One of the most significant recent trends in global trade governance has been the increasing use of regulatory “reliance” arrangements as a significant element of trade alliances. Against this backdrop, an important set of questions are raised about how existing institutions of global trade governance – especially the World Trade Organization and international regulatory standards organisations – should respond. To what extent, and how, should such institutions facilitate reliance arrangements? And what role can they usefully play in overseeing and guiding their use? This paper begins to answer these questions through a focused case study of regulatory reliance in the agrifood sector. Four challenges are identified regarding the implementation of such arrangements: the high costs of establishment and maintenance; the lack of agreed and reliable assessment methodologies; the potential for arbitrary discrimination between trade partners; and the difficulties of dealing with regulatory change over time. In light of these challenges, the paper assesses the work of existing international organisations in governing reliance arrangements in the agrifood sector. The paper concludes with a number of preliminary suggestions as to how this architecture of global governance might be supplemented or harnessed to address some of the challenges posed by reliance arrangements.

The aim of this article and the ensuing Special Issue is to assess, après fifteen years, the effects on the EU legal and political system of the overhaul of executive delegated powers inaugurated by the Lisbon Treaty. It identifies core parameters – i.e. (institutional) balance of powers, (democratic) legitimacy, control and accountability, effectiveness of EU policy implementation – considered by the contributions to this Special Issue to map and examine, both constitutionally and normatively, the EU system of delegated powers in law and practice. It also puts forward seven overarching reflections revealing some of the core issues and challenges posed by the current stage of development of the post-Lisbon EU system of delegated powers.

This Special Issue stems from some of the insights at the “Future of Food Law” Conference held at Wageningen University and Research (WUR) in 2023, prompting an examination of the Farm to Fork (F2F) Strategy’s achievements and shortcomings. With the von der Leyen Commission’s term concluding, the paper critically assesses key aspects of the F2F Strategy, laying the foundation for an in-depth discussion presented in six contributions. The exploration extends from US and EU perspectives to national considerations, moving even further and beyond the boundaries of the Strategy. It encompasses emerging views on food safety, fostering fair and sustainable agri-food production models, encouraging healthier and democratic food choices, and reevaluating decision-making distribution from EU to Member States in sustainability regulatory actions. This issue aims to probe how agri-food regulatory frameworks should adapt to current challenges, acknowledging new economic, social, and environmental expectations. As a frame to the six contributions, this paper addresses the substantial delay in implementing crucial food law interventions, with a focus on the legislative Framework for Sustainable Food Systems (SFSF). The paper concludes by outlining potential scenarios for the future of EU food law, emphasising the necessity for establishing a guiding principle of sustainability for food systems.

This paper describes how the development of texts on regulatory deference by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) addresses relevant recommendations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and supports Member countries of CAC in their negotiation and implementation of equivalence agreements. We consider the role and function of CAC within a rules-based multilateral framework, particularly in relation to the development and implementation of equivalence concepts. We then consider whether, through use of equivalence agreements, trade facilitation outcomes have been realised. Our hypothesis is that international standards on regulatory deference promote fair but aspirational standards and support fair practices in the trade of safe food – both vital outcomes for global food security and the achievement of many of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. We test this hypothesis against the framework provided by decisions of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee. We argue that the equivalence concepts and guidelines developed by CAC are appropriate but underutilised tools available for Member countries to strike a balance between their right to regulate to protect human, animal or plant life and health and to fulfil legitimate objectives whilst meeting their WTO obligations to avoid measures that constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.

Imperfect information on food safety and risk has created a system with less safety than the public wants. Consumers cannot pay for the level of safety they desire. Tort under-compensates for foodborne illness due to difficulty proving causation. When market controls are ineffective at producing the level of safety desired by consumers, the classic approach is government regulation. However, government regulators face challenges that impede the translation of scientific knowledge into regulatory controls. This often results in an equilibrium of private interests and bureaucratic interests rather than the public interest. To restore republican deliberation on food safety we need greater citizen involvement in the decision-making. Access to the courts is an effective means for citizens to participate directly in the decisions affecting food safety; thus, a private cause of action to our national food safety laws is proposed.

