Introduction
The push for collective responsibility sits at the center of most global environmental movements. This has reframed the natural world into a universal resource to be conserved not only for the current “global community” but also for imagined future generations. This same rhetoric of global responsibility is also now a mainstay in discussions of heritage, an approach that was solidified with the emergence of the UNESCO “World Heritage” list following the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (hereafter the “World Heritage Convention”). The World Heritage Convention marked two shifts in thinking. The first emphasizes the perceived “universal value” of heritage, which the Convention attempts to quantify through its nomination and listing process. The second relates to the ownership of heritage that becomes “World Heritage.” This language of globalization – bringing in the communities of “universal” and “world” – has disconnected local populations from their own claims to and management of their heritage.
Critique of the World Heritage Convention’s “universalism” and associated cultural relativism is far from unique.Footnote 1 These same concepts and criticisms also appear in discussions of human and Indigenous rights.Footnote 2 This paper builds on these foundations, examining the authorized heritage discourse (AHD)Footnote 3 that emerges through World Heritage Committee discussions, focused particularly on the impacts of universality and “Outstanding Universal Value” (OUV) and definitions of indigeneity and local communities within World Heritage thinking. Centered around the case study of the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex (KKFC) in Thailand, I trace how ideas of global community rights to natural heritage and natural resources have impacted the rights of the Karen people whose ancestral land falls within the park boundaries. This work, therefore, sits at the intersection of several prominent discussions within heritage, which will be brought together in this Thai case – a geographic context that has its added tensions of never having been formally colonized, whilst involved in its own processes of internal colonization.
The focus on Thailand provides an important addition to existing work on the issue of Indigenous Peoples and World Heritage, as the Thai state does not formally recognize Indigenous Peoples within the country. Meanwhile, the case of the KKFC listing is also a clear example of the role (or lack thereof) of Indigenous Peoples’ rights, and human rights more generally, in the World Heritage process – particularly as it relates to so-called natural heritage sites. This paper contributes to a growing body of work on World Heritage and Indigenous Peoples,Footnote 4 focusing on a single, recent example of the World Heritage Committee’s (hereafter WHC) failure to integrate human rights into the World Heritage process through the lens of the nested AHDs that influenced this outcome, including that of UNESCO, the various states on the WHC, as well as the Thai state.
As a non-Indigenous Thai and Australian person, I do not present a Karen or Indigenous view within this paper. Rather, I focus on the top-down narrative of World Heritage, using the case study of the nomination and inscription of the KKFC as a UNESCO Natural World Heritage Site. I undertake an analysis of the WHC’s 2021 discussions on the KKFC listing documented in the WHC Summary Record to illustrate how the World Heritage listing process and the language of “Outstanding Universal Value” (OUV) and “local communities” have been used to justify the exclusion of Indigenous communities like the Karen and overlook human rights abuses.
Although the KKFC nomination has been a point of discussion at four WHC meetings (2015, 2016, 2019, and 2021), I have chosen to focus on the latter date because not only did this meeting result in the successful listing of the KKFC but it did so against the advice of the advisory body (the IUCN). In previous years, decisions had either aligned with the IUCN or, as in 2019, upgraded the listing by only one step (in this case, from a deferral to a referral). By contrast, 2021 saw the WHC upgrade the nomination by two steps, from a deferral to an inscription. A close reading of the 2021 discussion, therefore, allows us to consider the justifications provided by the WHC to go against the IUCN’s advice. Of course, the scripted statements documented on the formal record of discussion at the WHC reflect only one small part of wider discussions and machinations that take place more informally, with final outcomes heavily influenced by lobbying and deal-making behind the scenes.Footnote 5 The WHC discussions documented in the summary record, however, provide a good overview of UNESCO’s “Authorised Heritage Discourse”Footnote 6 – documenting national stances and how states want to present themselves and their values as they relate to heritage, even if underlying motivations may remain speculative.
Indigeneity in the Thai context
Officially, the Thai government recognizes 13 communities as “Ethnic Hill Tribes” – Akha, Dara’ang, Hmong, H’Tin, Iu-Mien, Kachin, Karen/Pwakanyaw, Khamu, Lahu, Lisu, Lua/Lawa, Mlabri, and Shan.Footnote 7 The term “Hill Tribe” or “Ethnic Hill Tribe” is a deliberate assignation that sidesteps discussions of indigeneity while externally defining and homogenizing identity by geographic place. Moreover, it is a pejorative term tied to historical prejudices from the Cold War, as well as views that see “culture” and “civility” as antithetical to these more “natural,” wooded, and hilly environments.Footnote 8 Thailand’s Indigenous communities also extend well beyond these groups that are formally recognized by the Thai government (not as Indigenous, but as existing in the country). However, with no formal data collected on these other communities, it is impossible to say definitively how many Indigenous groups and peoples there are in Thailand today. The Council of Indigenous Peoples in Thailand (CIPT) conducted a literature review concluding that there are more than 40 Indigenous communities in Thailand, constituting over 3 million people.Footnote 9
This lack of clear data arises from the government’s stance that Thailand has no Indigenous Peoples.Footnote 10 As Rongvudhi Virabutr, the Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations explains, “Thailand has consistently maintained the interpretation that the term ‘[I]ndigenous [P]eoples’ refers to those who are pre-settlers or had lived in the area in the pre-colonial period, which is not applicable in the case of Thailand.”Footnote 11 This explanation relates to conventional definitions of “Indigenous Peoples,” largely based on colonization (and, more specifically, European colonization) and settler colonialism, which do not mesh neatly with the Asian context. This has allowed countries like Thailand – which was never formally colonized by the Europeans – to argue against the applicability of the term “Indigenous” in their national context.Footnote 12 This has become known as the “Asian controversy,”Footnote 13 and is why they voted for the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007, doing so with the understanding that it does not have Indigenous Peoples within its borders.Footnote 14
The definition of “Indigenous People,” adopted by the CIPT, is as follows (own translation):
[…] individuals or ethnic groups who settle together, following the traditions and customs inherited from their ancestors, as well as having their own language and cultural traditions up to the present. Indigenous Peoples are a group of people with historical continuity, living in one or more areas and who depend on the resources of that area. They are not dominant in the economy, society, politics, and culture, and consider themselves to be distinct from other sectors of society. They are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit their way of life, identity, and wisdom to future generations […] Moreover, they self-identify as Indigenous and are accepted by other groups.Footnote 15
