Bilateral security and defence cooperation towards third states amid institutional disintegration

The framework stipulates a flow of causes from the perceptions of individual allies (independent variables) towards the features that characterise their bilateral relations (intervening variables) resulting in trilateral relations, or the two allies’ common policy towards a third state (dependent variable). The framework is summarised in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Theoretical framework on persistence of bilateral security and defence cooperation towards third states.

Dependent variable: The framework's dependent variable is the extent of bilateral security cooperation between two states towards a third state.Footnote ³⁰ This manifests itself as the common pursuit to ameliorate threats stemming from a third state. I distinguish three constitutive elements of such security cooperation – common goals, strategies, and efforts (see below). Bilateral cooperation can be embedded in multilateral institutions and shared identities. States can be in multiple alignments with each other that can vary in their formality, strength, and function. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States are formally allied via NATO and a set of (other) formal international agreements. At the same time, they are informally aligned via their long-standing ‘special relationship’.Footnote ³¹ Overall alignment consists of all formal and informal alignment ties between two states. Henceforth, and if not specified otherwise, alliance and alignment is defined in this overall, aggregated, and bilateral sense.Footnote ³² A bilateral alliance is ‘multilaterally embedded’ when two states share strong alignment ties which are, in part, based on shared membership in a wider alliance, but transcend this multilateral alliance via additional bilateral links.Footnote ³³

The framework further defines and disaggregates effective security cooperation towards third states into three constitutive elements.Footnote ³⁴ First, common goals: both states will give high priority in their policymaking and diplomatic attention to the threat towards which the alliance is designed. Second, common strategies: both states will largely agree on the means and strategies employed to counter the threat. Third, common efforts: both states will accord significant and similar degrees of effort (proportional to their capabilities) to counter the threat. In the presence of all these components, an alliance is active and effective. If either of these factors is weak or absent, an alliance will either lack a common purpose, a common approach, or meaningfully shared efforts and therefore be ineffective with regards to its original purpose.

Core assumptions: The causal framework rests on three basic assumptions. First, states generally act according to instrumental and embedded rationality. This means that, given their goals, perceptions, available information, and security culture, they will try to employ those strategies and means that they perceive to ensure their goals most effectively.Footnote ³⁵ Second, states always seek to achieve a modicum of ‘security’, meaning a low probability that their values – political autonomy, people, territory, and resources – will be destroyed, extorted, or their use coerced in any way.Footnote ³⁶ Note that this is a wider notion of security than that deployed in most realist accounts and allows for variation of what counts as security across states.Footnote ³⁷ Third, security cooperation always entails some costs, be it material, reputational, or in terms of freedom of action.Footnote ³⁸ Hence, when states enter alliances or remain within them, they calculate that doing so will provide them with some benefits.

Causal logic, mechanisms, and intervening variables: With security being an important state goal, security cooperation is conceptualised here as the effect of two states’ individual preference to jointly deal with threatening third states.Footnote ³⁹ Consequently, the framework posits that bilateral security cooperation toward third states persists across time when the two allies continuously perceive the third state as a threat, when they expect that the other ally would support them against this threat, and when they view each other as capable of giving meaningful support in such a situation. The strength of security cooperation is hence determined by an interaction of three features of the two allies’ bilateral relations: common threats, mutual utility, and mutual reliability.Footnote ⁴⁰ Insofar as ongoing processes of normative and institutional disintegration do not affect these variables, security cooperation should persist.

The first factor underlying effective and persistent alliances, shared threat perceptions, has long been considered a core determinant of the strength and persistence of alliances, notwithstanding disagreements among theorists on the exact determinants of threat perception and securitisation.Footnote ⁴¹ Common threats solidify alliance strength because they focus the attention and efforts of both allies on a single third actor. In such a scenario, bargaining among allies is not about whether, but how to contain the third actor, and collective action problems are minimised. Consequently, given mutual utility and reliability, the higher the threat is that the third state presents simultaneously for both states, the stronger and more durable can the alliance be.

The second factor underpinning alliance strength and persistence is a shared sense of mutual reliability.Footnote ⁴² Given sufficiently severe common threats and mutual utility, mutual reliability bolsters an alliance by providing states with a sense that they can count on their allies to receive significant help against the common threat. Absent such a sentiment, there would be no point in keeping up a costly alliance. The third factor underlying alliance strength is mutual utility. Given significant common threats and mutual reliability, states will maintain stronger alignment ties when they are able to significantly help each other in addressing their respective security concerns.Footnote ⁴³ Absent mutual utility, at least one state would calculate that the costs of the alliance exceed its expected benefits, which would weaken and ultimately render obsolete the alliance with regards to the third actor.

