Greatness

Russian political and military figures divulge an infatuation with “greatness” that has persisted through centuries, ideologies, and state forms. Even the “new thinking” of the Gorbachev era envisaged a greatness based on “soft power” (Larson and Shevchenko Reference Deborah and Shevchenko2003). Adomeit (Reference Adomeit1995) offered a prescient account of early post-Soviet Russia and a return to traditional understandings. Symbolic demotion in an imagined international hierarchy distresses those who believe Russia to be equal if not superior to others that preoccupy it (Neumann and Pouliot Reference Neumann and Pouliot2011; Neumann Reference Neumann2016). Anger is one reaction: an emotional episode and an instrumentalized energy (Hall Reference Hall2011; Forsberg and Pursiainen Reference Forsberg and Pursiainen2017; Heller Reference Heller, Clément and Sanger2018). It was displayed in Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, about which he had informed insiders the night before (Teltschik Reference Teltschik2019). A few years later the thought image of Russia as a “regional power,” elicited by Barack Obama’s description, was infuriating. Putin felt “disrespect.”Footnote ²

Most states craft idealized accounts of their pasts. For the contemporary Russian state, “history” is a domain from which details are harvested, retrospectively projected, airbrushed out, or otherwise politicized (Gjerde Reference Gjerde2015; Pearce Reference Pearce2020). Censorship was well advanced when it was announced that a “Commission to Counteract Attempts to Harm Russia’s Interests by Falsifying History” would “analyze information […] aimed at diminishing the international prestige of the Russian Federation and report such incidents to the president” (President of Russia 2010). Other laws against political criticism were introduced. Old symbols and motifs, “the Soviet anthem but with new words, the coat of arms from the pre-imperial era and the flag from the imperial period,” returned (Bacon Reference Bacon2012, 779). “New” Russia is disassociated from crimes and failings of predecessors (Chatterje-Doody Reference Chatterje-Doody2014; Petrov Reference Petrov2018) while asserting inheritance of the Soviet or Tsarist empire’s rights, privileges, and fame. The “Russian Federation” is selectively interchangeable with these defunct entities.

Sport is a well tried and generally acceptable means to achieve and broadcast national greatness.Footnote ³ Persson and Petersson (Reference Persson and Petersson2014) consider the 2014 Winter Olympics, an event “intimately bound up with the international image of Russia” (192). The authors distinguish states “with disputable democratic credentials” from others that also have prestige goals. They note that “cognitively oriented literature on images does not do full justice to the emotive components propelling political action” (Persson and Petersson Reference Persson and Petersson2014, 192–194). Anna Alekseyeva (Reference Alekseyeva2014, 159) emphasizes Olympics images as intended to promote “diffuse notions of affective loyalty to one’s political system and the desire for national greatness.” Orttung and Zhemukov (Reference Orttung and Zhemukhov2014, 177) impress “intangible goals of image-building” alongside material aims. Success in gaining hosting rights for the 2014 Olympics and the 2018 football World Cup, gestures of goodwill from others, coincided with anti-government protests, the possibility of a color revolution (Horvath Reference Horvath2013), competitors in the field of nationalist ideology, one calling itself “Russian Image” (Horvath Reference Horvath2014), and the Ukraine crisis. A new public relations campaign appealed to sentiment and status ambitions, asserted in self-referential homage (Malinkova Reference Malinkova2014; Forsberg, Heller, and Wolf Reference Tuomas, Wolf and Heller2014). The regime’s “machine politics” (Hale Reference Hale, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2016) incorporated a more nationalistic posture and intensified discourses of internal resolve and external enemies.

The Adversary

Nikolai Ostapenko (Reference Ostapenko2010, 62) argued that “many Russian official attempts to change and improve” a “grand, mysterious, and unfortunately dark” image, “have been politicized and rejected by influential individuals and governments worldwide” (62). The chief perpetrator, according to Andrei Tsygankov (Reference Tsygankov2009), is a Russophobic lobby in the USA. This group, and others it guided, affronted Russia’s sense of honour (Tsygankov Reference Tsygankov2012). Tsygankov (Reference Tsygankov2014) later contended “Russia has been responsive to the behavior of the West and prepared to pursue cooperation” (26). Whenever it moved “toward its significant other, Moscow has only continued so long as it felt a sufficiently progressive recognition.” Without such recognition, “the reform-minded leadership in the Kremlin [ … ] runs into opposition.” In works covering the Medvedev interval and first years of Putin’s third term, Tsygankov (Reference Tsygankov2017, Reference Prokopenko2019) maintained that US’ politics and media concocted and spread an image of Russia as a “dark double.”

