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New Memorandum Elaborates U.S. Engagement in the Antarctic Treaty System, with Eye on Climate Change and Strategic Competitors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 November 2024

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Abstract

Type
Oceans, Environment, and Sciences
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

For the first time in thirty years, the United States has updated its Antarctic Region policy.Footnote 1 Last issued in 1994,Footnote 2 the new national security memorandum, which was released days before the 46th Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting (ATCM) in May 2024,Footnote 3 elaborates U.S. engagement in the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS),Footnote 4 with an eye on climate change and strategic competitors, such as China and Russia. It emphasizes the importance of the ATS, backs that system's policies and its decision bodies, and demonstrates the United States’ commitment to the region and to the treaty system. The memorandum comes amid rapid development of new technologies that make the Antarctic more easily accessible, heightened interest in the continent due to its abundant natural resources, including fisheries, minerals, and oil and natural gas reserves, and decreased consensus among states in the ATS's governance fora.Footnote 5 Confronted with these challenges, the new memorandum seeks to maintain an Antarctic Treaty System, built to promote scientific research and environmental protection and eschew military and economic undertakings, that is increasingly under stress.

Activities in the Antarctic are governed by the four treaties that comprise the ATS, as well as decisions made by the bodies established by those treaties, such as the ATCM. Its foundational document, the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959 and which was designed to sequester the continent from Cold War geopolitical competition, limits the Antarctic's uses to “peaceful purposes only.”Footnote 6 The treaty explicitly prohibits “any measures of a military nature” and bans “nuclear explosions . . . and the disposal . . . of radioactive waste material.”Footnote 7 Parties are precluded as well from making or expanding on any claims to territorial sovereignty, nor can they assert any acts or activities undertaken while the treaty is in force as the basis for any claim.Footnote 8 A transparency regime allows observers from the treaty's consultative partiesFootnote 9 “complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.”Footnote 10 (There have been more than sixty inspections since the treaty went into force.)Footnote 11 Parties are also required to give advance notice of “all expeditions to and within Antarctica” and of “any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica.”Footnote 12 The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty designates Antarctica as a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science,” sets out environmental principles for human activities there, and prohibits “[a]ny activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research.”Footnote 13 The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources provides for the adoption of conservation measures, including the management of fisheries and the establishment of marine protected areas (of which there are currently two).Footnote 14 The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals regulates the catching and killing of specified seal species.Footnote 15

The United States maintains the largest scientific program, by number of personnel, in the Antarctic.Footnote 16 Managed by the National Science Foundation (NSF), the U.S. Antarctic Program operates three year-round scientific research stations that undertake investigations “to understand the region and its ecosystems; to understand its effects on (and responses to) global processes such as climate; and to use the region as a platform to study the upper atmosphere and space.”Footnote 17 NSF-supported studies focus on “aeronomy and astrophysics, ecology, atmospheric sciences, biology and medicine, geology and geophysics, glaciology, and ocean and climate systems, and living marine resources.”Footnote 18

The new U.S. policy's four objectives remain essentially the same as those that were laid out three decades earlier. The objectives include: “protect[ing] the relatively unspoiled environment of the Antarctic Region and its associated ecosystems”; “preserv[ing] and pursu[ing] unique opportunities for scientific research and understand the Antarctic Region's relationship to global environmental changes”; “maintain[ing] the Antarctic Region as an area of international cooperation reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes”; and “assur[ing] the protection and conservation of the living resources in and ecosystems of the Antarctic Region.”Footnote 19