Independent variables: Footnote ⁴⁴ Three sets of independent variables reflect the perceptions of individual allies towards one another and towards the third state in question. Each intervening variable at the level of bilateral relations between the allies is determined by the lowest value of the constituent independent variables at the level of the individual ally. For example, the sense of mutual reliability between two allies will only be as high as the individual sense of reliability that the least trusting ally has of the other.

Operative perceptions about the degree to which another state represents a threat or a capable and reliable ally derive from interactions between the perceptual predispositions of the perceiving security elites and past behaviour of the other state in question.Footnote ⁴⁵ Most directly, such operative perceptions manifest empirically in a democratic state's foundational documents and the views of members of its security elite (see section on methods and data). The first independent variable, threat perceptions, increases when another actor exhibits a behavioural pattern that is processed as a sign of harmful intentions and is perceived to be capable of carrying out future harm. A state's sense of an ally's reliability, the second variable, increases when the ally, in past interactions, was perceived to have shown costly solidarity to the state in question or to the multilateral alliance in which the state is also a member. If the ally is perceived to have abstained from solidarity or even aggravated threats by its actions, it will be deemed a less reliable partner.

The third independent variable, a state's sense of an ally's utility, derives from perceptions about what the ally could do to ameliorate the threat stemming from the third state.Footnote ⁴⁶ Such an ability has two major components: the ally's own capabilities to increase resilience, weaken offensive capabilities of the third state, deter and disincentivise aggression; and the ally's ability to mobilise other states and cause them to ameliorate the threat. The next section will lay out how to operationalise these variables and measure them in the case of UK-German security cooperation towards Russia.

Methods and data

The analysis distinguishes three periods, or cases, according to variations in the independent and dependent variables:Footnote ⁴⁷ the period between Putin's ascent to power in 2000 up to the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the period before the Brexit referendum from 2014 to 2016, and a post-referendum period from 2016 to mid-2019. The following three sections provide analytical narratives for each period, organised around the framework's variables.

To apply and test the framework, two methods are employed. First, using structured and focused comparison, the article conducts a hoop test on the validity of the framework. If the values on the variables do not correspond with the correlations predicted by the framework, its validity would be disconfirmed.Footnote ⁴⁸ The comparison also serves to probe the validity of the rivalling pessimist views, which claim that the Brexit process weakened the common Russia policy. If the Russia policy would persist or even strengthen, the validity of pessimist views would be disconfirmed. Second, using congruence analysis, the article also assembles trace evidence to test the framework. Following Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, mechanisms are systems that transmit causal force from candidate causes, via entities engaging in activities, to produce an outcome.Footnote ⁴⁹ Hence, when relevant data is available, we should find trace evidence that transmits causal force from individual perceptions of threat, reliability, and utility towards the goals, strategies and efforts that comprise the common Russia policy of the United Kingdom and Germany. Finding evidence for such traces of the causal mechanism, especially when it has a high level of uniqueness and certainty, can strongly confirm or disconfirm the validity of the causal framework.Footnote ⁵⁰

As for measurements and data, primary sources are used where available. This includes original data from novel analysis of foundational policy documents on security and defence matters as well as interviews with British, German, and Russian top policymakers and experts involved in track II diplomacy.Footnote ⁵¹ The assurance of anonymity reduced interviewees’ incentives to misrepresent and allowed the interviewees to speak more freely about the regnant perceptions in their respective state apparatus. Conversely, the public and politicised nature of foundational policy documents in democracies indicates a close alignment between professed and actual perceptions, goals, and visions, as contradictions in rhetoric and action can undermine the government and empower its political opponents. This primary evidence is then triangulated with secondary sources, such as area studies, newspaper articles, and expert commentaries on the direction, intent, and intensity of the respective country's Russia policy. To minimise the danger of confirmation bias, three major bodies of research comparing the security and Russia policies of the United Kingdom and Germany were surveyed for evidence and arguments disconfirming the framework's validity.Footnote ⁵² The analytical narratives include and discuss all data points that could be argued to disconfirm the framework. As for confirming evidence, due to space constraints, only the most unique and certain evidence was included.

The elements of the common UK-German Russia policy – common goals, strategies, and efforts – are derived from the declared priorities in the respective country's foundational national security policy documents, and from interviews of practitioners involved in the formation and execution of their respective country's Russia policy. Threat perceptions are derived from foundational security documents and public statements of high-ranking politicians and state officials. If a third state is not named as a threat, this is not evidence of a lack of threat perception. However, due to the adverse diplomatic and domestic ramifications, publicly naming a third state as a threat is fairly robust evidence for the sincerity of the pronouncement.

