One of the most significant recent trends in global trade governance has been the increasing use of regulatory “reliance” arrangements as a significant element of trade alliances. Against this backdrop, an important set of questions are raised about how existing institutions of global trade governance – especially the World Trade Organization and international regulatory standards organisations – should respond. To what extent, and how, should such institutions facilitate reliance arrangements? And what role can they usefully play in overseeing and guiding their use? This paper begins to answer these questions through a focused case study of regulatory reliance in the agrifood sector. Four challenges are identified regarding the implementation of such arrangements: the high costs of establishment and maintenance; the lack of agreed and reliable assessment methodologies; the potential for arbitrary discrimination between trade partners; and the difficulties of dealing with regulatory change over time. In light of these challenges, the paper assesses the work of existing international organisations in governing reliance arrangements in the agrifood sector. The paper concludes with a number of preliminary suggestions as to how this architecture of global governance might be supplemented or harnessed to address some of the challenges posed by reliance arrangements.

This paper describes how the development of texts on regulatory deference by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) addresses relevant recommendations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and supports Member countries of CAC in their negotiation and implementation of equivalence agreements. We consider the role and function of CAC within a rules-based multilateral framework, particularly in relation to the development and implementation of equivalence concepts. We then consider whether, through use of equivalence agreements, trade facilitation outcomes have been realised. Our hypothesis is that international standards on regulatory deference promote fair but aspirational standards and support fair practices in the trade of safe food – both vital outcomes for global food security and the achievement of many of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. We test this hypothesis against the framework provided by decisions of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee. We argue that the equivalence concepts and guidelines developed by CAC are appropriate but underutilised tools available for Member countries to strike a balance between their right to regulate to protect human, animal or plant life and health and to fulfil legitimate objectives whilst meeting their WTO obligations to avoid measures that constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.

A financial services supplier authorised in its home state that wishes to supply services cross-border into another state will, absent any relief, have in addition to meet the regulatory requirements of that host state to trade in it. Regulatory frictions including duplicative regulatory requirements are barriers to cross-border trade. This article considers certain techniques deployed to reduce such barriers, noting that trust plays a part in many of them. These techniques grant relief to incoming firms from obligations to comply with the regulatory requirements of a host state. They may take the form of unilateral arrangements, with or without any conditions. There may be assessments of equivalence as a basis for relief from compliance with the host state’s rules: deference to the home state’s regime, a basis for recognition, whether unilateral or mutual. Recognition may be given effect through a party’s domestic laws or in international law under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article VII. A GATS Article VII agreement can relieve regulatory frictions in the financial services sector alone as there is no requirement for “substantial sectoral coverage” as required for regional trade agreements under GATS Article V. Mutual recognition agreements for financial services in international law are, however, few in number.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is not only increasingly being used in business and administration contexts, but a race for its regulation is also underway, with the European Union (EU) spearheading the efforts. Contrary to existing literature, this article suggests that the most far-reaching and effective EU rules for AI applications in the digital economy will not be contained in the proposed AI Act, but in the Digital Markets Act (DMA). We analyse the impact of the DMA and related EU acts on AI models and underlying data across four key areas: disclosure requirements; the regulation of AI training data; access rules; and the regime for fair rankings. We demonstrate that fairness, under the DMA, goes beyond traditionally protected categories of non-discrimination law on which scholarship at the intersection of AI and law has focused on. Rather, we draw on competition law and the FRAND criteria known from intellectual property law to interpret and refine the DMA provisions on fair rankings. Moreover, we show how, based on Court of Justice of the European Union jurisprudence, a coherent interpretation of the concept of non-discrimination in both traditional non-discrimination and competition law may be found. The final section sketches out proposals for a comprehensive framework of transparency, access and fairness under the DMA and beyond.

Previous research has neglected how repeated declarations of states of emergency (SsoE) in response to the same emergency may combine with executive overreach and underreach within a single jurisdiction, undermining the authority of the SsoE as a legal institution and increasing the vulnerability of the constitutional system as a result. This article examines how decision-makers’ commitment to a culture of justification is central to avoiding emergency mismanagement via underreach, overreach or their combination. The simultaneous instances of executive overreach and underreach as emergency management failures are studied via the Slovak case, which was celebrated for its initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic but castigated for its failure to contain the subsequent waves. The analysis of the legal framework of the SsoE and the justifications for SsoE declarations uncovers the lack of justifications for the patterns of simultaneous executive underreach and overreach, underscoring the elusiveness of these categories. The limited justifications for the decisions demonstrated by the “government in panic” point to the undermining of the SsoE as a legal institution. The article concludes with highlighting how leaders’ role conceptions as democratic emergency managers might be necessary to sustain the authority of the SsoE.

