Harmful acts are punished more often and more harshly than harmful omissions. This asymmetry has variously been ascribed to differences in how individuals perceive the causal responsibility of acts versus omissions and to social norms that tend to proscribe acts more frequently than omissions. This paper examines both of these hypotheses, in conjunction with a new hypothesis: that acts are punished more than omissions because it is usually more efficient to do so. In typical settings, harms occur as a result of relatively few harmful actions, but many individuals may have had the opportunity to prevent or rectify the harm. Penalising actors therefore requires relatively few punishment events compared to punishing omitters. We employ a novel group paradigm in which harm occurs only if both actors and omitters contribute to the harm. Subjects play a repeated economic game in fixed groups involving a social dilemma (total N = 580): on each round self-interest favours harmful actions (taking from another) and harmful omissions (failing to repair the victim’s loss), but the group payoff is maximized if individuals refrain from these behaviors. In one treatment harm occurs as a result of one action and two omissions; in the other, it is the result of two actions and one omission. In the second treatment, the more efficient strategy to maximize group benefit is to punish omissions. We find that subjects continue to prefer to punish acts rather than omissions, with two important caveats. There is still a substantial level of punishment of omissions, and there is also evidence of some responsiveness to the opportunity to enforce a more efficient rule. Further analysis addresses whether the omission effect is associated with asymmetric norm-based attitudes: a substantial proportion of subjects regard it as equally fair to punish harmful acts and omissions, while another portion endorse an asymmetry; and punishment behavior correlates with these attitudes in both groups.

Online experiments have become a valuable research tool for researchers interested in the processes underlying cooperation. Typically, online experiments are asynchronous, participants complete an experiment individually and are matched with partners after data collection has been completed. We conducted a registered report to compare asynchronous and synchronous designs, where participants interact and receive feedback in real-time. We investigated how two features of synchronous designs, pre-decision matching and immediate feedback, influence cooperation in the prisoners dilemma. We hypothesized that 1) pre-decision matching (assigning participants to specific interaction partners before they make decisions) would lead to decreased social distance and increased cooperation; 2) immediate feedback would reduce feelings of aversive uncertainty and lead to increased cooperation; and 3) individuals with prosocial Social Value Orientations would be more sensitive to the differences between synchronous and asynchronous designs. We found no support for these hypotheses. In our study (N = 1,238), pre-decision matching and immediate feedback had no significant effects on cooperative behavior or perceptions of the interaction; and their effects on cooperation were not significantly moderated by Social Value Orientation. The present results suggest that synchronous designs have little effect on cooperation in online social dilemma experiments.

This paper introduces the Hierarchical Mindreading Model (HMM), a new model of mindreading in two-person, mixed-motive games such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The HMM proposes that the strategies available to decision makers in these games can be classified on a hierarchy according to the type of mindreading involved. At Level 0 of the HMM, there is no attempt to infer the intentions of the other player from any of the context-specific information (i.e., signals, payoffs, or partner reliability). At Level 1, decision makers rely on signals to infer the other’s intention, without considering the possibility that those signals might not reflect the other’s true intention. Finally, in Level 2 strategies, decision makers infer the other player’s intended choice by integrating information contained in their signals with the apparent reliability of the other participant and/or the game’s payoffs. The implications of the HMM were tested across four studies involving 962 participants, with results consistently indicating the presence of strategies from all three levels of the HMM’s hierarchy.

People need to take others’ perspectives into account in order to successfully coordinate their actions and optimally allocate limited resources like time, attention, or space. And yet, people often face frequent, but avoidable, coordination failures in the form of wait times, crowding, and unavailability of desirable options. Such poor coordination suggests that the necessary perspective taking (i.e., considering the likely motivations and behavior of others) may be either inadequate or incorrect. The current research suggests that coordination in such situations is frequently unsuccessful, not because people try to take others’ perspectives and are mistaken, but because they neglect to consider those perspectives sufficiently in the first place. Six experiments across a range of limited-resource contexts (e.g., choosing when to visit a store, stream on a limited bandwidth service, go to a popular vacation location, etc.) find that encouraging decision makers to consider what others might do and why they might do it can ameliorate such coordination problems. We further demonstrate a boundary condition: in situations where people’s motivations are inherently obvious, decision makers are naturally able to coordinate without an explicit nudge to perspective take. This research sheds light on a unique class of coordination problems in which people must consider others’ motivations without directly communicating with them, and provides theoretical and practical contributions with the potential to ameliorate common coordination failures.

In the face of economic inequalities, redistribution of wealth is a key debate for society, and understanding the reasons why individuals may support more or less redistribution can inform this debate. Here we investigate the mechanisms by which experiencing success in a task decreases the support for redistribution of the wealth generated by the task, such that overachievers favor less redistribution than underachievers. In a laboratory experiment, we replicate this effect and explore how it that may be mediatedby an in-group bias, or by changes in individuals’ principles of redistributive justice. Critically, both in-group favoritism and self-serving adjustments of justice principles partially accounted for the effect of status on redistribution choices. Our study thus sheds new light on the various ways by which economic experience affects support for redistribution.