This definition is based heavily on the definition of indigeneity outlined by Martínez Cobo in the UN’s Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations.Footnote 16 However, one of the notable differences is the removal of historical continuity specifically with “pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies” in the CIPT version. This speaks to another distinct feature of Thailand’s Indigenous movement – in contrast to those in settler colonial contexts such as Australia, New Zealand, and North America – which is a lack of emphasis on the idea of “firstness.” This represents approaches to indigeneity in Asia more broadly.Footnote 17 Instead, indigeneity is centered around the relationship to the state – as oppressed or colonized (in the Thai case, as victims of “internal colonization” perpetrated by the Thai state against its Indigenous Peoples).Footnote 18 Within Thailand, indigeneity is also centered on presence prior to the Thai state and its modern borders.Footnote 19
Much more can be said about the complexities of indigeneity in Thailand and the history and development of its use in the country. However, the above provides sufficient background for understanding the discussions that will emerge through this paper and to highlight the complexities of Thailand as a case study to explore Indigenous environmental heritage.Footnote 20
The Karen and the KKFC
In contrast to expressions of Indigenous identity in settler countries where Indigenous Peoples are seeking sovereignty, Thailand’s Indigenous communities are seeking inclusion and must try to balance advocating for recognition of this separate identity of Indigenous whilst also maintaining their proximity to Thainess and compatibility with the Thai state.Footnote 21 As Morton observes, while the leadership of the Indigenous Peoples movement within Thailand has centered on securing formal recognition for Indigenous Peoples, at the constituent level, efforts remain focused on ensuring basic rights to full Thai citizenship (as well as land tenure).Footnote 22 For Indigenous Peoples in Thailand, their fight for recognition is situated within the confines of nationalist discourse and perceptions of ethnicity and what it means to be Thai. This balancing of distinctive and familiar can be complicated regarding environmental heritage in Thailand. During the Cold War, the Thai state demonized certain Indigenous environmental practices, focusing on shifting cultivation methods used by communities like the Karen.Footnote 23 The Thai identity, meanwhile, was defined by its own set of agricultural practices like wet rice farming.Footnote 24 This period in the 1960s, describing the “Hill tribe problems,” painted these highland ethnic groups as dangerous and environmentally destructive, linking them to communism, opium (through poppy farming), and deforestation.Footnote 25
By the early millennium, the Thai government’s attitude towards Indigenous groups seemed to have changed, with Buergin describing the government project in 2010 on “Recovering the Karen Livelihood in Thailand” as a “step forward.”Footnote 26 This project, proposed by the Ministry of Culture, had several aims, focused on culture, land tenure and rights to the environment, citizenship, and education. It ultimately led to the inclusion of the Karen, shifting cultivation as a national intangible cultural heritage in 2013. However, this should not be seen to mark a distinct shift in attitude towards accepting Indigenous environmental practices. Despite the Karen’s traditional ways of life and rights to land being recognized on paper, human rights groups say these changes failed to be implemented in practice.Footnote 27 Indeed, just one year later, Thailand nominated the KKFC as a World Heritage Site, which marked a distinct shift backward in the relationship between the Karen and the Thai government, as it reignited these historical tensions over land rights and human rights within the World Heritage context. This nomination was incredibly loaded given the site’s history with the Karen people, and there were run-on consequences of the nomination for the Karen living within the park’s boundaries.Footnote 28
The KKFC nomination is not the first time Thailand has put forward a World Heritage nomination that overlaps with Karen land. In 1991, Thailand gained its first natural World Heritage Site, the Thungyai-Huai Kha Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuaries. The nomination document outlined the threat to the Karen people living in Thungyai and included plans for their resettlement.Footnote 29 The IUCN’s evaluation of the nomination described the “policy to remove the remaining illegal settlements in the reserve” as one of the site’s “positive management initiatives.”Footnote 30 The government’s plans to remove the Karen, however, were ultimately halted owing to public pressure. This was not the case for the Karen in the KKFC. Protests that ensued following KKFC’s nomination and the prolonged, 7-year-long listing process (which ultimately concluded in the forest complex being listed under criteria x in 2021), were punctuated by the slogan: World Heritage, Blood Heritage (มรดกโลก มรดกเลือด), with protestors throwing red paint over the sign for the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment following the site’s eventual inscription under criteria (x) in 2021. These protests emerged as the rights of the Karen community living in the forest, and their place-based heritage were not recognized in the World Heritage proposal or the ensuing listing process, even though Thailand’s own nomination documents conceded that the Karen “have occupied the area for centuries.”Footnote 31
The Karen also faced forced evictions from their homes in 1981 when the KKFC was first declared a national park. Further evictions in 2010 and 2011 preceded the official submission of the site’s World Heritage nomination; however, the preparation was already well underway by that point, with the nomination document completed in 2009 and the site added to the tentative list in 2011. Karen houses during this time were burnt down and belongings confiscated – acts that cannot be separated from the World Heritage process.Footnote 32 The land that these families were relocated to was also insufficient for them to maintain their culturally embedded agricultural systems – including shifting cultivation.Footnote 33 The KKFC has further been enmeshed with the murder of two prominent figures supporting the Karen community – Tatkamol Ob-om, a human rights defender, and Pholachi (Billy) Rakchongcharoen, a Karen man from Bang Kloy village, which sits in the forest complex. In 2014, Billy disappeared after park officials arrested him for possession of wild honey. He was later assumed to be a victim of enforced disappearance, and his remains were later found near Kaeng Krachan Dam in 2019.Footnote 34 All of these issues were raised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights during the World Heritage process for the KKFC.Footnote 35
How, then, do we explain this tension of the recognition of Karen shifting cultivation as an intangible cultural heritage of national importance, yet, in the case of the KKFC and World Heritage, the Karen’s rights and heritage are undermined? The answer to this comes down to value and, more specifically, the value of World Heritage, natural parks, and natural resources. It is a question of value hierarchy at the state level, where economic interest and tourism are valued above Indigenous cultural rights. This value hierarchy forms the Thai state’s “authorized heritage discourse” (AHD), which describes this top-down definition and management of heritage (both natural and cultural).
