Concepts and Theory: Analysing Intra- and Anti-systemic Violence across Indian States

We conceptualize electoral violence as coercion directed towards actors and/or objects during the electoral cycle (Birch and Muchlinski Reference Birch and Muchlinski2020, 2; Höglund Reference Höglund2009, 415–16). Violence is part of a menu of electoral manipulation, which includes threats and coercion targeting voters, candidates and officials involved in the process (Fjelde Reference Fjelde2020; Staniland Reference Staniland2014). Even though electoral violence often manifests in contexts in which other types of political or criminal violence are prevalent, it is distinct in the sense that it ‘would not have occurred or would at least have manifested itself differently in the absence of an electoral contest’ (Fjelde and Höglund Reference Fjelde and Höglund2016b, 8). Violence can take place in the run-up to elections during campaigns, on voting day and after the closure of polls when votes are counted and results announced. In this article, our empirical focus is on violence taking place before the polls close, as we are interested in effects on election outcomes.

Building on the literature that conceives of pre-election violence as strategic, we distinguish between intra- and anti-systemic violence (Capoccia Reference Capoccia2002; Staniland Reference Staniland2014). In the former, an actor seeks ‘to win or maintain power within the context of the democratic political system’ (Staniland Reference Staniland2014, 108). The intention of violent electoral manipulation, in other words, is to tilt the playing field towards one particular candidate or party, while accepting elections as the appropriate means for determining who governs. Intra-systemic violence and electoral politics can be viewed as ‘strategic complements’ (Dunning Reference Dunning2011), in that these acts of violence support electoral aims. Intra-systemic violence comes in many forms, including riots or group clashes between party supporters and violent attacks on candidates, politicians or voters. In India, intra-systemic violence may also be ‘outsourced’ to specialists in violence, such as criminal gangs associated with politicians or parties (Berenschot Reference Berenschot2011). This includes instances of ‘booth capture’, where armed goons take over polling places (Berenschot Reference Berenschot2011; Verma Reference Verma2005). The following quote about the 1990 election in Bihar illustrates this range:

Anti-systemic violence, by contrast, seeks to disrupt the electoral process as such. This type of violence is ‘aimed at destroying the rules of the game, not winning within them’ (Staniland Reference Staniland2014, 108). Anti-systemic violence and electoral politics are ‘strategic substitutes’ (Dunning Reference Dunning2011), as these violent tactics constitute an alternative to electoral participation, as well as an attempt to undermine it. Anti-systemic violence – also referred to as ‘insurgent electoral violence’ (Condra et al. Reference Condra2018) – often takes place in the context of conflicts over territorial control between the state and insurgent groups. It involves the coercion of or threats against candidates, voters, poll workers or security forces, as well as the destruction of election infrastructure.

Strategies pursued by insurgent groups towards elections differ across time and space, and vary from seeking incorporation by allying with existing electoral alternatives or forming political parties, to armed opposition to the electoral process (Kennedy Reference Kennedy2014; Matanock and Staniland Reference Matanock and Staniland2018). Similarly, state strategies towards insurgents vary from co-optation to attempts at annihilation (Staniland Reference Staniland2015). In India, anti-systemic electoral violence often takes the form of violently enforced boycott calls by insurgent groups (see, for example, Spokesperson 2009). In such instances, insurgents not only state their opposition to the election, but also stake their reputation on their ability to disrupt its orderly conduct. The boycott call becomes a means for the group to demonstrate territorial control and popular support.

Key for the distinction between intra- and anti-systemic violence is the strategy of the actors towards the election. Whereas intra-systemic violence seeks to increase the chance that one particular candidate or party emerges victorious, anti-systemic violence seeks to delegitimize the winner by casting doubt on the state's ability to administer elections and by highlighting the importance of non-electoral alternatives. In making this distinction, it is important to acknowledge that identifying collective or individual motivations for engaging in violent tactics is notoriously difficult. Violence is generally considered illegitimate, and electoral violence in particular is unpopular with voters, creating incentives for actors to hide their involvement or distort their motivations (Birch, Daxecker and Höglund Reference Birch, Daxecker and Höglund2020, 5; Brass Reference Brass2003, 14; Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas Reference Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas2020). Moreover, actors who instigate violence are unable to fully anticipate the consequences and may miscalculate. Against this background, we limit our analysis to short-term strategies and effects related to specific elections.

