Many believe that the Marxist philosophy of history entails that man is not free in a sense in which it seems obvious that he is. In particular it is held to be (1) materialistic, (2) holistic, (3) economistic, and (4) fatalistic. It is claimed, in short, that since the Marxist philosophy of history has these features, man is not capable of shaping his own (social) destiny if it is true. I show for each of these features either that it does not entail what it is believed to entail or that it is not correctly attributed to the Marxist philosophy of history.

The method of Ramsey sentences has been proposed for handling theoretical constructs within a scientific system. Essentially it consists of constructing a certain “monolithic” sentence for an entire theory. In this present paper several improvements are suggested which help to overcome some of the awkward features of the method. In particular we have here many Ramsey sentences rather than just one, each erstwhile primitive theoretical term giving rise to a Ramsey sentence. Such a sentence in effect defines what we call a Ramsey constant. Using Ramsey constants, we attempt to improve the method in important logical and semantical respects. It is suggested also that such constants are of interest for the philosophy of mathematics.

Such difficulties in the theory of elementary particles as the infinite magnitudes of energy and charge when one takes into account a particle's interactions with vacuum, call for a radical synthesis and generalization of quantum and relativistic ideas if a real solution is to be obtained. It is purposed here to demonstrate that, if a synthesis of this kind is aimed at, the analysis of the concept of being may be of some heuristic value.

In studies of scientific methodology, surprisingly little attention has been given to tests of hypotheses. Such testing constitutes a methodology common to various scientific disciplines and is an essential factor in the development of science since it determines which theories are retained. The classical theory of tests is a major accomplishment but requires modification in order to produce a theory that accounts for the success of science. The revised theory is an analysis of the nondeductive aspect of scientific reasoning. It results in a new definition of probability and a nonclassical point of view with regard to the foundations of probability.

It is shown that quantum mechanics cannot be formulated as a stochastic theory involving a probability distribution function of position and momentum. This is done by showing that the most general distribution function which yields the proper quantum mechanical marginal distributions cannot consistently be used to predict the expectations of observables if phase space integration is used. Implications relating to the possibility of establishing a “hidden” variable theory of quantum mechanics are discussed.

The views of linguistic analysts and objectivists are explored with regard to the question of interactionism. It is argued that the admission of a logical difference between explanation by cause and explanation by motive cannot disqualify causal explanations of human action, cannot be construed as challenging the competence of science, and cannot count against interactionism. It is also argued that objectivist programs for eliminating mentalistic concepts either implicitly admit interactionism or cannot distinguish relevantly between interactionism and parallelism.

Horizons are frontiers between things observable and things unobservable. Even if such horizons exist we may extrapolate from observable to non-observable regions of the universe by

1. (a) using the laws of physics which tell us how a presently observable galaxy will evolve even when we can no longer observe it, and

2. (b) using the cosmological principle, which tells us that the physical situation beyond the horizon is by and large the same as the physical situation within the horizon.

It would be paradoxical to define the universe in terms of objects or events within a horizon because it is only in virtue of information about objects and events outside the horizon that we have reason to believe that the horizon exists.

The aim of this paper is to state the single most powerful argument for use of a non-classical logic in quantum mechanics. In outline the argument is the following. The working logic of a science is the logic of the events and propositions to which probabilities are assigned. A probability should be assigned to every element of the algebra of events. In the case of quantum mechanics probabilities may be assigned to events but not, without restriction, to the conjunction of two events. The conclusion is that the working logic of quantum mechanics is not classical. The nature of the logic that is appropriate for quantum mechanics is examined.

It is shown how a causal ordering can be defined in a complete structure, and how it is equivalent to identifying the mechanisms of a system. Several techniques are shown that may be useful in actually accomplishing such identification. Finally, it is shown how this explication of causal ordering can be used to analyse causal counterfactual conditionals. First the counterfactual proposition at issue is articulated through the device of a belief-contravening supposition. Then the causal ordering is used to provide modal categories for the factual propositions, and the logical contradiction in the system is resolved by ordering the factual propositions according to these causal categories.

Recent developments in social science methods have made most of the objectivism-subjectivism arguments in the philosophy of social science obsolete. Developments in experimental methods have made possible a behavioristic treatment of everything cherished as important in human action by the subjectivists; developments in computer and mathematical models have made possible a type of theory which carries out the program of the subjectivists but is not vulnerable to the arguments of the objectivists. What remains of the philosophical argument are two types of theory (for example, game theory and learning theory) which are both useful, both scientific, and frequently equivalent. Choice between them by scientists can be made on empirical grounds rather than on the grounds developed in the philosophical controversy.

This paper is an attempt at a vindication of induction. The point of departure is that induction requires a justification and that the only kind of justification possible is a vindication. However traditional vindications of induction have rested on unjustified assumptions about the aim of induction. This vindication takes the end pursued in induction simply to be correct prediction. It is argued that induction is the only reasonable way of pursuing this end because induction is the only objective method of predicting. While objectivity is not a necessary condition for successful predicting, it is a sufficient condition for the possession of a property that is, in turn, a necessary condition for correct predicting; and further there could be no reason to expect any non-objective method to possess this necessary condition for success.