Discussions at the 44th World Heritage Committee Meeting
At the level of UNESCO and the WHC, however, this value hierarchy is slightly different, as the level of the global community – and its own AHD – is added.Footnote 36 This AHD sits at the UNESCO level and works alongside the Thai national AHD. The distinction between national value and global/universal value can be glimpsed by an analysis of the statements given by country representatives as part of the 44th session of the WHC Meeting in July 2021, held jointly in Fuzhou (China) and over Zoom, which concluded with the successful listing of the site after its listing received support from the majority of committee members (see Table 1).
Table 1. World Heritage Committee members at the 44th session divided on whether they spoke in support of the inscription or against the inscription or made a neutral comment (not explicitly recommending inscription or deferral). See Table 2 for those who did not speak in the discussion.

* Brazil supported the inscription of the KKFC but also agreed with Norway that the Special Rapporteur should be heard.
** As the country whose site was under consideration, Thailand did not vote on this issue.
Outstanding Universal Value and Natural Heritage
As one would expect for a Natural World Heritage Site nomination, much of the discussion centered on the site’s natural values and, more specifically, its OUV. While the IUCN did mention the Karen in their reports and reiterated concerns raised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the language used speaks of “land rights and livelihoods,” rather than the Karen’s heritage explicitly.Footnote 37 Therefore, the IUCN’s report to the WHC only really evaluated the site’s natural value. Comments from the WHC highlighted the property’s “rich flora and fauna” (Delegation of the Russian Federation),Footnote 38 emphasized the “valuable species that are recognized as being globally significant and endangered” (Delegation of Egypt),Footnote 39 as well as the “ecological wealth of the property” and its “environmental services” (Delegation of Guatemala).Footnote 40 As the Delegation of South Africa noted, the KKFC is “part of the biogeographical regions that are not yet well represented” on the current list.Footnote 41 From these statements, most of the support for the site is ostensibly located within concern for the environment and its supposed “OUV.” The AHD we can see here, therefore, places biological diversity and threatened species over local communities, their culture, and their relationships with the landscape, as it is the natural value of the site that was deemed to be of universal value, not the Karen’s heritage. The Karen people’s role in helping to preserve this universally valued heritage was also ignored. As Pongsak Tonnampeych, a Karen man evicted from his home in the KKFC observed, “It’s our home. It’s our ancestors’ home. We have been cultivating the natural biodiversity for a very long time […] If what the government said is true, if we were destroying the natural heritage of these forests, we would not have such rich biodiversity. Kaeng Krachan would not have been recognized by UNESCO without us protecting this forest life.”Footnote 42
To be nominated as a joint natural and cultural site, there must be quantifiable OUV for both. This issue of advisory bodies – divided between ICOMOS for “cultural” sites and the IUCN for “natural” sites (or a joint report for sites nominated for natural and cultural OUV) – speaks to another flaw in the World Heritage process. Namely, it is based on a false division of natural from cultural and an imbalance of power in favor of the state, which is left to determine how a site will be valued, nominated, and listed. In the case of the KKFC, despite the Karen community’s deep cultural attachment to the landscape, the forest complex was nominated solely as a natural site. Given Thailand’s refusal to acknowledge indigeneity in the country, alongside their historical and continued treatment of the Karen at the site, what hope do Indigenous communities have of ever having their culture recognized in a state-driven World Heritage nomination (if they were to want this)? The hierarchy generated through UNESCO, and the ensuing need to quantify and rank heritage, is not realistic or representative. As Guatemala stated, “communities and their well-being are just as important as World Heritage. There is no point in protecting cultural and natural heritage if we are not protecting the lives of communities who have a permanent relationship with that heritage.”Footnote 43 Moreover, as the Delegation of Guatemala noted, the environmental values tied to the KKFC are something that the site “already provides without needing to be inscribed on the World Heritage List.”Footnote 44 This raises the question of why sites are listed, why they are important, and for whom. Suppose we view listing as World Heritage as a formal recognition and reward. What message does it send if the WHC decides to reward a site that has been the subject of historical and ongoing human rights violations?
This is not the first time the integrity of UNESCO and its World Heritage program has been called into question, with critiques spanning decades. In 2009, Simon Usborne described World Heritage as “teetering on its once sound foundations as its principles and priorities crumble under the weight of bureaucracy and outside influence.”Footnote 45 In her 2018 book, A Future in Ruins: UNESCO, World Heritage and the Dream of Peace, Meskell outlines several failures of the institution, including the shift away from conservation in favor of a focus on economic and political gain, and the “lucrative potentials of World Heritage inscription and branding for tourist revenues […], continued challenges over territory, and reignited conflicts between states.”Footnote 46 Keough has similarly criticized the World Heritage program as having “created a culture of economic and political quagmires rather than cooperation and preservation.”Footnote 47 Despite claiming to serve “all the peoples of the world,”Footnote 48 World Heritage in its current form largely benefits individual states, with listings reflecting internal politics over any “intrinsic value” of the heritage itself.
