In From Words to Worlds, Beau Breslin attempts to understand “the various functions of the modern constitutionalist text” and “explores the most critical design features of constitutions” (p. 6). He argues that constitutionalist texts “all have similar features, even if those features translate into very different political practices” (p. 7). His “primary aim” is “to acknowledge the importance of texts as instruments to order political societies, as documents that use words to create worlds” (p. 4).
After carefully limiting his discussion in Chapter 1 to constitutionalist regimes with “fully operative” constitutions, Breslin proceeds to explicate seven key functions of such constitutions. First, constitutions transform a polity by destroying an old regime and giving birth to a new one, often at a distinct point in time (Chapter 2). Second, constitutions inspire “a vision of the future for a specific and collective people” by articulating “certain collective values or principles” as aspirations often embodied in a preamble or bill of rights (Chapter 3). Third, constitutions design the institutions of government whose very structure helps prevent the infringement of rights (Chapter 4). Fourth, constitutions manage conflict by establishing rules to guide the resolution of disputes (Chapter 5). Fifth, constitutions recognize minorities, entrenching their political participation in the constitution's text, thereby enhancing the government's legitimacy with the minority (Chapter 6). Sixth, constitutions empower the political institutions that maintain order and stability, the necessary preconditions for individual liberty (Chapter 7). Last, and arguably most important, constitutions limit political power so as to prevent arbitrary rule (Chapter 8).
Despite the abstruseness of much constitutional theory, Breslin's writing style makes the subject accessible to general readers, even as he discusses the perennial puzzles of constitutional design. In every chapter he provides a pithy statement that captures the essence of his thesis: e.g., “[c]onstitutions matter” (p. 1), they “articulate some ambitions” (pp. 46–7), “they design polities” (p. 86), they “spawn conflict” (p. 87), and they “empower institutions” (p. 134). In several places, he does an excellent job of distinguishing related concepts: e.g., constitution versus constitutionalism (pp. 14–22), acceptance versus acknowledgement (p. 119), and constitution versus compact (pp. 164–9).
Another strength is Breslin's insightful comparisons between different constitutions, different groups, and different contexts used to elucidate his thesis. One example is his comparison between blacks in the United States and French-speaking Canadians, illustrating how the constitutionalization of certain rights does not always lead to political empowerment (pp. 129–31). Another example is his comparison of the different philosophical assumptions underlying the “unwritten” British Constitution and the “written” U.S. Constitution (pp. 170–6).
Among the book's shortcomings, however, is Breslin's failure to accomplish some of his stated objectives. Although his stated desire is to focus on “the [constitutional] text itself” to counter the tendency of many contemporary constitutional scholars to marginalize the text (pp. 2–4), his own focus seems to be not so much on the written text of constitutions, but on the textuality of constitutions—that is, the fact that modern constitutions, with only a few exceptions, are written. Even when he discusses textual provisions of specific constitutions, which he does at length in some places, he often merely summarizes the provisions (e.g., the South African constitution [pp. 76–9]). Further, while Breslin provides a rich and useful catalogue of constitutional functions, his data are neither systematic nor comprehensive; his specific examples are more illustrative than representative of the features he discusses.
The book claims to be a work of constitutional theory (p. 10), but it seems somewhat short on theorizing, at least of the normative kind. Yet Breslin seems to make, at least in part, a normative argument. In his Introduction, he suggests that constitutions are “supposed to do” certain things (p. 6). Because his discussion is focused on describing empirical features of constitutions, the book fails to adequately address the question posed by the title: namely, how does one get “from words to worlds”? What are the conditions or factors—whether historical, political, cultural, institutional, or ideological—that ensure that the “parchment barriers” of any constitutional text will be honored by those in power? Breslin states that it “depends almost entirely on the willingness of political leaders to consent to the pre-established rules embedded in the constitutional document” (pp. 88–9). But what ensures that?
Despite these shortcomings, From Words to Worlds is an excellent introduction to constitutional design. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read in isolation, which works well for teaching purposes. The book also summarizes concisely the key scholarly works relevant to the topics he discusses. Breslin starts and ends his book by asserting that written constitutions are worthy of attention (pp. 13, 183). Given their salience in the last few decades, this is a point on which all can agree.
