Why do some autocrats establish a ruling party, whereas others do not? The existing literature argues that weak leaders facing a commitment problem have an incentive to create highly institutionalised parties in order to stabilise their ruling coalition. However, empirical research points out that stronger leaders also create ruling parties, which tend to lack institutional strength and be short-lived.

Through a simple formal model and a case study, this paper explains strong leaders’ motivation to create less-institutionalised, short-lived parties. My model introduces two variables to classical leader-elite bargaining model. (1) indivisible benefit from incumbency, which the leaders can exclusively consume and cannot share with ruling elites. This makes the bargaining more difficult while it also increases the leaders’ merit to maintain his post. Thus, the leaders found ruling parties to temporarily deter the elites’ defection, even if the leaders are sure that their ruling coalition will inevitably collapse in the near future. (2) loser’s share, which the elites consume even after the failed rebellion. Many existing models assume that losers in rebellions lose everything, but some leaders lack the willingness or capability to punish defectors. The low loser’s share decreases the elites’ future share, which encourages weak elites to rebel before their bargaining power furthermore goes down. Thus, even strong leaders can face the commitment problem. Through the case study of Georgia, this paper also shows that even less-institutionalised ruling parties can prevent elites from rebelling by empowering potential defectors.

A growing number of studies focus on how governments can manage audience costs when they want to back down from international crises. In line with previous studies, especially Kohama et al. (2024), this paper argues that the Japanese government can use a variety of reasons to justify its decisions to de-escalate while minimizing domestic audience costs. I found that governments can reduce audience costs using several rhetorical devices, reinforcing the current understanding of audience costs. However, my design, which presented a fait accompli scenario by China against Japan, yielded significantly different results regarding audience costs compared to previous studies on the subject. Specifically, the results of this study indicate that the public might not value economic development following a fait accompli as highly as in less severe scenarios. The results also suggest that leaders might have a harder time backing down after a loss of territory compared to other forms of provocation.

Allied states often seek to discourage other members from engaging in unnecessary conflicts, frequently working to mitigate and de-escalate tensions during crises involving their partners. This study investigates the de-escalatory influence of alliances − referred to as the restraint effect − on state behaviour during international crises. The central question addressed is: under what conditions does the restraint effect of alliances become more pronounced? The study hypothesizes that relatively weak states allied with major powers are more likely to experience a stronger restraint effect compared to others. This hypothesis is empirically tested using multiple regression models. The findings provide evidence of an additional restraint effect associated with the presence of a major ally within defence pacts. Furthermore, the temporal analysis reveals that this effect is particularly evident during the Cold War era.

This study investigates whether corruption among public officials undermines fundamental rights, analysing data from 142 countries using the Rule of Law Index, a widely recognised and respected tool for assessing the rule of law worldwide. The results show that corruption among judges and bureaucrats consistently erodes fundamental rights, including labour rights and freedom of association. In advanced democracies, police and military corruption significantly reduces freedom of association, while lawmakers’ corruption undermines labour rights. However, in the broader context, corruption among lawmakers, police, and military officers does not significantly affect these rights. This study emphasises the significant role of bureaucracy in protecting rights and the devastating consequences of bureaucratic corruption. The trend of executive power abuse further complicates this issue. To combat corruption and safeguard fundamental rights, this article recommends robust mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency, emphasising the importance of democratic oversight.

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a human rights mechanism under which all UN members are subject to human rights reviews by other states. Given that North Korea is among the worst human rights violators globally, human rights practitioners and academic research have paid much attention to North Korea as a State under Review (SUR). What is much less known and researched is that North Korea actively engages as a ‘reviewer’, regularly making human rights recommendations to other UN members. Using UPR data from 2008 to 2020, this study explores the political dynamics of North Korean human rights recommendations by identifying to whom North Korea makes recommendations and why. We theorize that North Korea utilizes the UPR as a political arena wherein it pats on the back of politically close states and tries to shame politically antagonistic states. Empirical analysis shows that political closeness with North Korea is the main driver influencing its back-patting and shaming efforts in the UPR. Specifically, politically distant states from North Korea, measured by the UN General Assembly voting affinity and presence of unilateral economic sanctions, receive more condemnations and fewer back-patting recommendations. We also demonstrate that North Korea has become much more active over time in their shaming efforts. These findings suggest that even an isolated country like North Korea can learn how to operate in an international institution and can utilize it strategically.

How do different regime types execute a security response during a pandemic? We interrogate the politics of monopolistic securitization which we argue to have significantly directed and influenced the COVID-19 policy strategies adopted in the ‘democratic’ United Kingdom (UK) and ‘authoritarian’ Thailand. Despite their stark political differences, we contend that the British and Thai states’ parallel resort to monopolistic securitization as an overarching pandemic approach effectively made them ‘functionally similar’ by producing security responses that differed only in magnitude and scale but not in kind. Integrating securitization and democratic standards violations frameworks, we find out that the British and Thai authorities’ monopolistic securitization of COVID-19 initially constrained the intersubjective process required to socially construct the pandemic as a primary existential threat endangering both countries. This significantly diminished their public audiences’ individual/agential and collective/institutional capacity to deliberate the immediate emergency measures they unilaterally deployed, particularly during the pandemic’s early stages. Consequently, whether it was in the UK with a supposedly robust democracy or in Thailand with at best a hybrid regime if not outright authoritarian, the security responses that emerged constituted varying types and degrees of violations within the illiberal-authoritarian spectrum. Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, the fundamental deliberative-iterative mechanism underpinning securitization enabled the British and Thai public audiences to gradually reclaim their role and space, allowing them to challenge the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing emergency measures, thereby weakening the states’ monopolistic control over the process.

The home rule movements in Taiwan and Korea were two major events that took place at a time when the Taisho Emperor was embracing a more liberal atmosphere. While Taiwan asked for equal standing within the Japanese empire, Korea wanted political independence from colonial rule. The different framing strategies adopted by the social activists lead to the following empirical puzzles: How did the public intellectuals and social activists define their colonial grievances in Taiwan and Korea and seize the window of opportunity in the post-WWI era? And what framing strategies did they apply in promoting their ideas of self-determination?

This article proposes a comparative analysis of Taiwan’s and Korea’s mobilization of international norms, and it investigates how their framing strategies were used in their respective home rule movements during the colonial era. Their rhetoric and mobilization finally led to Japan’s shift to a more conciliatory policy in these two colonies. The finding contributes to the theoretical development of norm contestation and discourse analysis in international relations.

The organizational structure of this article is presented as follows. First, it engages the current literature on social movements, norm diffusion, and East Asian politics, and it explores the framing strategies of the resistance to Japan’s rule by comparing Taiwanese and Korean social movements in the early 1900s. Second, this study offers a framework of norm contestation in capturing how activists in Taiwan and Korea promoted the principle of self-determination. Third, it addresses alternative explanations on the structural factors and agency in these two movements.