This article examines the growth of algorithmic credit scoring and its implications for the regulation of consumer credit markets in the UK. It constructs a frame of analysis for the regulation of algorithmic credit scoring, bound by the core norms underpinning UK consumer credit and data protection regulation: allocative efficiency, distributional fairness and consumer privacy (as autonomy). Examining the normative trade-offs that arise within this frame, the article argues that existing data protection and consumer credit frameworks do not achieve an appropriate normative balance in the regulation of algorithmic credit scoring. In particular, the growing reliance on consumers’ personal data by lenders due to algorithmic credit scoring, coupled with the ineffectiveness of existing data protection remedies has created a data protection gap in consumer credit markets that presents a significant threat to consumer privacy and autonomy. The article makes recommendations for filling this gap through institutional and substantive regulatory reforms.

The transnational governance of bank resolution must be well-designed to provide credible solutions to financial crisis management. While at policy level, there is a broad consensus on best practice, the implementation stage often leaves something to be desired. Focusing on the implementation of the relevant Financial Stability Board (FSB) recommendations in the EU, this article explores this issue and proposes certain reforms. It argues for closer EU control and scrutiny over national decision-making without, however advocating a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Its main insight is that the promotion of transnational convergence need not come at the expense of the distinctive attentiveness of EU law to local conditions nor indeed involve a massive shake-up of the existing EU architecture. Its aim is to contribute to scholarly and public policy debates in this field in anticipation of the EU response to the final conclusions of the post-implementation evaluation of the FSB recommendations, which is currently in progress.

The case law and literature to date have struggled to locate the rationale for the assignability of arbitration agreements. While different justifications have been proffered, each of them rests on questionable premises. This has given rise to a host of uncertainties over the rules which apply in practice. This paper proposes that a satisfactory rationale can be found in the “acceptance principle”. This principle indicates, first, that arbitration agreements which are not actual burdens can be assigned, and second, that the assignability of arbitration agreements is grounded in the assignee's acceptance in the form of non-disclaimer of the assignment. Bringing the acceptance principle to the fore not only provides a theoretically sound justification for the assignability of arbitration agreements; it also suggests how the practical uncertainties in this area of law can be resolved satisfactorily.

The article examines a series of cases spanning a 250-year period in which the courts have awarded “mesne profits” against defendants who have occupied claimants’ land. The article argues (1) that various causes of action are disclosed by the facts of cases in which such awards have been made, (2) that these causes of action have changed as the law of obligations has evolved, (3) that modern courts often do not consider what causes of action are disclosed by the facts of “mesne profits cases”, (4) that this is unfortunate because practical consequences can flow from categorising the cases in one way or another and (5) that the resolution of future “mesne profits cases” will become more just and more transparent when it is understood that their facts may variously disclose causes of action in tort, contract or unjust enrichment.

In Phillips v Phillips, Lord Westbury stated that, against a bona fide purchaser faced with an “equity” to rescind, “the Court will not interfere”. This has been interpreted to mean that purchasers of even an equitable interest shall take free of prior equities. Yet the distinction between “equities” and equitable interests has been, and remains, uncertain; some have therefore questioned the intent behind Phillips. This paper shall elucidate Lord Westbury's intentions within their historical context and argues that Phillips offers a coherent, functional explanation of both: (1) the protection given to equity's darling; and (2) how that protection was effected.