Due to its high reputational costs and limited political value, foreign and security elites will rarely call a formally allied state ‘unreliable’, even if they feel this is the case. Consequently, direct evidence of unreliability is often not available. However, it is usually politically expedient to communicate a sense of strong reliability if there is one. Consequently, evidence for reliability was deduced from foundational security documents, interviews with practitioners, and public pronouncements of high-ranking politicians. Indirect evidence can be inferred from the past actions of allies: perceived acts of solidarity in the past attest to perceived reliability in the present, and a perceived lack of solidarity, let alone harmful behaviour, attests to a perceived lack of reliability in the present.

Two main indicators are used to establish the perceived utility of an ally. The first is the ally's material capabilities, such as disposable wealth, military equipment, and personnel.Footnote ⁵³ Material capabilities often represent the direct ability to help an ally by, for example, aiding its economy via foreign aid or bolstering its army via discounted and fast-tracked weapon sales. They can also aid an ally's security in indirect ways, such as rendering a capable ally more potentially dangerous to the third state and thus serving as a deterrent. Evidence for material capabilities are taken from the Military Balance database and from assessments by military experts and practitioners.

The second indicator for perceived utility is the ally's influence and leverage over other states, its institutional and soft power.Footnote ⁵⁴ States can use their good standing with other prospective allies to strengthen the coalition against the third state; they can also use a good standing with the threatening state to disincentivise aggression. Such influence is particularly important when only the ally holds such influence over the threatening state or capable potential allies. This also relates to relative influence in international institutions. The ability to mobilise members of such institutions and shape the policies of their members can be a major asset in addressing security challenges. Evidence for institutional and soft power is taken from expert assessments and evaluations from practitioners.

Setting the stage: Disunity on Russia before the Ukraine crisis

Overall assessment: Before 2014, Germany and the United Kingdom perceived each other as capable allies whose help in any contingency would be crucial. However, the United Kingdom regarded Russia as a significant threat, while Germany did not. This caused multiple situations that revealed a lack of mutual reliability between the two. In accordance with the theoretical framework, these diverging threat perceptions and a lacking sense of reliability resulted in a persistently weak common Russia policy.

Shared threat perceptions: The United Kingdom has perceived Russia as a potential threat well before the 2014 Ukraine crisis. In 2009, the House of Commons Defence Committee stated Russia could be a threat to Europe, although it did not deem Russia a ‘direct existential threat’ to the United Kingdom.Footnote ⁵⁵ In stark contrast, German security culture and construction of the Russian other permitted Russia's actions to be seen in a salvageable and even benign light.Footnote ⁵⁶ The German Ministry of Defence's Weißbuch of 2006, the only foundational document in this period exclusively designed to lay out German security and defence policy, comprises 165 pages, naming Russia 19 times, always in connection with the need and ongoing process of establishing and deepening security cooperation.Footnote ⁵⁷ There are no statements of Russia posing a threat in Europe.

Mutual reliability: Germany and the United Kingdom shared thick and long-lasting ties via the EU and NATO. However, these formal and institutional ties were not underpinned with shared threat perceptions, let alone a consensus on what would constitute a situation in which the two partners would aid each other vis-à-vis Russia. This resulted in cooperation failures and a subsequent lack of perceived reliability on both sides. For example, in 2006, a diplomatic crisis erupted between London and Moscow when former KGB/FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, who had been granted British asylum and had alleged crimes against the Putin administration, was assassinated. London expelled four Russian diplomats, put restrictions on Russian visas and stopped counterterrorist cooperation. In return, the British ambassador in Moscow was harassed by youth groups close to the government. The EU, including Germany, showed only lukewarm solidarity with London.Footnote ⁵⁸

Mutual utility: To each other, the United Kingdom and Germany represented a major potential help in security contingencies involving Russia, due to their formidable power resources, which, apart from the United Kingdom's influence in the EU, persist throughout the whole period under investigation. In terms of institutional and soft power, both countries have major diplomatic clout in world affairs and the influential role they play in virtually every consequential international institution give them the ability to organise joint opposition against or support for other states. Both are members of the G7 and the G20, command a dense global network of embassies and consulates, and hold significant voting shares in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The United Kingdom also holds a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and maintains a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, which, notwithstanding its questionable status as a security provider in Europe, remains by far the most powerful state on the globe.Footnote ⁵⁹ On the other hand, Germany's comparatively good relations with Russia and the formidable trade and energy ties between the two countries gave Germany some leverage in dealing with Russia.Footnote ⁶⁰