Intra- and anti-systemic violence undermine democracy. Intra-systemic violence respects the principle of elections but not the underlying norms of free and fair competition. Anti-systemic violence indicates that the principle of elections is not accepted uniformly by relevant actors. In the long run, both types of violence may feed into each other. Political groups that do not have a chance of winning within the system because there is no level playing field may turn against the system, for instance. With regard to the effects of violence, we focus on turnout and incumbent vote share in the election during which violence occurred. The long-run consequences of violence, either at the group or individual level, are beyond the scope of our analysis.

To understand the effects of intra- and anti-systemic electoral violence, we have to consider why actors engage in violent tactics. These electoral strategies, we argue, influence where we are likely to see violence and how violence shapes election results, specifically turnout and incumbent vote share. Focusing on the Indian context, we start by laying out the conditions under which actors develop their electoral strategies and decide whether or not to turn to violence.

The organization of free and fair elections depends on professional election management, as well as on impartial security forces that are able and willing to guarantee the safety of candidates, voters and poll workers. In India's federal system, elections require cooperation between the Election Commission of India (ECI) – an autonomous constitutional body – and state governments (Singh and Roy Reference Singh and Roy2019; Sridharan and Vaishnav Reference Sridharan, Vaishnav, Kapur, Mehta and Vaisnav2017). The architects of India's constitution believed that centralizing election management in one nationwide commission would provide better protections against electoral malpractice and political interference than state-level commissions (Gilmartin and Moog Reference Gilmartin and Moog2012, 138). Placing election administrators at arm's length from political influence is generally easier than insulating security forces from political pressure, however. Indian state governments have a constitutional mandate to uphold public order during the election, while they or their parties participate in the process and thus have a direct and immediate stake in the outcome. This dual position has often generated tension, and state governments have misused control over security forces to instigate violence or failed to effectively curb it. While attributing direct responsibility for specific violent incidents is difficult, there is substantial evidence that violence has the potential to generate electoral benefits and that political actors are aware of this potential (see, for example, Berenschot Reference Berenschot2020; Brass Reference Brass2003; Daxecker Reference Daxecker2020; Verma Reference Verma2005; Wilkinson Reference Wilkinson2006).

Elections not only influence actors trying to win at the ballot box, but also provide a flashpoint for insurgent groups, as campaigns and polling seek to engage the population in the political process under certain rules and procedures. If these groups are not aligned with any of the options on the ballot, they have a strong incentive to discourage participation, rather than to just let the election proceed unfettered. Campaigning in the run-up to the election provides opportunities for electoral forces to make inroads with the group's actual or claimed constituency. Candidates and party workers who enter the group's territory to disseminate campaign messages, even if only moderately successful, involve citizens in democratic politics and therefore present the threat of erosion of group support. In India, such boycott calls by armed groups go hand in hand with the intimidation or even assassination of candidates and election officials, which often requires them to enter the affected territory with armed escorts, if at all. Electoral participation is also symbolically important, as high turnout indicates broad support for selecting leaders through the electoral process. High levels of participation thus confer legitimacy on the eventual winner, which undermines the group's claim that existing electoral alternatives leave out important voices in society. Even though insurgent groups are not directly on the ballot, elections signify a referendum on non-electoral alternatives. Newspaper articles on elections in areas affected by boycott calls tend to prominently report the percentage of turnout and to relate this to group strength (see, for example, Banerjee Reference Banerjee2009). Depressing turnout is thus crucial to demonstrate that non-electoral alternatives need to be engaged with. An article published in the run-up to assembly elections in Jharkhand illustrates this strategy:

Since insurgent groups cannot afford to ignore elections, the extent to which they succeed in disrupting elections allows them to demonstrate strength. Their long-term goal may be to negotiate with the government and to win concessions. Governments only have incentives to negotiate, however, if the groups are relevant potential partners.