Furthermore, the perceived benefits of World Heritage listing still hinge largely on Eurocentric values – prioritizing preservation, conservation, and economic growth, which often do not align with local AHDs.Footnote 49 For example, Ittipol Thaikamol, the head of the Kaeng Krachan National Park at the time stated that the listing would present an opportunity through increased tourism, but this is not necessarily to the benefit of the Karen in the park. When asking why World Heritage status is important, the economic benefit of increased tourism is a significant factor.Footnote 50 However, this is a benefit that is rarely felt by the Indigenous communities impacted, who instead bear the social and cultural burdens of the World Heritage listing.Footnote 51 Moreover, the Karen and other upland ethnic and Indigenous groups in Thailand have a complicated history with tourism, othering, and exoticization, including through controversial “long-neck villages,” which can be seen as akin to “human zoos.”Footnote 52 Rather than empowering the community, tourism in this form often perpetuates internal colonialism.Footnote 53 As head of Bang Kloi village – the new site the Karen in the KKFC were forced to relocate to – Nih Ran Pongthep said, “We are worried that if more tourists come, we will have even less land and that the river and the forest will be spoiled. We have a right to live in the forest – we are not here just for a photo opportunity or as a tourism attraction.”Footnote 54
The universalizing nature of the World Heritage process lends itself to an AHD that creates a hierarchy from global to state to the local and Indigenous. In the case of the KKFC, the successful listing is evidence of perceived “OUV” outweighing the rights of the local Indigenous community. This hierarchy at the state level is also demonstrated in a press release by the Royal Thai Embassy in London following the KKFC’s inscription (own emphasis added) – “The recent inscription of KKFC as UNESCO World Heritage list marks another national pride for the country and the Thai people.”Footnote 55 Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment at the time, Varawut Silpa-archa, similarly called the KKFC inscription a “gift to Thais.”Footnote 56 Here, it is clear not only that the benefits are for the nation and the Thai people, with these nationalistic discourses of value and ownership paralleling global discourses of “World” Heritage and “universal” value. This is to the detriment of the Karen – those closest to the site – who were once again left out of the discussion. They are further alienated through this language, as the Karen for whom this listing is not a gift are consequently presented as “non-Thai.” As Gib Tonnarmpech, a Karen woman forced to leave her home in KKFC, was quoted as saying: “We don’t know what the World Heritage listing means – no one has told us how it will impact us or whether it will help solve our problems.”Footnote 57 For the Karen, the World Heritage process did not serve them. Instead, the case of the KKFC proved to them that World Heritage is a process steeped in blood.
Local communities and paragraph 123
“Local communities” was another central topic in the discussion, in large part because Paragraph 123 of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention had been raised as an issue preventing the listing of the site. When the KKFC was first submitted in 2014, paragraph 123 (2013) did not include mention of Indigenous Peoples, instead stating that that “Participation of local people in the nomination process is essential to enable them to have a shared responsibility with the State Party in the maintenance of the property.” This encourages state parties to “prepare nominations with the participation of a wide variety of stakeholders, including site managers, local and regional governments, local communities, NGOs and other interested parties.”Footnote 58 However, these guidelines changed in 2015 – aligning with the first WHC decision on the KKFC, and again in 2019, relevant to decisions made in 2019 and 2021. The revised paragraph 123 in 2015 added participation by “Indigenous peoples” as well as “free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples.”Footnote 59 This was maintained in the 2019 update, which further emphasized that participation should be “[e]ffective and inclusive.”Footnote 60 Despite this, discussions in 2021 centered only on “local communities” rather than Indigenous Peoples.
Moreover, counter to the statements made by the Special Rapporteur and the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage (IIPFWH) after the 2021 decision, which noted that the “Karen were never able to meaningfully participate, and no efforts were made to recognize their relationship with the land within the OUV” (IIPFWH),Footnote 61 some committee members commended Thailand for its work with local communities. The Delegation of Ethiopia, for example, noted that Thailand “had extensive and demonstrated consultation with local communities and it made [the] investment to improve the lives of the local communities,”Footnote 62 while the Delegation of Saudi Arabia said that an “important aspect” of the nomination was “the State Party effort towards [the] inclusion of local communities,” citing examples of efforts “to improve the livelihood of the local communities, including improvement of basic infrastructure, agriculture and livestock, healthcare and hygiene, arts and culture and ecotourism resulting in enhancement of their quality of life and well-being in a sustainable manner,” alongside the provision of “public utilities including electricity and water supply as well as fundamental education for children.”Footnote 63 The Delegation of Thailand reaffirmed these initiatives in later comments.
This language of “local communities” is deliberately vague. The Karen – the community at the center of this site and its nomination – were mentioned at the beginning of discussions in the introduction given by the Secretariat, stating concerns raised by NGOs. However, the Karen were not explicitly mentioned by any committee members in the ensuing discussion. It was not until after the vote, in statements by the UN Special Rapporteur and the IIPFWH, that the Karen were named again. This is in contrast to the 44th WHC in 2019, where the Karen were a central part of the discussion and were named by Australia, Norway, Azerbaijan, and Thailand. References to the Karen appeared 19 times in the 2019 discussion, compared to only 6 in 2021. Instead, in 2021, committee members (for example, delegations from the Russian Federation, Ethiopia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Guatemala, China, and Thailand) used this more generalized term – local community – to talk around the issue. The Karen were not explicitly referred to as “Indigenous” in 2021, and the only time any term other than “local community” was used was when Thailand stated (own emphasis added) “we have endeavored to provide land for livelihoods for all the local communities in the KKFC, including the ethnic communities.”Footnote 64 The more generic term – “local communities” –encompasses both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples living in and around the site. Thus, it would be possible to engage with the non-Karen communities in and around the KKFC in a consultative process while still claiming to have worked with “local communities.”
