Nationalism and voter turnout

Based on social identity theory (Tajfel Reference Tajfel1981), prior studies demonstrate that national pride increases turnout. First, some scholars suggest that, because national pride is psychological attachment to one's nation, it can facilitate the acquisition of values and norms of the nation-state. Thus, in democracies where voter turnout is considered a desirable virtue and a sign of good citizenship (Conover, Searing, and Crewe Reference Conover, Searing and Crewe2004), citizens with higher levels of national pride are more likely to have values related to political participation, because stronger attachment to a group leads to greater acceptance of norms and modes of in-group members' behavior (Terry, Hogg, and White Reference Terry, Hogg and White1999). Second, other scholars provide a different rationale for the positive relationship between national pride and political participation. For example, Hur (Reference Hur2022) argues that the effect of national pride on voter turnout depends on the degree to which the political community (state) and national community (nation) coincide. Because psychological attachment to a nation-state can raise intrinsic and ethical commitment, higher levels of national pride in democracies with strong nation–state linkage can be expressed as democratic political attitudes and behavior including civic duty to vote, actual participation in voting, tax payment, and military service.

However, the two strands of literature above have assumed that national pride is a one-dimensional concept, ignoring its diverse characteristics. This implies that their studies might offer limited explanations as to what aspect of national pride affects voter turnout and what mechanisms are at work. In criticizing the single-dimensional approach, some scholars differentiate subtypes of national pride (Bonikowski and DiMaggio Reference Bonikowski and DiMaggio2016; Powers Reference Powers2022; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine Reference Schatz, Staub and Lavine1999; Wright, Citrin, and Wand Reference Wright, Citrin and Wand2012). Among them, Schatz and his colleagues (Reference Schatz, Staub and Lavine1999) divide national pride into constructive and blind types. Because their fundamental differences can lead to different attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, the division can help answer the question of how and why each part or type of national pride is differently related to political participation.

First, because constructive national pride is associated with the attitudes and values of democracy and universalism (Davidov Reference Davidov2009; Kosterman and Feshbach Reference Kosterman and Feshbach1989; Livi et al. Reference Livi, Leone, Falgares and Lombardo2014; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine Reference Schatz, Staub and Lavine1999), those with higher levels of constructive national pride are likely to be interested in the way that healthy democracy works in their country. They can increase political psychological resources, such as political interests, efficacy, and political knowledge, which in turn may produce active voters. Second, in contrast, because blind national pride is related to chauvinism, it tends to idealize one's country both unconditionally and uncritically. Moreover, prior studies find that it is positively associated with anti-democratic values, such as right-wing authoritarianism, a tendency toward social dominance, traditional and pre-modern values, discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants, and even xenophobia (Finell and Zogmaister Reference Finell and Zogmaister2015; Livi et al. Reference Livi, Leone, Falgares and Lombardo2014; Peña and Sidanius Reference Peña and Sidanius2002; Sekerdej and Roccas Reference Sekerdej and Roccas2016). Due to the lack of incentives to keep an eye on the operation of healthy democracy, those with higher levels of blind national pride are likely to exhibit lower levels of political engagement, including voter turnout (Huddy and Khatib Reference Huddy and Khatib2007; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine Reference Schatz, Staub and Lavine1999).Footnote ¹

However, although the approach of differentiating between constructive and blind national pride helps us better understand the relationship between national pride and turnout, existing discussions on underlying theoretical mechanisms and empirical analysis have come primarily from advanced democracies. Little attention has been paid to new democracies, which may have very different political contexts where national sentiments operate to shape political behavior in a different way. In other words, studying constructive and blind national pride only in the context of advanced democracies may overlook alternative underlying mechanisms through which the two types of national pride are related to political participation. In this study, we, therefore, discuss and examine the relationship between constructive and blind national pride and turnout in some of young democracies, especially those with lingering legacies from past authoritarianism.

Blind national pride and voter turnout in new democracies

Understanding different political contexts is essential to analyzing political behavior, because the expected underlying mechanisms may not work in a new political context. For example, Jamal (Reference Jamal2007) finds that although participation in civic associations results in higher levels of trust, it does not lead to civic engagement and support for democracy in the Arab world, because the associations derive resources and benefits from the nondemocratic state in the region. Similarly, Zhong and Chen (Reference Zhong and Chen2002) show that citizens with higher levels of political efficacy, political interest, and democratic values tend to stay away from Chinese village elections. In short, in contrast to the conventional wisdom built on advanced democracies (Putnam Reference Putnam1993; Schlozman, Brady, and Verba Reference Schlozman, Brady and Verba2018), new political contexts can involve different mechanisms, thereby producing different political behavioral outcomes.