Disgust is a cross-culturally recognized emotion that is characterized by avoidant or cautious tendencies. Accordingly, greater sensitivity to disgust may be related to less willingness to take risks. Relatively little research has examined the association between disgust sensitivity and risk-taking propensity. Further, no research to date has taken a domain specific approach to understanding the association between these constructs. Across two studies (N1=98, N2=390) and a mini-meta analysis utilizing two additional datasets (total N=1981), we assessed the extent to which domain specific disgust sensitivity (i.e., Pathogen, Sexual, and Moral) were related to domain specific risk-taking propensity (i.e., Social, Recreational, Health/Safety, Ethical, and Financial). We conducted two cross-sectional studies, with a community and a student sample. Participants completed surveys that included measures of disgust sensitivity and risk-taking propensity. Bivariate correlations across the two studies indicated that greater disgust sensitivity was related to lower risk-taking propensity across almost all domains. However, when controlling for covariance among the disgust sensitivity domains, regression analyses suggested variability in the association between disgust sensitivity and risk-taking propensity depending on domains. Based on mini meta-analysis, sexual disgust sensitivity had the strongest relationships with social risk-taking propensity and health/safety risk-taking propensity, and moral disgust sensitivity had the strongest relationship with ethical risk-taking propensity. These findings suggest the presence of domain specific relations between disgust sensitivity and risk-taking propensity. The domain specific focus may help in utilizing disgust as a factor to decrease certain risky behaviors (e.g., moral disgust for decreasing plagiarism).

When people are given quantified information (e.g., ‘there is a 60% chance of rain’), the format of quantifiers (i.e., numerical: ‘a 60% chance’ vs. verbal: ‘it is likely’) might affect their decisions. Previous studies with indirect cues of judgements and decisions (e.g., response times, decision outcomes) give inconsistent findings that could support either a more intuitive process for verbal than numerical quantifiers or a greater focus on the context (e.g., rain) for verbal than numerical quantifiers. We used two pre-registered eye-tracking experiments (n(1) = 148, n(2) = 133) to investigate decision-making processes with verbal and numerical quantifiers. Participants evaluated multiple verbally or numerically quantified nutrition labels (Experiment 1) and weather forecasts (Experiment 2) with different context valence (positive or negative), and quantities (‘low’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’ in Experiment 1 and ‘possible’, ‘likely’, or ‘very likely’ in Experiment 2) presented in a fully within-subjects design. Participants looked longer at verbal than numerical quantifiers, and longer at the contextual information with verbal quantifiers. Quantifier format also affected judgements and decisions: in Experiment 1, participants judged positive labels to be better in the verbal compared to the equivalent numerical condition (and to be worse for negative labels). In Experiment 2, participants decided on rain protection more for a verbal forecast of rain than the equivalent numerical forecast. The results fit the explanation that verbal quantifiers put more focus on the informational context than do numerical quantifiers, rather than prompting more intuitive decisions.

Time preference reversal refers to systematic inconsistencies between preferences and bids for intertemporal options. From the two eye-tracking studies (N1 = 60, N2 = 110), we examined the underlying mechanisms of time preference reversal. We replicated the reversal effect in which individuals facing a pair of intertemporal options choose the smaller-sooner option but assign a higher value to the larger-later one. Results revealed that the mean fixation duration and the proportion of gaze time on the outcome attribute varied across the choice and bid tasks. In addition, time preference reversals correlated with individual differences in maximizing tendencies. Findings support the contingent weighting hypothesis and strategy compatibility hypothesis and allow for improved theoretical understanding of the potential mechanisms and processes involved in time preference reversals.

We investigate the manual selection of numbers by lottery participants,with a database consisting of over 800 million selections from 118 consecutive draws of the national lottery in Israel. Our findings replicate results from prior research and introduce novel discoveries.(1) Preference for, and avoidance of, specific numbers 1 through 37 are consistent throughout all the drawings. Strong, but differing preferences are observed in the selection of the “power” number ranging from 1 to 7. (2) The number of guesses entered per draw correlates with the size of the prize, with each additional million in prize money generating 33,000 additional manual guesses. (3) Number preferences are strongly influenced by their location on the form. Numbers in the first of the four horizontal rows are consistently the most popular, while numbers in the fourth rows are consistently unpopular. (4) As the number of guesses increases, popularly chosen numbers tend to become slightly less popular, while unpopular numbers tend to become less unpopular.

In this paper, we examined two pairs of datasets from selected Nigerian lottery games to determine players’ number preferences. Data explorations were conducted in the first pair of datasets to identify patterns in players’ choices of lottery numbers. The question whether players preferred number combinations that are well-spread out regardless of their true theoretical probabilities was examined in the second pair. In the first pair of datasets, we find that most players have a preference for small numbers especially 1 and 9. They also prefer numbers with repeated digits and tend to avoid multiples of 7 and numbers containing 7 (except 7 and 77). The most popular numbers are 90 and 1. In the second pair of the datasets, more than 50% of the players preferred selecting well-spread out number combinations than expected by chance.

A standard way to elicit expectations asks for the percentage chance an event will occur. Previous research demonstrates noise in reported percentages. The current research models a bias; a five percentage point change in reported probabilities implies a larger change in beliefs at certain points in the probability distribution. One contribution of my model is that it can parse bias in beliefs from biases in reports. I reconsider age and gender differences in Subjective Survival Probabilities (SSPs). These are generally interpreted as differences in survival beliefs, e.g., that males are more optimistic than females and older respondents are more optimistic than younger respondents. These demographic differences (in the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing) can be entirely explained by reporting bias. Older respondents are no more optimistic than younger respondents and males are no more optimistic than females. Similarly, in forecasting, information is obscured by taking reported percentages at face value. Accounting for reporting bias thus better exploits the private information contained in reports. Relative to a face-value specification, a specification that does this delivers improved forecasts of mortality events, raising the pseudo R-squared from less than 3 percent to over 6 percent.

We conducted three experiments to investigate the effects of physical and psychological pains on intertemporal choices. In Experiments 1 and 2, physical pain was induced by the self-created Shiatsu sheet treading method (SSTM) and the classical cold pressor task (CPT), respectively. In Experiment 3, psychological pain was induced by the video induction method. All types of pain increased preference for smaller immediate rewards. Theoretical implications and practical implications are discussed.