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Talking Lions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2024

Darren Bifford
Affiliation:
Champlain College, St Lambert, Quebec, Canada
Robbie Moser*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada
*
Corresponding author: Robbie Moser; E-mail: rmoser@mta.ca

Abstract

This article is an appreciative exegesis of Steven Burns's article “If a Lion Could Talk.” In his essay, Burns clarifies Ludwig Wittgenstein's enigmatic remark “If a lion could talk, we wouldn't be able to understand him” by locating it within the broader context of Wittgenstein's work in the philosophy of psychology. We read Burns's interpretation of the remark as opening core Wittgensteinian issues of meaning and (mis)understanding, and we situate it within the context of the work of Burns's teacher, Peter Winch. Our discussion is a close exegesis of the immediate content of the lion remark and it highlights connections to Wittgenstein's remarks on James George Frazer's The Golden Bough. We show how Burns and Winch employ Wittgenstein's methods of dissolving philosophical puzzles by drawing attention to intermediate familiar cases. We conclude with some impressionistic remarks about Socrates in a short discussion of the difficulty of the philosophical technique and activity Burns demonstrates and recommends.

Résumé

Résumé

Cet article est une exégèse appréciative de l'article de Steven Burns intitulé « If a lion could talk ». Dans son essai, Burns clarifie la remarque énigmatique de Ludwig Wittgenstein, « Si un lion pouvait parler, on ne serait pas capables de le comprendre », en la situant dans le contexte plus large de l’œuvre de Wittgenstein en philosophie de la psychologie. Nous lisons l'interprétation de cette remarque par Burns comme ouvrant les questions wittgensteiniennes fondamentales au sujet du sens et de la (mé)compréhension, et nous la situons dans le cadre du travail de l'enseignant de Burns, Peter Winch. Notre discussion est une exégèse étroite du contenu immédiat de la remarque sur le lion et elle met en lumière les liens avec les réflexions écrites de Wittgenstein sur The Golden Bough de James George Frazer. Nous montrons comment Burns et Winch utilisent les méthodes de Wittgenstein pour résoudre les énigmes philosophiques en attirant l'attention sur des cas familiers intermédiaires. Enfin, nous concluons par quelques remarques impressionnistes sur Socrate dans une brève discussion au sujet de la difficulté de la technique et de l'activité philosophiques que Burns déploie et recommande.

Type
Special Issue: ARPA Symposium: A Celebration of Steven Burns
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association / Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l’Association canadienne de philosophie

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References

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