Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of excluded parties. But what does this exclusivity mean for firms in nonmember states if production networks are internationally organized? This paper analyzes the effect of PTA exclusion on firms embedded in the global supply chains, focusing on the case of China's exclusion from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Drawing on a survey of Chinese firm managers during the TPP negotiations, we find that productive and downstream firms anticipated the exclusion and made adjustments accordingly, which led to a general sense of optimism toward the agreement. When presented with the prospect of an expanded TPP, however, firms are divided depending on how their own positions in the global supply chain complement or compete with the new member. These findings, validated with interviews in the field, suggest that the effects of PTA exclusion depend on the ability and need for firms to adjust. As a result, exclusion does not equate to an unalloyed loss for excluded firms.

The past three decades have witnessed a spectacular evolution in policies toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Whose interests do these policy innovations reflect? While existing theory suggests popular pressure drives openness, I argue reforms occur when shifts in financial access change local economic elites’ policy preferences toward FDI. When large domestic firms no longer have access to cheap credit through political connections, liquidity constraints outweigh firms' preferences to exclude foreigners. Economic elites then pressure governments to pursue liberal FDI policy environments. Using a combination of measures of FDI policy for up to 166 countries from 1973–2015, I find increases in financial constraints are robustly associated with decreases in foreign equity restrictions, and this relationship is strongest when domestic political institutions favor business interests. A financing constraints explanation of FDI policy reform has important implications for explanations of policy change, theories of business power amid increased interdependence, and expectations over the distributive effects of globalization.

Corporate political strategies have been used extensively by firms attempting to shape their political environments. In this context, access to targeted policymakers is essential to allow their deployment. Thus, we propose to study the determinants of access to the European Commission representatives. This research builds on the resource-based view (RBV) of firms to argue that political knowledge is a valuable resource to increase firms' degree of access to the European Commission. To test our hypotheses, we built a novel dataset merging firms characteristics with lobbying meetings information, and analyze it through negative binomial regression. The results suggest the importance of political knowledge, emphasizing that it may represent a source of sustainable competitive advantage. This study highlights interesting information that broadens the understanding of corporate political strategies in the European Union.

Does international investor sentiment improve when a crises-ridden country participates in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program? I argue that merely participating in an IMF program may not revive the sentiments of investors. Rather, investor sentiment would improve when governments enhance the credibility of their commitment to reforms by accepting severe conditions imposed by the IMF, which incur ex ante and ex post political costs. Using panel data on 166 countries during the 1992–2013 period (twenty-two years), I find that countries participating in IMF programs, with conditions attached, specifically prior actions and performance criteria conditions, after controlling for endogeneity concerns using exogeneous instruments, are associated with an increase in long-term investor sentiment. These results are robust to using alternative data, variables and estimation methods. My findings are in stark contrast to those who argue that IMF conditional programs are akin to swallowing a bitter pill. In fact, my results demonstrate that the so-called bitter pill may act as a palliative.

Rulemaking pursuant to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act provides a useful setting to assess theories of interest group influence. In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress delegated new rulemaking authority to federal agencies to regulate mortgage markets. A critical aspect of this new regulatory regime engendered significant controversy from affected interests: “credit risk retention” would require sponsors of asset-backed securities to retain a stake in the risk of securitized assets. Contrary to unrefined industry capture-based accounts stressing the disproportionate role of larger, well-established regulated entities in setting policy, we find little evidence of sustained effort by large lenders to dilute regulatory standards via political investments. Rather, a diverse coalition of housing sector, community, and civil rights groups, backed by an ideologically diverse swath of legislators, forced substantial regulatory retrenchment. Our analysis suggests a more nuanced view of private influence, in which coordination plays a more substantial role than political investments alone.