¹ The purpose of this paper is not to argue for the acceptance of one of the five ways in the Summa Theologiae, the presentation in Summa contra Gentiles or the understanding of God's existence in On being and essence. This does not address different scientific worldviews found in the thought of Thomas and in our own time.

² It would be helpful to examine the thought of Thomas and how his methodology was influenced by Augustine, Neo-Platonism, Aristotle, interpreters of Aristotle, etc. but many works have been written on that topic and that would expand the scope of this essay.

³ This is meant to highlights thinkers and schools of thought that brought about changes in the method and content of philosophy. For example, in Kant there is an idea of analogy, which greatly differs from the Medieval and a moral argument for the possibility of God. In Descartes, there is an attempt to establish the existence of God beyond all doubt with standard of clear and distinct justification.

⁴ Vatican I in Dei Filius provides a synthetic articulation of the existence of God and the relationship between faith and reason. “By enduring agreement the Catholic Church has held and holds that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only in principle but also in object: (1) in principle, indeed, because we know in one way by natural reason, in another by divine faith; (2) in object, however, because, in addition to things to which natural reason can attain, mysteries hidden in God are proposed to us for belief which, had they not been divinely revealed, could not become known.” “And, not only can faith and reason never be at variance with one another, but they also bring mutual help to each other, since right reasoning demonstrates the basis of faith and, illumined by its light, perfects the knowledge of divine things, while faith frees and protects reason from errors and provides it with manifold knowledge.” “And it (the Church) does not forbid disciplines of this kind, each in its own sphere, to use its own principles and its own method; but, although recognizing this freedom, it continually warns them not to fall into errors by opposition to divine doctrine, nor, having transgressed their own proper limits, to be busy with and to disturb those matters which belong to faith.”

⁵ It is worth noting that the work of Henri de Lubac, especially in his Mystery of the Supernatural was a theological attempt to heal the theoretical and methodological “dualism” that was being espoused between a pure nature and the supernatural. Maurice Bondel articulated a philosophy of action, which was purely immanent, in the attempt to propose the human will as an infinite power which cannot terminate in a finite realm; hence it would extend into the infinite. Raymond Moloney, S.J. De Lubac and Lonergan on the Supernatural Theological Studies 69 (2008).

6 Philosophers who seriously engage with Naturalism can be found in the volumes of collected essays on the topic. Also relevant are works by Jurgen Habermas and Charles Taylor because Naturalism is an important concept in the discussion of secularism, as the political application of living in a secular or disenchanted world.

The work of Fiona Ellis has been selected because it is current and it engages with theologians, such as, Karl Rahner, Herbert McCabe, Michael Buckley, and philosophers, such as, John Cottingham, Elanor Stump, Charles Taliaferro, Brian Davies, Akeel Bilgrami, and Mario De Caro. And because she is active in recent engagements on the topic: “2017-18: Supernaturalism and Naturalism: Beyond the Divide, Porticus UK/Heythrop College, (collaborative project with Professor Mario De Caro, University Roma Tre/Tufts) It is a common assumption of contemporary analytic philosophy that supernaturalism is indefensible, and that ‘anti-supernaturalism’ is the starting point of all good philosophy. The aim of this project has been to examine and to challenge this anti-supernaturalist stance, and to explore the limits of a more liberal or expansive form of naturalism.” https://www.roehampton.ac.uk/research-centres/centre-for-philosophy-of-religion/ https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLMCjHRs0UcFY84cIuZw4eOb3_d7462bRg/

⁷ Ellis, Fiona, “Why I am not an atheist; room for God in naturalism.” The Philosopher's Magazine (2014), p. 33.

