I develop a semantics for imperatives within the truthmaker framework by taking the meaning of an imperative to be given by the actions that are in compliance with or in contravention to the imperative.

I extend the previously given truth-maker semantics and logic for imperatives to deontic statements.

The deviation of mathematical proof—proof in mathematical practice—from the ideal of formal proof—proof in formal logic—has led many philosophers of mathematics to reconsider the commonly accepted view according to which the notion of formal proof provides an accurate descriptive account of mathematical proof. This, in turn, has motivated a search for alternative accounts of mathematical proof purporting to be more faithful to the reality of mathematical practice. Yet, in order to develop and evaluate such alternative accounts, it appears as a necessary prerequisite to first possess a clear picture of what the deviation of mathematical proof from formal proof consists in. The present work aims to contribute building such a picture by investigating the relation between the elementary steps of deduction constituting the two types of proofs—mathematical inference and logical inference. Many claims have been made in the literature regarding the relation between mathematical inference and logical inference, most of them stating that the former is lacking properties that are constitutive of the latter. Such differentiating claims are, however, usually put forward without a clear conception of the properties occurring in them, and are generally considered to be immediately justified by our direct acquaintance, or phenomenological experience, with the two types of inferences. The present study purports to advance our understanding of the relation between mathematical inference and logical inference by developing a detailed philosophical analysis of the differentiating claims, that is, an analysis of the meaning of the differentiating claims—through the properties that occur in them—as well as the reasons that support them. To this end, we provide at the outset a representative list of the different properties of logical inference that have occurred in the differentiating claims, and we notice that they all boil down to the three properties of formality, generality, and mechanicality. For each one of these properties, our analysis proceeds in two steps: we first provide precise conceptual characterizations of the different ways logical inference has been said to be formal, general, and mechanical, in the philosophical and logical literature on formal proof; we then examine why mathematical inference does not appear to be formal, general, and mechanical, for the different variations of these notions identified. Our study results in a precise conceptual apparatus for expressing and discussing the properties differentiating mathematical inference from logical inference, and provides a first inventory of the various reasons supporting the observations of those differences. The differentiating claims constitute thus a set of data that any philosophical account of mathematical inference and proof purporting to be more faithful to mathematical practice ought to be able to accommodate and explain.

This article discusses how to update one’s credences based on evidence that has initial probability 0. I advance a diachronic norm, Kolmogorov Conditionalization, that governs credal reallocation in many such learning scenarios. The norm is based upon Kolmogorov’s theory of conditional probability. I prove a Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov Conditionalization. The two theorems establish Kolmogorov Conditionalization as the unique credal reallocation rule that avoids a sure loss in the relevant learning scenarios.

The logic of Conditional Beliefs (CDL) has been introduced by Board, Baltag, and Smets to reason about knowledge and revisable beliefs in a multi-agent setting. In this article both the semantics and the proof theory for this logic are studied. First, a natural semantics for CDL is defined in terms of neighbourhood models, a multi-agent generalisation of Lewis’ spheres models, and it is shown that the axiomatization of CDL is sound and complete with respect to this semantics. Second, it is shown that the neighbourhood semantics is equivalent to the original one defined in terms of plausibility models, by means of a direct correspondence between the two types of models. On the basis of neighbourhood semantics, a labelled sequent calculus for CDL is obtained. The calculus has strong proof-theoretic properties, in particular admissibility of contraction and cut, and it provides a decision procedure for the logic. Furthermore, its semantic completeness is used to obtain a constructive proof of the finite model property of the logic. Finally, it is shown that other doxastic operators can be easily captured within neighbourhood semantics. This fact provides further evidence of the naturalness of neighbourhood semantics for the analysis of epistemic/doxastic notions.

Abstract algebraic logic is a theory that provides general tools for the algebraic study of arbitrary propositional logics. According to this theory, every logic ${\cal L}$ is associated with a matrix semantics $Mo{d^{\rm{*}}}{\cal L}$. This article is a contribution to the systematic study of the so-called truth sets of the matrices in $Mo{d^{\rm{*}}}{\cal L}$. In particular, we show that the fact that the truth sets of $Mo{d^{\rm{*}}}{\cal L}$ can be defined by means of equations with universally quantified parameters is captured by an order-theoretic property of the Leibniz operator restricted to deductive filters of ${\cal L}$. This result was previously known for equational definability without parameters. Similarly, it was known that the truth sets of $Mo{d^{\rm{*}}}{\cal L}$ are implicitly definable if and only if the Leibniz operator is injective on deductive filters of ${\cal L}$ over every algebra. However, it was an open problem whether the injectivity of the Leibniz operator transfers from the theories of ${\cal L}$ to its deductive filters over arbitrary algebras. We show that this is the case for logics expressed in a countable language, and that it need not be true in general. Finally we consider an intermediate condition on the truth sets in $Mo{d^{\rm{*}}}{\cal L}$ that corresponds to the order-reflection of the Leibniz operator.

In two recent articles, Norihiro Kamide introduces unusual variants of Nelson’s paraconsistent logic and its classical extension. Kamide’s systems, IP and CP, are unusual insofar as double negations in these logics behave as intuitionistic and classical negations, respectively. In this article we present Hilbert-style axiomatizations of both IP and CP. The axiom system for IP is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a four-valued Kripke semantics, and the axiom system for CP is characterized by four-valued truth tables. Moreover, we note some properties of IP and CP, and emphasize that these logics are unusual also because they are contra-classical and inconsistent but nontrivial. We point out that Kamide’s approach exemplifies a general method for obtaining contra-classical logics, and we briefly speculate about a linguistic application of Kamide’s logics.