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Supposition and (Statistical) Models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2023

Corey Dethier Open the ORCID record for Corey Dethier [Opens in a new window]
Corey Dethier*
Affiliation:
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Hannover, Germany
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In a recent paper, Sprenger advances what he calls a “suppositional” answer to the question of why a Bayesian agent’s degrees of belief should align with the probabilities found in statistical models. I show that Sprenger’s account trades on an ambiguity between hypothetical and subjunctive suppositions and cannot succeed once we distinguish between the two.

Type
Discussion Note
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 90 , Issue 3 , July 2023 , pp. 744 - 749
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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