Various critics of the New Perspective on Paul (NPP) often highlight the lack of church tradition as one deficiency of the various interpretations of Paul. To some, the lack of church history automatically renders such newer interpretations suspect. In turn critics of the NPP often turn to the reformers such as Calvin and Luther to defend the traditional reading of Paul and trace this traditional reading back to Augustine. For the critics, church tradition stands on the side of the traditional reading.

This article seeks to highlight an often neglected early church view on one aspect of the NPP, that of Paul and the Law. This article highlights one of the fiercest exchanges between two church fathers. Through a series of letters, Jerome and Augustine corresponded on Jerome's interpretation of Galatians 2 and the Antioch incident. For Augustine the pastor, nothing less than the veracity of scripture was at stake and Augustine mounts a defence of Paul's actions in Galatians 2 in response to Jerome's insistence of an agreed-upon lie between Peter and Paul. In the process of Augustine's rebuttal of Jerome, he notes that Paul followed the law without ‘pretence’ and that there was a period in early Christianity where Jewish Christians practised law observance. Augustine highlights the divine origin of the Mosaic law, which renders a positive role for the law in early Christianity, and notes that the negative critique of the law comes within the context of a Gentile audience, but did not have implications for Jewish Christians. Augustine rightly notices and raises the important context of Paul's negative statements on the law and offers a nuanced discussion of Paul's treatment of the law.

Augustine notes some of the important conclusions drawn by the NPP, namely a positive view of the law and its practice by Paul and other Jewish Christians. He also notes the various ways the law functions in Jewish and Gentile contexts. Such a positive view of Paul and the law may appear striking to many, but must be considered by those who are otherwise critical of the NPP. This article shows that there was at least one voice, among others, within the early church which advocated for a positive reading of Paul and the law. The history of interpretation of Galatians 2 offers many insights for contemporary Pauline scholars which ought to be heeded in future discussions. This article, by highlighting the exchange between Jerome and Augustine, seeks to give the NPP a historical ‘rootedness’ and placement within the history of interpretation.

The many conflicts around the reformation of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries drew the problem of political resistance to the forefront of European political thought. Thinkers in all of the various religious camps considered scripture to be politically normative. Consequently, both pro- and anti-resistance thinkers from a variety of traditions had to engage with Romans 13:1–7, Paul's apparently definitive pronouncement in favour of obedience and, therefore, against resistance. The opponents of resistance could cite Romans 13 with fairly little explanation, but the resisters and revolutionaries faced the challenge of working with the text to draw different political conclusions from it without violating the ‘literal’ sense that they almost universally held to be authoritative. Some even aimed to bring Paul forward as a staunch supporter of the sort of violent political resistance they advocated.

Lex, Rex, the political tract of seventeenth-century Scottish theologian Samuel Rutherford (1600–1661), represents a particularly comprehensive early modern justification for violent resistance against a political sovereign. Rutherford was a member of the party of the radical covenanters, who vehemently opposed the church reforms of Charles I and, when hostilities began, fervently supported the war against the king. This article explores the series of arguments, distinctions and theological moves that Rutherford employs to incorporate Romans 13 as a central supporting text for his pro-resistance argument. Among these are: the distinction between God's immediate institution of governmental power and the constitution of particular governments mediately through the people, the positing of a conditional covenant agreed upon at the constitution of any government, the scholastic distinction between voluntas beneplaciti and voluntas signi in the divine will, and the distinction between the royal office in abstracto and its concrete occupant. Using these and other arguments and distinctions, Rutherford constructs a conceptual apparatus that is able, to a great extent, to appropriate Paul's exhortation to obedience in the service of a justification of resistance. In so doing, Rutherford illustrates some of the array of theological and philosophical resources that early modern resistance theorists could marshal in support of their cause, while still maintaining their fundamental theological commitments.

The New Testament's two pictures of divine intercession, that of the risen Christ interceding at the right hand of God (Rom 8:34; Heb 7:25) and that of the Holy Spirit interceding from within believers’ hearts (Rom 8:26–7), offer additional perspective on the difficult issue of how God comes in touch with human suffering. Romans 8:26–7 connects the Spirit's intercession with the experience of human suffering, and through its reference to groaning implies that the Spirit communicates something of the believer's felt experience of weakness to God. Hebrews links Christ's high priestly work, including his intercessory activity, with his experience of struggle, thereby implying that he brings the needs of weak and pressured believers to God with an empathy born of direct experience of suffering. These scriptural pictures open a fruitful path for theological reflection, suggesting that God comes to know human suffering not simply by unmediated divine knowledge, or even by the bare fact of the divine Son's incarnation, but also in a mediated fashion, through complementary actions of Christ and the Spirit best described as acts of intercession.

