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Figures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2023

Noam Lupu
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
Jonas Pontusson
Affiliation:
Université de Genève

Summary

Type
Chapter
Information
Unequal Democracies
Public Policy, Responsiveness, and Redistribution in an Era of Rising Economic Inequality
, pp. ix - xii
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Figures

  1. 1.1Income inequality growth, 1995–2018/2019

  2. 1.2Support for redistribution, by country

  3. 2.1Coefficients for support by income on the probability of policy change (bivariate linear probability models with two-year windows)

  4. 2.2Predicted probabilities of policy change at different preference gaps between P90 and P10 or P50 (two-year windows)

  5. 2.3Policy responsiveness when the preferences of two groups align and the third group diverges (two-year windows)

  6. 2.4Predicted probabilities of policy change conditional on the P90–P50 preference gap and government partisanship (two-year windows)

  7. 2.5Predicted probabilities of policy change, economic/welfare issues only, conditional on the P90–P50 preference gap and government partisanship (two-year windows)

  8. 2.6Predicted probabilities of policy change by time period, conditional on the P90–P50 preference gap and government partisanship (two-year windows)

  9. 3.1Net transfers to M as a share of the net extended income of H and M

  10. 3.2Net transfers by income decile

  11. 3.3The median net income relative to mean net income, 1985–2010

  12. 3.4Real extended income growth in 17 Europe and the United States, 1980–2019

  13. 5.1The end of state economic convergence in the United States

  14. 5.2Gross public investment in the United States

  15. 5.3Federal aid to the thirty-four biggest US cities

  16. 5.4Federal grants for states and localities, 1980–2020

  17. 5.5Federal housing and urban development spending

  18. 5.6Republican overrepresentation in the US Senate

  19. 5.7Partisan skew in statehouse district maps, 1972 vs. 2020

  20. 7.1Continuity of the forcing variable

  21. 7.2Distribution of difference in average years of education of government and opposition members

  22. 8.1Working-class representation in the OECD

  23. 8.2Left-party representation and worker representation

  24. 8.3Worker representation, by electoral system

  25. 8.4Public financing predicts modest differences in worker representation

  26. 8.5Economic characteristics of society matter on the margin

  27. 8.6Worker representation varies more in parties than countries

  28. 9.1Voting, by education and income

  29. 9.2Alternative forms of political participation, by education and income

  30. 9.3Possible mechanisms explaining the association between unequal participation and unequal representation

  31. 9.4Participation by satisfaction with the system

  32. 9.5The power of differential satisfaction with the system in explaining differences in participation across income and education

  33. 9.6Country variation in the voting gap by income and education

  34. 10.1What is fair? Who is deserving?

  35. 10.2Fairness reasoning and demand for redistribution: unidimensional approach

  36. 10.3Fairness reasoning and demand for redistribution: two-dimensional approach

  37. 10.4Changes in fairness beliefs

  38. 10.5Correlation between proportionality and reciprocity beliefs

  39. 11.1Posttax-and-transfer income share of the top 1 percent of individuals for nineteen advanced democracies

  40. 11.2Correlation between the annual rate of GDP growth and annual change in top-1-percent pretax income shares for a broad set of countries, before and after 1980

  41. 11.3Correlation between the annual change in the unemployment rate and annual change in top-1-percent pretax income shares for a broad set of countries, before and after 1980

  42. 11.4Association between economic news tone and pretax income growth for each income quintile, conditional on income growth for all other quintiles

  43. 11.5Association between economic news tone and pretax income growth for top-income groups, controlling for bottom- and middle-income growth

  44. 11.6Estimated coefficient ratios from models predicting economic news tone with pretax income growth for different parts of the income distribution

  45. 11.7Association between economic news tone and disposable income growth for each income quintile, conditional on income growth for all other quintiles

  46. 11.8Association between economic news tone and disposable income growth for top-income groups, controlling for bottom- and middle-income growth

  47. 11.9Estimated coefficient ratios from models predicting economic news tone with disposable income growth for different parts of the income distribution

  48. 13.1Social classes’ average predicted perceptions of systemic congruence on social policy

  49. 13.2Social class differences in proximity to preferred party and party system

  50. 13.3Social class differences in subjective proximity to preferred party and party system, by social policy area

  51. 13.4Social class differences in subjective proximity to preferred party and the party system on social consumption across different party system configurations

  52. 13.5Social class differences in subjective proximity to preferred party and the party system on social investment across different party system configurations

  53. 13.6Social class differences in subjective proximity to preferred party and the party system on benefits for migrants across different party system configurations

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  • Figures
  • Edited by Noam Lupu, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, Jonas Pontusson, Université de Genève
  • Book: Unequal Democracies
  • Online publication: 07 December 2023
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  • Figures
  • Edited by Noam Lupu, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, Jonas Pontusson, Université de Genève
  • Book: Unequal Democracies
  • Online publication: 07 December 2023
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

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  • Figures
  • Edited by Noam Lupu, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, Jonas Pontusson, Université de Genève
  • Book: Unequal Democracies
  • Online publication: 07 December 2023
Available formats
×