This paper is about the Asante perception and understanding of Asante history as expressed in the apae or ‘praise songs’ of Asantehene (King of the Asante) Osei Tutu Kwame, known as Osei Bonsu (1804–23). As such, it offers an indigenous portrait of kingship and the expectations and behaviours attaching to it in Asante thought. The core of the paper is centred on the role of Osei Tutu Kwame as a leader in war, against the Fante of the southern Gold Coast in 1806–07 and against the Abron of Gyaman (today in the eastern Côte d'Ivoire) in 1818–19. Both campaigns are interpreted from the point of view of Asante thinking about their own historical goals and understandings, and of the fit and proper role of an Asantehene in such matters. Throughout, extensive oral historical materials are used in conjunction with the apae, and a rich range of European sources are deployed as a counterpoint. The paper's claim to originality is that it offers an Asante view, at once intellectual and ideological, of their own constructions of their past and of the nature of their history as they themselves chose to understand it.

While from the sixteenth to the early twentieth century there was a lasting and elastic demand for slaves in Central Africa, the practices by which they were acquired had to be adapted to the physical and human terrain, the technologies available and the socio-cultural postures of the predator and prey societies. In this paper, I sketch the changing patterns of these variables in six slaving zones in and around the northern Mandara Mountains. Using historical sources, information from the diary of Hamman Yaji, a Fulani chief and active slaver, and data gathered in the course of ethnographic research in three of these zones by myself and colleagues, I show that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the extraction of slaves from particular sub-regions within these zones was highly variable, as is evident in the interfaces between the decentralized prey societies and the predatory states. Besides providing fresh perspectives on slaving and evidence for evaluating the constructions of historians, such studies open the way for research on the mutual accommodations to slaving affecting the societies and cultures of both prey and predators.

Homologous origin myths concerning the Tsodilo Hills in north-western Botswana, Polombwe hill at the southern tip of Lake Tanganyika in Zambia and Kaphiri-Ntiwa hill in northern Malawi are examined. Parallels are drawn between the myths, where, in the process of creation, a primal pair in undifferentiated space and time passes through a series of liminal states, thereby bringing structure to the landscape and legitimacy to society in Iron Age Central and Southern Africa. These myths narrate the instituting of social legitimacy in their respective societies based on a resolution of the inherent contradiction between the concepts of authority and power, lineage and land. The structure of rights to possession of land is examined, and the text considers the role of sumptuary goods such as glass beads and metonymic signifiers such as birds within this structure. This study examines the prominence of hilltops as the residence of paranormal power and its association with human authority, and relates this to the archaeological interpretation of the Iron Age site Nqoma (Tsodilo Hills); this is compared with Bosutswe (eastern Botswana), Mapungubwe (Shashe-Limpopo basin), and the Shona Mwari myth recorded by Frobenius as used by Huffman in his analysis of Great Zimbabwe.

This article explores how the state police in Mozambique tried to (re)encroach upon a former war zone and what their methods implied for state authority more generally. Post-war reform efforts to professionalize the police in accordance with the rule of law and human rights have had apparently paradoxical results. This is in part because efforts to constitute state authority have relied on both embracing and taming ‘tradition’ as an alternative domain of authority, order and law. Ethnographic fieldwork at police stations shows that the police increasingly handle witchcraft cases and spiritual problems. This, the article argues, does not only reflect a tension between local/customary and state/legal notions of order and justice. Equally significant is the existence of partial sovereignties. A spiritual idiom of power and evildoing constitutes an alternative articulation of sovereignty due to the capacity of invisible forces to give and take life. This is an idiom mastered by chiefs and healers. Police officers engage with invisible forces to gain popular legitimacy and manifest state power, and yet they never manage to fully master those forces. Consequently, state police authority remains uncertain, and must be continually reinforced by enacting hierarchies and jurisdictional boundaries and by using force.

The implementation of community policing schemes and development programmes targeting street youth in inner city Addis Ababa, intended to prevent crime and unrest, has resulted in an expansion of structures of political mobilization and surveillance of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the party that has ruled the country since 1991. Yet the fact that the government managed to implement its programmes does not imply that the ruling party was entirely successful in tackling ordinary crime as well as political dissent. As neighbourhoods continued to be insecure, especially at night, the efficacy of the ruling party's politicized narratives on community policing and crime prevention was questioned. An appreciation of the shortcomings of government action on the streets of the inner city raises questions about the extent of the reach of the EPRDF's state into the grass roots of urban society as well as about the ways in which dissent is voiced in a context where forms of political surveillance and control are expanding. This paper investigates these issues in order to contribute to the study of the Ethiopian state and to the broader debate on community policing and crime prevention on the African continent.

Nigeria is one of three countries where polio continues to be endemic. In northern Nigeria, areas with low levels of polio immunization due to persistent parental opposition as well as implementation and infrastructural problems have contributed to wild poliovirus transmission. Furthermore, political violence associated with Islamic groups opposed to the federal government has also hampered the conclusion of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) efforts. This violence, which began in Borno State and has spread to other parts of northern Nigeria, occurs precisely where poliovirus transmission continues. These two related aspects – parallel dilemmas of low immunization and political violence – confound the conclusion of GPEI efforts in Nigeria. This situation also raises ethical questions both about the final stages of eradication efforts and about military actions to contain ongoing violence. The Nigerian government's attempts to suppress opposition to the polio eradication campaign by threatening non-compliant parents with arrest and by closing down media outlets may frighten some parents into compliance but can also breed resentment and resistance, just as military and police activities, such as house-to-house sweeps and widespread arrests, may encourage sympathy for Islamic insurgents. This situation suggests that the possible solution of one problem – the ending of wild poliovirus transmission – depends upon a solution of the other, i.e. the cessation of violent anti-government activities.