Material capabilities added to the United Kingdom's and Germany's mutual sense of utility, as the 2012 rows in Figure 2 illustrate. Shortly before the Ukraine crisis, the two countries’ nominal GDP and military expenditure far exceeded that of Russia and their combined population equalled it. Taken together, the United Kingdom and Germany were able to field about half of what Russia could have fielded in terms of overall military personnel, main battle tanks, tactical aircraft, and combat ships. While the United Kingdom spent significantly more than Germany on defence, the average share of these indicators is more or less equal. On top of this, the United Kingdom commands a significant nuclear deterrent, as its Trident force can fire submarine-launched nuclear missiles at strategic and substrategic targets. This includes four sophisticated submarine launched delivery systems with Moscow as their informal target.Footnote ⁶¹ Adding further utility is Germany's formidable economy, which by far exceeded that of both the United Kingdom and Russia.

Figure 2. Russian, British, and German material capabilities, absolute numbers and ratio of combined UK-German capabilities as share of Russian capabilities, 2012, 2015, 2018.

Note: Data from the Military Balance Dataset.Footnote ⁶² Ratio percentages are calculated by the author and represent the combined quantity of the United Kingdom and Germany in a given category and year as a percentage of that of Russia. GDP and military expenditure are in nominal rates and lagged one year. Note that nominal values likely undervalue Russian military expenditure due to its lower domestic prices of labour and goods.Footnote ⁶³ Similarly, the slump in Russian GDP between 2015 and 2018 is largely due to rising exchange rates. Only active military personnel and main battle tanks are included. Combat ships comprise cruisers, frigates, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and tactical submarines.

Common Russia policy: While both allies were officially committed to ensuring the security of fellow NATO and EU members as well as supporting democracy and human rights, the United Kingdom and Germany pursued largely dissimilar goals towards Russia, which caused them to adopt different strategies and employ their resources in different ways. This sometimes brought the United Kingdom and Germany into public opposition with each other. When Russia sought to quell Chechen separatism in the North Caucasus, committing gross human rights abuses in the process, the United Kingdom granted asylum to Chechen leader Akhmad Zakayev in 2003, and refused to extradite him to Russia.Footnote ⁶⁴ Germany, meanwhile, was reluctant to even criticise Russian conduct in Chechnya.Footnote ⁶⁵ In 2008, the United Kingdom lobbied towards granting Georgia and Ukraine a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), a policy strongly advocated by the United States and sharply resisted by Moscow.Footnote ⁶⁶ Germany, alongside France, opposed the Action Plan, again siding with Russia.Footnote ⁶⁷

The United Kingdom has traditionally taken an assertive and securitised approach towards Russia, usually siding with the United States when it came to condemning Russian actions.Footnote ⁶⁸ It has often used sanctions, sharp rhetoric, and international forums to curb Russia's influence, promote democracy and civil rights within Russia and deter Russian aggression. The 1999 Kosovo crisis, the 2003 Iraq War, the Libya intervention in 2011, the ongoing Syrian civil war – on all of these issues, the United Kingdom and the United States have taken a joint position and were met with fierce Russian opposition in the UN.Footnote ⁶⁹ The United Kingdom, in 2010, took the lead in forming the so-called Northern Group, which provides a forum for security and defence cooperation and includes all northern states proximate to Russia. This group includes even states that are not members of NATO, like Sweden and Finland, but also Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.Footnote ⁷⁰

Compared to the United Kingdom, Germany had pursued markedly different goals towards Russia, using significantly different strategies. Germany has long been perceived in the EU as a ‘lawyer of Russian interests’.Footnote ⁷¹ Starting in the early 2000s and bolstered by a genuine friendship between German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russo-German economic relations received plenty of political attention and support, with trade growing rapidly between the two countries.Footnote ⁷² This was undergirded with high-level symbols of cordiality and intensified intersocietal exchanges.Footnote ⁷³ For example, in 2001, Putin gave a very well-received speech to the German parliament, using the German language throughout the whole oration.Footnote ⁷⁴ When Angela Merkel became Chancellor in 2005, the political rhetoric towards Russia cooled, but Germany's actual policy towards Russia did not undergo major changes.Footnote ⁷⁵

Germany had long sought to further desecuritise relations with Russia, choosing economic and societal engagement over diplomatic and military assertion.Footnote ⁷⁶ Indeed, Germany strongly supported Russia in international forums, pushing Russia into the G7 (transforming it into the G8). Germany also opted to postpone its own G8 chairmanship to allow Russia to chair the group in 2006.Footnote ⁷⁷ In 2008, new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier packaged and upgraded several bilateral projects into a ‘Modernization Partnership’.Footnote ⁷⁸ After the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, Germany was quick to support French President and President of the European Council Nicolas Sarkozy in mediating between Georgia and Russia (with Sarkozy basically freezing in Russian gains).Footnote ⁷⁹ Germany sought to return quickly to business as usual.Footnote ⁸⁰ While public rhetoric cooled over the start of Putin's controversial third presidential term and human rights violations in Russia,Footnote ⁸¹ no major policy change occurred.

