Role of Civilians in Civil Wars

Civilians adapt and adjust in response to the military struggle that may have become part of everyday life (Reference LubkemannLubkemann 2008; Reference BarterBarter 2012). The regularity of war forces individuals to make strategic decisions about how to confront the challenges imposed on them. Rebels and civilians are two separate actors with bargaining powers that may not necessarily favor the rebels (Reference ArjonaArjona 2016; Reference MampillyMampilly 2011). The strength of community institutions defines civilian bargaining power and thus the level of agreement in negotiations, or in this case, level of cooperation between the two actors. When civilians have strong community organizations, bargaining power favors these civilians, who can make demands on their partners (i.e., the insurgents) such as requiring them to be accountable for their actions. In contrast, when community organizations are weak, bargaining power favors the insurgents, who can make demands on the community (Reference ArjonaArjona 2016). In a different situation, organized communities successfully negotiated an agreement with armed actors. Normally, civilians agree to share their resources, as long as armed actors respect their autonomy in handling community relations (e.g., punishing members of the community who refuse to maintain neutrality in the war) (Reference WilsonWilson 1992; Reference Anderson and MarshallAnderson and Wallace 2013; Reference KaplanKaplan 2017).

From this viewpoint, civilians may not be helpless or weak. They are independent actors with their own demands, as long as they are equipped with an advanced level of organization. However, armed actors sometimes underestimate civilians’ capacity to organize and attempt to impose their regime without considering the people’s preferences, which pushes inhabitants to resist armed actors (Reference ArjonaArjona 2016).Footnote ¹ In this case, civilians might arm themselves and fight back to protect themselves from the abuse of armed actors. For example, Peruvian peasants created self-defense organizations called rondas campesinas to protect their communities from the Shining Path (Reference FumertonFumerton 2001).

In other situations, civilians prefer to use peaceful means to say no to armed actors. Case studies show that civilians conform to autonomous organizations (e.g., Zones of Peace, Communities of Peace) to bargain with armed actors and convince them to moderate their behavior toward civilians (Reference WilsonWilson 1992; EPICA and CHRLA 1993; Reference Avruch, Jose, Hancock and MitchellAvruch and Jose 2007; Reference ValenzuelaValenzuela 2009; Reference BarterBarter 2012; Reference KaplanKaplan 2017; Reference Anderson and MarshallAnderson and Wallace 2013). However, other civilians adopt a different approach. They prefer to hold public demonstrations against one or both parties of the war to show their dissatisfaction (Reference StollStoll 1993; Reference ShahShah 2008). The subject of this article is the nature of these protests.

Regarding the various obstacles civilians face in staging a successful protest, they must first solve the problem of collective action. Citizens might be reluctant to mobilize if they enjoy the benefits of the struggle without assuming any cost. Staging public manifestations might trigger a violent response from armed actors who interpret such actions as expressions of disloyalty (Reference Moreno LeónMoreno León 2017).Footnote ² Some civilians might avoid participating, expecting others to assume the risks. If everyone shares this view, no protests will be held. The question then becomes, Why do people mobilize peacefully? In other words, how do they overcome the problem of collective action?

The Civilians’ Dilemma

When civilians face dangerous situations during civil wars, they must make difficult decisions to survive. The first alternative civilians contemplate is to leave town. Civilians tend to emigrate when security and economic conditions are unbearable to the extent that they foresee a better future in other lands (Reference Davenport, Moore and PoeDavenport Moore and Poe 2003; Reference Engel and IbañezEngel and Ibañez 2007; Reference AdhikariAdhikari 2013).Footnote ³ The second alternative is to stay and cooperate (in the broadest sense of the word) with one of the armed sides in the confrontation. In this situation, one side might provoke the other to target civilians indiscriminately in an attempt to force them to switch sides (Reference KalyvasKalyvas 2006; Reference Humphreys and WeinsteinHumphreys and Weinstein 2008). A third option is to resist the presence of armed actors, which may incite violence from both sides (Reference WilsonWilson 1992; EPICA and CHRLA 1993; Reference StollStoll 1993; Reference ShahShah 2008; Reference BarterBarter 2012; Reference Anderson and MarshallAnderson and Wallace 2013; Reference KaplanKaplan 2017). According to certain conditions, individuals make their choices by ranking their preferences among these options.