But the updated document differs from its predecessor in three important ways. First, the memorandum explicitly links climate change with Antarctic policy. It notes the “direct and indirect pressures from human activities” on the region and its resources and ecosystems.Footnote 20 It stresses how the region “plays a vital role in the global climate system.”Footnote 21 And it highlights the importance of Antarctic scientific research to understanding climate change.Footnote 22 In announcing the new memorandum, the White House emphasized that research has “conclusively demonstrated that ongoing climate and other global changes and their associated impacts are affecting the Antarctic Region,” and it “encourage[d] countries to take immediate steps to . . . protect the Antarctic Region's vulnerable environment and ecosystems . . . [by] set[ting] ambitious . . . [goals] under the Paris Agreement . . . and establishing a system of effective marine protected areas in the Antarctic Region.”Footnote 23 The memorandum also advocates other environmental measures, such as “the application of a precautionary, ecosystem-based approach rooted in the best available science” for “ecosystems and resources subject to exploitation” and “establishing, enforcing, monitoring, and adaptively managing fully and highly protected large-scale marine protected areas.”Footnote 24

Second, the new policy prioritizes the importance of maintaining the ATS itself, underscoring the United States’ “continue[d] . . . strong[] support [of] the ATS as the legal framework” for the region.Footnote 25 Elaborating on the centrality of the ATS, the memorandum reiterates its core policies. It describes the Antarctic region “as a zone for peace, international operation, the pursuit of science, and environmental protection.”Footnote 26 It “reiterates [the United States’] steadfast position of not recognizing sovereignty claims and of reserving all its rights throughout the whole of the Antarctic Region.”Footnote 27 And it promises that “[t]he United States will continue to maintain an active and influential presence in the ATS.”Footnote 28 The emphasis on sustaining and bolstering the ATS implicitly acknowledges the challenges the system currently faces.

Third, and relatedly, the policy focuses on the importance of compliance with ATS obligations and the commitment of the United States to their enforcement. “To maintain the effectiveness and durability of the ATS,” the memo explains, “the United States will continuously strengthen its promotion of transparency, compliance, cooperation, the exchange of best practices, and adherence to relevant norms by all ATS participants.”Footnote 29 To this end, the policy vows that “the United States will continue to use all tools available.”Footnote 30 The approach outlined in the memo “reflects the United States’ steadfast commitment to all aspects of the ATS, to include but not limited to arms control, the protection of vulnerable flora and fauna, and the general prohibition of activity relating to mineral resources.”Footnote 31 The policy's prioritization of maintaining the ATS reflects the White House's understanding of the threats to the system. A press statement stated this more directly, asserting that the United States must “remain vigilant against actions by countries that could threaten U.S. national interests by bringing international discord to the Antarctic Region.”Footnote 32

The new U.S. Antarctic policy comes just months after China opened its fifth Antarctic station in February 2024.Footnote 33 China has expanded its presence in the Antarctic since 2009 and now has the fourth most stations on the continent.Footnote 34 Chinese President Xi Jinping, who announced in 2014 that China would become a “polar great power,”Footnote 35 marked the completion of the new station with a congratulatory letter.Footnote 36 The U.S. Defense Department's annual report on China warned in 2022 that “[China's] strategy for Antarctica includes the use of dual-use technologies, facilities, and scientific research, which are likely intended, at least in part, to improve [People's Liberation Army] (PLA) capabilities.”Footnote 37 The Department's 2023 report explained further that “[w]hile the equipment [located in China's research stations] is ostensibly used for legitimate scientific research and is allowable under the Antarctic Treaty, it could also be used for unspecified military purposes . . . provid[ing] the PLA with better surveillance capabilities” including the “collect[ion] [of] signals intelligence over Australia and New Zealand.”Footnote 38 A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said shortly after the new station opened that “China always makes sure that our activities are consistent with the stipulations of the Antarctic Treaty System. China's new Antarctic station is built and operated in full compliance with international rules and procedures.”Footnote 39

The policy also comes at a time when there are growing concerns regarding the stability of the ATS. The abundant natural resources of the Antarctic Region are a great temptation to states, and the consensus-based decision-making processes in the ATCM and the Commission for the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) create challenges when states have diverging interests. In recent years, an increasing number of conflicts have arisen in these fora. In the CCAMLR, for example, China and Russia have prevented the creation of new marine protected areas (MPA), which (if established) would limit fishing within those waters.Footnote 40 In the ATCM, the Antarctic Treaty parties have not been able to find consensus on the addition of Belarus and Canada as consultative parties.Footnote 41 And since 2022, China has prevented the ATCM from adopting measures that would protect emperor penguins.Footnote 42 In its 2023 report on China, the Department of Defense asserted that China “has been de-legitimizing the Consensus-based Antarctic Treaty, preparing for 2048, when central aspects of the treaty will be open to renegotiation. It is likely both China and Russia will work together to seek to renegotiate the Antarctic Treaty to loosen regulations on mining and fishing practices, which both countries need for future consumption.”Footnote 43