Likewise, we expect that the relationship between national pride and voter turnout is different in new democracies. Our core argument is that although constructive national pride is still positively associated with turnout, this may also be true of blind national pride in new democracies with lingering authoritarian legacies. This is because authoritarian regimes tend to utilize nationalism, a key characteristic of blind national pride, to promote unconditional political support in facing the twin challenges of nation-building and industrialization (Dukalskis and Gerschewski Reference Dukalskis and Gerschewski2017). Hence, when individuals shape their national sentiments via the socialization process under those circumstances (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches Reference Neundorf and Pop-Eleches2020) and, more importantly, when successor parties sustain the nationalist legacies even after democratization (Jhee Reference Jhee2008; Miller Reference Miller2021), citizens in new democracies are likely to be active in political participation based on blind national pride. If such is the case, we expect the positive relationship to be more robust among older citizens, because they have experienced the authoritarian regime both recently and directly, which would lead them to have a stronger and better memory of it. Also, if the authoritarian successor party is conservative (e.g., in Korea), the same pattern can appear more strongly as citizens' political ideology becomes more conservative.

We argue that the positive relationship between blind national pride and voter turnout arises from the following three mechanisms: good economic performance under authoritarianism, formation of nationalism during the period, and presence of authoritarian successor parties after democratization. First, the good economic performance of an authoritarian regime can serve as the foundation for political support and national sentiments under the new regimes as well as the old. Although cultural traditions, media manipulation, and external threats such as wars and terrorist attacks can be sources of political support for the regime and its leaders, a good economic performance plays a greater role than any other factors in shaping public loyalty to and support for the authoritarian regimes (Hong and Park Reference Hong and Park2014; Treisman Reference Treisman2011). In particular, because national economic development is one source of national pride (Smith and Kim Reference Smith and Kim2006), good economic performance can create a political environment in which citizens shape their national sentiments based on that and, at the same time, leaders solidify their political foundations (Dukalskis and Gerschewski Reference Dukalskis and Gerschewski2017). Furthermore, because a good economic record is one of the legacies that can be easily transmitted and translated to democratic competition, it allows citizens to maintain favorable political attitudes toward the past regime and its leaders even after experiencing a regime transition (Jhee Reference Jhee2008; Miller Reference Miller2021).

Second, under economically successful authoritarian regimes, citizens can develop a nationalist outlook, which tends to contain characteristics of blind national pride. When confronted with the twin challenges of nation-building and industrialization, authoritarian leaders can utilize nationalism and mobilize citizens by internalizing and indoctrinating key ideologies, norms, and values to push the entire society toward the state-defined goal of economic development (Dukalskis and Gerschewski Reference Dukalskis and Gerschewski2017; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches Reference Neundorf and Pop-Eleches2020; Treisman Reference Treisman2011). Because authoritarian regimes control both public education and mass media, political and national socialization in accordance with the official line of the regime can be achieved using well-designed curricula, textbooks, and diverse governmental programs (Darden and Grzymala-Busse Reference Darden and Grzymala-Busse2006). Given that the provision of mass education facilitates shared values and homogenizes the population based on nationalism (Gellner Reference Gellner1983; Wimmer Reference Wimmer2018), children and young people—the primary targets of the educational system—can shape national sentiments by easily internalizing the ideologies and values that help solidify authoritarian rule during their formative years. Therefore, their national sentiments can be closely linked to unconditional political support for the regime, which in turn facilitates political mobilization through diverse governmental programs.

Lastly, the nationalism formed during the authoritarian period can persist even more strongly when the past regime's elites lead the process of democratic transition and, thus, their successor parties survive as viable political actors in the new democracies (Slater and Wong Reference Slater and Wong2022). Because the successor parties are likely to mobilize their supporters by sustaining authoritarian legacies based on shared memories (Elçi Reference Elçi2022), blind nationalism formed during the past regime can promote voter turnout even in a new regime. Although political orientations from the days of authoritarianism may become biased against the old regime (Dinas and Northmore-Ball Reference Dinas and Northmore-Ball2020; Frantzeskakis and Sato Reference Frantzeskakis and Sato2020), pro-dictator bias can also appear in new democracies (Jhee Reference Jhee2008; Kim-Leffingwell Reference Kim-Leffingwell2022). In particular, one source that produces favorable attitudes toward the past regime is economic success, which is easily transmittable to democratic competition (Miller Reference Miller2021). Therefore, national sentiments based on unconditional political loyalty, which had been indoctrinated during the period of authoritarian economic success, can be sustained and revitalized as a part of the successor parties' mobilizing strategies.Footnote ² As a result, this can lead blind national pride to be positively associated with voter turnout in new democracies.