I argue that three factors influence this decision-making process, all of which involve the problem of collective action. The first factor is the connection between community and territory. In this situation, societies are committed to remaining in their region and protecting their unity despite obstacles so that they can preserve the benefits they are entitled to in their land of residence. The second factor is the relationship between the community and external actors or organizations. External actors can provide selective incentives to local residents to build cohesive communities organized around common goals such as development, peace, and appropriation of the territory. In this situation, foreign actors become agents who subsidize the costs of the collective action problem for the good of the community. Finally, the increased probability of being a target in the war reduces the probability of nonparticipation. When the cost of a passive attitude equals the cost of resisting, individuals may be inclined to mobilize against armed actors. However, when the risks of protesting become extremely high or exceed a risk threshold, people may choose to flee.

Autonomy as a commitment to the territory

People protest armed actors when the expected utility for remaining in the zone is higher than that of migrating. This depends on the cost function, the cost of migrating (C_mi), and the cost of staying and mobilizing against armed actors (C_sm). The latter equals the aggregation of the costs for mobilizing against armed actors (C_m), as well as the costs of repression by other armed actors (C_rm), who are likely to punish them for not supporting their armed group. Therefore, mobilization occurs only if the following equations are satisfied:

(1) $C_{\mathrm{mi}}\ge \hspace{0.17em}{C}_{\mathrm{sm}}.$

(2) $C_{\mathrm{mi}}\ge C_m+C_{\mathrm{rm}}.$

C_mi is greater than C_sm when the territory has high cultural and economic value, such as the territories of ethnic groups whose identities are deeply rooted in their homeland. Regarding various factors, landscape shapes identity construction by delineating the economic and social relationships among people (Reference GordilloGordillo 2004; Reference EscobarEscobar 2008). In the individual, this dynamic promotes the perception of belonging to a certain region, triggers ethnic solidarity, and embodies the sense of community (Reference KosekKosek 2006). However, only when these social groups feel threatened by external agents (e.g., dam and mining projects, civil war violence) do they see the necessity of defining the border of their region as a defense mechanism and an opportunity to defend their autonomy (Reference ParajuliParajuli 1996; Reference EscobarEscobar 2001; Reference KosekKosek 2006; Reference ÖslenderÖslender 2008). Forced migration then presents itself as a mechanism that dispossesses the territory from its true occupants, putting in danger the transmission of cultural heritage to future generations (Reference Gilbert, Doyle, Allen and XanthakiGilbert and Doyle 2011). I discuss how the relationship between an ethnic group and its territory is strategic, as official ethnic and cultural recognition depends on the permanence of this bond in certain collective spaces. Given the fundamental relationship between ethnic identity and territory, I argue that it is expensive for ethnic groups to relocate.Footnote ⁴

The net utility of staying in a territory must be compared both to migration and to staying and cooperating with one side of the conflict. Cooperating with either side of a confrontation must produce a payoff that is lower than that of maintaining the status quo at the expense of popular opposition. In this context, inhabitants mobilize against armed actors only if the costs of doing so (C_sm) are much lower than those of supporting an armed actor (C_sc). C_sc is first a function of the risk of violence from the remaining armed actors (C_rc) and second of the resources that inhabitants provide to the armed actor they support (C_g). Therefore:

(3) $C_{\mathrm{sc}}\ge C_{\mathrm{sm}}.$

(4) $C_{\mathrm{rc}}+C_g\ge C_m+C_{\mathrm{rm}}.$

In this context, (C_m) becomes an essential part of the problem. Communities that already have a high level of organization tend to have low transaction costs when deciding to protest. These communities have several strong institutions including community chiefs, religious leaders, and indigenous guards (or self-defense groups) with sizable memberships (Reference KaplanKaplan 2017).Footnote ⁵ These institutions have a history of facilitating cooperation among members, which is an asset when coordinating protests against armed actors in the community (Reference OstromOstrom 1999). In addition, they include political entrepreneurs with the ability to coordinate member contributions and punish those who do not participate in the provision of the public good (Reference TaylorTaylor 1987). Members of these communities prioritize group and community goals over individual interests and can thus maintain autonomy from armed actors (Reference LichbachLichbach 1998; Reference PetersenPetersen 2001).