This article offers some general thoughts on the rule of law in international economic law. It begins by briefly defining the rule of law and indicating the legal sources on which it is based. It then shows that the TFEU, confirmed by the case law of the Court of Justice, requires the rule of law to be respected in the conduct of the Union’s commercial policy. However, although the rule of law may be favourable to international trade and investment, it is not indispensable to them. The rule of law is conducive, but not essential, to trade and investment. For businesses, the risks associated with a weak respect for the rule of law represent a cost, which they take into account when setting the price of their products. Finally, it should be remembered that the principles of the rule of law do not apply in the same way in the domestic sphere as in international law. This article is intended as a panoramic introduction to the relationship between the rule of law and international economic law. More specialised studies are published later in this issue, including analyses focusing on trade or investment or national perspectives, such as that of China.

Fifteen years following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this article seeks to analyse its impact on EU executive rulemaking. It delves into the constitutional concerns arising from the architecture of Articles 290 and 291 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular relating to the institutional balance, the concept of implementation, the distinction between delegated and implementing acts and the legitimacy of the control mechanisms envisaged in the TFEU. The article argues that there is a need for reform and integration of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU in one Article dedicated to EU executive rulemaking, going beyond mere considerations of institutional balance. Such a reform entails a return to the essence of comitology as a general mechanism for consultation in and control of rulemaking, allowing Member States to deliberate with the Commission with a veto right for both the Parliament and the Council, embracing the idea of executive subsidiarity. It requires also to go beyond the old comitology mechanisms based on a pure interinstitutional perspective by connecting to Article 11 TEU (Treaty on European Union) and recognising the need for participatory engagement so as to enhance the legitimacy of EU executive rulemaking.

Since its inception, the inter-state dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation has generally been praised for effectively protecting the rule of law in international trade relations. While the relatively recent dismantling of this system does not necessarily mean the end of the WTO nor of the binding nature of its rules, the current crisis may be a good opportunity to reconsider the role of the rule of law in international trade relations and the ways in which it could further be accommodated. One suggestion, occasionally raised in the past, would be strengthening the enforcement of WTO rules by opening it to private action, either before national courts or through international adjudication. After all, the latter has been widely available to foreign investors covered by thousands of international investment agreements in force for decades. This contribution recalls the reasons behind the current lack of private enforcement of WTO law and argues that developments in international trade relations and experiences with investor-state dispute settlement are likely to work against rather than in favor of its introduction in the foreseeable future. Increased transparency and institutionalisation of non-state actors’ role in trade enforcement is therefore recommended instead.

A financial services supplier authorised in its home state that wishes to supply services cross-border into another state will, absent any relief, have in addition to meet the regulatory requirements of that host state to trade in it. Regulatory frictions including duplicative regulatory requirements are barriers to cross-border trade. This article considers certain techniques deployed to reduce such barriers, noting that trust plays a part in many of them. These techniques grant relief to incoming firms from obligations to comply with the regulatory requirements of a host state. They may take the form of unilateral arrangements, with or without any conditions. There may be assessments of equivalence as a basis for relief from compliance with the host state’s rules: deference to the home state’s regime, a basis for recognition, whether unilateral or mutual. Recognition may be given effect through a party’s domestic laws or in international law under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article VII. A GATS Article VII agreement can relieve regulatory frictions in the financial services sector alone as there is no requirement for “substantial sectoral coverage” as required for regional trade agreements under GATS Article V. Mutual recognition agreements for financial services in international law are, however, few in number.

The delegation of powers to the European Commission, facilitating the adoption of non-legislative acts to implement centrally provisions of European legislation, has long been an essential part of administrative governance in the European Union. However, the established practice of delegating legslative and implementing powers to the European Commission has increased over the last decade, at the same time in the context of the various crises that the EU has had to confront during this period. The crisis context has generally demonstrated that executive institutions often emergency politics, and the amplified use of delegated powers in such circumstances raises questions about the capacity of legislative institutions to carry out their usual control and scrutiny functions. The concern here is whether – at times when the established mechanisms of control need to be carried out in times of crisis, under greater time pressure – there is the risk of legislative institutions (that had originally delegated powers to the Commission) are being sidelined, with the detrimental effects that this may have on the democratic accountability of the whole process. Against this background of normative question-marks, this article examines empirically to what extent the scrutiny of the Commission’s adoption of delegated powers has fundamentally changed during times of emergency. In particular, it provides an analysis of the use of delegated powers by the European Commission in the context of the EU’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic in order to establish whether the Council and the European Parliament managed to enable the usual control mechanisms effectively. By way of conclusion, the article discusses the implications of the findings for the wider discussion and the future use of emergency governance in the European Union.

