Building on Herbert Simon’s critique of rational choice theory, Schwartz et al. (2002) proposed that when making choices, some individuals — maximizers — search extensively through many alternatives with the goal of making the best choice, whereas others — satisficers — search only until they identify an option that meets their standards, which they then choose. They developed the Maximization Scale (MS) to measure individual differences in maximization, and a substantial amount of research has now examined maximization using the MS, painting a picture of maximizers that is generally negative. Recently, however, several researchers have criticized the MS, and almost a dozen new measures of maximization have now been published, resulting in a befuddling and contradictory literature. We seek to clarify the confusing literature on the measurement of maximization to help make sense of the existing findings and to facilitate future research. We begin by briefly summarizing the understanding of maximizers that has emerged through research using Schwartz et al.’s MS. We then review the literature on the measurement of maximization, attempting to identify the similarities and differences among the 11 published measures of maximization. Next, we propose a two-component model of maximization, outlining our view of how maximization should be conceptualized and measured. Our model posits that maximization is best understood as the pursuit of the maximization goal of choosing the best option through the maximization strategy of alternative search; other constructs such as decision difficulty and regret are best considered outcomes or causes — rather than components — of maximization. We discuss the implications of our review and model for research on maximization, highlighting what we see as pressing unanswered questions and important directions for future investigations.

People frequently underestimate the time needed to complete tasks and we examined a strategy – known as backward planning – that may counteract this optimistic bias. Backward planning involves starting a plan at the end goal and then working through required steps in reverse-chronological order, and is commonly advocated by practitioners as a tool for developing realistic plans and projections. We conducted four experiments to test effects on completion time predictions and related cognitive processes. Participants planned for a task in one of three directions (backward, forward, or unspecified) and predicted when it would be finished. As hypothesized, predicted completion times were longer (Studies 1–4) and thus less biased (Study 4) in the backward condition than in the forward and unspecified conditions. Process measures suggested that backward planning may increase attention to situational factors that delay progress (e.g., obstacles, interruptions, competing demands), elicit novel planning insights, and alter the conceptualization of time.

We propose that in strategic interactions a player is influenced by self-similarity. Self-similarity means that a player who chooses some action X tends to believe, to a greater extent than a player who chooses a different action, that other players will also choose action X. To demonstrate this phenomenon, we analyze the actions and the reported beliefs of players in a two-player two-action symmetric game. The game has the feature that for “materialistic” players, who wish to maximize their own payoff, there should be negative correlation between players’ actions and the beliefs that they assign to their opponent choosing the same action. We first elicit participants’ preferences over the outcomes of the game, and identify a large group of materialistic players. We then ask participants to choose an action in the game and report their beliefs. The reported beliefs of materialistic players are positively correlated with their actions, i.e., they are more likely to choose an action the stronger is their belief that their opponent will also choose the same action. We view this pattern as evidence for the presence of self-similarity.

Although post-error slowing and the “hot hand” (streaks of good performance) are both types of sequential dependencies arising from the differential influence of success and failure, they have not previously been studied together. We bring together these two streams of research in a task where difficulty can be controlled by participants delaying their decisions, and where responses required a degree deliberation, and so are relatively slow. We compared performance of unpaid participants against paid participants who were rewarded differentially, with higher reward for better performance. In contrast to most previous results, we found no post-error slowing for paid or unpaid participants. For the unpaid group, we found post-error speeding and a hot hand, even though the hot hand is typically considered a fallacy. Our results suggest that the effect of success and failure on subsequent performance may differ substantially with task characteristics and demands. We also found payment affected post-error performance; financially rewarding successful performance led to a more cautious approach following errors, whereas unrewarded performance led to recklessness following errors.

Prospect Theory predicts that people tend to be more risk seeking if their reference point is perceived as a loss and more risk averse when the reference point is perceived as a gain. In line with this prediction, Franken, Georgieva, Muris and Dijksterhuis (2006) showed that young adults who had a prior experience of monetary gains make more safe choices on subsequent decisions than subjects who had an early experience of losses. There are no experimental studies on how experiencing prior gains and losses differently influences young and older adults on a subsequent decision-making task (the Iowa Gambling Task). Hence, in the current paper, adapting the methodology employed by Franken et al.’s (2006), we intended to test the generality of their effect across the life span. Overall, we found that subjects who experienced prior monetary gains or prior monetary losses did not display significant differences in safe/risky choices on subsequent performance in the Iowa Gambling task. Furthermore, the impact of prior gains and losses on risky/safe card selection did not significantly differ between young and older adults. These results showed that the effect found in the Franken et al.’s study (2006) is limited in its generality.

We examined the effect of perceptions of advantage and disadvantage on the variability and stability of efficacy beliefs in a competition. Perceptions of advantageous or disadvantageous opening position were experimentally manipulated (keeping the actual positions equal) and pre- and post-competition efficacy beliefs were observed. Perceiving an advantage resulted in more variability and less stability in efficacy beliefs. These results are explained by the higher sensitivity of the advantaged to the experiences of the competition.