Given that these communities are highly organized and their identity is closely associated with their territory, their resistance is perceived as credible. The persistence of people staying in the territory, despite the risks, sends an informative signal to armed actors: the community is not going to move away or support any side, despite threats of violence against them. By publicly signaling their compromise, the decision to resist becomes irreversible. This signal has an immense impact on the behavior of armed actors, who avoid punishing members of autonomous communities strongly committed to resistance (Reference ArjonaArjona 2016).Footnote ⁶ Repression only exacerbates the hostility toward the armed actor and encourages that actor to support the other side (Reference KaplanKaplan 2017). Therefore, (C_rm) is lower for these communities than for other social groups.

In Colombia, the Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have a strong institutional history and power. Colombian law recognizes the collective property rights of these groups and grants them the autonomy to govern their territories under the figures of resguardo or consejo comunitario, respectively.Footnote ⁷ Rappaport (Reference Rappaport1996) and Wade (Reference Wade and Cheater2005) explain that this recognition shapes how nonethnic Colombians perceive these groups and enhances the identification of ethnic Colombians, further dividing insiders and outsiders. Therefore, ethnic identity acquires immense value, not only because of deeply rooted emotional ties but also because ethnicity is a strategic tool used by ethnic communities to acquire autonomous political status. Thus, autonomous status facilitates the growth of strong institutions that define the principles and roles of all community members (Reference Hernández DelgadoHernández Delgado 2004; Reference Ranincheski and MorenoRanincheski and Moreno 2010; Reference KaplanKaplan 2017).

Under these circumstances, autonomy, ethnic membership, and property rights are strictly tied to the territory. Consequently, individuals in these communities choose not to migrate, despite the violence of civil war, as doing so means losing benefits entitled to members of the ethnic community in that territory. Each ethnic autonomy then is prone to mobilize both, because the transaction costs of mobilization are low (and in some cases, public demonstration reinforces their identity as a community) and the exit option is too costly or nonexistent. Hence, municipalities that count with several ethnic autonomies in their territory are more likely to stage protests against armed actors. Therefore:

H₁: Municipalities with many autonomous ethnic organizations are more likely to protest against any armed actor of a civil war.

Patrons of peace

Not all communities have the means to proclaim themselves autonomous. The question as to how other nonethnic communities overcome their collective action problem thus emerges. Case studies mention the participation of external actors of the community such as religious communities and NGOs in the creation of nonviolent resistance movements (EPICA and CHRLA 1993; Reference OrjuelaOrjuela 2003; Reference Hilhorst and LeeuwenHilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005; Reference Anderson and MarshallAnderson and Wallace 2013). However, these analyses neglect to review how outside agents catalyze peaceful demonstrations against armed actors in civil wars.

I argue that external agents such as NGOs are well-endowed political entrepreneurs that can consolidate autonomous and committed organizations. They distribute selective incentives (SI_pe) among members of the community to shape and transform community preferences (Reference LichbachLichbach 1998). In this case, political entrepreneurs use their resources to recruit and retain members of their organizations, rewarding those who contribute to the provision of public goods with private goods (Reference TaylorTaylor 1987; Reference LichbachLichbach 1998). For instance, the Peace and Development Corporation from Medium Magdalena is a well-known Colombian NGO that channels foreign aid resources for developing peace-building processes within communities. This organization supports local initiatives to address the structural causes of conflict and empower communities by teaching them about peaceful solutions such as nonviolent resistance (Reference Moreno LeónMoreno León 2009; Reference Barreto HenriquesBarreto Henriques 2010).

After the Cold War, the foreign aid system transformed to improve the impact of aid on reducing poverty. The new strategy entailed supporting small-scale projects that the community helped design. Unfortunately, donors were incapable of developing such endeavors, since they lacked the expertise and personnel to conduct these projects. Therefore, they delegated this responsibility to NGOs (Reference Ahmed and PotterAhmed and Potter 2006; Reference ReimannReimann 2006). NGOs have played an important role in civil conflicts by implementing peace-building policies to boost economic development and democratic governance. They have attempted to rebuild communities by solving part of the social distress that civilians suffered regardless of the outcome of peace negotiations among conflicting parties (Reference Mitchell, Hancock and MitchellMitchell 2007). Therefore, they developed a series of economic and political projects, trying to mitigate the deteriorating economic conditions of the community and bolstering local organizations to create conditions for lasting peace at the local level (Reference OrjuelaOrjuela 2003; Reference Hilhorst and LeeuwenHilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005; Reference AltherAlther 2006; Reference CareyCarey 2012; Reference DoschDosch 2012; Reference Fearon, Humphreys and WeinsteinFearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2015). Thus, NGOs provide a credible promise on the delivery of private goods to those willing to stay and work for the community. In this scenario, C_mi is bigger than C_sm, because NGOs provide SI_pe that may not be available in another location (see equation 5):