In line with its multilateral security culture, Germany had long sought to maintain a common EU and NATO approach towards Russia and has, at times, refrained from vetoing more assertive policies towards Russia to this end. Examples include Germany's acceptance of suspending the NATO-Russia Council after the Russo-Georgian WarFootnote ⁸² and uploading its ‘Modernization Partnership’ to the European level.Footnote ⁸³ However, this policy has been circumscribed when Germany saw national interests on the line. For example, and most prominently, Germany has resisted attempts to decrease economic links with Russia, especially in the energy sector.Footnote ⁸⁴ The Nord Stream pipeline projects, directly connecting Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea, have been considered a grave security threat by the Baltics and Poland. Nonetheless, Germany continued to pursue these projects, both under Chancellors Schröder and Merkel.Footnote ⁸⁵

The Ukraine shock: Convergence after 2014

Overall assessment: Due to Russian conduct in Ukraine since 2014, including the occupation of Crimea, support for fighters in Donbas, and its conduct surrounding the downing of the Malaysian plane MH17, German threat perceptions towards Russia changed rapidly and converged with those of the United Kingdom. Both states signalled their mutual reliability by stating that they would support and advance assertive policies towards Russia, invoking a common European identity and using both NATO and EU structures in the process. Mutual utility persisted at a high level, as their relative material and institutional capabilities had remained virtually unchanged. Congruent with the theoretical framework, the converging threat perceptions and increasing sense of mutual reliability brought forth a much more united and assertive common Russia policy.

Shared threat perceptions: For the United Kingdom, the Ukraine crisis confirmed pre-existing threat perceptions towards Russia. In Britain's National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015, Russia's conduct since 2010 is called ‘more aggressive, authoritarian, and nationalist’.Footnote ⁸⁶ The document also referred implicitly to Russia's recent aggressions in Ukraine: ‘Recent changes in the international security context remind us that we cannot relax our guard. We cannot rule out further shifts which would put us, or our NATO Allies, under grave threat.’Footnote ⁸⁷

With the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Germany's comparatively optimistic and non-securitised perception of Russia transformed into one of threat and pessimism, converging rapidly towards that of the United Kingdom. High-ranking German diplomats working on Russia and Eastern Europe attest that German threat perceptions towards Russia have risen significantly since 2014.Footnote ⁸⁸ This is also evinced by the provisions of the 2016 Weißbuch.Footnote ⁸⁹ In the document, Russia and its policies, as well as the methods of hybrid war, are perceived as ‘a threat to the European peace order [europäische Friedensordnung]’, with significant consequences for security in Europe and therewith [und damit auch] also for Germany's own security.Footnote ⁹⁰

Mutual reliability: With the start of the Ukraine crisis, Germany and the United Kingdom increasingly perceived each other as reliable partners, as common identities and institutional ties were now frequently invoked and utilised to enact new common policies towards Russia. Before the crisis, the Russia policy within both NATO and the EU represented little more than an abstract, formal, and declarative consensus. This changed with the crisis, where both institutions became platforms for assertive and unified policies as well as the focal point for expressions of unity and solidarity,Footnote ⁹¹ with the United Kingdom calling Russia a threat to NATO allies, and Germany denoting it as a threat to the European peace order (see shared threat perceptions).

Mutual utility: Mutual utility remained at a comparatively high level. Institutional and soft power assets as well as the ratio of material capabilities between the United Kingdom and Germany remained virtually unchanged, as did their combined weight as compared to that of Russia (see Figure 2, row 2015).

Common Russia policy: From 2014 onwards, the Ukraine crisis caused significant convergence between British and German goals, strategies and efforts towards Russia. This was mainly a result of Germany's goals, strategies, and efforts aligning with those of the United Kingdom. Most notably, both states were instrumental proponents and contributors to a series of NATO policies that condemned and punished Russian aggression while aiming to increase deterrence of future Russian incursions. The United Kingdom agreed to send combat troops to Estonia and act as a leader and framework nation for other NATO allies in Estonia.Footnote ⁹² Germany, for its part, took the unprecedented move and pledged to contribute NATO combat troops as tripwire forces in Lithuania to deter and defend against Russian aggression.Footnote ⁹³

