Supralapsarian christologies all hold that the incarnation is not contingent upon sin but may differ on the nature of the gift given to us in the incarnation. In this essay I conceptualize and evaluate a crucial difference between two supralapsarian strategies. One strategy, exemplified by Kathryn Tanner, focuses on the natures of the incarnate One: it argues that in the incarnation the Word takes on a human nature which, being transformed in the act of assumption, becomes the conduit of grace for those who share in the same humanity. The other, represented by Samuel Wells, thinks of the incarnation as a gift of a transforming presence of the incarnate person. In taking on human form, the person of the divine Word comes as close to us as God can – the invisible God now can be seen, touched, heard – and draws us into a community of friendship and love.

One of the most puzzling features of Barth's ethics is the insistence that God's divine command encounters us so definitely and concretely that it simply requires immediate and unquestioning obedience. This article offers an interpretation of these comments by reading them through the framework of Barth's description of the secularity, one-sidedness and spirituality of God's Word in Church Dogmatics I/1. Such a reading suggests that Barth's comments are not promoting a foolproof and immediate way of adjudicating ethical quandaries but orient us to the commanding Lord who goes before us.

Herman Bavinck's reception of the organic motif has become in recent years the central locus for discussing the means by which the unity of his thought may be recognised. This article provides a critical reading of Bavinck on Hegel on the locus of providence for the purpose of contributing to the ongoing discussion that identifies the unity of Bavinck's thought not in his confessional self in simple opposition against the philosophies of his day, but rather in characterising Bavinck as an eclectic, orthodox and modern theologian. To this end this essay moves in three steps. First, we provide an analysis that showcases the nuanced points of contact between Bavinck and Hegel on providence. Second, the essay homes in on the specific ways in which the two thinkers diverge on the Creator–creature relationship. Finally, we close the essay by sketching the salient dogmatic and philosophical implications of the preceding analysis.

Doctrines of the atonement have tended either to elevate the status of one biblical metaphor or to gather together various metaphors into a unified concept or chorus of equal metaphors. The purpose of this article is to shed light on how the biblical metaphors function, using by way of reference the contrasting interpretations of Charles Hodge and Joel Green, who tend towards opposing theories of language based on naïve realism and idealism respectively. Drawing on the work of Colin Gunton, I recommend a mediating approach based on a critical realist theory of language which aims to steer a middle course between rationalism and relativism. Such an approach, which values the epistemic and revelatory potential of metaphors, is facilitated by a more integrative theological method with respect to scripture, reason, tradition and experience.

The notion of rest frames Augustine's Confessions: the expression of the desire for rest and the prayer for God's bestowal of rest. Between these bookends is an extended account of Augustine's past expressed in the form of a confession, one that is saturated with the Psalms. How are these major motifs – rest, memory, confession and the Psalms – related? And how do they relate to the seemingly paradoxical depiction of Augustine's own striving towards rest and God's bestowal of rest? This essay answers these questions by delineating the logic of grace and rest embedded in the Confessions.

An important contemporary approach to understanding a Pauline account of sin takes sin to be a self or personal agent who acts in the world. This article engages with such a proposal by offering theological analysis. It is argued that the exegetical arguments in favour of the proposal that sin is a personal agent are less than convincing, and it is argued further that the theory encounters serious theological problems.