The literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people’s initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2–4, we experimentally tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background information and the other has none — it is actually preferable for both counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue.

People often perform poorly on stock-flow reasoning tasks, with many (but not all) participants appearing to erroneously match the accumulation of the stock to the inflow – a response pattern attributed to the use of a “correlation heuristic”. Efforts to improve understanding of stock-flow systems have been limited by the lack of a principled approach to identifying and measuring individual differences in reasoning strategies. We present a principled inferential method known as Hierarchical Bayesian Latent Mixture Models (HBLMMs) to analyze stock-flow reasoning. HBLMMs use Bayesian inference to classify different patterns of responding as coming from multiple latent populations. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach using a dataset from a stock-flow drawing task which compared performance in a problem presented in a climate change context, a problem in a financial context, and a problem in which the financial context was used as an analogy to assist understanding in the climate problem. The hierarchical Bayesian model showed that the proportion of responses consistent with the “correlation heuristic” was lower in the financial context and financial analogy context than in the pure climate context. We discuss the benefits of HBLMMs and implications for the role of contexts and analogy in improving stock-flow reasoning.

Two psychological sources of uncertainty bear implications for judgment and decision-making: external uncertainty is seen as stemming from properties of the world, whereas internal uncertainty is seen as stemming from lack of knowledge. The apparent source of uncertainty can be conveyed through linguistic markers, such as the pronoun of probability phrases (e.g., I am uncertain vs. It is uncertain). Here, we investigated whether and when speakers use different pronoun subjects as such linguistic markers (Exp. 1 and 2) and what hearers infer from them (Exp. 3 and 4). Speakers more often described higher probabilities and knowable outcomes with internal probability phrases. In dialogue, speakers mirrored the source of their conversational partner. Markers of the source had a main effect or interacted with the probability conveyed and speaker expertise to shape the judgments and decisions of hearers. For example, experts voicing an internal probability phrase were judged as more knowledgeable than experts using an external probability phrase whereas the result was the opposite for lay speakers. We discuss how these findings inform our understanding of subjective uncertainty and uncertainty communication theories.

In line with earlier research, a multi-phase study found a significant positive association between a widely used measure of trait disgust and people’s tendency to favor absolutist (non-consequentialist) restrictions on genetically modified food (GMF). However, a more nuanced high-granularity approach showed that it was individual sensitivity to fear (specifically, a tendency to feel creeped out by strange and subtly deviant events) rather than a tendency to be disgusted (orally inhibited) by these events that was a unique predictor of absolutist opposition to GMF and other types of new technology. This finding is consistent with prior theorizing and research demonstrating fear to be “the major determiner of public perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards” related to new technology (e.g., nuclear power) (Slovic & Peters, 2006, p. 322). The present study calls attention to the importance of conducting future assessments of disgust (and other affective constructs) in a manner that, among other things, recognizes the substantial disconnect between theoretical and lay meanings of the term and illustrates how a policy-guiding result may arise from a sheer miscommunication between a researcher and a subject.

Previous studies have found that the proportions of people who endorsed utilitarian decisions varied across different variants of the trolley dilemma. In this paper, we explored whether moral choices were associated with beliefs about outcome probabilities in different moral dilemmas. Results of two experiments showed that participants’ perceptions of outcome probabilities were different between two dilemmas that were similar to the classical switch case and footbridge case. Participants’ judgments of the outcome probabilities were associated with their moral choices. The results suggested that participants might not accept task instructions and thus did not perceive the outcomes in the dilemmas as certain. We argued that researchers who endorse descriptive tasks in moral reasoning research should be cautious about the findings and should take participants’ beliefs in the outcomes into account.

Judgments and decisions can rely on rules to integrate cue information or on the retrieval of similar exemplars from memory. Research on exemplar-based processes in judgment has discovered several task variables influencing the dominant mode of processing. This research often aggregates data across participants or classifies them as using either exemplar-based or cue-based processing. It has been argued for theoretical and empirical reasons that both kinds of processes might operate together or in parallel. Hence, a classification of strategies may be a severe oversimplification that also sacrifices statistical power to detect task effects. We present a simple measurement tool combining both processing modes. The simple model contains a mixture parameter quantifying the relative contribution of both kinds of processes in a judgment and decision task. In three experiments, we validate the measurement model by demonstrating that instructions and task variables affect the mixture parameter in predictable ways, both in memory-based and screen-based judgments.

Several scholars have suggested that Americans’ (distorted) beliefs about the rate of upward social mobility in the United States may affect political judgment and decision-making outcomes. In this article, we consider the psychometric properties of two different questionnaire items that researchers have used to measure these subjective perceptions. Namely, we report the results of a new set of experiments (N = 2,167 U.S. MTurkers) in which we compared the question wording employed by Chambers, Swan and Heesacker (2015) with the question wording employed by Davidai and Gilovich (2015). Each (independent) research team had prompted similar groups of respondents to estimate the percentage of Americans born into the bottom of the income distribution who improved their socio-economic standing by adulthood, yet the two teams reached ostensibly irreconcilable conclusions: that Americans tend to underestimate (Chambers et al.) and overestimate (Davidai & Gilovich) the true rate of upward social mobility in the U.S. First, we successfully reproduced both contradictory results. Next, we isolated and experimentally manipulated one salient difference between the two questions’ response-option formats: asking participants to divide the population into either (a) “thirds” (tertiles) or (b) “20%” segments (quintiles). Inverting this tertile-quintile factor significantly altered both teams’ findings, suggesting that these measures are inappropriate (too vulnerable to question-wording and item-formulation artifacts) for use in studies of perceptual (in)accuracy. Finally, we piloted a new question for measuring subjective perceptions of social mobility. We conclude with tentative recommendations for researchers who wish to model the causes and consequences of Americans’ mobility-related beliefs.

Adding to prior literature that has examined the relationship between maximization and dissatisfaction, the present research suggests that maximizers, as defined by the original maximization scale, are unhappier decision makers than satisficers because maximizers fail to adequately handle dissonant experiences. Throughout three studies that use different conceptualization and measurement of maximization, we show that maximizers are more vulnerable to negative feedback about one’s choice such that they decrease positivity toward the chosen option to a greater level than satisficers. However, this effect was mainly driven by the decision difficulty factor in the conceptualization of maximization. When decision difficulty was conceptualized as a defining component of maximization (Study 1 and 2), “maximizers” show greater positivity drop in the face of negative feedback. However, in the absence of a decision difficulty component, a recently proposed two-component model of maximization (the goal to get the best and search for alternatives; Cheek & Schwartz, 2016) did not play a significant role in predicting positivity drop, while perceived decision difficulty did (Study 3). Together our findings suggest that previously reported contradictory outcomes of maximization may be due to inconsistent conceptualization and measurement, especially treating decision difficulty as a defining component of maximization.