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The test for decision-making capacity in common law countries is not the test outlined by Zhong et al

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 July 2019

Christopher James Ryan*
Affiliation:
Clinical Associate Professor and Consultation-Liaison Psychiatrist, Disciple of Psychiatry and Sydney Health Ethics, University of Sydney and Department of Psychiatry, Westmead Hospital, Sydney, Australia. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Type
Correspondence
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal College of Psychiatrists 2019 

In the UK and common law countries the legal test for decision-making capacity is not the test outlined by Zhong et al.Reference Zhong, Sisti and Karlawish1 That test is derived from literature that emanates from the USA.

In common law jurisdictions, adults are presumed to have decision-making capacity, but this presumption can be rebutted for particular decisions if the person has some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning that renders him or her either: unable to comprehend and retain the information that is material to the decision, or; unable to use and weigh the information as part of the process of making the decision.2 This common law test was codified into the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s3(1).

Contrary to Zhong et al’s rendering, the common law test does not incorporate an ability to ‘appreciate’ information. Indeed ‘appreciation’ was specifically rejected by the UK Law Reform Commission.3 To the extent that appreciation might be relevant it should be considered as part of the ability to comprehend. The ‘use and weigh’ arm of the common law test does not require that information be ‘rationally manipulate[d]’.Reference Zhong, Sisti and Karlawish1 A competent person must have their decision respected even if his or her reasons are ‘irrational’.2, Reference Ryan, Szmukler and Large4 Choices need not be ‘consistent’ over time, although if a person were to constantly change his or her mind that might be reason to question the usual presumption of decision-making capacity.2, Reference Ryan, Callaghan and Peisah5 The bar for decisional ability does not rise as the risk of harm or complexity of the decision rises – it remains as described in the second paragraph above. However: as the risk increases, the more we should be concerned that the person has capacity, and; as the complexity increases, the more difficult it will be to attain the understanding of the relevant information required to demonstrate capacity.Reference Ryan, Callaghan and Peisah5

It is also worth highlighting that although the USA has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, almost all other countries, including the UK, have. Article 12 of the Convention places a duty on those who are assessing capacity to assist the person as much as possible to attain that capacity. This changes the process from one of objectively assessing the patient's abilities to one that determines whether the assessor can assist the patient to achieve those abilities.

References

1Zhong, R, Sisti, DA, Karlawish, JH. A pragmatist's guide to the assessment of decision-making capacity. Br J Psychiatry 2019; 214: 183–5.Google Scholar
2Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] EWCA Civ 3093.Google Scholar
3Law Reform Commission (UK). Report No 231: Report on Mental Incapacity. HMSO, 1995.Google Scholar
4Ryan, C, Szmukler, G, Large, M. Kings College Hospital Trust v C: using and weighing information to assess capacity. Lancet Psychiatry 2016; 3: 917–9.Google Scholar
5Ryan, CJ, Callaghan, S, Peisah, C. The capacity to refuse psychiatric treatment – a guide to the law for clinicians and tribunal members. Aust N Z J Psychiatry 2015; 49: 324–3.Google Scholar
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