3. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and Protocols I-III (1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), 1342 UNTS 137; 19 ILM 1523. Opened for signature 10 October 1980, entered into force 2 December 1983.

4. Art. 8 of the CCW (Review and Amendments) specified that a Review Conference could be convened, if agreed by a majority of States Parties, to consider proposals for amendments to the CCW or for additional protocols relating to categories of other weapons. Further, if no such Conference had been convened in the first ten years following entry into force, then a Conference could be convened to review the scope and operation of the CCW.

5. Art. 8 of the Final Declaration of the first Revcon stated that ‘The Conference agrees that future Review Conferences should be held more frequently, with consideration to holding a Review Conference every five years. The Conference decides, consistent with Article 8(c) to convene a further Conference … not later than 2001, with preparatory expert meetings starting as early as 2000, as necessary'. Agreement on the five year interval between the first and second Revcon for the CCW also brought the CCW in line with a number of other arms controls treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (which specified five yearly intervals between Review Conferences in the treaty texts), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) (for which five yearly intervals between Review Conferences has become the accepted practice).

6. For a detailed discussion of the negotiation of the CCW, the first Revcon, and developments leading up to the second Revcon, see Mathews, R.J., ‘The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: A Useful Framework Despite Earlier Disappointments’, 83 IRRC (12 2001) pp. 991–1012Google Scholar. (Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/review).

7. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (1996), 35 ILM 1209 (Amended Protocol II to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons). Opened for signature 3 May 1996. Amended Protocol II (APII) included: the scope extended to internal armed conflicts; strengthened general humanitarian restrictions on use of APLs; bans on non-detectable APLs; bans on anti-sensing devices on APLs; enhanced rules on mine laying (e.g., long-lived mines may only be used if properly fenced, marked and monitored); stronger restrictions on use of remotely-delivered APLs (including a ban on remotely-delivering long-lived mines); and transfer restrictions.

8. These meetings were well attended and generally regarded as successful. For example, 47 of the (then) 58 States Parties participated in the Second CSP and an additional 27 states not parties to Amended Protocol II participated as observers. However, concerns were expressed at the Second CSP that only 29 of the 58 States Parties had submitted their National Annual Report in accordance with para. 4 of Art. 13 of Amended Protocol II. (See Report of the Second Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, CCW/AP.II/CONF.2/1, dated 3 February 2001).

9. The 1997 Ottawa Treaty was negotiated, in record time, externally to the UN-based arms control negotiation machinery. For more details see L. Maresca and Maslen, S., The Banning of Antipersonnel Landmines: The Legal Contribution of the International Committee of the Red Cross 1955–1999, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2000)Google Scholar. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 18 September 1997, 36 ILM p. 1507 (The Ottawa Landmines Convention) (entered into force on 1 March 1999).

10. For example, see Lachowski, Z., ‘The Ban on anti-personnel mines’, SIPRI Yearbook (1999) pp. 658–659Google Scholar.

11. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons), (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), 35 ILM, 1218. Opened for signature 13 October 1995, entered into force 30 July 1998. This agreement was particularly noteworthy because it was the first time since the conclusion of the negotiation of the CCW in 1980 that a new protocol was added to the CCW, and was also unique in arms control history because the prohibition was negotiated before the weapons were actually used in battle.

12. Submunitions and other Unexploded Ordnance: A Study: Explosive Remnants of War (Geneva, ICRC 2000)Google Scholar.

13. Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo: Explosive Renmants of War (Geneva, ICRC 2000)Google Scholar.

14. Ibid. pp. 19–24.

15. Heiby, P. and Nuiten, A., ‘Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting civilians through an additional protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’, 83 IRRC (03 2001) pp. 195–205Google Scholar.

16. ‘Expert Meeting on Explosive Remnants of War’. Report of meeting held on 18–19 September 2000 in Nyon, Switzerland (Geneva, ICRC 2000).

17. UN GA Res. 55/37, of 20 November 2000.

18. This meeting was chaired by Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden. Fifty-three States Parties participated, and six states not parties participated as observers. The ICRC participated in the work of the Committee. In addition, representatives of the ICBL attended this meeting.

19. The Committee recommended that the President of the Second Revcon make the following statement: ‘With regard to Rules of Procedure, it is affirmed that, in the deliberation and negotiations relating to the Convention and its annexed Protocols, High Contracting Parties have proceeded on the basis of consensus and no decisions have been taken by vote’. (See CCW/CONF.II/PC.2, dated 6 April 2001).