The newly issued policy has been welcomed as a long overdue response to these developments and praised for its strong support for scientific research programs and the ATS.Footnote 44 Critics have noted, however, that U.S. commitment to the ATS requires increased investment in NSF programs and operations and greater congressional engagement.Footnote 45 In its announcement, the White House promised to “work with Congress to continue its support of our three world-class, year-round scientific research stations; research in the Antarctic Region on ocean ecosystems and Antarctic marine living resources; and modernization of the nation's polar icebreaker fleet” and “also work with Congress to meet international commitments and to ensure the appropriate domestic legislation and regulations to safeguard the wide range of U.S. interests in the Antarctic Region.”Footnote 46Footnote *

References

* This is the corrected version of a paper first published on November 15, 2024, containing minor typesetter errors.

1 See White House Press Release, National Security Memorandum on United States Policy on the Antarctic Region (May 17, 2024), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/05/17/national-security-memorandum-on-united-states-policy-on-the-antarctic-region [https://perma.cc/T8WJ-SWTU] [hereinafter NSM-23].

2 See United States Policy on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26 (June 9, 1994), at https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12750 [https://perma.cc/CS4V-L5JS] [hereinafter Clinton Antarctic Policy]. U.S. policy on the Arctic region was updated separately in a national security presidential directive in 2009 and was elaborated most recently in 2022 in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. See National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD – 66 (Jan. 2009), at https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm [https://perma.cc/JD4G-GAWG]; White House, National Security Strategy for the Arctic Region (Oct. 2022), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf [https://perma.cc/F767-SGMV]. U.S. law pertaining to Antarctica was last updated in 1996. See Antarctic Science, Tourism, and Conservation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–227, 110 Stat. 3034 (Oct. 2, 1996).

3 See Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty Press Release, Forty-Sixth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting – Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Committee for Environmental Protection (May 2024), at https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Meetings/Past/97 [https://perma.cc/QWR7-BYHH] [hereinafter Forty-Sixth ATCM].

4 The memorandum defines the ATS as encompassing the four international agreements discussed below, as well as “Measures, Decisions, and Resolutions in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty and [the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources] Convention.” NSM-23, supra note 1, Sec. 3(a).

5 See, e.g., Kees Bastmeije et al., Regulating Antarctic Tourism: The Challenge of Consensus-Based Decision Making, 117 AJIL 651 (2023).

6 Antarctic Treaty, Art. I(1), Dec. 1, 1959, 402 UNTS 71.

7 Id. Arts. I(1), V(1).

8 Id. Art. IV. Seven states maintain claims to parts of Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom), and Russia and the United States “maintain[] a basis to claim territory.” U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, Antarctic Region, at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/antarctic.

9 “Consultative party” includes the states noted in the Antarctic Treaty upon its adoption and those that have been recognized by the consultative parties as having “conduct[ed] substantial scientific research activity.” Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6, Arts. VII(1), IX(2).

10 Id. Art. VII(2); see also Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Art. 14, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 ILM 1455 [hereinafter Protocol].

11 See Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Inspections Database, at https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Ats/InspectionsDatabase?lang=e.

12 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6, Art. VII(5). This provision is reported to be “failing.” William Muntean III, Antarctic Monitoring Tools in Action 5 (Mar. 19, 2024), at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-03/240319_Muntean_Antarctic_Monitoring_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7XW-ASAF].