Applying a model of thought which emphasises the intercessory activities of Christ and the Spirit to the problem of divine passibility has a number of advantages. First, it coheres well with New Testament patterns for describing the roles of Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Christ's intercession is rooted in his incarnation and distinctive redemptive mission, while the Spirit's intercession emerges from his redemptive indwelling. Second, its picture of God knowing human suffering through the mediated process of intercession suggests that God maintains his freedom and holiness even as he gets in touch with human suffering. Third, the intercession model may shed additional light on how the sufferings of the incarnate Son touch or otherwise relate to the Father. Fourth, the Bible's pictures of divine intercession suggest that God is brought in touch with two dimensions of human suffering: the objective reality of human affliction (mediated through Christ's intercession) and the subjective experiences of afflicted people (mediated through the Spirit's intercession). Finally, these scriptural pictures of intercession orient our thoughts about the question of passibility in a pastoral direction.

Applying the legal metaphor integral to the book of Job, this article re-evaluates the evidence for Job's innocence (Job 42:7). After examining the conflicted testimony of the book itself, the article focuses on exemplars of Christian interpretation throughout history (the author of James, Ambrose, Gregory the Great, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Kierkegaard, and Barth) to discuss the various attempts made to come to terms with the final form of the book of Job, including its testimony to Job's complaints. Though some interpreters simply ignore the complaints in their attempts to hold up Job as an exemplar of patience, following, it is often argued, the example of James 5:11, for those who wrestle with Job's apparent blasphemy, three general approaches emerge. The first, denial, refuses to acknowledge Job's accusations of divine injustice. The second, mitigation, attempts to minimise the force of Job's arguments against God. The third, absolution, acknowledges Job's defiance of God but claims that this wrong is not beyond God's grace, and that it may in fact highlight it. However, none is able to satisfactorily reconcile Job's accusations with the innocent verdict God delivers at the end of the book (42:7) and affirm that Job has indeed said what is right about God. Even so, the broader biblical testimony offers evidence to exonerate Job by testifying to divine favourable response to and even initiation of complaint in a tradition of ‘faithful revolt’. Job joins the heroes of Israelite faith, Abraham (Gen 18:17–33), Jacob (Gen 32:6–12, 22–31), and Moses (Exod 32:1–14), the psalmists who dare to cry ‘Why?’ and ‘How long?’ and prophets such as Amos (e.g. 7:1–9), Jeremiah (e.g. 20:7–18), and Habakkuk (e.g. 1:2–4, 12–17) in confronting God and demanding that the deity make things right. Jesus endorses this tradition through both his parables of the importunate friend (Luke 11:5–9) and the importunate widow (Luke 18:1–8) and his cry of dereliction from the cross. Instead of reading Job's complaints in line with this tradition, when these Christian interpreters grapple with Job's accusations against God, Job's ‘friends’ once again become his accusers due to their application of a limited view of God and God's relationship to humanity.

Scholarly attention to the popular style of contemporary worship has so far been infrequent, and generally dismissive. Dismissive attitudes have generally been based on claims that individual contemporary worship songs are lacking in theological development, and that contemporary worship merely apes the mores of pop culture, replacing a proper liturgical event with something akin to a rock concert. In this paper I suggest that both these criticisms are false. The first is a misunderstanding of the nature of the liturgical tradition of contemporary worship, in which the crucial liturgical event is the ‘time of worship’, constructed out of a number of songs and other liturgical elements, which together construct a liturgical narrative with theological and pastoral depth; criticising individual songs is therefore largely irrelevant. The second fails to pay attention to the nuanced negotiation with popular culture that is evident in the tradition of contemporary worship, when observed carefully; dominant cultural practices are not unreflectively adopted, but modified and, if embraced, embraced critically and put to use. I demonstrate these two points by offering readings of two (video recordings of) contemporary worship events, Matt Redman's Facedown DVD and Tim Hughes's Happy Day DVD; in each case I explore the ways in which cultural practices are modified and effectively subverted in pursuit of a liturgical goal, and offer a theological reading of the narrative of the time of worship. I propose that, whilst there are significant differences, both can be seen to be liturgically responsible and theologically deep experiences of worship.