Although the Karen were mentioned several times in the 2019 discussions, the language of Indigenous was also largely absent, apart from one reference by Kyrgyzstan to “Indigenous and local communities,” with a preference instead for terms like “ethnic communities/groups/peoples” and “local communities” in the rest of the discussion.Footnote 65 Avoiding the term “Indigenous” also avoids its association with rights. This is because, unlike “local communities,” Indigenous Peoples are afforded additional rights (for example, to self-determination, and to free prior and informed consent) under international law. These rights are supported by UNDRIP and also incorporated into the World Heritage process through the Operational Guidelines and Sustainable Development Policy. The use of “local communities” is, therefore, deliberately disempowering, as it fails to view the Karen as legitimate rights-holders.
It is important here to note that while Indigenous Peoples’ rights are human rights, there are also key distinctions and tensions that make explicit acknowledgment of Indigenous rights essential. The concept of human rights has developed within the context of 18th-century European enlightenment and centers on the idea of a universal humanity with all people having equal rights and freedoms.Footnote 66 This approach focuses on protections on an individual level and overlooks “local relationships of people and places, practiced through culture” that impact Indigenous rights.Footnote 67 Rather than adding “special” or “new human rights,” the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous people, S. James Anaya, notes that UNDRIP offers “a contextualized elaboration of general human rights principles and rights as they relate to the specific historical, cultural and social circumstances of Indigenous peoples.”Footnote 68 As Kulchyski states, “We do not all have Aboriginal rights, nor should we.”Footnote 69 In contrast to the individual protections offered through human rights, Indigenous rights focus more on the collective. For example, UNDRIP acknowledges that “Indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being, and integral development as peoples.”Footnote 70
The nebulous nature of what defines a community – and the various scales of these imagined communitiesFootnote 71 – raises a further point of complication that is echoed in statements made by Thailand. For example, the statement (own emphasis added) that “Thailand would like to reaffirm to everyone our undeterred commitment of constructively resolving community forest issues and forest management for the benefit of all citizens of the world and not someone or anyone in particular.”Footnote 72 This was then followed by the assertion of their commitment to “preserve this world for its true owner the future generations” (own emphasis added). The hierarchy of values and importance when it comes to communities is, therefore, clearly defined, with the supposed value of the site to future generations being weighed over the current value to the Indigenous Karen peoples living within the KKFC.Footnote 73
Regarding the involvement of local communities, Oman specifically applauded new developments in Thailand’s environmental legislation, namely, the 2019 National Park Act (NPA) and the amended Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act (2019), which, they stated, “represent a significant paradigm shift in Thailand’s environmental conservation policy to strike a balance between nature conservation and sustainable utilization of resources.”Footnote 74 This note of “sustainability” in relation to balancing community uses of nature was also raised by Saudi Arabia, and it is a slippery term that can be levied to support or disempower Indigenous communities and their heritage, with the Karen’s supposed “unsustainability” due to population growth and use of natural resources deeming them targets for eviction from the KKFC. Moreover, while this language of “sustainability” can be interpreted to push a specific agenda, laws are also only as useful as their implementation and enforcement. While Section 65 of Thailand’s 2019 NPA includes provisions for working with communities who rely on natural resources for subsistence as part of their “traditional way of life,”Footnote 75 permission to continue these practices is still left at the discretion of the government. At the same time, the 2019 NPA also emphasizes reducing the community’s dependence on the natural resources over time (effectively encouraging a shift away from traditional practices and/or a shift outside national park boundaries), with this use of the environment under strict control and subject to “supervision, inspection, [and] monitoring.”Footnote 76 Not only is the implementation of these laws discretionary, but there have also been accusations of inequitable enforcement of these newer environmental laws and policies in Thailand.Footnote 77
While sustainability discourse in this case has masked abuse of Indigenous rights, it has also been used in other instances as a way of centering communities within the World Heritage process. For example, Disko and Ooft describe UNESCO’s 2015 Policy for the Integration of a Sustainable Development Perspective into the Process of the World Heritage Convention as “a significant step towards enhancing the role of Indigenous peoples in the implementation of the World Heritage Convention.”Footnote 78 This policy advocates for an approach to sustainability that acknowledges the intersection of environmental, cultural, Indigenous, social, and economic rights, and the need for sustainable development to align with human (and Indigenous) rights. This marked the first time that human rights were mentioned in one of the WHC’s policy documents.Footnote 79 The view of sustainability outlined in this policy, however, does not align with the interpretation used to argue in favor of the listing of the KKFC.
Proper procedure and human rights
Another key theme in this discussion was that of correct procedure within the listing process and the role of human rights in the debate. This was first raised regarding the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People (Cali Tzay) and whether he should be allowed to speak before the decision to list (or otherwise) was made. While delegations from Spain, Norway, Guatemala, and Brazil all called for the Special Rapporteur to be heard before making a decision (and South Africa stated he should speak “after the discussion”), delegations from Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and China called for the Special Rapporteur to speak only after the adoption of a decision, with the Delegation of Ethiopia stating that this was “customary” practice.Footnote 80 Ultimately, it was noted to be the prerogative of the Chair, His Excellency Mr Tian Xuejun, who called for a vote where it was assumed the majority supported the Special Rapporteur, who spoke only at the end. What, then, would be the point of his comments if they were to have no influence on the outcome?
The fact that the WHC meeting that saw the final inscription was held in China is also worth considering, given China’s own stance on indigeneity and its parallels with Thailand. Pocock and Lilley also note that China – along with France, India, and other African and Asian state parties – has been among the most active in pushing “the World Heritage Committee’s anti-Indigenous position.”Footnote 81 In his analysis of this WHC meeting, Brumann considers the Chair to have exploited his position in deciding to hear the Special Rapporteur at the end of the KKFC discussion, arguing the Chair’s presumption of a majority in favor of this decision was incorrect.Footnote 82 He further critiqued the Chair’s failure to allow enough time for objections – pausing only four seconds between asking for objections and moving on.Footnote 83
There was a lack of consensus within the committee regarding the role human rights should play in the World Heritage process. For example, Norway stated that “the connection between the United Nations Human Rights mechanism and the World Heritage mechanism is unavoidable,” ultimately dissociating itself from the decision to list the KFFC. Norway’s decision also aligned with its general voting record in support of the advisory body’s evaluation.Footnote 84 However, the Delegation of China argued that human rights issues, while important, should be kept separate and instead would be more appropriately situated within the UN Human Rights Council. Meanwhile, the World Heritage list should be decided “based on scientific evidence and on our professional judgment,”Footnote 85 thus reducing heritage to its scientifically quantifiable values and ignoring the intangible and human dimensions attached to heritage nominations – all of which are inalienable from any given site.