Based on these motivations for engaging in intra- and anti-systemic violence, we now develop our hypotheses, starting with how violence influences turnout. Electoral violence is a disruptive and often exclusionary tactic, which implies that both types of violence should be associated with lower turnout (Bratton Reference Bratton2008; Collier and Vicente Reference Collier and Vicente2012; Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas Reference Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas2020; Trelles and Carreras Reference Trelles and Carreras2012). In the case of anti-systemic violence, insurgent groups aim to obstruct or delegitimize the election. We therefore expect them to seek to decrease turnout as much as possible, ideally to the point where the election is cancelled or postponed, or where polling is disrupted to such an extent that the eventual winner lacks legitimacy. Violent tactics signal to everybody in the group's area of influence that there are severe repercussions for supporting, facilitating or participating in the electoral process. By making good on their threat in some locations, insurgents amplify the boycott call in neighbouring constituencies.

The goals of partisan elites are distinct from those of insurgent groups. To benefit parties who aim to win the election, polling must take place, and it must be credible enough to ensure that the winner has some legitimacy. If irregularities are systematic or widespread, the ECI will order a re-poll in affected constituencies, thus rendering the initial election result moot. Rather than disrupt the election wholesale, the purpose of intra-systemic violence is to suppress support for political opponents, while boosting the electoral fortunes of allies. This can be achieved through threats aimed at opposition candidates or supporters. It can also be achieved through ‘booth capture’, as in the first newspaper quote earlier. In such instances, armed goons block off access to a polling station and stuff ballot boxes. Overall, it is easier to keep voters away from the polls than to make them vote a certain way once they are in the polling booth. While the presence of armed goons at polling stations could galvanize participation as a mode of protest (Aytaç and Stokes Reference Aytaç and Stokes2019) and the stuffing of ballot boxes could also make it appear as if more votes have been cast, we expect that some groups of voters will be dissuaded from participating in the election to avoid the (threat of) violence. In the case of intra-systemic violence, we therefore also expect to see a decrease in turnout, though not as dramatic as in the case of anti-systemic violence:

The location of violence is endogenous to the goals actors aim to achieve by turning to violent tactics. As indicated earlier, anti-systemic violence tends to be focused on the areas of influence of insurgent groups in order to demonstrate and maintain territorial control. Boycott calls generally affect contiguous areas encompassing multiple administrative districts, which, in turn, contain multiple assembly constituencies. A violent incident anywhere in the area affected by the boycott signals that the threat of coercion is credible. Insurgents therefore have quite a lot of flexibility in choosing their specific targets within their area of influence. The institutional framework of the election and the characteristics of constituency-level incumbents therefore matter less for targeting.

The location of intra-systemic violence, by contrast, is influenced by partisan electoral goals. In the case of India's first-past-the-post electoral system, the single-member constituencies in which members of the state legislative assembly are elected are the focal point of competition. We argue that intra-systemic violence is more likely to take place in constituencies where the local incumbent belongs to the state-level opposition. Aligned constituencies – that is, those where the incumbent member of the legislative assembly belongs to the party in control of the state government – are therefore comparatively more likely to be peaceful. There are several reasons to expect this pattern. Incumbents are more frequently responsible for electoral violence, and opposition supporters are more likely to be targeted (Burchard Reference Burchard2020). Overall, as outlined earlier, incumbent elites in control of the state government have opportunities to deploy security forces strategically. Existing literature demonstrates that intra-systemic violence is likely to occur in locations where it generates electoral benefits to incumbents (see, for example, Daxecker Reference Daxecker2020; Wahman and Goldring Reference Wahman and Goldring2020; Wilkinson Reference Wilkinson2006). Incumbent elites may use their control of security forces to broaden their territorial base. The strategic deployment of security forces allows their co-partisans to campaign beyond the party's core constituencies. This is a crucial resource not available to the opposition, as only incumbent elites can draw on security forces to muscle their way into non-aligned constituencies. In plurality systems, pre-election violence is therefore particularly common in areas controlled by the opposition (Wahman and Goldring Reference Wahman and Goldring2020). Fjelde (Reference Fjelde2020) shows that parties are more likely to resort to violence when they lack other means to appeal to voters, such as an infrastructure for organizational outreach and voter mobilization. This again points to opposition-controlled areas as likely sites of violence. While Fjelde's analysis is cross-national and looks at party strength in the aggregate, we expect the same logic to hold at the subnational level:

Finally, if intra-systemic violence is more likely in non-aligned constituencies, then within these constituencies, it should be targeted at supporters of the state-level opposition. The effect of electoral violence would then be to strategically depress turnout among supporters of the local incumbent. These are the voters who would be on the receiving end of coercion and intimidation, and they may respond by withdrawing from the electoral process:

In sum, we expect the distinct intentions of intra- and anti-systemic violence to influence where violence occurs and how it influences election outcomes. We now turn to the empirical test of our hypotheses.

Measuring Intra- and Anti-systemic Electoral Violence

Our analysis draws on an original dataset that includes electoral violence during legislative assembly elections between 1985 and the implementation of the new delimitation order in (Electoral Commission of India (ECI) 2008). This timespan ensures that the borders of assembly constituencies, which are our units of analysis, are consistent over time. As indicated earlier, previous efforts to collect data on electoral violence have focused on events related to national elections (see, for example, Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung Reference Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung2019; Hyde and Marinov Reference Hyde and Marinov2015). Existing violence data that would cover subnational elections are related to either armed conflict (see, for example, Sundberg and Melander Reference Sundberg and Melander2013) or communal violence (see, for example, Varshney and Wilkinson Reference Varshney and Wilkinson2006), and therefore do not systematically capture intra- and anti-systemic violence in the same dataset.

Methodologically, the scope of our project implies the need to select data that are available consistently between 1985 and 2008. We rely on election coverage in a national newspaper, namely, the ToI, the English-language daily with the largest circulation in the country. Since it is regarded as a quality (or ‘broadsheet’) newspaper, the ToI has been popular as a reliable source for event data on India (see, for example, Kennedy and King Reference Kennedy and King2013; Varshney and Wilkinson Reference Varshney and Wilkinson2006). It is the best source of information for our purposes for two reasons. First, the events we are aiming to identify are newsworthy, as they involve violence or the threat of violence. While newspapers filter incoming information, ‘violent events, particularly when involving death, are generally more likely to make news’ (Franzosi Reference Franzosi2004, 168). Secondly, since the ToI is a national newspaper, it is more likely to offer comprehensive coverage of state assembly elections than international newspapers or newswires. This alleviates concerns about under-reporting and geographically biased coverage (von Borzyskowski and Wahman Reference Von Borzyskowski and Wahman2019), though it does not fully resolve them. Media-based data always remain accounts of ‘reported violence’, rather than capturing all violent events. Nevertheless, elections are central events in democratic societies, meaning that even subnational elections tend to draw considerable media attention. The articles we code include reporting by local journalists, who may be more likely to travel to and report from urban areas and expected violence hotspots (von Borzyskowski and Wahman Reference Von Borzyskowski and Wahman2019). Violence in rural areas and in constituencies with no previous history of violence may not be picked up. In addition, however, the articles also draw on updates provided by the ECI, which organizes the elections and staffs polling places, investigates whether incidents were reported, and, in severe cases, orders a re-poll. By referencing this information, ToI articles offer more comprehensive geographic coverage than traditional news reporting.