⁸ Ellis, Fiona, God, Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 3. e.g. The New Atheists

⁹ Ellis, Fiona. God Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 115. The fact of value phrase is a play on words. Thank to the work of Hilary Putman, as one towering example, many philosophers no longer accept the fact/value dichotomy. Putnam, Hilary. The Collapse of the Fact/value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. Ellis says, “‘Some expansive naturalists admit that it is possible to admit value as something which “elude scientific investigation and which demand for their discernment and understanding a rather different approach.” While rejecting any analogously theistic ontology because they see God as a thing like a ghost, all together too “spooky” to be admitted.’ “The familiar message is that we must reject the assumption that the scientist has the monopoly on nature and broaden its limits accordingly. The message I have been building up to here is that we must be prepared also to question the assumption that these limits are to be monopolized by the form of expansive naturalism under current consideration. That is to say, we must consider the possibility that there is an intellectually respectable version of the claim that the natural world is divinely enchanted, that our responsiveness precisely does have a bearing upon our humanity. Such a position promises to lend justice to the scientific naturalist's assumption that divine enchantment and evaluative enchantment come as a joint package, although the precise nature of the relation between od and value remains to be seen.” Page 87

¹⁰ Ellis, Fiona, God Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 198-9. “The idea that God is not reducible to the world suggests that we need to uphold a distinction between theology and philosophy, and it is no part of my position that the two disciplines are to be conflated. On the contrary, we can philosophize about things in the world without mentioning God, just as we can take as our focus God Himself. The conclusions we draw in this latter context will be confined to God as He is in relation to the world, for even if we endeavor to talk about God outside His relation to the world, such talk involves an implicit and irreducible reference to the one who is seeking to comprehend Him in this manner.”

¹¹ Ellis, Fiona. God, Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 202. “Should philosophers be naturalists? The answer is no if naturalism is understood in exclusively scientific terms … Should philosophers be expansive naturalists? If this amounts to asking whether they should accept everything that is said by the typical expansive naturalist, then the answer must likewise be no … ”

¹² Ellis, Fiona. God, Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 204. “if we allow that theology can enrich philosophy, and that God's action can enrich nature. This can look like an invitation to bad philosophy, and there are versions of this move which warrant such a complaint. However, the theologian under present consideration is critically astute, … At this point, and in the spirit of his expansive naturalist approach, he may be persuaded to enter into dialogue with the theologian. If my conclusions are justified then he can forsake such a task only at the risk of compromising his insights and robbing theology of a fundamental philosophical resource. After all, he offers the prospects for demonstrating that belief in God is intellectually respectable, and that this conclusion can be appreciated by those who have taken on board the lessons of the best naturalistic philosophy of our time.”

¹³ Ellis, Fiona. God, Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 85. God is not a being among other beings in the natural world and yet this does not deny a place for God within a naturalist framework understood in a particular manner just as value can be understood. And 86. That the divine enchantment of the world is not an introduction of ghosts, gods or a being god is analogous to the evaluative enchantment of nature. The scientific naturalist blocks the entry of values into their ontology and analogously blocks God from ontology as if God where a thing like a ghost.

¹⁴ Ellis, Fiona ‘Religious Understanding, Naturalism, and Theory,’ in Ellis, Fiona, ed., New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 47.

¹⁵ Ellis, Fiona ‘Religious Understanding, Naturalism, and Theory,’ in Ellis, Fiona, ed., New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 49-50.

¹⁶ Ellis, Fiona. ‘Religious Understanding, Naturalism, and Theory,’ in Ellis, Fiona, ed., New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 55. “Clearly it is not enough simply to re-assert, in the face of her skepticism, that nature is God-involving and that she is already open to God. What we can do, however, is to suggest a way of making sense of such a position, making clear that the approach here is invitational and exploratory rather than commanding. We can begin by pointing out that there is a general question of how we are to comprehend the limits of nature, and that once we have resisted the assumption that these limits are to be comprehended in exclusively scientific terms, there are questions of how far we can go, whether there is any scope for moving in a theistic direction, and whether we haven't already made this move by virtue of acknowledging a level of moral and spiritual awareness.” “...these questions are not closed off at the outset by the imposition of a framework which excludes theism.”

¹⁷ Hans Halvorson, “Does the Universe need God?” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDwpTcSEjak. The example is given of a lecture in an upper level mathematics course and a student asks where does God fit into this universe? The response is that if the principles and methodology of mathematics are followed then God is not a variable that is included in the equation. This illustrates the false understanding of God as a competitive source of meaning within scientific/naturalistic disciplines.

¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles Book 2, Chapter 4: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus (THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN CONSIDER CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS): “The philosopher considers such things as belong to them by nature—the upward tendency of fire, for example; the believer, only such things as belong to them according as they are related to God—the fact, for instance, that they are created by God, are subject to Him, and so on.” “But any things concerning creatures that are considered in common by the philosopher and the believer are conveyed through different principles in each case. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things; the believer, from the first cause … ” “Hence again, the two kinds of teaching do not follow the same order. For in the teaching of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures; the last, of God.” https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles2.htm#4

¹⁹ Thomas Aquinas, On being and essence. “78. Now, if we posit a thing which is existence alone, such that this existence is subsistent, this existence will not receive the addition of a difference because it would no longer be existence alone, but existence plus some form. And much less will it receive the addition of matter because it would no longer be a subsistent existence, but a material existence. Whence it remains that such a thing, which is its own existence, cannot be but one. 80. And because every thing which exists by virtue of another is led back, as to its first cause, to that which exists by virtue of itself, it is necessary that there be some thing which is the cause of the existence of all things because it is existence alone. … It is clear, therefore, that an intelligence is form and existence, and that it has existence from the First Being, which is existence alone. And this is the First Cause, which is God.” https://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/DeEnte&Essentia.htm

²⁰ Velde, Rudi Te, Aquinas on God; The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae New York: Routledge Press, 2006), pp. 37-9. “Throughout history, the Five Ways have received widely different interpretations and evaluations. To some, they belong to the most valuable of Thomas’ contributions to philosophy … to others they may be regarded as nothing more than a preliminary clarification of what the notion of ‘God’ stands for in the context of Christian faith. The significance to be attached to the demonstration of God's existence in the context of the Scientia of faith is a matter of discussion. One can say that, mostly, the arguments of the Five Ways are approached from a distinctly philosophical viewpoint … Recently, however, one sees in the literature a growing awareness of the place and the role of the Five Ways within the theological project of Thomas’ Summa. … I want to argue in this chapter that the question as to whether God exists is first and foremost a matter of finding an access (via) to the intelligibility of God. The real issue for Thomas is not whether God exists as a matter of fact, or even whether we may consider ourselves rationally justified in believing that God exists. His focus is in a certain sense not epistemological at all; … What Thomas is looking for is not so much rational certainty as intelligibility, to wit the intelligibility of the truth expressed and asserted by the proposition ‘God exists.’”

²¹ Summa contra Gentiles, ibid.

²² SCG, ibid. For example, the philosopher discusses the nature of human language and arrives at conclusions based on the evidence of experience in a method similar to the empirical scientist. If the theologian is considering language then she argues from God as the cause of meaning, perhaps relating it to the use of Logos in the Gospel of John.

²³ Ellis, Fiona, “Why I am not an atheist; room for God in naturalism.” The Philosopher's Magazine (2014), 40.

²⁴ Ellis, Fiona, God, Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 204. See ft. 22; it might be possible to argue for a parallel between Te Velde's criteria of intelligibility and Ellis's idea on intellectually respectable.

²⁵ SCG.

²⁶ SCG.

²⁷ SCG.

²⁸ Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae; Questions on God. Davies, Brian and Leftow, Brian, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24-27. Compare with a different translation and it becomes clear that Thomas is addressing the different concepts: things in nature and nature itself.: “Objection 2: Moreover, anything that can be caused by few principles is not caused by many. But it seems that we can fully account for everything we observe in the world while assuming that God does not exist. Thus we explain natural effects by natural causes, and intentional effects by human reasoning and will. So, there is no need to accept that God exists. Reply Objection 2: Since nature acts for definite ends under the direction of a higher cause, its effects must be traced to God as the first of all causes. Similarly, even things done intentionally must be traced back to a higher cause than human reasoning and will, for these are changeable and lacking. And, as I have said, we must trace all such things back to a first cause that cannot change and is intrinsically necessary.” https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2OUTP1

²⁹ SCG.

³⁰ Simply speaking, the methodology and principles of mathematical disciplines do not consider mathematics as an abstracted whole.

³¹ This immediately raises the concern that as Fiona Ellis says, “we must consider what follows on a proper understanding of the idea that God is the source of nature.” God, Value, and Nature, 115.