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Contents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2024

Mona Simion
Mona Simion
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow

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Information
Resistance to Evidence , pp. ix - xi
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Contents

  1. Acknowledgements

  2. Introduction

    1. 0.1Game Plan

  3. Part IThe Epistemology and Psychology of Resistance to Evidence

    1. 1Resistance to Evidence: Triggers and Epistemic Status

      1. 1.1Resistance to Evidence

      2. 1.2The Social Psychology of Evidence Resistance

      3. 1.3Rejecting Evidence: A Taxonomy

      4. 1.4Conclusion

    2. 2Evidence One Has and the Impermissibility of Resistance

      1. 2.1Evidence Internalism

      2. 2.2E = K

      3. 2.3Reliable Indicators

      4. 2.4Virtuous Reasons

      5. 2.5Conclusion

    3. 3Evidence You Should Have Had and Resistance

      1. 3.1The Social ‘Should’

      2. 3.2Worries for Social Epistemic Normativity

      3. 3.3Problems for the Moral ‘Should’

      4. 3.4Conclusion

    4. 4Permissible Suspension and Evidence Resistance

      1. 4.1Proper Suspension: The Simple Knowledge-Based View

      2. 4.2Sosa on Virtue, Telic Normativity, and Suspension

      3. 4.3The Respect-Based View of Permissible Suspension

      4. 4.4Gesturing towards a Better Way

      5. 4.5Conclusion

    5. 5Resistance to Evidence, Epistemic Responsibility, and Epistemic Vice

      1. 5.1Responsible Inquiry and Epistemic Character Traits

      2. 5.2Content-Individuating Responsibilist Virtues and Vices

      3. 5.3Psychological Vice Individuation

      4. 5.4Value-Based Vice Individuation

      5. 5.5Conclusion

  4. Part IIResistance to Evidence and Epistemic Proper Function

    1. 6Resistance to Evidence as Epistemic Malfunction

      1. 6.1Epistemic Oughts

      2. 6.2Functions and Norms

      3. 6.3Resistance to Evidence as Epistemic Malfunction

      4. 6.4Conclusion

    2. 7Evidence as Knowledge Indicators

      1. 7.1Knowledge Indicators

      2. 7.2Evidence and the Impermissibility of Resistance

      3. 7.3Infallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge

      4. 7.4Conclusion

    3. 8Defeaters as Ignorance Indicators

      1. 8.1The Nature and Theoretical Importance of Defeat

      2. 8.2Defeaters as Ignorance Indicators

      3. 8.3External Defeat and Norms of Evidence Gathering

      4. 8.4Conclusion

    4. 9Inquiry and Permissible Suspension

      1. 9.1Suspension and the Knowledge Function

      2. 9.2Justified Suspension

      3. 9.3Suspension and the Normativity of Inquiry

      4. 9.4Conclusion

  5. Part IIITheoretical Upshots

    1. 10Epistemic Oughts and Epistemic Dilemmas

      1. 10.1Obligations to Believe and Epistemic Dilemmas

      2. 10.2What Dilemmas Are Not

      3. 10.3Epistemic Non-dilemmas

      4. 10.4Conclusion

    2. 11Scepticism as Resistance to Evidence

      1. 11.1Two Neo-Mooreanisms

      2. 11.2Against Concessive Neo-Mooreanism

      3. 11.3A New Radical Neo-Mooreanism

      4. 11.4Conclusion

    3. 12Knowledge and Disinformation

      1. 12.1Information and Disinformation

      2. 12.2Against Disinformation Orthodoxy

      3. 12.3A Knowledge-First Account of Disinformation

      4. 12.4Conclusion

  6. Concluding Remarks: The Way Forward in Policy and Practice

    1. Evidence Resistance

    2. Disinformation

  7. Bibliography

  8. Index

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  • Contents
  • Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Resistance to Evidence
  • Online publication: 16 February 2024
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  • Contents
  • Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Resistance to Evidence
  • Online publication: 16 February 2024
Available formats
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  • Contents
  • Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Resistance to Evidence
  • Online publication: 16 February 2024
Available formats
×