The collection of the data proceeded in two steps. First, we extracted articles covering elections from the ToI. For each election, we searched for articles published one month prior to the beginning of polling up until one month after results were announced.Footnote ¹ The majority of articles are clustered around polling days. We extracted articles that contain the name of the state and the word ‘election’. In addition, we specified nine search terms, at least one of which had to be present in the article: ‘repoll’, ‘re-poll’, ‘irregularit*’, ‘violen*’, ‘unrest’, ‘attack’, ‘intimidat*’, ‘booth captur*’ or ‘boycott*’.Footnote ² For the 88 legislative assembly elections covered in our analysis, we coded 2,107 articles and, on average, we extracted 24 articles per election, with some searches yielding more than 100 articles (for example, in Punjab in 1992). In a second step, we coded incidents reported in the extracted articles based on three criteria: (1) election related; (2) taking place in the state holding assembly elections; and (3) substantiated, that is, either the event is presented as a fact by the ToI or the ECI recognized the event as substantiated. For each event, we coded the constituency name and a brief event description.Footnote ³ Where the information about the event was incomplete, we complemented information about extracted events with other news sources (for example, The Hindu or India Today magazine). If the ToI mentioned only the name of the village, not the constituency, we matched the village to a constituency.

In our analysis, we include Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. These are the states for which census data are available at the district level. Combined, they accounted for 95 per cent of the Indian population in 2001.Footnote ⁴ In addition to our violence data, we draw on three datasets: district-level census data collected by Iyer and Shrivastava (Reference Iyer and Shrivastava2018); constituency-level electoral data compiled by Jensenius and Verniers (Reference Jensenius and Verniers2017); and data on the composition of state governments provided by Harbers, Bartman and Van Wingerden (Reference Harbers, Bartman and Van Wingerden2019).

Variables

Intra- and anti-systemic violence

The distinction between intra- and anti-systemic violence captures ‘whether an actor in question is seeking to win or maintain power within the context of the democratic political systemic (intra-systemic) or whether instead the actor seeks to overthrow the status quo order (anti-systemic)’ (Staniland Reference Staniland2014, 107). As highlighted earlier, identifying collective or individual motivations for engaging in violent tactics is difficult. In order to operationalize types of violence, we therefore have to render motivations observable. For anti-systemic violence, we rely on stated intentions by armed groups to disrupt the election and code whether such groups have declared an election boycott in a specific area.Footnote ⁵ In order for the boycott to be effective, it must be publicized. Armed groups generally put up announcements calling on residents to abstain from voting and implicitly or explicitly threatening those who do not comply, as in the newspaper article earlier. They may also issue statements to the press (for example, Spokesperson 2009). By announcing boycott calls before an election, armed groups essentially try to turn these constituencies into anticipated violence hotspots, which draws media coverage (von Borzyskowsi and Wahman 2019). Boycotts generally affect whole districts and often several districts. In addition to identifying whether a boycott call is in place in a constituency in a given election, we also code whether violent events are reported in the area affected by the boycott call and, if so, whether these events were lethal or non-lethal.

While boycott calls by armed groups have to be made explicit in order to be effective, violent tactics by actors trying to win the election are more covert. Parties and candidates generally cannot openly declare their intention to use violence against opponents. They at least have to maintain a semblance of commitment to the principle of free and fair elections. Our data are therefore asymmetric, in the sense that actor involvement is more observable in boycott calls than intra-systemic violence. We deal with this asymmetry in two ways. First, we code violent incidents that did not occur in an area affected by a boycott call and that involved actors affiliated with parties on the ballot, such as party workers, party supporters and voters, as intra-systemic violence. Through their connections with political parties, we thus assume that these actors are trying to influence the outcome of the election, and we use this operationalization of intra-systemic violence for our main analyses. In addition, however, we also create a second variable – which we call ‘non-boycott violence’ – that captures all violent events in our database that did not occur in an area affected by a boycott call, even if the actors involved are not clearly identified as situated within the political system.Footnote ⁶ We expect non-boycott violence to demonstrate greater similarity to intra-systemic than to anti-systemic violence in our analyses. We report results for non-boycott violence in the Online Appendix and, indeed, find that they are broadly consistent with patterns observed for intra-systemic violence.