Moreover, the existence of authoritarian successor parties can further maintain citizens' habit of political participation formed under authoritarian elections. According to the literature on the characteristics, causes, and effects of authoritarian elections compared to democratic ones (Chen and Zhong Reference Chen and Zhong2002; Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010; Reuter et al. Reference Reuter, Buckley, Shubenkova and Garifullina2016), though elections under authoritarianism might be perceived as “a ritual that everyone knows is fake” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar Reference Gandhi and Lust-Okar2009, 406), participation in them can still raise political psychological resources, such as voter efficacy, and the likelihood of becoming habitual voters (Shi Reference Shi1999). Therefore, given that the survival of successor parties can sustain the effects of a combination of good economic performance and formation of nationalism under the past regime, we expect that the habit formed in authoritarian elections can further strengthen the positive relationship between blind national pride and turnout.

It is also possible that a successful democratic transition weakens the positive link between blind national pride and turnout—that, instead, democratic values on which constructive national pride stand shape political behavior in new democracies just as they do in advanced democracies. However, political orientations and attitudes obtained via political socialization under authoritarianism cannot change immediately after a regime transition because of the accumulated stock of political regimes (Weil Reference Weil1985). In other words, the period of democratic experience as a historical process shapes political contexts in which blind national pride is associated with political participation. In this regard, Sumino (Reference Sumino2021) finds that the level of educational attainment reduces blind national pride only in advanced democracies with larger stocks of democracy, whereas its remedial effect is not observed in new democracies. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the presence of authoritarian successor parties can strengthen the positive impact of blind national pride on voter turnout by maintaining nationalist authoritarian legacies. Hence, we expect that blind national pride, like constructive national pride, is likely to be positively associated with voter turnout in some of new democracies.

In addition, we expect that there will be conditional effects of political cohorts and political ideology. First, given that the positive relationship between blind national pride and voter turnout comes from nationalist legacies of authoritarianism, it is likely that the pattern is stronger among older cohorts. This expectation can be supported by political socialization theory, which explains that fundamental political values are obtained during the so-called impressionable years in early adulthood (Krosnick and Alwin Reference Krosnick and Alwin1989). Because different experiences of political socialization can yield variation in the strength of psychological attachment to social groups (Wong Reference Wong2010), the same mechanism can be applied to the authoritarian legacies, which come from the shared social identity—national identity in our case—formed during the past regime. For instance, Ekman and Linde (Reference Ekman and Linde2005) provide the life-biography perspective to explain that the strength of past communist regimes' legacies in East and Central European democracies depends on individuals' direct experiences and memories. Similarly, Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar (Reference Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar2020) find that those in younger cohorts, who did not directly experience the past regime and its indoctrination efforts, tend to put less weight on the values and achievements of authoritarianism. We thus expect the positive relationship between blind national pride and voter turnout to be stronger among citizens in older cohorts with direct experiences of the past regime than among those in younger cohorts.

Second, one of the key mechanisms that positively connects blind national pride to voter turnout is survival of authoritarian successor parties as viable political actors in new democracies. In Korea, the successor party is the conservative party, which occupied the presidency for ten years after democratization in 1987. Political leaders during the transitional period calculated that they retained power and legitimacy through a remarkable record of economic development. Thus, authoritarianism in Korea “did not collapse, nor was the regime overthrown, but rather the incumbent ruling party introduced and led the democratization process” (Slater and Wong Reference Slater and Wong2022, 122). If our theory holds, we expect blind national pride to be more positively associated with turnout among conservatives.

