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THE RISE, FALL, AND LEGACY OF THE STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE PARADIGM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2023

Matthew T. Panhans Open the ORCID record for Matthew T. Panhans [Opens in a new window]
Matthew T. Panhans*
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Matthew T. Panhans: U.S. Federal Trade Commission.
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Email: mpanhans@ftc.gov.
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Abstract

The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm was the core framework of industrial organization for two decades, and had a significant impact on competition policy from the 1950s through the 1970s. This essay considers what made the SCP framework so influential in the United States, the shortcomings economists identified in the framework during the shift to the “new IO” in the late 1970s, and the lasting contributions that the SCP paradigm made on policy and the study of industry and competition.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of the History of Economic Thought , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , September 2024 , pp. 337 - 357
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of History of Economics Society

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Footnotes

I thank Steve Medema, John Berdell, Mike Vita, Edoardo Peruzzi, Nic Johnson, Daniel Francis, and seminar participants at Duke University’s Center for the History of Political Economy for helpful comments. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner.

References

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