Our unit of analysis is the constituency-year. We aggregate events at the constituency level into binary and categorical variables. The binary variables capture: (1) whether a boycott call was in place and the constituency was thus affected by anti-systemic violence (0 = no; 1 = yes); and (2) whether intra-systemic violence occurred (0 = no; 1 = yes). This dummy does not reflect the severity of violence, but it is useful for our analysis, as we are primarily interested in where violence occurs and how its occurrence influences the outcome of the election. Further, based on news coverage, it is difficult to accurately determine whether separate incidents occurred at multiple polling places or whether one large-scale event affected multiple polling places. Especially in elections where irregularities were widespread, articles tend to mention the constituencies where clashes between party supporters or attacks by armed groups occurred, though without fully disentangling each event or explaining the relationship between different events.Footnote ⁷ While it is therefore not possible to count events to measure the severity of the violence, we are able to distinguish between lethal and non-lethal events. To develop a more nuanced measure of violence, we also created categorical variables that capture: (1) the type of intra-systemic violence (0 = none; 1 = non-lethal violence; 2 = lethal violence); and (2) the type of anti-systemic violence (0 = no boycott call; 1 = boycott call in place; 2 = boycott call with non-lethal violence; 3 = boycott call with lethal violence).

Over our entire time period, we have 18,982 observations, and our variables are highly skewed towards zero (3.35 per cent of our units are affected by intra-systemic violence, and 1.63 per cent of our units are affected by anti-systemic violence). Figure 1 visualizes the constituencies that were affected by each type of violence. The maps confirm that, while there is some spatial overlap in Bihar and Punjab, intra- and anti-systemic violence generally take place in different areas, suggesting different dynamics.

Fig. 1. Constituencies affected by intra-systemic violence (left) and anti-systemic violence (right), aggregated over 1985–2008.

Analysis

Following our hypotheses, we analyse three different relationships. First, we model the effect of intra-systemic and anti-systemic violence on turnout (H1). Next, we analyse the effect of alignment on the likelihood of intra-systemic violence (H2a) and on the likelihood of anti-systemic violence (H2b). Finally, we model the interaction effect of intra-systemic violence and alignment on incumbent vote share (H3). We report descriptive statistics and alternative specifications, including those using different operationalizations of the violence variables, in the Online Appendix.

Table 1 presents the results of our analysis of the effect of intra-systemic and anti-systemic violence on turnout. We use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity between constituencies and do not include the time-invariant control variables in these models (that is, ruggedness, constituency type and state fixed effects).

Table 1. Results of the fixed-effects analysis, dependent variable: turnout (%)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster: district); * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001: fixed effects at the constituency level.

Our results are in line with our first hypothesis: intra-systemic and anti-systemic violence are negatively associated with turnout, both in separate models and in a combined model. For intra-systemic violence, the negative effect emerges only for non-lethal events, which constitute 88.2 per cent of all intra-systemic violence in our data. The coefficient for lethal events is not significant. The effect of anti-systemic violence on turnout is stronger than the effect of intra-systemic violence (see Model 3 in Table 1), which makes sense considering that anti-systemic violence aims at depressing overall turnout and intra-systemic violence aims at depressing turnout selectively to favour one candidate over others.Footnote ¹² While intra-systemic violence could lead to higher turnout, for instance, in the case of ballot-box stuffing, the aggregate effect is thus still negative. For anti-systemic violence, the size of the negative effect increases with the severity of violence. A boycott call, even without additional events reported, depresses turnout significantly, but the negative effect becomes more pronounced if there are specific violent incidents reported and increases further if there are fatalities. This contrasts with the pattern for intra-systemic violence, where the coefficient for lethal events is not significant, suggesting that both types of violence are qualitatively different. Further, the spatial lag for intra-systemic violence is positive, suggesting that while intra-systemic violence decreases turnout locally, it boosts turnout in neighbouring constituencies. Literacy and electrification – two variables that tap into the provision of public goods – have positive effects on turnout. Since this is a fixed-effects model, this indicates that an increase in the provision of public goods is associated with an increase in electoral participation.