(5) $C_{\mathrm{mi}}\ge C_m+C_{\mathrm{rm}}-S{I}_{\mathrm{pe}}.$

Foreign aid projects administrated by NGOs convince people to unite and work for the community. The dialogue and cooperation mechanisms embedded within these organizations help solve their collective action problems. Understanding the importance of individual efforts in the consecution of public goods (Reference Lam and OstromLam and Ostrom 2010; Reference Fearon, Humphreys and WeinsteinFearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2015), communities may continue working together despite the absence of the economic resources promised or delivered by NGOs. The community organizations that NGOs help to build and fortify often shape the conscience of their members to the extent that they become politically active in their communities (Reference Boulding and GibsonBoulding and Gibson 2009; Reference BouldingBoulding 2010; Reference Murdie and BhasinMurdie and Bhashin 2011). For example, with the funds of the European Union and support from the Peace and Development Corporation from Medium Magdalena, the small population of Micoahumado, Colombia, created Humanitarian Spaces. They then declared themselves a third party in the war, engaged in a series of negotiations with local armed actors, and demanded better behavior towards civilians during their presence in the territory. This project immediately produced backlash from the government such that national authorities temporarily froze all foreign aid funds to the region. Despite this obstacle, the community continued its struggle (Reference Moreno LeónMoreno León 2009). Thus, the intervention of NGOs distributes private goods, SI_pe, and reduces the costs of mobilization, C_m, as they help organize the community:

(6) $C_{\mathrm{rc}}+C_g\ge C_m\text{'}+C_{\mathrm{rm}}-S{I}_{\mathrm{pe}}\hspace{0.17em}\mathrm{where}\hspace{0.17em}\hspace{0.17em}{C}_m\text{'}<C_m.$

Last, NGOs also provide an invisible cloak of protection to the communities they work with. Armed actors, who are concerned about their international reputation, may find it too costly to punish civilians who demand that their rights be respected (Reference Eguren and MahonyEguren and Mahony 1997; Reference MampillyMampilly 2011).Footnote ⁸ International audience costs are likely to deter violence by armed actors, as the global network in which NGOs are embedded is likely to disapprove of violent actions against unarmed civilians, pushing governments to punish those who hurt civilians. Consequently, communities funded by foreign aid resources and supported by NGOs assume lower C_rm, given that armed actors are likely to find repression and indiscriminate violence against civilians a costly strategy:

(7) $C_{\mathrm{rc}}+C_g\ge C_m\text{'}+C_{\mathrm{rm}}\text{'}-S{I}_{\mathrm{pe}}\hspace{0.17em}\mathrm{where}\hspace{0.17em}\hspace{0.17em}{C}_m\text{'}<C_m\hspace{0.17em}\mathrm{and}\hspace{0.17em}{C}_{\mathrm{rm}}\text{'}<C_{\mathrm{rm}}.$

In summary, NGOs can increase community cohesion and security, which encourages peaceful mobilizations against armed actors (Reference ArjonaArjona 2016). Indeed, these organizations have been decisive in the constitution of many autonomous territories that claimed neutrality in civil conflicts, such as the zones of peace in the Philippines and the Peace Community at San José de Apartadó in Colombia (Reference OrjuelaOrjuela 2003; Reference AltherAlther 2006; Reference Avruch, Jose, Hancock and MitchellAvruch and Jose 2007; Reference ValenzuelaValenzuela 2009). Therefore:

H₂: Municipalities receiving high amounts of foreign aid are more likely to protest against any armed actor of a civil war.