EU food law is built on two paradigms – food safety and consumer choice. Consumers should have access to any food they like, provided that it is safe for consumption and that consumers are made aware of the products’ characteristics through adequate information. Growing emphasis on sustainability has not challenged these foundations. On the contrary, the law is intended as a tool to further empower consumers to make a healthy and environmentally responsible choice. However, it will be argued that this information centric approach is no longer a tenable position. The regulatory solutions characteristic of the consumer empowerment logic are of limited effectiveness and do not challenge the biggest obstacles to the sustainable transition of food systems – the commodification of food and the lack of regulation of the food environment. This contribution sketches out some far-reaching yet realistic food law reforms to genuinely address sustainability issues. Mindful of the special status of food and the growing discontent towards the EU and the green transition, this contribution also argues for some changes in the making and design of EU food law, leading towards greater involvement of citizens and local communities, and, ultimately, for truer empowerment of individuals.

A Sustainable Food System needs to be implemented through a legal framework balancing measures concerning all the aspects of sustainability (the social, economic and environmental ones), as defined by the Farm to Fork strategy.

Since environmental issues are considered a structural part of CAP regulations, a special attention shall be paid both to social and economic sustainability of agricultural and food system, as fundamental pillars for a resilient and competitive development of the primary sector.

A new “social” approach of agricultural policy takes into consideration the position of farmers (in particular, a fair revenue of their activity) and workers involved in the agricultural sector (in particular, the rights to protection and safety at work). It also involves the comprehensive rural areas, ie the social context that represents the premise to reach environmental goals of sustainability in rural territories, realised by the farmers themselves as main actors of the rural economy.

Therefore, for the future of food law, a strategic consideration of the legal framework related to people working in agriculture and agri-food sector should concern two main aspects.

On one hand, the introduction of social conditionality, establishing compliance with labour law rules, including work safety and transparency of employment conditions in agricultural labour contracts in order to receive CAP subsidies – becomes a component of the process for “safe food” through an “ethical and legal food production.”

On the other hand, it is important to consider the improvement of life conditions and services in rural areas in favour of resident citizens, the attractiveness of young farmers as well as the implementing measures for an inclusive growth.

These aspects, which make up a “social sustainability model” in the agri-food chain are strongly linked together and require a comprehensive policy regulation. This policy perspective includes a new perception of entrepreneurs and workers employed in rural areas intended for the production of food and related to the environmental protection.

The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) disciplines WTO Members’ health regulations to prevent their misuse for protectionist purposes. In doing so, its obligations reflect several elements of the rule of law, including legal certainty, non-arbitrariness and non-discrimination, as well as a recognition of the rights of individuals. Through its obligations of non-discrimination, transparency and scientific justification and the scope it leaves for Members to prioritise the protection of health over trade liberalisation, the SPS Agreement can be regarded as entailing a rule-of-law approach. However, cognisant of the limits to the rule of law when transposed to the international level, it is important to avoid an overly “judicialised” approach to the disciplines of the SPS Agreement, and in particular its reliance on scientific justification to prevent arbitrariness in sanitary and phytosanitary regulation. Otherwise, there is a risk of intruding too far into the regulatory autonomy of States, weakening the “compliance pull” of the agreement and thus inadvertently undermining the rule of law in this area. An approach that instead recognises the inherent subjectivity and uncertainty in science and respects Members’ divergent priorities in health regulation would go further in engendering support for the rules-based system of international trade.