13 Protocol, supra note 10, Arts. 2–3, 7.

14 See Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Art. IX, May 20, 1980, 33 UST 3476, 1329 UNTS 48.

15 See Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 UST 441, TIAS No. 8826.

16 White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Actions to Ensure Environmental Protections of the Antarctic Region (May 17, 2024), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/05/17/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-actions-to-ensure-environmental-protections-of-the-antarctic-region [https://perma.cc/6L4Z-F7EB] [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet].

17 U.S. National Science Foundation, United States Antarctic Program, at https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/antarct/usap.jsp [https://perma.cc/8FE7-T54A].

18 White House Fact Sheet, supra note 16.

19 NSM-23, supra note 1, Sec. 1(b).

20 Id., Sec. 1(a).

21 Id.

22 See id., Sec. 2(e).

23 White House Fact Sheet, supra note 16.

24 NSM-23, supra note 1, Sec. 2(f).

25 Id., Sec. 2(a).

26 Id.

27 Id., Sec. 2(b).

28 Id., Sec. 2(c).

29 Id., Sec. 2(d).

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 White House Fact Sheet, supra note 16.

33 William Yang, China's New Antarctic Research Station Renews Concerns About Potential Security Threats, Voice of America (Feb. 16, 2024), at https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-new-antarctic-research-station-renews-concerns-about-potential-security-threats/7490164.html.

34 See China Opens Antarctic Station South of Australia, New Zealand, Reuters (Feb. 7, 2024), at https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-opens-antarctic-station-south-australia-new-zealand-2024-02-07.

35 John Garrick, The Antarctic Treaty System Is on Thin Ice—and It's Not All About Climate Change, Strategist (Nov. 12, 2021), at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-antarctic-treaty-system-is-on-thin-ice-and-its-not-all-about-climate-change [https://perma.cc/M3G4-XZE5].

36 Xi Sends Congratulatory Letter on Completion, Operation of Qinling Station in Antarctica, Xinhua (Feb. 7, 2024), at https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202402/07/WS65c2fb23a3104efcbdaea2c5.html.

37 U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2022, at 142 (Nov. 2022), at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF [https://perma.cc/QGP3-5P5N].

38 U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2023, at 163 (Oct. 2023), at https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF [https://perma.cc/QC8R-MPQ7] [hereinafter 2023 Defense Department Report].

39 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference (Feb. 7, 2024), at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202405/t20240530_11347696.html [https://perma.cc/4YBA-YB86].

40 See Francesco De Augustinis, Amid Record Melting, Countries Fail Again to Protect Antarctic Waters, Mongabay (Oct. 30, 2023), at https://news.mongabay.com/2023/10/amid-record-melting-countries-fail-again-to-protect-antarctic-waters [https://perma.cc/83TU-Y4PY]. The United States has supported the establishment of these MPAs. See U.S. Embassy in Canberra Press Release, Remarks: Ambassador Kennedy's Speech at the 42nd Annual CCAMLR Meeting (Oct. 17, 2023), at https://au.usembassy.gov/transcript-ambassador-kennedys-speech-at-the-42nd-annual-ccamlr-meeting [https://perma.cc/8N6U-78GQ].

41 See Forty-Sixth ATCM, supra note 3.

42 Frank Jordans, China Blocks Moves to Increase Protection of Emperor Penguins, PBS News (June 3, 2022), at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/china-blocks-moves-to-increase-protection-of-emperor-penguins.

43 2023 Defense Department Report, supra note 38, at 163.

44 See, e.g., Wilson Center, National Security Memorandum on United States Policy on the Antarctic Region, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/national-security-memorandum-united-states-policy-antarctic-region [https://perma.cc/8E32-8JX4]. The United States was the last state to update its policy among those that are active in Antarctica. See William (Bill) Muntean, United States Silence on Antarctic Policy, Polar J. (Feb. 27, 2024), at https://polarjournal.ch/en/2024/02/27/united-states-silence-on-antarctic-policy [https://perma.cc/U7AK-966A].

45 See, e.g., William “Bill” Muntean III, U.S. Operational Retreat from Antarctica (May 8, 2024), at https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-operational-retreat-antarctica [https://perma.cc/HPR8-MBFZ].

46 White House Fact Sheet, supra note 16.