The case of South Korea

The Korean case provides theoretically appropriate settings to discuss and test our argument. Our theory about the relationship between blind national pride and turnout relies on the expectation that the past authoritarian regime showed a good economic performance, citizens formed nationalist inclinations during the period, and the successor parties exist as a viable actor in a new regime to provoke the public's positive memories and national sentiments on the past regime. As will be discussed below, all these mechanisms were at play in Korea.Footnote ³

Historically, Korea was one of the most dynamic developmental states under authoritarianism (Haggard Reference Haggard2018; Kohli Reference Kohli2004; Woo-Cumings Reference Woo-Cumings1999). Especially under President Park Chung-hee's rule, manufacturing industries, one of its primary developmental strategies, grew at an impressive 16 percent per year during the 1970s, contributing to an annual GDP growth rate by about 9 percent. Given the miraculous economic success, many Korean citizens supported and approved the regime and its policies in elections, despite the violations of human rights and democratic values.Footnote ⁴ Moreover, as of 2021, many Koreans still consider President Park not only as the most favored (32.2 percent), but also as the most successful (47.9 percent) among all the past and current presidents.Footnote ⁵ In short, the Korean authoritarian regime enjoyed favorable political environments for their legitimation, owing to political support resulting from good economic performance.

More importantly, by implementing diverse governmental policies, the regime took advantage of nationalism to mobilize and push the entire society towards national development. Indeed, in his presidential speeches, President Park proclaimed that nationalism is a core ideological construct (Kim Reference Kim2013), and he tried to implant strong nationalism, particularly in schools, among farmers in rural areas, and in private businesses, to form a developmentalist coalition. For example, he issued the “Charter of National Education” (CNE) in 1968 and used nationalism to industrialize and revitalize the nation by stating that “we were born into this land charged with the historic mission to revitalize the nation.” Specifically, the CNE consists of three core values: “the establishment of self-reliant nationalism,” “the creation of a new national culture with harmonization of tradition and progress,” and “the development of democracy with harmonization of the state and individuals.” Since it was printed on the first page of all school textbooks and used as guidance for all education, the Park regime could easily and successfully indoctrinate young citizens, including students, using the nationalist ideologies to promote unconditional allegiance to the single-minded goal of national development (Moon and Jun Reference Moon, Jun, Kim and Voge2011).

In addition to the CNE, the Park regime also launched the “New Village Movement” (Saemaul Undong) in 1970. Although its explicit purpose was rural village development, based on a nationwide self-help program that conditionally offered financial and material resources for production of public goods (e.g., cash transfer, cement, fertilizer, grain subsidies), it implicitly aimed to mobilize farmers in rural areas for top-down national economic growth (Park Reference Park1979). Specifically, by emphasizing values such as “diligence,” “self-help,” and “cooperation” as the key components of economic developmental strategies, the program efficiently spread nationalist ideology and collaborative spirit among the citizens. As a result, the regime successfully utilized nationalism as an effective strategy not only to expedite the industrialization process, but also to mobilize citizens for political support and loyalty during the 1970s.

Furthermore, the positive effects of the New Village Movement on political support persisted even after democratization in 1987. Villages that received more benefits from the program tended to show stronger support for Park Geun-hye, the daughter of President Park, in the 2012 presidential election (Hong, Park, and Yang Reference Hong, Park and Yang2022; Kang Reference Kang2016). In particular, Hong and her colleagues (Reference Hong, Park and Yang2022) demonstrate that the underlying mechanism of its lingering influence is psychological (e.g., attachment to the Park regime), rather than economic (e.g., material benefits). This implies that the national sentiments Koreans formed under the economically successful authoritarian regime have not only produced political support during the past regime, but also provided a psychological foundation of blind nationalism even after democratization.Footnote ⁶ Put differently, citizens who experienced Park's regime strongly embedded unconditional political loyalty into their national sentiments.

Given the political environments favorable to the past authoritarian regime, Korea's democratization in 1987 allowed its successors to survive as a viable political party in the new regime (Slater and Wong Reference Slater and Wong2022). The legacy party consolidated its power based on strong organizational resources and established personnel networks under democracy. Moreover, it thrived as the dominant conservative party to win the presidency in the two subsequent elections after democratization. As a result, it has maintained the nationalist legacies that can promote political loyalty and even unconditional political support. Therefore, given the political context of Korea, we expect blind national pride to have a positive impact on voter turnout in addition to constructive national pride. We also expect that the positive relationship will be stronger both among older citizens who both recently and directly experienced the past regime, and among those with conservative ideologies.

Data, variables, and model specification

To empirically test our theory, we analyze original survey data collected in Korea, in August, 2020. Our survey was conducted with quota sampling for adults older than 18, by considering actual proportion of gender, age, and region. The sample size of our data is 1,236 in total. Despite its online survey format, the data include diverse measures of constructive and blind national pride, which are the variables of interest in this study. We first provide appropriate measures of constructive and blind national pride and conduct a factor analysis to show that the conceptual divide is applicable to Korean citizens as it is in the US and European democracies before testing our hypotheses.