If parts of the US policy elite and media are preoccupied with Russia, it is more than reciprocated. In an existential mega-drama, Russia is under siege, dependent on Putin to defend it and assert a rightful place in a world where America strives for hegemony. The Russian armed forces and defence industry are central to a branding strategy around the “symbolic value of safety,” and its counterpoint, fear (Danilova Reference Danilova2017). The show runs simultaneous to a contrary storyline propounding the terminal decline of the “liberal order” and its (until Donald Trump’s partial revisions) main proponent. Russia grows stronger and a shift to a “multipolar/polycentric world” proceeds inexorably, the narrative suggests. These ideas inform a unique “geo-imagery” (Omelicheva Reference Omelicheva2016). A passage from Tsygankov (Reference Tsygankov2019, xii) is instructive. It describes a Q&A where that author asked Putin “whether the growing polarization between the Russian image of the West as spiritually corrupt and the Western image of Russia as the oppressive neo-Soviet autocracy reflect the inevitable struggle between culturally distinct entities.” Putin responded that “Russia’s worldview”

The exchange concluded with Putin declaring that US society and “those who make political decisions” should treat Russia “with respect.” Personal respect conflates with that for the nation and state (Wolf Reference Wolf2011). Breslauer (Reference Breslauer2017) notes that “a demand to be treated with ‘dignity’ is driven by a sense of ‘indignation’” (148). At the Valdai Club (2018), Putin declared that “Stirring up emotions is not our approach” before expounding on Russia’s destiny, posited against “post-heroic” nations (Münkler Reference Münkler2007). A few years after a friendly bear mascot welcomed Olympic visitors, Putin was prompted on the metaphor of a (different) bear protecting his/our taiga:

The “bear” transforms into an offensive/defensive nuclear weapons system, fused with nation and leader in an ontological and physical security complex:

Credible foreign media coverage does not blame or threaten the Russian population. It critiques the regime, which is not a “mirror image” of the USA (cf. Greene and Robertson Reference Greene and Robertson2019). On Russian state television, anti-American sentiment fueled in Rossiya 1’s Vesti Nedeli reaches a large audience (Figure 1). The USA and NATO (Figure 2) were castigated even as censure of Trump intermittently halted when he adopted a more accommodating stance. The EU is not immune. Samoilenko and Laruelle (Reference Samoilenko, Laruelle and Pashentsev2020) “typologize attacks on the EU’s image into three main categories: [ … ] decadent values [ … ] puppet of the US [ … ] supporting the revival of fascism” (149).

Figure 1. The US on Russian State TV.

Source: Rossiya 1.

Figure 2. NATO HQ Compared to SS Insignia.

Source: Sputnik (2016).

When it began as Russia Today, RT’s goal was to “change the image of Russia in the world.” It is now a “weapon in the war of images” (Bidder Reference Bidder2013), specializing in fabrication, distortion, and performativity (Stewart Reference Stewart2017, 18–23). Pomerantzev and Weiss (Reference Pomerantsev and Weiss2014) argued that “feeling itself relatively weak, the Kremlin has systematically learnt to use the principles of liberal democracies against them” (4). The ruling clique rebels against and heeds a “standard of civilization” (Kaczmarska Reference Kaczmarska2016). It imitates the West while asserting distinctiveness (Wood and Cox Reference Wood and Cox2021). RT and Sputnik rely on western journalists and producers to help fashion, subtly or crudely, a Kremlin view (Rutland and Kazantsev Reference Rutland and Kazantsev2016). Former German “Commissioner for Russia,” Gernot Erler, described the output as “fakes from A to Z” and “propaganda without end” (Erler Reference Erler2015). Foot soldiers fight on print, television, and Internet battlefields. Ridicule, sarcasm, and mimicry are used to provoke the West, techniques that the regime cannot abide being applied to itself. Satires like The Death of Stalin film and other “denigrations” are banned. Spectacle, censorship, and a personality cult strive to camouflage decision-making processes and yet betray the regime’s anxiety.