Colombia as a Case Study

In the mid-1960s, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército Nacional de Liberación (ELN), two of the longest-lived guerrilla groups of the Western Hemisphere, started their struggle against the government. At the beginning of the confrontation, both guerrillas were small groups that did not represent a real threat to the government since they operated in remote areas (Reference González, Bolívar and VásquezGonzález et al. 2002). In the early 1980s, such tendency changed. Both guerrillas multiplied their military fronts and their economic sources (e.g., extortion, kidnapping, coca crops) with the only purpose of taking control over the government. While insurgents were gaining more strength, local elites (some linked to drug trafficking) constituted a series of paramilitary organizations to fight insurgents and secure their control over different illegal economies (Reference González, Bolívar and VásquezGonzález et al. 2002). Besides the countless lives lost during the past decades, the civil conflict generated nearly seven million internal displaced people between 1988 and 2010.Footnote ¹⁰

The long duration of the Colombian civil conflict has driven civilians to consider the war as part of daily life (Reference PécautPécaut 2001). As such, civilians have learned to survive while caught in the cross fire (Reference LubkemannLubkemann 2008). In addition to autonomous organizations that encourage dialogue between civilians and armed actors (e.g., Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó) (Hernandez Delgado 2004, Reference ValenzuelaValenzuela 2009, Reference KaplanKaplan 2017), civilians also implement public demonstrations against insurgents, paramilitaries, and state forces to shape combatants’ preferences for violence. According to the Social Struggles Dataset from the Centre for Research and Popular Education (CINEP), 19.9 percent of the total number of demonstrations in Colombia between 1988 and 2010 were protests against one or more armed actors in the war. In the late 1980s, mobilizations against armed actors were not so frequent. However, such trend shifted in the mid-1990s. Protest behavior rise as well as the recrudescence of the civil conflict. According to Granada and colleagues (Reference Granada, Restrepo, Vargas, Restrepo and Aponte2009), the number of civilian causalities, kidnappings, and internal displaced people increased dramatically between the end and the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this sense, protests against armed actors is a reflection of the hardest moments of the Colombian civil conflict.

This article attempts to explain how civilians make decisions regarding the local dynamics of the war. I compare how municipalities’ political and military characteristics influence protest behavior against combatants. Unfortunately, little cross-national information is available on the local dynamics of civil war and protest behavior (Reference Rustad, Buhaug, Falch and GatesRustad et al. 2011).Footnote ¹¹ Furthermore, social mobilization data are not typically aggregated by town and focus solely on antigovernment protests. However, in Colombia, private and public organizations have made efforts to collect local-level information about the dynamics of the civil war and protest behavior (Reference Restrepo, Spagat and VargasRestrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2006). As a result, Colombia presents a good case for testing the conditions under which civilians in civil conflicts resist violent organizations.

Research Design

The dependent variable is number of protests against any armed actor in each town per year. I employed information extracted from the CINEP Social Struggles Dataset. This data set uses national and regional newspapers, interviews with social movement leaders, and reports from social organizations to collect information about protests, which it defines as any public demonstration with at least ten participants. From that data set, I selected all civilian protests against guerrillas, paramilitaries, state forces, or armed actors between 1988 and 2010.Footnote ¹²

I tested the first hypothesis by creating the variable autonomy, which measures the number of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian autonomous communities the government recognizes in each town. I used the registers from the Interior Ministry of Colombia.

I evaluated the second hypothesis according to the amount of foreign aid each town receives per year and created a variable named foreign aid to account for the number of official development assistance (ODA) projects each town implements per year. This variable was developed based on the reports of the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation of Colombia.

Finally, to test the last hypothesis, I employed the rate of victims killed and wounded by armed actors, and created the variable victimization rate using the number of civilians harmed by armed actors.Footnote ¹³ This was derived from the Human Rights and International Law Observatory data set and population projection data from DANE. I then squared this variable to account for the negative effect of extreme violence on the probability of mobilization against armed actors.

Furthermore, I employed four control variables. First, I extracted the number of Catholic and Christian churches in the municipality in 1995 using data from the Social Foundation. Using this variable, I evaluated the role of religious communities as external agents in the promotion of organizational processes in the community in favor of peace-building initiatives (Reference WilsonWilson 1992; Reference KaplanKaplan 2017). Second, I used a dummy variable to evaluate the impact of regional capitals on mobilization. Political centers are more likely to have resources and the community relationships required for mobilization. This variable equals 1 when the city is the regional capital and 0 otherwise. Third, I employed population density to assess how easy it was for the population to organize a demonstration. I formulated this variable by using population projection data from DANE and geographic area data from the Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi. Because of the variance of this variable, it was logged. I expect that mobilization is easier in populous communities. Fourth, I included in the model the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index of the Colombian Census of 2005 to address the effect of the level of economic development on the probability to protest. Finally, I accounted for the number of protests unrelated to war, using this measure to assess the ease with which towns reached the minimum threshold for mobilization (Reference PetersenPetersen 2001).

