Many nations incentivize retirement saving by letting workers defer taxes on pension contributions, imposing them when retirees withdraw their funds. Using a dynamic life-cycle model, we show how ‘Rothification’ – that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts – alters saving, investment, consumption, and Social Security claiming patterns. We find that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to delayed retirement, somewhat lower lifetime tax payments, and relatively small reductions in consumption. Indeed, the two tax regimes generate quite similar relative inequality metrics: the relative consumption inequality ratio under taxed-exempt-exempt (TEE) is only 4% higher than that in the exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) case. Moreover, results indicate that the Gini measures are also strikingly similar under the EET and the TEE regimes for lifetime consumption, cash on hand, and 401(k) assets, differing by only 1–4%. While tax payments are higher early in life under the TEE regime, they are slightly lower in the long run. Moreover, higher EET tax payments are also accompanied by higher volatility. We therefore find few reasons for policymakers to favor either tax approach on egalitarian or revenue-enhancing grounds.

In this paper, we derive the optimal cyclical design of a target benefit (TB) pension plan that balances the sustainability and the benefit stability using the optimal control approach. The optimal design possesses a linear risk sharing structure with cyclical parameters. We observe that the optimal design should be pro-cyclical in the usual circumstances, but counter-cyclical when the pension plan is severely in deficit. We compare the TB plans with the defined benefit plans and conclude that a more aggressive investment strategy should be adopted for the TB plans. In the end, we provide a cautionary note on the optimal control approach in the study of the TB plans.

We study causal effects of two early retirement reforms. Reform 1 increased normal retirement age stepwise from 60 to 63. Simultaneously, it became possible to use early retirement with benefit discounts. Reform 2 increased the age of early retirement stepwise from 60 to 63. We investigate behavioral responses to the reforms using administrative data and difference-in-differences strategies. We find strong and significant causal effects of both reforms. Individuals postponed retirement, stayed employed longer, postponed unemployment, and shifted to alternative pathways into retirement. The overall use of the retirement system declined by about 1.5 and 2 months per person after each of the two reforms. Individuals with low pension wealth and those who were affected immediately by the reform responded more strongly.

This paper presents the results of a choice experiment that is designed to examine whether changing how plan information is presented affects planned retirement-savings behavior. The main hypothesis is that providing plan information in a more concise format with helpful recommendations, rather than providing lengthy and detailed information, will alter retirement-planning choices. The specific choices examined include: whether to enroll, how much to contribute, and how to structure (broadly) the asset allocation. The choice experiment is conducted on three different samples: (i) a Qualtrics panel of new employees, (ii) a Qualtrics panel of job seekers, and (iii) a sample of business-school students. Our results suggest that, controlling for demographic and other factors, our main hypothesis was not supported by the data in any of the samples. Thus, the data cast some doubt on the notion that simplifying and condensing the retirement-plan information presented to employees will result in vastly different retirement-planning choices.

Many pension reforms in OECD countries included pension statements with the objective of improving individuals' financial security in retirement. Our objective is to assess the effectiveness of the pension information policy implemented in France and to investigate whether the pension statement results in better informed workers, who then increase their retirement savings. Using regression discontinuity designs combined with quantile regressions, we assess whether the changes in retirement savings and holding of assets are due to the pension information system and then quantify the impact. We conclude that a pension estimate sent to workers encourages the wealthiest to increase their retirement savings while it does not influence the savings of individuals with a low level of wealth.

Based on two decades of Danish register data at the individual level, this paper finds that a 1-dollar increase in pension wealth leads to a 42-cent rise in total debt for a group of low-wage earners. Collective bargaining in the labor market provides time-sector variation in mandatory pension contribution rates, which we exploit in two empirical research designs; an event study and a cross-sectional instrumental variable regression model. Both methods demonstrate that the debt rise is accompanied by increased housing wealth and homeownership rates. Together, the empirical evidence indicates that mandatory pension contributions lead to a significant increase in net wealth, as well as in gross debt.

We study whether pension fund board governance relates to asset allocation. Pension funds with well-governed boards have greater international diversification, lower cash holdings, and, when pension funds are small, invest more in risky assets. In particular, pension fund boards that establish comprehensive investment policies invest more in equities, in foreign assets, and hold less cash. We argue that a comprehensive investment policy is likely to serve as a proxy for the financial expertise available to the fund while it provides the set up to facilitate decision making. Finally, we further show that the presence of external financial experts is also associated with lower cash holdings.

This paper evaluates alternative reforms of the public pension system in an overlapping generations model for an open economy facing demographic change. We make progress compared to existing literature on pension reform by modelling individuals with heterogeneous innate ability and endogenous human capital, and by putting (the reduction of) welfare inequality effects of reform at the centre. Frequently adopted reforms such as an increase of the normal retirement age or a decrease of the pension benefit can guarantee financial sustainability, but they fail when the objective is also to avoid intergenerational or intragenerational welfare inequality. Our results prefer a reform which combines an increase of the retirement age with an intelligent linkage between the pension benefit and earlier labour earnings. First, this design conditions pension benefits on past individual labour income, with a high weight on labour income earned when older and a low weight on labour income earned when young. Second, this linkage is complemented by a strong rise in the benefit replacement rate for low ability individuals (and a reduction for high ability individuals).