Induction is the only objective method of predicting for it alone uses facts which must be identified by any predicting method based on rules; and it alone uses these facts according to a relationship that must hold between facts and any meaningful empirical statement. Any alternative to induction must assume that the factual regularities that have been detected will alter in the future and the way they are expected to alter must be arbitrary. It is further claimed that this vindication is proof against the criticisms that have been advanced against practicalist justifications of induction.

Much of the recent discussion of problematic aspects of quantum-mechanical measurement centers around that feature of quantum theory which is called “the projection postulate.” This is roughly the claim that a change of a certain sort occurs in the state of a physical system when a measurement is made on the system. In this paper an argument for the projection postulate due to von Neumann is considered. Attention is focused on trying to provide an understanding of the notion of “the state of a physical system” which is compatible with the argument von Neumann offers. An attempt is made to formulate the argument in terms of an objectivistic interpretation of probability concepts. It is seen that such an interpretation does not provide a suitable way of understanding the argument. An attempt is made to illustrate the source of this failure in terms of a non-quantum-mechanical example.

A proof is given that there does not exist an event, that is not already in the past for some possible distant observer at the (our) moment that the latter is “now” for us. Such event is as “legally” past for that distant observer as is the moment five minutes ago on the sun for us (irrespective of the circumstance that the light of the sun cannot reach us in a period of five minutes). Only an extreme positivism: “that which cannot yet be observed does not yet exist”, can possibly withstand the conclusion concerned. Therefore, there is determinism, also in micro-physics.

“What might have been is an abstraction Remaining a perpetual possibility Only in the world of speculation.”

T. S. Eliot

Burnt Norton

Some of the concerns which motivate attempts to provide a philosophical reduction of nomological necessity are briefly introduced in I. In II, Hempel's treatment of the paradoxes is contrasted with a position which holds that nomological necessity is a pragmatic dimension of laws of nature, and that this pragmatic dimension is of such a type that it prevents laws of nature from contraposing. Such a position is, however, untenable unless (i) the sense of ‘pragmatics’ at issue is specified, and the possibility of pragmatic differences resulting in differences in confirmation is defended, and (ii) a relevant pragmatic difference between contrapositives is indicated. III attempts to satisfy condition (i) by developing a new sense of pure pragmatics and argues that some remarks by Goodman and Scheffler together with work on the logic of explanation by Dr. Rescher and myself suggest that nomological contrapositives are not pragmatically equivalent (i.e. substitutable salva veritate in the pure pragmatics of an ideal scientific language). If such is the case, condition (ii) is also satisfied.

The charge that the limit-frequency theory of probability is inconsistent due to incompatibility between the required features of randomness and limit convergence is inapplicable when probability sequences are taken to be empirically (i.e., extensionally) generated, as they must be on a strictly empirical conception of probability.

All past attempts to meet this charge by formulating constructive definitions of randomness that would still allow for a demonstrable limit-convergence have, in their exclusive concern with logically (i.e., intensionally) prescribed sequences, left the logic of extensional classes essentially untouched. In the light of a strict differentiation between intensional and extensional classes a generalized approach is possible under which several closely connected senses of randomness, i.e., the formal, material, restricted and unrestricted senses may be easily distinguished and related to the notion of relevance.

How can reasons explain actions? What is the force of “because” in “He did this because...” followed by a statement of the agent's intentions? The answer involves some concept of what can count as explanation, and the history of science indicates that the acceptability of explanations depends, in part, on a scientific community which has decided to pursue its inquiries in one direction rather than another. The first part of this paper examines this pragmatic aspect of explanations; the second part draws on this examination in the hope of elucidating the way reasons explain actions. The possibility of eliminating our ordinary, “purposive,” explanations of actions in favor of some “mechanistic,” neuro-physiological, account is then considered.

One hears increasingly from philosophers that statistical inference is a technical study that is well in control by statisticians and should be left to them; and one hears, increasingly, from mathematical statisticians that all this talk about interpretations of probability is so much philosophical frosting that is utterly irrelevant to the serious business of producing mathematical statistics. “The more interpretations of probability there are, the wider the scope of applications of our purely mathematical theories.” The point of this paper is to present, in detail, a situation in which an individual with given degrees of belief, given evidence, and given values, will have three different and contrary courses of action recommended to him, each according to one of the three most popular interpretations of probability.

The paper∗∗ discusses the problems raised by the inexactness of experiential concepts for a deductivist account of theoretical explanation. The process of theoretical explanation is explicated in terms of the devising of exact forms of inexact concepts. Analysis of the adjustments of concepts and their exact forms to each other reveals an implicit criterion of adequacy for theories which is related to the principle of connectivity.

“Adaptation” has several meanings which have often been confused, including relations, processes, states, and intrinsic properties. It is used in comparative and historical contexts. “Adaptation” and “environment” may designate probabilistic concepts. Recognition of these points refutes arguments for the notions that: 1) all organisms are perfectly adapted; 2) organisms cannot be ill-adapted and survive or well-adapted and die; 3) adaptation is necessarily relative to the environment; 4) change in environment is necessary for evolution; 5) preadaptation implies teleology. Such notions are associated with metaphysical ideas, and may affect the thinking of biologists.