This paper suggests a theoretical and methodological framework that integrates Bourdieu’s conception of the juridical field with Mnookin and Kornhauser’s claim of the centrality of the action occurring in the shadow of the law. This framework is constructed based on a study of the Israeli legal field governing divorce that included the analysis of 360 divorce files and in-depth interviews with more than 40 divorcees and legal and therapeutic professionals. The study allows a rare exploration of a legal field in action, including the main positions within the field and the power relations between them, as well as the field’s boundaries and game rules. The findings illustrate the importance of Bourdieu’s fields theory if and when opened up to the informal dimensions of law and demonstrate the potential of the suggested framework to the sociological understanding of law in action.

This article aims to assess the work of the courts as navigators when law meets culture in Turkey, where the culture of the official legal system and the culture of the people do not always accord. First the conceptual framework used is analysed, then readers are introduced to the peculiarities of Turkish law and socioculture, and finally, the work of the judge is considered. Selected cases are in three groups: cases where courts face culture contrary to the vision embodied in the official legal framework; then, where courts face culture which can be catered for within the legal framework, though not in keeping with it, and now need revision because of the aspired European Union membership; and finally, where courts face demands of further Europeanisation and human rights law from the outside, which may or may not fit in the framework or the traditional values of the people.

This paper sets out the work of Parfit, in terms of Hume and Locke, in terms of the treatment of the person. It considers how ontological status is often a chimerical notion. It sets out the non-bindingness of promises thesis and develops this in terms of intentional action to show how intentional action itself may be impossible. The paper also raises questions about how we define groups, such as criminal groups, in terms of intentionality.