The United Kingdom and Germany were also crucial supporters of new and assertive EU actions towards Russia. Due to its traditionally Russia-friendly policy, its formidable influence within the EU, and its economic clout, Germany was also an instrumental driving force behind bringing about, toughening, and maintaining sanctions against Russia.Footnote ⁹⁴ Since their introduction on 31 July 2014, EU sanctions have been repeatedly renewed and strengthened before and after the Brexit referendum. These sanctions and the ensuing Russian countersanctions have harmed both the German and UK economy. Simultaneously, major financial and energy sanctions were precluded, with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Russia protecting their respective core economic interests and accepting that their counterparts did so as well.Footnote ⁹⁵

Analogous to its changing perceptions, Germany took a much more assertive and securitised approach towards Russia, while retaining its long-standing emphasis on multilateral action. High-ranking German officials involved in the formation of Germany's Russia policy characterise the changes in Germany's Russia policy since 2014 as a ‘paradigm shift’.Footnote ⁹⁶ Having been its most ardent proponent in the past, Germany now supported Russia's expulsion from the G8 and the suspension of Russian voting rights in the Council of Europe.Footnote ⁹⁷ Russian decision-makers and experts were strongly dismayed by this German conduct and the traditionally cordial rhetoric between the two countries deteriorated.Footnote ⁹⁸

This policy convergence on Russia since 2014 has also caused a shift in how the Russian foreign and security elite views the United Kingdom and Germany, with the former being perceived as a continuously aggressive proxy of a hegemonic United States, and the latter as a less and less reliable mediator between the supposedly aggressive United States and Russia.Footnote ⁹⁹

Security cooperation did not strengthen in all areas. Germany retained some elements of its traditional Russia policy and did not abandon all measures of engagement. For example, Germany, and its traditional ally France, were instrumental in bringing about the Minsk accords and the Normandie process, which was favoured by Russia and disliked by Ukraine. The United Kingdom did not become a part of the Normandy format. However, British and German policymakers report a high degree of policy coordination with London and neither side saw the United Kingdom's abstention as an act of exclusion.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ The 2016 Weißpapier of the German Armed Forces urged the facilitation of ‘cooperative security’ and ‘sectoral collaboration’ with Russia.Footnote ¹⁰¹ The 2 per cent NATO Wales Summit target, although agreed upon, was ambiguously perceived in the German political establishment. Nonetheless, since 2014, defence spending in Germany has steadily increased.Footnote ¹⁰²

Protecting the new consensus during the Brexit process

Overall assessment: After the 2016 Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom and Germany continued to jointly perceive Russia as a major threat to their own security and that of their allies, mainly due to Russia's conduct towards Ukraine. Mutual reliability had increased, as both sides had observed the other asserting common values and interests towards Russia in the immediate aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. With the Brexit referendum, mutual utility also increased, as Germany prospectively gained more relative influence in the EU, just as the United Kingdom did within NATO. In accordance with the theoretical framework, this rise in mutual reliability and utility strengthened the common Russia policy of the United Kingdom and Germany, despite of the corrosive effects that other processes endogenous to Brexit might have had.

Shared threat perceptions: British and German threat perceptions remained largely unchanged and continued to be mostly congruent. In its National Security Capability Review of March 2018, the United Kingdom again stressed the ‘resurgence of state-based threats’ and gave as the first and most prominent example a ‘well-established pattern of Russian State aggression’.Footnote ¹⁰³ The 2018 German Governmental Coalition Agreement echoed the 2016 Weißbuch statement that through ‘the annexation and its involvement in Eastern Ukraine, Russia violates the European peace order [europäische Friedensordnung]’.Footnote ¹⁰⁴

Mutual reliability: Two lines of evidence attest to a rising sense of mutual reliability between the two allies. Both were corroborated by British and German officials working closely on relations with Russia.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ First, in rhetoric, spending, and action, both sides increased their efforts within NATO. The United Kingdom in particular has always had the reputation and declared policy of preferring NATO over EU frameworks as the core instrument of military security in Europe.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Right after the referendum, outgoing British Prime Minister David Cameron pledged at a NATO summit that the United Kingdom would keep its commitment to European security even after leaving the EU.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ During the same time period, British Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, with reference to British NATO deployments to Estonia, stated that, ‘[NATO] is the cornerstone of our defence … we'll be doing more in [NATO] to compensate for our withdrawal from the EU. That's the purpose of the deployment we're announcing today.’Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Since the referendum, the United Kingdom has also repeatedly restated its commitment to use its nuclear Trident forces to protect NATO allies.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

Germany also renewed and increased its NATO commitment, sending combat troops to Lithuania. In the 2018 Coalition Agreement, the signatories stated that ‘NATO remains an indispensable guarantor and is the foundation of our security. Germany is and will remain a reliable partner in the alliance. We want to strengthen the European contribution to the transatlantic partnership and we are committed to closer cooperation between NATO and the EU. … Germany will continue to make an appropriate contribution to the preservation of the alliance's deterrence and defence capabilities and to a strong European defence.’Footnote ¹¹⁰