In Table 2, we explore the effect of alignment on the incidence of intra-systemic violence (H2a) and on anti-systemic violence (H2b). Since we are not trying to account for the severity of violence in a particular place, we draw on the binary operationalization of intra- and anti-systemic violence for these models.Footnote ¹³ Our hypothesis is that alignment has a negative effect on the likelihood of intra-systemic violence but that it is not systematically related to anti-systemic violence. For these models, we use zero-inflated Poisson regression with robust standard errors to account for the highly skewed nature of our dependent variables.

Table 2. Results of the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression, logit inflation model

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster: assembly constituency); * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

The results of this second analysis are also in line with our theoretical expectations: compared to non-aligned assembly constituencies, the probability of intra-systemic violence is lower in aligned constituencies (β = −0.339** [see Model 1 in Table 2]). In other words, constituencies where the incumbent belongs to the party in power are less likely to experience intra-systemic violence. As expected, alignment is not systematically related to anti-systemic violence.Footnote ¹⁴ Interestingly, we find that margin of victory is positively associated with both types of violence. This means that the less competitive the race, the higher the likelihood of violence. Especially with regard to intra-systemic violence, this finding is remarkable, as previous research on India has highlighted that close electoral races lead to riots (Wilkinson Reference Wilkinson2006). One possible interpretation is that the violence that appears in our dataset, which is generally limited in scale, is qualitatively different from full-blown communal riots. In this sense, the positive relationship we find is in line with research on intra-systemic electoral violence in other countries, where incumbents have been found to use violence to muscle their way into opposition strongholds (Fjelde Reference Fjelde2020; Wahman and Goldring Reference Wahman and Goldring2020). In the case of anti-systemic violence, it is possible that insurgent activity is endogenous to the lack of vibrant electoral competition, as these groups operate in areas where democratic institutions function less well and their presence further erodes such institutions.

Finally, in Table 3, we analyse how intra-systemic violence influences election results and whether the decline in turnout benefits parties in control of the state government. If so, we expect the vote share of incumbents in non-aligned constituencies to decrease in the case of violence. Once again, we use a fixed-effects model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. To model the combined effect of intra-systemic violence and alignment on incumbent vote share, we use an interaction term. We again rely on the binary operationalization of intra-systemic violence here and report specifications based on categorical variables in the Online Appendix.Footnote ¹⁵

Table 3. Results of the fixed-effects analysis, dependent variable: incumbent vote share (%)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster: district); * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; fixed effects at the constituency level.

Results are in line with our hypotheses: we find that intra-systemic violence has a negative effect on incumbent vote share, which indicates that violence is associated with fewer votes for the constituency-level incumbent party. Further, the positive coefficient of alignment indicates that incumbents who belong to a party in power at the state level have comparatively higher vote shares than incumbents belonging to an opposition party. The positive interaction term (β = 7.993***) indicates that the negative effect of intra-systemic violence on incumbent vote share is positively mitigated by alignment, that is, that the negative effect of violence is diminished if the incumbent is aligned with the state government. This is consistent with our theoretical expectations: vote shares of incumbents belonging to opposition parties suffer more due to intra-systemic violence than vote shares of incumbents belonging to the party that governs the state. This suggests that within non-aligned constituencies, intra-systemic violence is targeted at supporters of the state-level opposition and thus strategically depresses turnout among supporters of the local incumbent. Combined, our analyses lend support to the idea that intra-systemic violence benefits state-level incumbents.