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Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Gabriel L. Negretto
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Abstract

Since 1978, all countries in Latin America have either replaced or amended their constitutions. What explains the choice between these two substantively different means of constitutional transformation? This article argues that constitutions are replaced when they fail to work as governance structures or when their design prevents competing political interests from accommodating to changing environments. According to this perspective, constitutions are likely to be replaced when constitutional crises are frequent, when political actors lack the capacity to implement changes by means of amendments or judicial interpretation, or when the constitutional regime has a power-concentrating design. It is further argued that the frequency of amendments depends both on the length and detail of the constitution and on the interaction between the rigidity of the amendment procedure and the fragmentation of the party system. The article provides statistical evidence to support these arguments and discusses the normative implications of the analysis.

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Articles
Information
Law & Society Review , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 749 - 779
Copyright
© 2012 Law and Society Association.

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Footnotes

I would like to thank Ernesto Calvo, Gretchen G. Casper, Barbara Geddes, Jonathan Hartlyn, Marcus Andre Melo, Leiv Marsteintredet, Covadonga Meseguer, Marcus Andre Melo, Nina Wiesehomeier, and the anonymous reviewers and editors of Law & Society Review for their constructive and helpful comments to previous versions of this article.

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