I estimated a set of zero-inflated negative binomial models to evaluate the effect of the independent variables on the number of protests against armed actors. I use this model because the number of protests against any armed actor is a discrete variable with nonnegative integer responses. Furthermore, as it is rare to protest against armed actors, the dependent variable has many zeros. Potentially, the creation of zeros responds to two processes: there might be towns in which inhabitants never stage protests and cities in which civilians have the opportunity for public demonstrations but choose not to protest. The selected model not only address the characteristics of my discrete response of counts but also helps adjust the estimates of the count equation according to the probability of finding zeros in the sample (Reference LongLong 1997). In the inflated equation, I used only the control variables. In addition, I clustered the standard errors by municipality in all the models. The unit of analysis was municipality-year.

Results

The empirical analysis supports the first hypothesis. Municipalities with many ethnic autonomous organizations are more likely to protest all sides of the civil war. The estimations demonstrate a positive and stable correlation between Indigenous and Afro-Colombian autonomies and the number of protests against the civil war. In fact, an increase in the number of autonomies enhances the expected number of protests by 1.9 percent when all other variables are held constant (see Figure 1).Footnote ¹⁴ Therefore, the provision of particular rights attached to the territory provides incentives to ethnic communities to remain in the territory despite military confrontation and to mobilize against the war.Footnote ¹⁵

Figure 1: Incidence rate ratio of the number of ethnic autonomies and the number of foreign-aid projects over the number of protests against armed actors.

The second hypothesis argues that municipalities receiving a high amount of foreign aid are more likely to protest the civil war. The findings confirm that an increase in the number of foreign-aid projects in a municipality increases the chances of mobilization against combatants. According to the results of the estimation, a unit increase in foreign-aid projects boosts the expected number of protests by 4.4 percent when all other variables are held constant. In this case, the participation of foreign actors can convince the population to remain in the territory and mobilize to induce better treatment from armed actors. Thus far, I have accounted for the propelling effect of NGOs through ODA on the number of protests against armed actors. Other external agents such as religious organizations might produce a similar effect on civilians’ mobilization. My empirical analysis revealed that a unit increase in the number of Catholic and Christian churches decreases the probability of having no protests against armed actors by 21.5 percent. Despite the fact that this variable is insignificant in the count equation, the result in the inflated equation suggests that religious organizations might influence the probability of having a protest but not the quantity thereof.

The last hypothesis argues that an increase in the number of victims increases the number of protests against armed actors. However, I also contend that there are fewer protests when the level of violence is too extreme. According to the estimation, people tend to mobilize more often when facing violence and when the probability of being targeted is high. Figure 2 shows how a rise in violence against civilians by armed actors increases the incidence rate ratio of a protest in the territory. For example, municipalities in which 5 percent of the population was victimized protested 14 percent more often than did municipalities where only 4 percent of the population was victimized. However, when the rate totals 7 percent of the population, the incidence rate ratio decreases when all other variables are held constant.Footnote ¹⁶ For instance, towns where 12 percent of the population was victimized protested 5 percent less than did towns where 11 percent of the population was victimized. Therefore, violence against civilians can motivate mobilization against military organizations, but only if the benefits justify the costs. For example, people do not mobilize when the level of violence reaches a certain threshold (i.e., cost) that prevents any change in the outcome (i.e., benefit).Footnote ¹⁷

Figure 2: Effect of the victimization rate on the number of protests against armed actors.

Robustness Checks

One concern is that the dependent variable fuses all demonstrations, disregarding their target. Therefore, I also tested the three hypotheses using a multivariate probit model. I input three equations in the estimation. The first two equations evaluated the conditions under which civilians protest against one side—insurgents, or state forces or paramilitaries—in the war. The third equation assesses the circumstances that drive civilians to mobilize as unbiased actors and demand from both armed actors better behavior toward the community.

As shown in the online appendix, ethnic autonomies and foreign aid still explain why people protest armed actors. Of course, the probability of having a protest change according to the target exists, but both variables demonstrated a strong and positive relationship with protest behavior against armed actors.Footnote ¹⁸ Again, the rate of victims hurt by armed actors produces an inverted U shape for the probability of a protest against any armed actor. Consequently, the three hypotheses postulated in this article explain the minimum conditions that drive civilians to overcome their collective action problem and mobilize against armed actors despite the target of the protest.Footnote ¹⁹

Thus far, I have assumed that civilians are more likely to mobilize against armed actors when the costs of migrating are too high. However, is this assumption valid? I tested the impact of the main independent variables that predict protest behavior against armed actors given the possible choice of migration. In this case, I estimated a set of multivariate probit models that demonstrate the correlation among the errors of two or more seemingly unrelated equations (Reference Davidson and MacKinnonDavidson and MacKinnon 2004). I input three equations into the models. The first equation evaluates the conditions under which civilians protest armed actors, the second tests the circumstances under which citizens forcibly emigrate, and the third assesses the factors that explain the arrival of internal displaced people to municipalities in Colombia.