This perceived separation of human rights from World Heritage was also affirmed by the Delegation of Thailand, whose delegate, H.E. Mr Sihasak Phuangketkeow, himself served as the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council from 2010–2011. He stated, “we strongly believe that a clear distinction should be made between the rights of the local communities under the [World Heritage] Convention and these specific human rights cases which must be addressed under the due process of law and the relevant United Nations human rights mechanism.”Footnote 86 This echoes the very first stages of the KKFC nomination process at the 29th Session of the WHC in 2015, where a clause in a draft decision by the IUCN requiring Thailand to obtain free, prior, and informed consent from the Karen was removed, after the delegate for Vietnam stated “we are here at a prestigious Committee of culture and heritage, we are not in Geneva on the Human Rights Council, Madam Chair.”Footnote 87
In stark contrast to this, remarks by the Special Rapporteur and the IIPFWH both pushed for recognition of the key role human rights must play within UNESCO and World Heritage. The World Heritage Convention of 1972 predates the 2007 UNDRIP. As such, the original convention lacks explicit recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ rights.Footnote 88 This is partly why the debate on the KKFC instead centered on paragraph 123 of the WHC Operational Guidelines and its “local communities,” despite the 2015 update of paragraph 123 to include “Indigenous peoples” and “free, prior and informed consent” (“as appropriate”).Footnote 89 Moreover, statements made regarding the role (or lack thereof) of human rights within World Heritage ignore the Operational Guidelines, which, at the time of the discussion in 2021, included paragraph 12, stating “State Parties to the Convention are encouraged to adopt a human-rights based approach” – including the participation of Indigenous Peoples.Footnote 90 The inclusion of Indigenous Peoples specifically within the World Heritage process was also affirmed by paragraphs 14bis, 64, and 111, the latter of which attempts to balance UNESCO’s AHD by emphasizing a “shared understanding” of a property’s “universal, national and local values […] by all stakeholders, including local communities and Indigenous peoples.”Footnote 91
The misalignment of the Operational Guidelines with WHC practice was an issue raised at the 44th WHC meeting by the Special Rapporteur who, when he was finally permitted to speak, stated he was there to “remind UNESCO and its member states and the WHC of your commitment and responsibility to respect the rights of Indigenous People in the important decision you took today, and you will take in the future.”Footnote 92 He observed that the committee’s working method was “not in compliance with UNDRIP and [the WHC’s] own Operational Guidelines,” and that it must be brought in line with UNDRIP to “ensure credibility.”Footnote 93 Like the Special Rapporteur, the IIPFWH – an observer to the proceedings – was able to make a statement after the listing had already been approved. Chrissy Grant, speaking on behalf of the IIPFWH, called the decision to list the KKFC “one of the lowest points in the history of the Convention and indeed in the history of UNESCO,” “trampl[ing] upon the most fundamental principles and purposes of UNESCO, as well as those of the United Nations Charter.”Footnote 94
This is, however, not the first time that UN bodies concerning Indigenous rights (that is, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) have called for the WHC Operational Guidelines to be updated to better align with UNDRIP.Footnote 95 To do so would certainly be an important step forward. However, the question of whether the alignment of the UNESCO Convention and UNDRIP would have changed the outcome of this case is not easy to answer. Of those countries who supported the inscription, two – the Russian Federation and Nigeria – voted in abstention of UNDRIP (out of 11 total abstentions), and one – Ethiopia – was non-voting (out of 34 total non-voting countries recorded). As Thailand’s own vote for UNDRIP indicates, however, the voting record is not fully indicative of attitudes towards Indigenous rights domestically. China, like Thailand, voted for UNDRIP whilst disavowing any obligations under the declaration and maintaining there are no Indigenous Peoples within the country, opting for the label of “ethnic minority” instead (Davis 2014; Hathaway 2016). Brazil also has a complicated relationship with Indigenous Peoples’ rights. The government of Jair Bolsonaro, which was in power at the time of the 44th WHC meeting, was noted for rolling back protections for both the environment and Indigenous Peoples’ rights (de Lourdes Beldi de Alcântara Reference de Lourdes Beldi de Alcântara and Mamo2024). Nonetheless, this does not mean World Heritage should not be compliant with human rights – and Indigenous rights, more specifically.