As a contribution to discussions of the relationship between trinity and election, in this article I explore the helpfulness of a return to ancient modal and metaphysical theological distinctions. At the forefront of trinity/election debates has been Bruce McCormack's controversial claim that election could be conceived as logically prior to, and the motivation for, God's being triune. Steering clear of questions about the right interpretation or trajectory of Karl Barth's theology, I attempt to identify the motivating theological convictions of this debate's interlocutors and find constructive options which maintain or address those convictions. One option I defend is the possibility that triunity is not logically prior to election.

I begin with an analysis of three central theological convictions which seem to be at the heart of the trinity/election debates. They are: (1) a revelation axiom – that knowledge of God's nature is governed by the particular historical revelation of God in Christ; (2) a nuanced commitment to divine immutability; and (3) divine libertas a coactione – God's being free in nature and action from external constraint. I then contend that if more attention is paid to modal and metaphysical options with respect to the existence and essence of God, one will see that there are a number of viable positions which respect these convictions.

I argue that at least some of the conceptual difficulties of McCormack's position can be eliminated if we properly distinguish kinds of necessity in reference to God's being and if we dispense with any notion of priority between God's essence and God's willing God's essence. With respect to kinds of necessity, I recall the ancient distinction between properties that are (a) necessary consequents of God's essence, (b) contingent and (c) a necessary consequence of God's essence given certain contingent states of affairs. Those distinctions, along with clarifications about the nature of divine freedom vis-à-vis his essence and actions, allow us to see the range of theological positions which remain faithful to the relevant concerns of the revelation axiom, divine immutability and divine freedom.

I conclude that, while it is problematic to defend the logical priority of election over triunity, McCormack is justified in his claim that granting election as part of God's essence does no violence to divine freedom and he is perfectly entitled to the view that God's essential properties, including both God's fit-for-election-hypostatic-configuration and God's being the electing God are mutual aspects of God's single self-caused being.

The two books under review here are remarkably similar, although (it would appear) entirely independent of each other. Further, I must say right at the start that, in many respects (perhaps the most important respect), I am entirely in agreement with many of their conclusions, and their manner of reaching those conclusions. So maybe this ‘critical’ review is not critical enough!

• - Both authors are English; and both books come across (to me) as very ‘English’: the argument is cautious, fully acknowledging caveats, never overstating the case, etc.

• - The prime issue addressed in both is the relationship between Thomas and the Synoptics.

• - Both argue for a broadly similar conclusion – that Thomas is dependent (whether directly or indirectly: see below) on at least Matthew and Luke.

• - Both reach this conclusion via an almost identical methodology: seeking to identify possible elements of Synoptic redactional activity in Thomas as an indication of Thomas’ dependence.

• - Some (but not all) of the evidence cited is common, e.g. Th 5 / / Luke 8:17; Th 14 / / Matt 15:11; Th 31 / / Luke 4:24. (However, other examples do not overlap.)

• - Both are reticent about relying too much on theories about Q (perhaps surprisingly, Goodacre less than Gathercole).

• - Both see Thomas as potentially mystifying, not necessarily aiming at clarity, but demanding hermeneutical effort on the part of the reader.

• - Both emphasise the importance of taking seriously the evidence of the Greek fragments, and indeed both at different points use the Greek evidence closely.

• - Both offer powerful critiques of the older form-critical ‘norms’, or ‘laws’, about the development of the tradition, both effectively denying that such rigid ‘laws’ have any validity at all.

• - Both address in detail the more general arguments of others defending Thomas’ independence, e.g. on order, the apparent lack of ‘much’ agreement with the Synoptics, the possibility of assimilation in the textual transmission, etc.

• - Both also offer good arguments referring to the possibility of being misled by the phenomenon of the Synoptic Gospels about what level of agreement might be expected in a case of dependence. (The Synoptics may be highly unusual in the high level of agreement (in wording and order) they display.)

• - Both emphasise the danger of polarising the debate prematurely, of simply claiming that one's own theory has ‘won the day’ and ignoring others who disagree. Certainly both authors here take on, and engage with (in my view very fairly) the views of others who disagree.

Charles Taylor's A Secular Age is by any account a monumental work. It has spawned a cottage industry of comment which should not abate for a long time to come. While social theorists have engaged Taylor's arguments from the very moment the book appeared, theologians seem to have been slower to comment. Recently, however, two important theological assessments have appeared in the Journal of Religion and Modern Theology.