As shown in the online appendix, the three hypotheses explain protest behavior against armed actors. However, interesting results regarding forced migration processes in civil war emerged, which require further analysis in the future. Ethnic autonomies are positively associated with immigration and emigration processes in Colombia. Some studies emphasize that ethnic autonomies in Colombia form a network that shares information and supports fellow ethnic groups. When armed actors execute violent actions against the population, ethnic autonomies warn the ethnic communities in the neighborhood to prepare for the arrival of the armed actor. Ethnic autonomies then preemptively migrate to other places as a mechanism to defend against possible attacks on their members. They temporarily abandon their territories, relocating to places where they will be supported by other ethnic organizations, and eventually return to their territories (Reference ÖslenderÖslender 2008; Reference Castillo ValenciaCastillo Valencia 2009). For ethnic autonomies, mobilization and migration are complementary strategies used to increase their probability of survival. In contrast, foreign aid cannot predict migration processes in Colombia. Despite the fact that NGOs distribute foreign-aid resources to the community, stronger factors shape the preferences of civilians for migration, such as violence. Finally, escalation in the level of violence increases the probability of the emergence of internally displaced people. However, when the rate of victims is 2 percent of the population, the probability of having an additional emigrating person decreases, probably because the most cost-sensitive citizens have already left. In contrast, when the level of violence escalates, the probability of protesting against armed actors also increases until the percentage of victims totals 3 percent of the population, after which the probability of a protest against armed actors declines. These results suggest that the first set of people who abandon the town are less committed to the community, while those who remain find that mobilizing can be an effective mechanism by which to improve the security of the town. This preliminary evaluation indicates that it is necessary to contemplate the conditions under which emigration and mobilizations against armed actors are complementary choices for civilians rather than substitutes. As such, future research should explore the interaction between protest behavior and emigration.

Some scholars argue that foreign aid is not randomly assigned. International cooperation agencies might prefer to assign their resources to strong grassroots organizations. In this case, the level of organization of the communities for a protest against armed actors might be mediated by foreign aid. In this sense, the impact of foreign aid on protest behavior might be a product of the level of organization located in the municipalities. Following this strategy, I could more precisely evaluate the underlying causal mechanisms between level of organization of the communities, foreign aid, and protests against armed actors.

Using protests unrelated to the war as a proxy for level of organization of the municipality, the results show that the variable protests unrelated to the war directly and indirectly affect the probability of a protest in the municipality. The number of protests unrelated to the war has an impact on protest behavior against armed actors through foreign aid. However, this impact accounts for only 1 percent of the total effect of protests unrelated to the war on mobilization against armed actors. Therefore, most of the effect of foreign aid on protest behavior stems from the direct effects explained in this article.Footnote ²⁰

Finally, I argue that through the distribution of foreign aid, NGOs can catalyze protests against armed actors. However, previous studies highlighted a positive effect on the level of conflict behavior. In this case, the effect of foreign aid on protests against armed actors might be mediated by the victimization rate. Because foreign aid might escalate violence in municipalities, foreign aid could indirectly impact mobilization, given its effect on the level of violence. Therefore, I estimated a causal mediation model (Reference Imai, Keele, Tingley and YamamotoImai et al. 2011). Following this strategy, I could more precisely evaluate the causal mechanisms underlying foreign aid and protests against armed actors.

As shown in the online appendix, the results of the estimation indicate that foreign aid directly and indirectly affects the probability of a protest in the municipality. The allocation of foreign aid in the municipality then impacts protest behavior through the victimization rate. However, this impact represents only 2 percent of the total effect of foreign aid on mobilization against armed actors. Therefore, most of the effect of foreign aid on protest behavior stems from the direct effects explained in this article.