Water stress is a growing concern in Europe, partly due to the changing climate context. Despite the cross-cutting impacts that water availability has on different areas under the competence of the European Union (EU), there is not currently a comprehensive and systematic legal framework addressing this issue. The purpose of this article is therefore to examine the EU legislation that concerns the measures aimed at mitigating these risks. To this purpose, it is first examined how droughts and water scarcity are framed within EU legal acts. Based on such an overview, the analysis is directed to the mechanisms developed at the EU level for monitoring, identifying and forecasting water stress risks, as well as the legal provisions relating to the planning tools. The remainder of the article is devoted to the regulation of preventative measures for water scarcity and drought risk reduction, following the water hierarchy resulting from COM(2007) 414.

Today, there are a dozen labelling schemes pertaining to farm animal welfare in at least seven Member States. Despite the proliferation of animal welfare labels, European Union rules on food information to consumers concerning the treatment of farmed animals used in animal-source food production remain fragmented and incomplete. On the one hand, the rules contained in agricultural regulations primarily aim to harmonise marketing standards, but only for some products. On the other hand, consumer protection rules aim to protect consumers from misleading commercial claims but not misleading claims about animal treatment specifically. After examining the situation that has led to the proliferation of animal welfare food labels in the European Union, this article analyses the animal welfare food labelling landscape and presents different regulatory pathways to best harmonise consumer information on farm animal welfare.

No matter how good a smart device may be, it remains useless outside the context of a digital ecosystem. Internet of Things (IoT) environments are possible as long as services and products can interconnect smoothly and exchange data in real time. Therefore, interoperability ranks high in global policy agendas, with the promise of bringing an end to network effects slanted in favour of ecosystem orchestrators. However, recent regulatory initiatives introducing interoperability obligations risk falling short of their intent or even risk generating unintended consequences in the absence of a coherent approach to standardisation. Against this backdrop, focusing on the UK Open Banking experience, this article makes a proposal for workable interoperability in IoT ecosystems aimed at ensuring market contestability without undermining incentives to innovate.

Since the EU Directive (EC) No 128/2009 (SUD) was approved by the European Parliament, the establishment of a general framework aimed at securing the sustainable use of pesticides was laid down, and European Union (EU) Member States adopted National Action Plans in accordance with this Directive. Specifically, for EU Member States, pesticides, objectives and quantitative targets were created. Therefore, the EU Commission provided a methodology for risk assessment as the derivation of two harmonised risk indicators: HRI_1 and HRI_2. The present study focuses on HRI_1, as this can be implemented at the country level. Each EU Member State delivers annual harmonised risk indicators values to the Commission based on calculations using their own data and results. However, only the EU Commission can derive this HRI_1 (concatenated) indicator at the EU level. Therefore, the present study is an attempt to shed some light on the modus operandi used by the EU Commission to compile this HRI_1, and it also aims to clarify these calculations. Data originating from twenty-seven EU Member States were analysed. These data were compared to data published on the EU Commission website over time. Possible virtual developments including the modification and evolution of active substance statuses are envisaged.

On 8 June 2023, the European Commission published a long-awaited proposal for the establishment of an interinstitutional ethics body, meant to restore the public’s faith in the European Union’s administration following the Qatargate corruption scandal. Alas, the Commission’s proposal outlines a body that lacks investigative and sanctioning powers, has minimal administrative capacity and for the most part relies on the institution’s own policing. Put simply, it falls short of the promises made by the Commission’s President in her 2019 political guidelines, and much shorter of what was expected as a remedy to the European Union’s recent ethics-related scandals. In this short piece, we reflect on the Commission’s proposal for an inter-institutional ethics body in light of the overall ethics framework in the Union and provide a brief analysis of the Commission’s missed opportunity and of what could have been.

The purpose of this contribution is to briefly present the content of the EU–US Data Privacy Framework recently adopted by the European Commission and then to assess whether it meets the expectations expressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Schrems II judgment and related case law.

The Hague District Court in the Netherlands faced a novel tort law issue in 2021 in Milieudefensie et al v Royal Dutch Shell plc – namely, whether Shell is liable in tort for the reduction costs of carbon dioxide produced in the end use of energy-carrying Shell products. The civil lawsuit aims to make Shell (re)search for adequate substitutes so as to enable Shell’s customers to reduce their consumption of energy-carrying Shell products. It is argued here that Shell’s liability should be assessed within Guido Calabresi’s “cheapest cost avoider” framework.