This article traces the recent history of border closures in Turkey and Morocco and their impact on human mobility at the two ends of the Mediterranean. Border closures in the Mediterranean have produced new spaces where borders are often fenced, immigration securitized, and border crossings and those facilitating border crossings criminalized. Here, bordering practices are conceptualized as physical bordering practices, border controls, and legal measures. Turkey and Morocco constitute comparable cases for an analysis of border closures insofar as they utilize similar mechanisms of closure, despite having quite different outcomes in terms of numbers. The article’s findings are based on fieldwork conducted at both locations between 2012 and 2014, as well as on analysis of Frontex Risk Assessment Reports from 2010 to 2016. The first part of the article reflects on the concepts of border closure and securitization, together with their implications, and draws for its argument on critical security studies and critical border studies. The second part of the article is an overview of controls over mobility exercised in the Mediterranean from the 1990s onward. Then, in the third and fourth parts, we turn to the particular cases—respectively, Turkey and Morocco—in order to discuss their processes of border closure and the various implications thereof. Through analysis of the two country cases, we show that border closures are neither linear nor irreversible.

This article develops a typology of migrant smuggling. Six generic types of migrant smuggling that were originally produced in the early 2000s are reviewed against more recent empirical findings. These six types were developed in the context of the profound transformation faced by Europe over the course of the 1990s in terms of its geopolitical landscape, when the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in an unprecedented magnitude of asylum migration, irregular migration flows, and migrant smuggling. Today, in the aftermath of the Arab spring protests and the outbreak of civil war in Syria, the phenomenon of migrant smuggling toward Europe has regained notoriety and relevance. The article concludes that the fundamental mechanisms and types of migrant smuggling that were identified more than a decade ago have persisted over time, but that certain changes in the modus operandi of migrant smugglers can be observed, changes that are linked to geopolitical, market, infrastructural, and other factors.

This article analyzes the extent to which Turkey’s irregular migration governance has evolved since the 1990s and the most salient factors in that process. Relying on the methods of process tracing and political ethnography, the article demonstrates that, since the early 1990s, Turkey’s irregular migration governance has been driven by the following factors: 1) responses to the European Union’s (EU) attempts to control migration through externalization; 2) Turkey’s national security concerns, which increased with the advent of mass migration from the Middle East; and 3) the increase in the number of irregular migrants on Turkish territory. The Syrian mass migration that began in 2011 gave momentum to the evolution of irregular migration governance in line with the long-term externalization on the part of the EU. Our analysis sheds light on the interconnectedness of irregular and mass migration, as well as on the outcomes of interactions between international politics and national migration governance. Thus, the article provides insights that will prove valuable for migration studies, EU studies, and studies on Turkish foreign policy.

Human smuggling is a complex process. Made up of actions both organized and chaotic, it compels migrants to deal with different structures and agents of power, among them smugglers, the state(s), and migrants’ own social networks. The current literature on human smuggling provides a detailed analysis of the different phases of this process, within which discussion of the structure and operation of this “business” can be situated. However, only minimal attention has been paid to migrants’ agency in the smuggling process. Engaging with recent perspectives in migration studies, which emphasize the need to conceptualize human smuggling by focusing on the interdependencies between the different actors involved, the analysis developed in this article aims to explore the different phases of the human smuggling process by focusing on the multilayered relations between smugglers and undocumented people. Drawing upon qualitative ethnographic fieldwork conducted with migrants on the Turkish-Iranian border, the article examines how the physical and sociopolitical conditions of border crossing affect people’s ways of thinking, behavior, and engagement with different structures of power. In doing so, the article attempts to further our understanding of how smuggled migrants mobilize their agency in such a way as to manipulate and challenge the system, as well as of how this process transforms migrants’ capacity to simultaneously recognize and unsettle state bordering practices.

This article aims to explore the views of the Turkish elite on the state of polarization in Turkey. By identifying four political frames—namely, harmony, continuity/decline, conspiracy, and conflict—that selected Turkish political and civil society elites use in discussing the phenomenon of polarization in the country through their contributions to a workshop and in-depth qualitative interviews, the article finds that there is a considerable degree of polarization among the Turkish elite regarding their views on the presence of polarization in Turkey. Moreover, this overlaps with the divide between the government and the opposition in the country. An analysis of the justificatory arguments employed in constituting the aforementioned frames shows that, while those elites who deny the existence of polarization seek its absence in essentialist characteristics of society, in reductionist comparisons with history, or in internal/external enemies, those who acknowledge polarization’s presence look for its roots in political and institutional factors and processes. The article highlights how, given the denial of polarization by the pro-government elite and the substantial gap between the two camps’ justificatory narratives, the currently reported high rates of polarization in Turkey can, at best, be expected to remain as is in the near future, barring a radical change in political constellations.

The failed coup of July 15 has shocked the current state apparatus in Turkey. This shock has culminated in the public demand for administrative reform, which would make previous public designs and policy failures a matter of the past. The state crisis has transpired in the middle of a political transition process whereby the ruling party envisioned systemic change in the political system from the parliamentary to a presidential system. The constitutional amendments also imply changes in the administrative order, with further political hold on bureaucratic cadres. The coup attempt and the massive purges in its aftermath brought the state to its breaking point. In light of such deficits and challenges, this paper discusses the ways, means, and prospects for capacity development and institution-building to overcome the state crisis in Turkey. The reform and restructuring process entails cooperation and a level of understanding between the government, opposition, and bureaucracy. Polarization and disenfranchisement are recipes for further fragmentation in Turkish politics. A cooperative model based on a working relationship between the government, opposition, and bureaucracy would facilitate a return to normalcy.