Conclusion

Civilians are important agents in the dynamics of civil wars, as they are capable of bargaining with armed actors and vocalizing their preferences. Sometimes, military organizations may determine the order of things individually, and civilians may not necessarily agree. Thus, they may choose to develop a nonviolent type of resistance against the presence of combatants (Reference ArjonaArjona 2016). For civilians to conduct such costly actions, they must solve their collective action problem. Some choose to pay the considerable cost of mobilization to obtain small benefits (Reference WoodWood 2003). Some overcome their mobilization problems and protest against one or all sides of a confrontation. This article has attempted to explain the conditions leading to that decision.

I have argued that people make choices based on the possible costs of their actions. In other words, individuals resist only if the costs of doing so do not exceed the costs of alternatives (e.g., migrating to a safer place or cooperating with one of the armed groups). However, communities and war dynamics have different attributes that influence how the costs are defined during civil wars. These attributes can either reduce the costs of staying and mobilizing against the war, or they can raise the costs of being a passive actor in the territory. In this article, I studied three of these costs: ethnic autonomies, foreign aid distributed through NGOs, and the level of violence.

First, I argued that autonomy among ethnic communities affects their choices. These communities assume elevated costs if they move to other locations. By migrating, they lose part of their identity and the political rights entitled to them in their home territory. Furthermore, the institutions that help autonomous communities function have the means to reduce the costs of mobilization and sometimes, these institutions can empower individuals in the community. As my findings show, these communities tend to mobilize more often than nonautonomous communities against the civil war.

Second, I evaluated the role of external actors by focusing on NGOs as external entrepreneurs. As well-endowed actors, NGOs can distribute selective incentives in communities for two main purposes: to empower local inhabitants and thus promote and strengthen political and communitarian bonds, and to convince individuals to remain in their territory and play a role in its future. The results of the empirical analysis confirm the strong correlation between number of protests and number of foreign-aid projects within municipalities.

Finally, the violence generated from the conflict can alter how the population evaluates the costs of mobilization. When the costs of violence are the same as the costs of mobilizing, inhabitants are willing to protest against the war. However, when the level of violence is excessively high, the population is less inclined to mobilize against armed actors. The evidence has pointed to how the population studied tends to mobilize when the violence produced by the conflict increases. In contrast, when the victimization rate totals around 7 percent of the population, the probability of protests declines. Nevertheless, further research should evaluate how individual civilians survive in contexts of indiscriminate violence following other strategies (e.g., migration) and how the variation in the violent repertoires might influence the probability of having a protest against armed actors.

In this article, I have developed my argument that civilians are rational actors. According to a cost-benefit analysis, civilians choose to protest against armed actors when the costs of such action are less expensive than the alternatives (migrating or supporting one party in the war). Sometimes, people mobilize in favor of a cause despite the lack of benefits of that endeavor. At first glance, self-respect and defiance can drive human behavior toward foolish actions in dangerous contexts (Reference WoodWood 2003). However, people’s conduct cannot be interpreted as irrational. In this case, civilians mobilize because their cost-benefit analysis is formulated under the premise of their moral duty to themselves and the community (Reference VarshneyVarshney 2003). Since the behavior of civilians is driven by the pleasure of agency instead of the future benefits of the action, these civilians are less sensible to the costs of mobilization (e.g., repression). In this framework, autonomous communities and organizations supported by NGOs are more likely to mobilize. Both groups count on institutional strength to solve the collective action problem and protest against armed actors. In contrast, the level of violence can pacify demonstrations against the parties at war. Civilians are more sensitive to a loss of human lives in their communities and will mobilize more to demand better behavior from combatants. However, civilians might be considered risk seekers from this perspective, and they will realize that in extreme levels of violence, few people have their same combative spirit and prefer to refrain from contentious behavior.

Much work is needed to understand civilian resistance against combatants during civil wars. The theory in this article explored a civilians’ cost-benefit analysis. Future work should evaluate the strategic interaction of both civilians and armed actors. Studying the many contexts in which civilians and armed actors interact and the outcomes of these interactions can improve understanding of civil wars. For example, future research should differentiate the targets of protests. Thus far, my analysis aggregated all types of protests against armed actors, regardless of target. If civilians are strategic, they select a target of mobilization to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. How do armed actors behave in return? In equilibrium, neither civilians nor armed actors should have the incentive to change behavior according to behavior of the other. Understanding this strategic relationship can strengthen our comprehension of long-term conflicts such as that in the Colombian case and the effects of such conflicts on local communities.