Second, mutual reliability since the referendum has been solidified through mutual symbolic reassurances and new forms of British-German security cooperation. The United Kingdom aimed to quickly negotiate a hitherto unprecedentedly comprehensive security and defence deal with the EU.Footnote ¹¹¹ It also sought additional institutional frameworks outside of the EU and NATO to pursue its Russia policy. Since 2016, British decision-makers repeatedly stressed the firm commitment to Northern security frameworks.Footnote ¹¹² In September 2017, the United Kingdom explicitly reiterated its security commitments to the Nordic countries.Footnote ¹¹³ In June 2018, the United Kingdom joined the European Intervention Initiative (EII) along with Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Spain, Portugal, and France, which had spearheaded the project. The EII works outside EU as well as NATO frameworks and aims at ensuring coordination among national armed forces and rapid reactions in critical situations.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Signalling its commitment to UK security, Germany expelled four Russian diplomats over the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in 2018. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas declared this to be an act of solidarity to the United Kingdom. While the United States and Ukraine expelled more Russian diplomats over the Skripal case, many EU member states expelled fewer, while, notably, Italy and Austria expelled none.Footnote ¹¹⁵ This stands in stark contrast to the EU's and Germany's lukewarm reaction to the UK-Russian confrontation over the Litvinenko assassinations in 2006 (see section 4, reliability).

Mutual utility: After the referendum, perceived utility between the United Kingdom and Germany rose. This is mostly due to an increase in perceived soft and institutional power. The United Kingdom's prospective exit from the EU entailed that the relative influence of the EU and its members within NATO would weaken, while that of non-EU powers would rise even more. With the United Kingdom, NATO's two most militarily capable states will not be EU-members. As the build-up of EU ‘Strategic Autonomy’ is at most a future project and bedazzled with many structural problems,Footnote ¹¹⁶ good relations to the United Kingdom, as a non-EU member and due to its ‘special relationship’ with the United States, becomes more important, especially for a multilaterally oriented actor such as Germany. With the prospective exit of the United Kingdom from the EU, Germany's already towering influence within the EU is bound to increase even further.Footnote ¹¹⁷ This comes at a time where Italy and France face economic problems and political infighting, further pronouncing Germany's role within the EU. The EU commands considerable economic power and influence in the world, which renders good relations with Germany a major foreign and security policy asset for the United Kingdom.

Rising mutual utility is evinced by the constant and determined diplomatic overtures by both sides to quickly form supplementary UK-EU ties in the security area to compensate for Brexit, with explicit references to the need to cooperate towards Russia.Footnote ¹¹⁸ On 5 October 2018, UK Secretary of Defence Gavin Williamson joined his German counterpart Ursula von der Leyen in Minden, where they signed a ‘Joint Vision Statement’. This bilateral declaration on closer cooperation in security and defence policy was intended to provide the framework for further joint projects, such as improving the interoperability of the two armed forces, deepening cooperation in the development of capabilities, as well as more joint training and exercises.Footnote ¹¹⁹

While the mutually perceived soft and institutional power rose, perceptions of utility stemming from material capabilities remained steady. Across the main indicators, overall material capabilities of the United Kingdom and Germany decreased somewhat from 2015 to 2018. However, the combined weight of the United Kingdom's and Germany's material capabilities towards those of Russia remained basically unchanged, as did their relative share in the aggregate across these indicators (see Figure 2, rows 2015 and 2018).

Common Russia policy: The Brexit referendum did not negatively affect the UK-German Russia policy in any significant and measurable way. Most importantly, the Russian foreign and security elite does not seem to believe that the Brexit process caused a weakening of the UK-German Russia policy.Footnote ¹²⁰ Furthermore, the language in the foundational security documents about the goals towards Russia on both sides continued to be highly similar, which suggests active coordination preceding the formulation of them. The EU Global Strategy of 2016, which was drafted before the referendum and released right after it, stated that ‘[managing] the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge. A consistent and united approach must remain the cornerstone of EU policy towards Russia.’Footnote ¹²¹ On 2 March 2017, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FCO) released a paper on the United Kingdom's relations with Russia that featured an assessment that matched the EU Global Strategy:

Strategies and efforts towards Russia remained similar or converged even further after the Brexit referendum. Sanctions against Russia were routinely supported by both the United KingdomFootnote ¹²³ and Germany and consequently renewed every half year. Both sides sought to prevent a weakening of sanctions in the absence of Russian compliance on the Minsk agreements. A 2017 UK House of Commons report stated that withdrawal of the existing sanctions should be linked to Russian compliance with its obligations toward Ukraine, and should not be offered in exchange for Russian co-operation in other areas.Footnote ¹²⁴ Similarly, in 2018, the new Federal Coalition Agreement of Germany's ruling parties stated that cancellation of the main package of sanctions should be contingent on Russia implementing the Minsk Agreements.Footnote ¹²⁵ Both documents emphasised the need to maintain a unified front amid the ongoing political turbulence in Europe, with the British one explicitly stating that the common Russia policy should be insulated as far as possible from the ongoing Brexit negotiations. The United Kingdom has also since undertaken steps to impose additional unilateral sanctions on Russian individuals involved in gross human rights abuses.Footnote ¹²⁶ The United Kingdom is also actively assessing how to pursue sanctions (hitherto couched in an EU framework) after a finalised Brexit.Footnote ¹²⁷

Both the United Kingdom and Germany have increased their efforts to cooperate towards Russia in the context of NATO. In 2017, Operation Enhanced Forward Presence started in the Baltics.Footnote ¹²⁸ The United Kingdom provides most combat troops and acts as lead nation in Estonia, with Germany doing the same in Lithuania. NATO, under general secretary Jens Stoltenberg, has sharply condemned Russian deployments of intermediate missiles and its conduct in the Kerch strait in late 2018.Footnote ¹²⁹ This also reflects an underlying unity of the NATO members, which include most of the old EU member states as well as the United Kingdom and Germany.Footnote ¹³⁰

Despite this ongoing convergence, some elements of Germany's Russia policy remain at odds with that of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom remained outside the Normandy Group. In the first half of 2018, the German federal government coordinated the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and resisted numerous attempts from EU and NATO partners to stop construction.Footnote ¹³¹

Brexit, Russia, and cooperation persistence amid institutional disintegration

Figure 3 gives an overview of how the actual strength of UK-German security cooperation towards Russia over time relates to the predictions on correlations derived from the theoretical framework and the rivalling pessimist positions. Values are arrived at by drawing on the analytical narratives and comparing relative differences across time and countries. For example, German threat perception towards Russia rose significantly due to Russian actions towards Ukraine since 2014 and became virtually indistinguishable with that of the United Kingdom, rising from ‘low’ before 2014 to ‘high’ thereafter. While the various pessimist positions simply predict a weakening common Russia policy after 2016, the framework predicts that the strength of the common Russia policy will correlate with the lowest value on either of the three intervening variables in a given period. The common Russia policy was weak and ineffectual before 2014. It gained strength with the start of the Ukraine crisis, and became even more unified and assertive after the Brexit referendum, even though some possible elements of a more robust Russia policy remained unrealised, such as Germany agreeing to extend sanctions to the gas sector, or the United Kingdom inserting itself in the Minsk process. Overall, the permutations of the variables disconfirm pessimist positions and corroborate the theoretical framework.

Figure 3. Hoop test results. Determinants and nature of the common UK-German Russia policy from 2000 to mid-2019.

The balance of trace-evidence listed in the analytical narratives further corroborates the framework's validity and indicates that the correctly predicted correlations in Figure 3 reflect the causal mechanisms stipulated by the framework. While evidence was not available to test for the causal mechanisms in all conceivable instances, no decisive disconfirming evidence was found, while corroborating evidence was abundant. The divergence in German and British goals, strategies, and efforts towards Russia before the start of the Ukraine crisis can be directly traced to dissimilar perceptions, with the United Kingdom perceiving Russia as a threat to be guarded against, while Germany saw Russia largely as a misunderstood security partner in the making. The Ukraine crisis, measurably and drastically, changed the German threat calculus, as not even Germany's pacifistic and civilian security culture allowed a benign interpretation of Russian behaviour. Both the United Kingdom and Germany started to use NATO and the EU as platforms to guard against future Russian aggression, thereby inadvertently signalling commitment and reliability to each other. With the Brexit referendum, these converging threat perceptions and increasing sense of mutual reliability was met with a rising sense of mutual utility due to the now more prominent roles that Germany would play in the EU and the United Kingdom within NATO.

Combined, these findings demonstrate that proposed mechanisms of normative and institutional disintegration did not measurably diminish continued security cooperation towards Russia. Rather, amid time-consuming and partially hostile negotiations during the Brexit process, trace evidence indicates that both the United Kingdom and Germany took active steps to insulate and protect the common Russia policy from these effects due to threat perceptions towards Russia and mutual perceptions of utility and reliability (see the subsection on the common Russia policy in the preceding section).