Our main explanatory variables are constructive and blind national pride. To measure them, we utilize 20 items, as shown in Table 1. For each item, subjects in the survey selected one of the five-point scale responses from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). Most of the items listed in Table 1 were developed in Schatz and his colleagues' study (Reference Schatz, Staub and Lavine1999), where they verified the validity and reliability of the measures among American voters. Considering the Korea-specific contexts, we also included four additional items (item 4, 18, 19, and 20).Footnote ⁷

Table 1. Measures of constructive and blind national pride and factor analysis

Note: Bolded values indicate retention of item on the factor.

Table 1 presents question wordings of the measures and the results of factor analysis, which examines whether the two types of national pride are distinguished among Koreans in ways similar to Western democracies. The results clearly show that the 20 items are divided into two factors, constructive and blind national pride. Because the factor analysis distinguishes factor 1 (eigenvalue = 5.5) and factor 2 (eigenvalue = 4.8),Footnote ⁸ we retain items included in each factor based on factor loadings.Footnote ⁹ We then calculate mean values of each type of national pride, which ranges from 1 to 5, respectively. Since the inter-item reliability is 0.895 and 0.859 (Cronbach's α) for constructive and blind national pride, respectively, we generate composite indices using their mean values. In sum, the two types of national pride are conceptually distinct among Korean voters (see online Appendix A for further information on the composite indices).

In addition to constructive and blind national pride, another key variable is political cohorts, which is our first moderator to test Hypothesis 3. To measure political cohorts in accordance with the historical trajectories of Korea, we follow prior studies in Korean politics (Noh, Song, and Kang Reference Noh, Song and Kang2013), and divide into five cohorts based on birth year as follows: “before 1960” (6.55%); “1960~1969” (15.29%); “1970~1978” (29.85%); “1979~1987” (26.78%); “after 1987” (21.52%). We create an interaction term by combining blind national pride and political cohorts. For Hypothesis 4, we measure political ideology, our second moderator, by using the following question: “People generally divide political ideology into ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’. On a scale from 0 (being the most liberal) to 10 (being the most conservative), where do you think you belong?” Respondents selected one of the 11-point scale responses. To create an interaction term, we then combine blind national pride and political ideology.

Our dependent variable is voter turnout. To measure respondents' participation in elections, we directly asked whether or not they participated in the 2020 Korean legislative election, which was the latest election before the survey. If a respondent participated in the election, we score him or her 1 on the measure and 0 otherwise.

We include political and socio-demographic covariates in our analysis. Given that political psychological resources are well-known predictors of political participation (Schlozman, Brady, and Verba Reference Schlozman, Brady and Verba2018), we first consider the following political variables: political knowledge (the number of correct answers out of four questions; 0–4);Footnote ¹⁰ political interest (1 = “not interested”; 4 = “very interested”); internal and external political efficacy (1 = “not efficacious”; 4 = “very efficacious,” respectively); partisanship (1 = “independent”; 0 = “partisan”); strength of political ideology (0 = “very weak”; 5 “very strong”). Second, we also include socio-demographic variables:Footnote ¹¹ gender (1 = “female”; 0 = “male”), education (1 = “≤ high school graduation”; 2 = “college/university”; 3 = “graduate”), monthly household income (1 = “≤ one million won”; 11 = “≥ ten million won”), and employment status (1 = “employed”; 0 = “unemployed”). Lastly, because our dependent variable is a binary variable, we utilize binary logistic regression models and then provide substantive interpretation based on predicted probabilities using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg Reference King, Tomz and Wittenberg2000). For our interaction models, we use marginal effects graphs to interpret. Online Appendix B presents the summary statistics of all variables in our first analysis.

Findings

Table 2 displays findings from our analysis. Before discussing the key findings, we briefly introduce each model in the table. While Model 1 includes the variables of interest and socio-demographic covariates, it does not contain political psychological variables except for political ideology and strength of political ideology. But Model 2 includes all covariates. Models 3 and 4 include the interaction terms to examine Hypothesis 3 and 4, respectively.Footnote ¹²

Table 2. Constructive and blind national pride and voter turnout in South Korea

Note: Coefficients and standard errors are from binary logistic models. AIC: Akaike information criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