In 2014, it was estimated that over a third of the natural sites on the World Heritage List overlapped with Indigenous Peoples’ traditional land (Disko, Tugendhat and García-Alix Reference Disko, Tugendhat, García-Alix, Disko and Tugendhat2014). Indigenous Peoples worldwide manage or have tenure rights over a quarter of the global land surface and 40% of protected areas on land (Garnett et al. Reference Garnett, Burgess, Fa, Fernández-Llamazares, Molnár, Robinson, Watson, Zander, Austin, Brondizio, Collier, Duncan, Ellis, Geyle, Jackson, Jonas, Malmer, McGowan, Sivongxay and Leiper2018). As the World Heritage List continues to expand, and even though Article 1.3 of the UN Charter encourages “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all” it seems as though conflicts between Indigenous Peoples and these World Heritage listings will continue until Indigenous Peoples” rights are formalized in the World Heritage process itself and respected by the WHC.Footnote 96
Niezen suggests the Indigenous Peoples movement “as the embodiment of human diversity involved in a process of legal universalism” has the potential to “alter human institutions” and “pluralize and collective international institutions,” shifting away from a strict focus on state governance.Footnote 97 In the case of UNESCO, we can see this through efforts to push bottom-up rights within the World Heritage framework by groups like the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage (IIPFWH), the latter of which was created only in 2017. Positive changes to date include the addition of provisions supporting Indigenous and human rights into the World Heritage Convention’s Operational Guidelines in 2015 and 2019, updates to the Format for the nomination of properties for inscription on the World Heritage List in 2021, and the Request Format for a Preliminary Assessment of a Potential Nomination to the World Heritage List, adding explicit mention of the need to identify and include affected Indigenous Peoples and to obtain free, prior, and informed consent.Footnote 98 The statements made by Vietnam in 2015, and echoed by Thailand in 2021, suggesting human rights have no place in World Heritage matters, indicate that, despite efforts to align human rights and World Heritage through policy, in practice, the disconnect is still apparent. This leads to an erosion of trust in World Heritage as an institution. As the report of a 2022 advisory mission by the IUCN to the KKFC the year following its inscription notes, “[a]s the World Heritage Convention moves towards a more meaningful consideration and involvement of [Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities], inscription prior to the resolution of strong, well-documented and highly visible conflicts can be seen as a missed opportunity for the credibility and relevance of the Convention.”Footnote 99
In a country like Thailand, where the state does not acknowledge Indigenous existence within the country and, therefore, does not protect local Indigenous rights, Indigenous Peoples must instead rely on global mechanisms to protect them. In 2000, when the idea of establishing a World Heritage Indigenous Peoples Council of Experts was proposed at the 24th WHC session, Thailand disagreed. Adul Wichiencharoen, Chairman of Thailand’s WHC at the time, stated that “Indigenous issues are a domestic, national question, and are best handled on that level,” cautioning that the introduction of this council would be “introducing a political element” to World Heritage proceedings.Footnote 100 However, as this paper has shown, politics are already embedded within the World Heritage process. In the case of the KKFC, this process failed the Karen. This does not mean, however, that global frameworks are not useful. Future work to incorporate explicit recognition of Indigenous rights within the World Heritage Convention must also consider circumstances like Thailand – including other Asian and African countries – where indigeneity remains a contested concept. Thailand’s failure to acknowledge the Karen as Indigenous should not undermine their indigeneity and rights to protection at the international level. Decisions by members of the WHC should also align with other UN guidelines alongside their own, as well as with advisory body recommendations. Failure to do so would mean communities like the Karen continue to slip through the cracks of supposedly protective mechanisms – to the loss of their heritage, histories, livelihoods, and fundamental human rights.
Horse trading and shifting goalposts
The statement made by Chrissy Grant on behalf of the IIPFWH following the decision to list the KKFC also highlights an unspoken layer to the AHD that could not be captured by analysis of the record of prepared statements made at the formal meeting alone, as it was not part of the “on the record” discussions. Grant noted that rather than being made on “expert judgment,” “good heritage practice,” and “the principles of the sustainable development policy,” the decision to list the KKFC was instead “the result of highly public, politicized lobbying and horse trading based on [the] economic interest[s] of Committee members.”Footnote 101 Such vote-trading was confirmed in the case of the Spanish delegate, who stated that they voted against the Danger Listing of the Great Barrier Reef in exchange for support listing Spain’s nomination of Paseo del Prado and Buen Retiro.Footnote 102 Of the members of the WHC that year, only four – Guatemala, Norway, Oman, and Saint Kitts and Nevis – did not have any direct connection to the sites being discussed. Of these, only Oman spoke in favor of the KKFC listing. Grant’s accusations of a lack of impartiality within the WHC process parallel arguments made on the other side of the debate, with both Ethiopia and Thailand accusing the WHC of “shifting goalposts” in relation to the KKFC nomination, where Thailand argued that “most of these issues have been addressed or clarified but they are constantly rehashed or revived for the purpose of preventing the inscription.”Footnote 103 The Delegation of Saudi Arabia also raised concern over the “consistency and the integrity of the decisions taken” within the WHC should the KKFC be referred once again, stating that such an outcome would be inexplicable.Footnote 104
The mention of shifting goalposts alludes to the drawn-out, seven-year-long process of the KKFC nomination, which was referred back to the Thai State Party at WHC meetings in 2015, 2016, and 2019, before its eventual inscription in 2021. This came despite the IUCN’s recommendation of a deferral for a second year in a row, downgrading it from the initial referral recommendations given in 2015 and 2016. Although Ethiopia accused the committee of double standards, the successful inscription of the KKFC in 2021 was highly questionable. The KKFC was listed despite Thailand’s consistent failure to address previous committee concerns and the usual maximum referral time being three years. In 2021, the KKFC nomination had significant changes to the boundary since the initial proposal: the complete removal of the buffer zone, the failure to obtain support from the Karen within the park, and the failure to address human rights concerns in accordance with paragraph 123 of the Operational Guidelines. The IUCN, as the advisory body, also had not visited the site since it was first evaluated seven years prior. The 2021 listing pushed the KKFC up two levels – taking it from a deferral recommendation to an inscription and bypassing another referral recommendation. UNESCO’s 2010 Advisory Bodies’ background information document on referral and deferral of nominations states that there have been “a few cases” where properties where deferral was recommended ended up being referred and later listed “without some fundamental issues and concerns being addressed,” as is the case with the KKFC.Footnote 105 It also states that “[i]n the worst case scenario, such an outcome may have the perverse result that premature inscription on the World Heritage List might actually damage the cultural or natural heritage that is the subject of the nomination.”
