At least 100,000 retired UK citizens currently live in Spain. Under EU law, they are entitled to access the Spanish National Health Service (NHS) with minimum administrative difficulty. What will their legal position be under a ‘no-deal Brexit’? This is a question of Spanish law. The worst case scenario is that they will have to reapply for their residence permits under the Spanish legislation applicable to non-EU/European Economic Area citizens, with all the administrative inconvenience and cost entailed. If they successfully reapply, their personal health care costs will be considerably higher than at present, should they choose to remain in Spain. Very obvious questions of capacity planning arise. The Spanish system will potentially need to gear up for a significant administrative effort. Given the distinct possibility of a ‘no-deal Brexit’, the UK NHS should prepare to welcome significant numbers of pensioners home.

In recent years, several emerging economies have introduced national health insurance programs ensuring access to health care while offering financial protection from out-of-pocket and catastrophic expenses. Nevertheless, in several nations these expenses continue to increase. While recent research has emphasized the lack of funding, poor policy design and corruption as the main culprits, little is known about the politics of establishing federal regulatory agencies ensuring that state governments adhere to national insurance reimbursement and coverage procedures. This article fills in this lacuna by providing an alternative perspective, one that accounts for differences between nations in the creation of regulatory institutions, with an emphasis instead on governing elite strategies to campaign on access to health care during transitions to democracy, civil societal mobilization, constitutional constraints and the national electoral incentives to overcome ineffective decentralization processes. The cases of Indonesia and China are introduced as examples of how and why their differences in this political process accounted for Indonesia’s success and China’s failure to ensure financial protection.

This paper examines a remarkable lawsuit in health care rationing. The Patients Association for Interstitial Cystitis sued the Dutch National Health Care Institute for alleged misconduct against Interstitial Cystitis patients, as the Institute decided that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid are no longer covered by the basic health insurance. The patients’ organisation challenged the Institute for basing its standpoint on scientific evidence; overruling clinical expertise and patients’ experiences. While scientific advice is often solicited in public health issues, simultaneously, the authority of scientific advice is increasingly being questioned in the public domain. Also, the judiciary is frequently called upon to adjudicate in rationing decisions. Based on an ethnographic study of the National Health Care Institute, drawing on insights from the field of Science and Technology Studies, we analyse this lawsuit as a negotiation of what knowledge counts in reimbursement decisions.

In a health care system based on managed competition, health insurers negotiate on quality and price with care providers and are allowed to offer restrictive health plans. It is crucial that enrolees who need care choose restrictive health plans, as otherwise health insurers cannot channel patients to contracted providers and they will lose their bargaining power in negotiations with providers. We aim to explain enrolees’ choice of a restrictive health plan in exchange for a lower premium. In 2014 an online survey with an experimental design was conducted on members of an access panel (response 78%; n=3,417). Results showed 37.4% of respondents willing to choose a restrictive health plan in exchange for a lower premium. This fell to 22% when the restrictive health plan also included a longer travelling time. Enrolees who choose a restrictive health plan are younger and healthier, or on lower incomes, than those preferring a non-restrictive one. This means that enrolees who use care will be unlikely to choose a restrictive health plan and, therefore, health insurers will not be able to channel them to contracted care providers. This undermines the goals of the health care system based on managed competition.

In 2010 the Belgian government introduced a low cost administrative procedure for compensating medical injuries to overcome the major shortcomings of the existing tort system. This paper examines, for the first time, to what extent this reform had an impact on physician specialists’ defensive practices and what are the relevant determinants affecting physicians’ clinical decision making. Based on a survey of 508 physicians, we find evidence of a relatively modest increase in defensive practices among physicians in various specialties. In general, 14% of the respondents, who were aware of the reform, reported to have increased their overall defensive behaviour, while respectively 18 and 13% altered their assurance and avoidance behaviour. Commonly used physician characteristics, such as claims experience and gender, have a similar impact on defensive medicine as documented in existing literature. Furthermore, the determinant physician’s access to an incident reporting system is found to have a significant impact on most of the defensive medicine measures. Health care institutions may therefore play an important role in controlling and reducing physicians’ defensive practices.

Publicly funded health system reforms increasingly require the evaluation of competing programmes. However, programmes are made of multi-dimensional attributes of value (where value refers to latent expectations of health system improvement). This paper identifies the design, implementation and validation of a methodology to elicit health system values to guide health care priority setting. The exercise suggests that the proposed methodology is suitable for eliciting and validating health system values, and its findings show that pursuing health gain alone does not fully capture the dimensions of health system value. More specifically, we identify a list of health system values (elicited by both potential and actual users) and classify them in terms of process-related values (e.g., shorter waiting lists, greater choice, etc.) and improvements in health system equity in addition to value derived from health gain.