In Model 1, constructive national pride is positively associated with voter turnout as Hypothesis 1 predicts.Footnote ¹³ This suggests that because constructive national pride is closely related to democratic values, Koreans who exhibit its higher values are more likely to participate in elections just like those in the advanced democracies. Interestingly, however, blind national pride is also in a positive relationship with voter turnout, which provides empirical support for Hypothesis 2. Unlike citizens in Western democracies, those with high levels of blind national pride are more likely to go to the polls in Korea. Substantively, when other variables are held at their means or medians, the min–max change of constructive national pride increases the likelihood of voting from 0.42 (0.23, 0.63) to 0.97 (0.96, 0.98). Though relatively weaker, the same change of blind national pride also increases it from 0.84 (0.73, 0.91) to 0.96 (0.92, 0.98) (parentheses indicate the 95% confidence intervals).

As discussed above, this result may come from the fact that Korea has a history as a developmental authoritarian state. Despite violations of human rights and democratic values, a significant number of Koreans under the regime may have been satisfied with its successful and rapid economic development and thus supported the regime and its leaders. In particular, the fact that the regime utilized nationalism as an effective ruling and mobilizing ideology may have allowed Koreans to shape unconditional political support and loyalty based on the national sentiments. As a result, even after democratization, blind national pride among Koreans can be associated with voter turnout in a positive direction, unlike in western democracies.

In turn, we further examine the patterns of the relationship between the two types of national pride and voter turnout in Model 2 by including variables of political psychological recourses. When controlling for political psychological variables, though blind national pride does not hold statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level, it is still significant at the 90 percent confidence level (Hypothesis 2). Constructive national pride remains significantly associated with voter turnout in a positive direction at the 99 percent confidence level and thus consistent with Hypothesis 1. For substantive interpretation, we estimate predicted probabilities. When holding other variables at their means or medians, the min–max change of constructive national pride increases the voting probability from 0.75 (0.56, 0.89) to 0.97 (0.94, 0.98). Again, although weaker than constructive pride, the min–max change of blind national pride also boosts the voter turnout from 0.88 (0.78, 0.94) to 0.97 (0.93, 0.98) (parentheses indicate the 95% confidence intervals).Footnote ¹⁴ Therefore, the findings again strongly suggest that both constructive and blind national pride are positively associated with voter turnout (Hypothesis 1 and 2), which implies that they have different mechanisms in terms of political participation at least in some of new democracies with lingering authoritarian legacies compared to advanced democracies.

In addition to the positive effects of both constructive and blind national pride on turnout, our Hypothesis 3 predicts that the positive association between blind national pride and voter turnout will appear stronger among older cohorts. And Hypothesis 4 states that the relationship will be more robust as citizens' political ideology becomes more conservative. The interaction terms in both Models 3 and 4 are statistically significant in a positive direction and thus support our hypotheses.Footnote ¹⁵ The marginal effects are displayed in Figure 1, which clearly shows the expected patterns: the association between blind national pride and voter turnout appears more robust as political cohorts become older (left) and individuals become more conservative (right). Specifically, a positive relationship is observed among political cohorts born before 1979, whereas the relationship becomes null among relatively younger cohorts. Likewise, while the relationship is null among liberal and moderate citizens, it appears positive as political ideology becomes more conservative. In contrast, online Appendix E shows that neither political cohorts nor political ideology moderate the relationship between constructive national pride and voter turnout.Footnote ¹⁶

Figure 1. Conditional effects of political cohorts and political ideology.

Note: Marginal effects are from Model 3 (left panel) and Model 4 (right panel). Other variables are fixed at their means or medians. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

This suggests that, as Ekman and Linde's (Reference Ekman and Linde2005) life-biography perspective explains, because citizens' memories about the past and its experiences are crucial in shaping political attitudes and behaviors, older cohorts who directly experienced the developmental state are likely to participate in elections based on the blind national pride that they internalized during the past regime. And the nationalist legacies of the authoritarian regime may have lingering influence on the national sentiments and political behavior of Koreans—particularly, older citizens—after democratization. Also, given that the authoritarian successor party in Korea is the conservative party, the mobilizing effects of blind national pride appear more robust among conservative voters.

In sum, in sharp contrast to advanced Western democracies, in some of new democracies with authoritarian legacies, blind national pride, like constructive pride, has a positive association with voter turnout. Furthermore, the pattern becomes more salient especially among older citizens who experienced authoritarianism directly in the recent past and conservative citizens who are psychologically more attached to the successor party. Lastly, among control variables, our models show that, as expected, those with higher levels of political knowledge and political interest and partisan voters are more likely to go to the polls.