Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if it conflicts with jus cogens. It is theoretically possible that two or more states would conclude such a treaty, yet this is not very likely in practice. The question thus arises how jus cogens operates outside of Article 53 situations and outside of treaty law in general. A ‘trumping effect’ of jus cogens over all other norms of international law has been proposed in some writings and judicial decisions. Such views have been shattered by the ICJ, most recently (but not exclusively) in Germany v. Italy. Jus cogens seems to be back to Article 53 and its (rather theoretical) voiding powers. Considering the latest judicial decisions, this article aims to place jus cogens within the international legal system. It demonstrates that jus cogens is not a futile concept; but it is wrong to see it as a trump card.

This article discusses some problems arising from the proposed conferral of international criminal jurisdiction on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. While it is uncertain whether the AU will ever adopt the Draft Protocol amending the Statute of the Court, it is worthwhile examining certain provisions of the Protocol which, in addition to the myriad political hurdles that will militate against the adoption and/or entry into force of the Protocol, will most likely prevent the Court from exercising that jurisdiction. The article concludes that the future of international criminal justice in Africa lies not in the duplication of international criminal justice systems, but in the AU ensuring that its member states take the prevention and domestic prosecution of international crimes more seriously, and in the ICC improving its modus operandi vis-à-vis its member states.

This article addresses the issue of whether the international criminal tribunals are under an obligation to fund family visits for indigent detainees. It examines the concept of positive obligations and its relation to the detention situation and describes the practice of funding family visits as it has developed at the International Criminal Court. It further analyses relevant developments in the Court's case law. It argues that the Court is indeed obliged to fund family visits. In this regard, the mere recognition of a detainee's right to family visits in the tribunals’ legal frameworks and in international soft-law penological standards can be said to inadequately reflect the particularities of international detention.

Maritime embargo operations implement economic sanctions adopted by the UNSC by means of naval forces at sea. In order to implement such sanctions in line with international law, it is essential for states that the legal basis in maritime embargo operations is clear. Since the UNSC has authorized states to use force in the enforcement of economic measures at sea, the precise legal basis of a certain category of maritime embargo operations has, however, been the subject of debate. Commentators have argued in a variety of ways to either categorize these military operations under Article 41, or Article 42 of the UN Charter, or even somewhere in between. This article first categorizes the different types of maritime embargo operations to underline that such maritime embargo operations can have different legal bases. Secondly, it considers under which circumstances maritime embargo operations can fall within the context of Article 41 or 42. It is argued that against the background of the evolved scope of Article 42 there may now be less reluctance to position explicit maritime embargo operations that also authorize the use of force within Article 42 of the UN Charter.

García Amador, the first Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility, was of the view that in international law, special circumstances denote situations of exemption from the secondary rule which attaches disadvantageous consequences to breach of obligation under any primary rule. By contrast, his successor, Roberto Ago, advanced the notion that the exceptional circumstances characterise situations of exemption from the obligations arising out of primary rules. In departure from both conceptions, James Crawford, the last Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility, submitted that it is only after having established that a certain course of behaviour is contrary to the terms of a prohibition that it becomes possible to enquire whether the actor had a justification for acting as he did. If affirmative, the conduct in question is to be regarded as conduct which neither conforms with the obligation nor constitutes a violation thereof. If negative, then the act amounts to an unjustified wrongdoing and accordingly forms the basis for the operation of the various disadvantageous consequences envisaged by the law of international responsibility. This contribution first examines the process of the development of the notion of exceptional circumstances in the edifice of the law of international responsibility ex delicto. It then shows that from the three competing conceptions, only that advanced by Ago proves capable of accurately accounting for the circumstances of consent, self-defence, and the legitimate application of a countermeasure.

Supreme Court, 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations