-building work at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, the potential arguably now exists for credible movement towards multilateral rules in investment law. While the WTO's current negotiating stalemate highlights the difficulties in reaching agreement among 164 Members, international trade law offers lessons for working towards multilateralism in the international investment law field. Alongside informal discussions about a world investment court, mega-regionals provide a vehicle for future multilateral investment rules, particularly through the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership currently under negotiation in Asia.

Since 1998, non-state actors have had access to submit an ‘amicus curiae’ brief to the WTO DSM. Like other forms of non-state actor involvement in the WTO, amicus curiae access has been controversial. Despite this controversy, non-state actors have made use of this access and submitted amicus curiae briefs. This article asks: What has come of these briefs once they are submitted and what explains how amicus are treated by the DSM? This article empirically maps amici in all disputes from 1998 (after amicus access was first recognized) through 2014, arguing that amicus access is conditioned by a combination of political and legal constraints faced by the WTO panels and AB. In particular, whether the content of an amicus is considered hinges on it having the endorsement of a disputing party and whether its consideration interferes with the WTO DSM's reputation for coherence. In all, these findings have implications for the debate over whether amicus curiae access is good or bad news for the WTO and non-state actor involvement.

As an integral part of the WTO trading regime and in line with the international trend of antitrust control, TRIPS harmonized intellectual property protection with competition in mind. However, diverse national FRAND enforcement practices that take either a contractual or an antitrust approach challenge TRIPS integrity. While personal property recognition for SEPs lends constitutional support to the contractual approach to FRAND enforcement, private property's in-built limitation warrants a balance with the antitrust approach for needs from others. A critical examination of the TRIPS conclusion and the analytical structure of TRIPS provisions reveal that TRIPS obligation against anticompetitive practices is imperative. The imbalance of harmonized TRIPS with un-harmonized FRAND practices reflects TRIPS birth defect and challenges TRIPS integrity. To improve balance of rights and obligations in international trade and to ensure innovation and technology dissemination that is conducive to social and economic welfare, the paper calls for a contract–antitrust balanced approach to FRAND enforcement and the resumption of WTO's competition negotiations.

A mega-RTA such as the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) may overlap another RTA, with the result that some of the parties to the mega-RTA's overlapping RTA may become common parties, while others may remain as single-agreement parties. If the mega-RTA provides rules of origin based on the change in tariff classification (CTC)-with-exception criterion such as yarn-forward rules, the rules of origin will become more restrictive with respect to the imports of the excluded intermediate goods from the single-agreement parties after the formation of the mega-RTA than before, thus failing to meet the requirement under GATT Article XXIV:5. The exclusionary rules of origin of the mega-RTA draw the trade away from the single-agreement parties, causing ‘fracture’ in the mega-RTA's overlapping RTA. As a legal remedy to the problem, the mega-RTA should eliminate the restriction from the CTC-with-exception criterion by adopting the rules of origin based on the non-exclusionary criteria such as the value-added or the CTC criterion that does not presumptively exclude the use of certain non-originating intermediate inputs.

Over the years, many developing countries have attempted to make policies utilizing the WTO–TRIPS flexibilities to address the public health needs of their populations. A common strategic trend in these policies has been the tendency to attempt to increase access to medicines through price reduction, achieved by weakening patent protection. This paper, using the policy that has recently been adopted by the East African Community (EAC) member states as a case study, demonstrates the inappropriateness of this strategy. The core argument is that weakening patent protection will hinder further research and invention, which are necessary to ensure the availability of medicines. For developing countries, especially those in Africa, such as the EAC member states, the problem is aggravated by the fact that pharmaceuticals, due to commercial considerations, have already ignored investing in developing medicines for diseases predominant in these countries, hence the need to strengthen rather than weaken, patent protection.

The dispute concerns tax incentives granted by the state of Washington in the United States (US) pursuant to the tax-related provisions of the Revised Code of Washington. Nine tax-related provisions incentives were adopted to attract the production of large civil aircraft in that state. The State of Washington adopted seven aerospace measures corresponding to the nine tax-related provisions. The aerospace measures fell into three general categories of measures: a reduced tax rate, tax credits, and tax exemptions, which included the following (i) reduced corporate tax rates for aircraft manufacturers and retailers (B&O aerospace rate); (ii) tax credits for property and leasehold excise taxes on computer manufacturing facilitates and aerospace product development; and (iii) exemptions of sales and use tax for certain computer hardware, software and peripherals and construction services and materials, and leasehold excise tax and leaseholder property tax. According to the European Union (EU), the measures at issue are prohibited under Article 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) because they are contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods. This contingency results from two siting provisions: the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, which are contained in Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5952 (ESSB 5952).

The dispute concerns an anti-dumping duty, imposed in 2011 by the European Union, on imports of certain fatty alcohols and their blends originating in India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Fatty alcohols are mainly used in the production of detergents and surfactants. They are also components of cosmetics, foods, and as industrial solvents. With respect to Indonesia, the anti-dumping duties were imposed primarily on two investigated companies, Ecogreen and Musim Mas. After the initial application of the anti-dumping duty, the Commission revised the determination in the light of an intervening judgment of the European Court of Justice that had addressed an issue of significance to an issue raised during the fatty alcohols investigation. As a result of that revision, the Commission removed a cost adjustment for one of the companies (Ecogreen), but not the other company (Musim Mas). The measure ultimately expired in the fall of 2016, at the very end of the WTO panel proceedings.

On 8 December 2016, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal chaired by Professor Andreas Bucher, with co-arbitrators Professor Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga (Claimants' appointee) and Professor Campbell McLachlan QC (Respondent's appointee), issued its award in Urbaser and CAAB v. Argentina (Award). The dispute related to a Concession Contract granted to Aguas Del Gran Buenos Aires S.A. (AGBA), a company in which Claimants were shareholders, for the provision of water and sewerage services in the Province of Greater Buenos Aires (Province). Claimants alleged that they had faced numerous obstacles created by the Province's authorities, which precluded the efficient and profitable operation of their Concession. Respondent counterclaimed that Claimants had failed to make the necessary investment in the Concession, thereby violating their obligation under international law based on the human right to water.

On 21 July 2017, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal (Tribunal) chaired by Judge Thomas Buergenthal, with co-arbitrators Henri C. Alvarez (Claimants’ appointee) and Kamal Hossain (Respondent's appointee), issued its award in Teinver SA and others v. Argentine Republic (Award). The Tribunal upheld, by a majority, several of Claimants’ claims, and ordered Argentina to pay US$320 million in compensation, as well as 20% of Claimants’ legal costs and expenses. On 22 November 2017, Argentina registered a request to have the Award annulled.