European electricity regulation has evolved to include a novel category of binding sectoral rules known as terms, conditions, and methodologies (TCMs). These are created within a regulatory framework outlined in delegated Commission regulations by private electricity firms and approved by technocratic agencies, most notably the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Despite their technical nature, TCMs have significant economic impact. This prompts frequent appeals of ACER’s TCM decisions, questioning ACER’s role and the overall institutional equilibrium of the TCM procedure. ACER’s TCM decisions are subject to dual-level legal review – internal by ACER’s Board of Appeal and external by European Courts. This paper uses two case studies to examine how dual-level legal review impacts the institutional balance of the TCM procedure. We find that the two levels of review engage poorly, so that contrary to expectations, legal review creates uncertainty rather than clarity, allowing for considerable pragmatism. These findings show the importance of considering legal review when studying sectoral governance. Policy implications are also significant, as the identified issues inhibit innovation and problem-solving, the raison d’etre of the TCMs.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is not only increasingly being used in business and administration contexts, but a race for its regulation is also underway, with the European Union (EU) spearheading the efforts. Contrary to existing literature, this article suggests that the most far-reaching and effective EU rules for AI applications in the digital economy will not be contained in the proposed AI Act, but in the Digital Markets Act (DMA). We analyse the impact of the DMA and related EU acts on AI models and underlying data across four key areas: disclosure requirements; the regulation of AI training data; access rules; and the regime for fair rankings. We demonstrate that fairness, under the DMA, goes beyond traditionally protected categories of non-discrimination law on which scholarship at the intersection of AI and law has focused on. Rather, we draw on competition law and the FRAND criteria known from intellectual property law to interpret and refine the DMA provisions on fair rankings. Moreover, we show how, based on Court of Justice of the European Union jurisprudence, a coherent interpretation of the concept of non-discrimination in both traditional non-discrimination and competition law may be found. The final section sketches out proposals for a comprehensive framework of transparency, access and fairness under the DMA and beyond.

Previous research has neglected how repeated declarations of states of emergency (SsoE) in response to the same emergency may combine with executive overreach and underreach within a single jurisdiction, undermining the authority of the SsoE as a legal institution and increasing the vulnerability of the constitutional system as a result. This article examines how decision-makers’ commitment to a culture of justification is central to avoiding emergency mismanagement via underreach, overreach or their combination. The simultaneous instances of executive overreach and underreach as emergency management failures are studied via the Slovak case, which was celebrated for its initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic but castigated for its failure to contain the subsequent waves. The analysis of the legal framework of the SsoE and the justifications for SsoE declarations uncovers the lack of justifications for the patterns of simultaneous executive underreach and overreach, underscoring the elusiveness of these categories. The limited justifications for the decisions demonstrated by the “government in panic” point to the undermining of the SsoE as a legal institution. The article concludes with highlighting how leaders’ role conceptions as democratic emergency managers might be necessary to sustain the authority of the SsoE.

This work has the aim of dissecting the legal and policy dress designed for the new “Green” Common Agricultural Policy (CAP 2023–27) across the proposed CAP Strategic plans (CSPs) of the EU member states. The analysis is carried out through the lens of a special inquiry: the consistency and coherence between the CAP and the perspective of the Green Deal and its satellite strategies, among all the Farm to Fork Strategy (F2F) and Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, for transition to a resilient and Sustainable food system. The F2F proposes a roadmap of interventions and sets specific goals to reach such a transition. Within these interventions, a renewed CAP is the first stage through which the direction undertaken by the EU can be measured. Following the new CAP delivery model, this work will investigate the national CSPs and address the consistency of the CAP financial instruments utilised to fulfill the social, economic and environmental objectives of the CAP according to the ambition of the F2F and other key strategies.

Within the area of electricity market regulation, a practice has emerged in which the chain of delegation has gone beyond the European Commission, resulting in double delegation. During 2015–2017, the European Commission adopted implementing regulations requiring detailed European terms, conditions and methodologies (TCMs) for electricity markets and system operation to be jointly adopted by national energy regulators. Should the latter fail to agree within a predefined time limit, rule-making would move to the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. This rule-making procedure entails that, depending on the dynamic within the procedure, different actors would adopt the TCMs. This article examines how double-delegated rule-making unfolds in a novel and emerging practice, evolving beneath implementing acts. By analysing the factors behind whether TCMs are adopted jointly by national agencies or not, the study investigates whether this form of delegated rule-making in a network setting delivers decisions or whether rule-making by a European Union agency is needed.

Public and political controversies over Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) have prompted reform processes in international investment law, at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, with different actors shaping the future of international investment governance. In its essence, the options for the ISDS reform reflect the diverging perspectives on the rule of law in international law. Ultimately, they present a choice about who should control power over States’ action in issues of public importance – the States who have created the system, or international investment tribunals who have shaped the legal development of the system. This paper considers the application of the rule of law as a normative meta-principle to international investment law and its dispute settlement, and it sheds light on different perspectives of this concept, as they shape the ongoing ISDS reform(s).