The rise of populism in some western polities was a windfall for the Kremlin, enabling specifically targeted and trans-ideological appeals to a mélange of discontents and into the political centre (Braghiroli and Makarychev Reference Braghiroli and Makarychev2016, 2018). These appeals market cordial relations with a peaceful though fearless and alert Russia (Sarembo Reference Sarembo2019), which is contrasted with depictions of the USA as a warmongering menace. The Internet Research Agency (IRA) also aims at god-fearing America, staging “tests of allegiance” (Shane Reference Shane2018). Dawson and Innes (Reference Dawson and Innes2019) detail the IRA’s agenda and methods: “one would function as ‘the villain’ criticising the authorities; then the others would enter a debate with him/her. One would post an image/meme in support of their argument, the other posting a link to a supportive source. [ … ] Operators wrote Twitter bots to amplify visibility” (4).

Figure 3. Russia Focused on the Future.

Source: Kremlin (2018).

Hyperspace helps to relativize a disparity of resources between Russia and the West. Their production and distribution of disinformation demonstrates the skill and “malign influence” of Russian “political technologists” (US official representation, Germany 2019). Although “sovereign morality” (Sharafutdinova Reference Sharafutdinova2014) emerged to accompany “sovereign democracy,” there is scope for diversions beyond these quasi-official concepts if they serve the state’s purposes. Fedor and Fredheim (Reference Fedor and Fredheim2017) show that it was prepared to draw on “young creatives” who supply “outlandish” Internet imagery that could complement traditional material and messages. Domination of the agenda is more important than specific content. But the Internet is a two-edged sword and not entirely controllable. The regime tried to disconnect the “Russian Internet” from the global to stop the wrong sort of imagery entering or leaving Russia (Szostek Reference Szostek2018; Gaufman Reference Gaufman2019; Prokopenko Reference Prokopenko2019). For example, Google was embroiled in a dispute with Russian officialdom over maps showing Crimea as disputed or foreign territory. Google was also fined for not obeying the Russian censor (Luxmoore Reference Luxmoore2019a).

Putin: Cult, Hero, Image

Putin’s crafted persona synthesizes imperial-orthodox and Soviet elements with narcissism, new media, and literary representations. He is the model for a “Chosen One” character in a novel released shortly after he became president. Another portrays him engaged in battle against Chechen militants, whom he disposes of and is wounded in the process (Rogatchevski Reference Rogatchevski2008). The “West” is charged with excessive attention on Putin and its reportage reflects a strange liaison of autocrat and media icon. But Russian sources industriously broadcast images of Putin superimposed over nation and land, tailored for the occasion and target group: action man, paragon of “Russian glamour” (Menzel Reference Menzel2013), caring father figure, respecter of religion, international statesman, military expert. Putin’s qualities merge with those of a heroic nation. His praise for Russia is praise for himself. The President’s hospital visits and appearances at televised gatherings of young people convey his popularity and provide an irenic contrast to the apocalyptic scenarios said to threaten Russia (Figure 3).

Figure 4. Putin and the Priests.

Source: Kremlin.

Figure 5. Armed Forces Cathedral Model.

Source: Russian Defence Ministry.

Public support is not explainable by sustained economic performance, competent governance, or Russia’s reputation and friendships. It could be apprehended via the concept of “charisma” and Putin as projecting something “quintessentially Russian” (Ioffe Reference Ioffe2014; Goscilo Reference Goscilo2014; Gloger Reference Gloger2017b; Sharafutdinova Reference Sharafutdinova2020). Other observers offer different views. Richard Sakwa (Reference Sakwa2020) opined that Putin has “contempt for demagogic populism other than his own formulation” (20). A German official noted, “when you are in charge for 20 years you get used to giving the orders, and you take everything personally” (Office of the German Federal President 2019).

There is an uncanny resemblance to the Kremlin’s representation of Putin and Russia’s fate in Sangar et al.’s (Reference Sangar, Clément, Lindemann, Clément and Sanger2018) analysis of a “coward and hero-protector” dichotomy in “modern cultural products” (183–184). In this type of scenario, bold and righteous action overcomes the “intellect” and “rhetorical skill” of nefarious cowards whose “emotional function [ … ] is to exploit the audiences’ self-esteem.” These “morally shameful” characters are contrasted with a modest, brave, selfless hero, who protects innocent victims and a wider community. Emphasis on the hero’s “legitimate cause” denies “moral integrity and redemption capacity” for the aggressor-coward. Moral anger incited in the audience facilitates “need for the hero’s intervention, even if this involves the use of force.” The hero-protector is associated with “virile qualities” (Sangar et al. Reference Sangar, Clément, Lindemann, Clément and Sanger2018, 183–184). As it proceeds, “a dramatized story of conflict features escalating sequences of illegitimate wrong-doings committed by a fundamentally unchanging ‘aggressor’ against the ‘victim’” (Sangar et al. Reference Sangar, Clément, Lindemann, Clément and Sanger2018, 185). These tales style the present as