While international and domestic pressure from local Karen activists supported by Indigenous and human rights NGOs working alongside the IIPFWH and the OHCHR may have succeeded in stalling the inscription of the KKFC, it ultimately fell short. That is not to say global protective frameworks are not useful. The Karen received support from the OHCHR Special Rapporteurs throughout the World Heritage process, which aided in advocacy and visibility. It is also important to note that the Karen were not against the idea of a World Heritage listing, as seen in a letter to the Director of the World Heritage Programme in 2014, which stated, “We support the establishment of a natural world heritage site” as long as it “respects our rights, our identity as indigenous people and for equitable conservation of natural resources and biodiversity as an asset for the world community.”Footnote 106 Ultimately, the inscription of the KKFC without the inclusion of the Karen highlights crucial flaws in the World Heritage Process. In particular, it showed the self-serving focus of the WHC, which was able to treat UN frameworks like UNDRIP and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as irrelevant in the World Heritage Process.
As notable as those who spoke out – for or against the listing – were those members who remained silent during the discussion (see Table 2). Although Bertacchini et al. state that it is “difficult to interpret the position of those countries that do not intervene” in WHC discussions,Footnote 107 the IWGIA observed that Australia’s silence during the discussion was likely part of an exchange of votes with Thailand, where the Delegation of Thailand would not vote for Australia’s Great Barrier Reef to be put on the list of World Heritage Sites “In Danger” in exchange for Australia’s support for the KKFC listing.Footnote 108 This is particularly convincing as Australia had argued against the inscription of the KKFC at the WHC session in 2019, stating that “Australia certainly can’t support the proposition of inscription.” They argued for a deferral but stated that should the property be referred, then the revised nomination would require a “comprehensive update on the State Party’s engagement with the Karen community in accordance with paragraph 123 of the Operational Guidelines and that the UNOCHR should be asked to review the dossier in relation to the point about engagement with the Karen community through paragraph 123.”Footnote 109
Table 2. Members of the World Heritage Committee (44th Session) who spoke or remained silent on the KKFC nomination.

* Countries that voted “No” to UNDRIP (1 of 4)
† Countries that were “Non-Voting” (4 of 34)
‡ Abstentions (2 of 11).
The silence in 2021 was, therefore, a stark reversal of this position. The IWGIA also noted that in this 44th session, only one site of all considered was not listed, and 43% (16 out of 37) of sites, including the KKFC, were listed against recommendations from the advisory bodies (IUCN and ICOMOS).Footnote 110 Thus, while the Delegation of China advocated that human rights concerns should be set aside in favor of a decision based on scientific and professional judgments, it is clear that, at least in this session, the expertise of the IUCN and ICOMOS was ignored. As Brumann describes in his analysis of the 44th session, “more than ever before, the Committee insisted on being accountable only to itself,” noting also that while this year was exceptional, this is a trend that began to emerge in 2010.Footnote 111 Therefore, while the discourse of universality was used to undermine the Karen’s rights to KKFC in favor of the imagined global community’s rights to the site’s natural resources in the official WHC discussion, the internal politics behind the scenes suggests universality was not the primary motivator for this decision, which was ultimately the result of national self-interest.
Conclusion
The World Heritage List holds power. Through its AHD, UNESCO presents itself as the authority on heritage. This authority also translates into priority for designating funding and for heritage preservation and protection. A joint document released by UNESCO, ICCROM, ICOMOS, and IUCN on Guidance and Toolkit for Impact Assessments in a World Heritage Context notes that “[i]n the case of World Heritage, OUV is irreplaceable and cannot be ‘offset’.”Footnote 113 However, is this not the case for all heritage? In this document, OUV is defined as “of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity,” with the protection of such heritage classed as “of the highest importance to the international community as a whole.”Footnote 114 “Other heritage/conservation values,” meanwhile, are described as “being of national or local heritage importance, and Indigenous values attributed to the property”Footnote 115 – lacking the urgency of protection because they are not “universal.” However, how can one speak on behalf of the “global community”? In the case of the KKFC, it is clear that Thailand’s state representatives do not represent even the whole Thai community. It is also clear that decision-making with the listing process is far from impartial or apolitical.
World Heritage and the AHD that it reinforces emphasize OUV and the global and future communities at the cost of Indigenous and “local communities.” Moreover, this language of “local community” is vague, and allows members to eschew responsibility by taking advantage of the broad scope of this term. These imagined communities – global to local – are not homogeneous, nor are their values, so how can the WHC claim to represent them? This is especially relevant when nation-states like Thailand already fail to represent Indigenous Peoples. Countries like Thailand that deny Indigenous existence (and continue to enforce a nature/culture division, favoring fortress-style, protected area approaches to the environment) will never list Indigenous environmental heritage in a way that benefits the community and reflects their values. This means that categories like cultural landscapes – created to overcome the issue of mixed sites needing to have OUV for both natural and cultural aspects to be listed – are not viable solutions.
Recognition of a community’s intangible cultural heritage is also not enough if respect for these traditions and their ties to the land are not valued in practice, as is the case with the Karen, and reinforces the artificial divide between cultural/natural/intangible and community/national/world. As World Heritage remains a top-down process mediated at the state level and without explicit reference to Indigenous Peoples and their rights in the Operational Guidelines, it is not representative. Moreover, does such a hierarchy of heritage even make sense? In practice, it creates a list of priorities for funding and protection based on these invented values and imagined communities. Meanwhile, immediate and local attachments to place are undervalued within such a discourse compared to a monument many communities may never see or even know exists. Smith argues that the AHD perpetuated by the World Heritage process – while claiming to be universal – is still largely Eurocentric, with “universality” acting as a guise for the export and imposition of Western values.Footnote 116 Perhaps it is this presumption of universality that makes World Heritage, blood heritage.
As to what message the listing of the KKFC sends, a 2023 report on the KKFC by the IUCN made after the site’s listing made several references to “The Andaman Sea Nature Reserves of Thailand,” noting parallels to this site that was put on the tentative list as a Natural World Heritage site by Thailand in 2021.Footnote 117 Like the KKFC this site is involved with several community rights issues, in this case relating to the sea-faring Moken people. What message the Thai government has taken from the KKFC process and inscription regarding the role of Indigenous Peoples and human rights within natural heritage will be evidenced in how they proceed with this next nomination.