Religion

A Russian past of Christianity and atheist totalitarianism presents difficulties for a regime seeking to justify and extract political capital from both (Bogumił and Łukaszewicz Reference Bogumił and Łukaszewicz2018; Smith Reference Smith2019). The incongruities did not go unnoticed. Though there is no record of Putin as a devout person before 2000 (Cf. Gloger Reference Gloger2017b: 87–92), he is now an Iconodule, wearing a crucifix, visiting hallowed sites, and meeting Patriarch Kirill, who “equips” him with an “army of metaphors” (Suslov Reference Suslov2014, 588; Figure 4), blending church, military, and “sacralisation of territory” (Pavkovic Reference Aleksandar2017). The presidential website is full of references to religion. Proclamations about sovereignty and vigilance against threats are flanked by appeals to “traditional values” (Horvath Reference Horvath2016) fusing religion and patriotism (Halbach Reference Halbach2019). A holy Russia/distinctive civilization discourse (Tsygankov Reference Tsygankov2016) repeats staple tropes. Victory in the war increases in spiritual and political meaning the more it recedes chronologically.

Figure 6. Proclaiming a Cathedral of the Armed Forces.

Source: Kremlin/Tass.

Figure 7. Crimea is (Still) Ours.

Source: Kremlin.

The imposing physical and symbolic qualities of architecture are also drawn on. Having erected a giant statue of his namesake in Moscow in 2016 (“A tale of two Vladimirs,” Economist, November 5, 2016), Putin contributed his “own money” for an icon to adorn a Cathedral of the Armed Forces built where the Red Army had repelled the Wehrmacht in December 1941. The phantasmagorical project combines titanic visual imagery with endorsed historiography and partisan spirituality. Church, military, and leader merge as a holy troika. The cathedral, located in Patriot Park, was due to open on May 9, 2020, the 75th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, replete with steps made from melted German military material (Kremlin 2018; Figure 5 and Figure 6). The park will include a “Multimedia Museum and Exhibition Complex dedicated to the Russian Spiritual Army” and “house unique expositions dedicated to various episodes of heroic history of Russian army” [sic]:Footnote ⁴

After Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, initiated the venture (Russian Ministry of Defence 2020), some clergy were dubious about a secular takeover of the divine. The cathedral’s scheduled consecration was thwarted by the pandemic and a reaction against the inclusion of mosaics representing Stalin, Putin, and Shoigu (Bennetts Reference Bennetts2020). These were removed and the consecration occurred on June 14. Putin visited on June 22, the “Day of Memory and Sorrow,” accompanied by Shoigu and Kirill. The crypt is named after Saint Vladimir (Kremlin 2020).

Figure 8. Berlin Citadel Visit.

Source: Author (orig. Tagesspiegel).

Figure 9. Putin’s Bundestag Speech.

Source: Kremlin.

Figure 10. Call to Peace.

Source: Russian Embassy Berlin.

Crimea and Other Parts of Ukraine are Ours

Discourses of Russia’s greatness, a threatening adversary, vigilance, and the godsend of a saintly warrior, are incorporated into the Ukraine crisis. In speeches justifying the seizure of Crimea, Putin (Reference Putin2014) and Lavrov (Reference Lavrov2014) expressed plaintive anger at how history had unfolded and the asymmetry in global influence between Russia and the USA. They extolled a balance of power as inviolable. Suslov (Reference Suslov2014) interpreted the annexation as “linked to the reshuffling of the mental landscape” (588). He vividly elucidates the interplay of historical thought images with topical visuals in film, cartoons, and social media. Putin (Reference Putin2020; Figure 7) explained to a public audience that he had congratulated “builders of the Crimean Bridge [ … ] a landmark that ‘visualises’ the reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with the rest of Russia. In addition to ‘visualising’, it has created good conditions for the steady and sound development” (1–2). He outlined material benefits that would complement the spiritual connection conveyed by the bridge’s physical presence. The “sacred character of Crimea” was reprised in a history lesson:Footnote ⁵

Beyond Crimea, the creation Novorossiya, a “Delightful and Unique State,” aspired to subsume Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions in a union of “Russian republics” (Hosaka Reference Hosaka2019).

Figure 11. Putin’s Virtual Death.

Source: Agit Rossija.