20. Proposals had been provided by the ICRC, through adopting a new protocol which would extend the scope of the whole CCW (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/WP.1) and the USA, through amendment of Article I on the Framework Convention (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/WP.2). For details of this and other USA proposals see http://www3.itu.missions/US/CCW/.

21. There were proposals by France (Non-paper titled ‘Compliance’, dated 2 April 2001, presented to the Second Preparatory Committee) and USA (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/WP.7).

22. Loc. cit. n. 15.

23. Working paper presented by Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Poland, United Kingdom and USA, ‘Protocol on mines other than anti-personnel mines’. (CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.11).

24. Working paper presented by Switzerland, ‘Restrictions on Small Calibre Ammunition which cause excessive wounding and unnecessary injuries’. (CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.3).

25. It is interesting to note that these proposals were similar to some of the proposals that had first been considered during the negotiation of the CCW during the 1970s, and some of these issues were also considered at the First Revcon in 1995/6.

26. In particular, a workshop on small calibre weapon effects was hosted by Switzerland and the Netherlands hosted a workshop on ERW.

27. The 2nd CCW Revcon followed immediately after the third annual Conference of States Parties of Amended Protocol II, which took place on 10 December 2001.

28. Indeed, it would have been difficult to argue against broadening the scope to include non-international armed conflicts, as most injuries (especially to civilians) in recent conflicts have been caused during non-international armed conflicts (for example, recent conflicts involving insurgents and rebels, and civil wars).

29. Indeed, in South Africa's national statement, the Ambassador stated that ‘South Africa believes that the absence of regular meetings of States Parties since entry into force of the CCW in 1983 until the First Review Conference in October 1995 created a climate of near obscurity of the CCW thereby contributing to its restricted impact’ and was convinced that a decision to include annual meetings of States Parties of the CCW should be taken at the Revcon.

30. Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, Final Document, CCW/CONF.II/2, Art. 8 (Review and amendments), p. 16 (Geneva 2001).

31. It has been reported that a number of CCW States Parties from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have opposed inclusion of compliance measures in the CCW because of concerns that such measures could be applied in times of armed conflicts and subject ongoing military operations to scrutiny. See Matheson, M.J., ‘Filling the Gaps in the Conventional Weapons Convention’, Arms Control Today (11 2002)Google Scholar (available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_11/).

32. Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, Final Document, CCW/CONF.II/2,), p. 13 (Geneva 2001).

33. Ibid.

34. The dates agreed for the three sessions are as follows: 20–24 May, 8–19 July or 22 July-2 August 2002, and 2–10 December 2002. (The dates for the second period will be finalised once dates for the UN Disarmament Commission are confirmed for July, so as to avoid any overlap).

35. For example, South Africa expressed the view that the group of government experts should cover issues such as AVMs with sensitive fuses or with sensitive handling devices. (CCW/CONF.II/2, p. 77). Concerns have been expressed by some developing countries that they depend to a greater degree on AVMs than developed countries, and that any further restrictions on the use of AVMs could seriously harm their security interests. See for example, ‘Position of the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Anti-Vehicle Mines’, Document CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.15 (presented at the Third Preparatory Committee, 24–28 September 2001).

36. This will follow immediately after the fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, which will be held on 11 December 2002.

37. Ambassador Sood of India was appointed Chairman-Designate of the December 2002 meeting of States Parties and will oversee the inter-sessional work program, with Ambassador Sanders of the Netherlands appointed coordinator on ERW and Peter Kolarov, Deputy Permanent Representative of Bulgaria, coordinator for AVMs.

38. The general view was that the group should aim to complete its work in time to present its findings to the December 2002 meeting of States Parties. However, a small number of delegations argued that the Revcon should not set ‘artificial deadlines’ as there was no way of knowing how long it would take for the group to conclude its work. A number of delegations intervened to acknowledge this concern but noted that the group should at the very least be in a position to submit an interim report.

39. ICRC, ‘Ensuring Respect for the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Prohibiting the Use of Certain Explosive Projectiles’, Document CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.6 (presented at the Third Preparatory Committee, 24–28 September 2001).

40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, 1125 UNTS 3; 16 ILM 1391 (Additional Protocol I) (entered into force 7 December 1978).

41. This exemplifies the link between coverage of weapons issues in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions and the CCW. The third preambular paragraph of the CCW contains a very similar objective to Art. 35 of Additional Protocol I (In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering).

42. For example, the fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, which took place in Geneva in the three weeks prior to the CCW Revcon, was eventually suspended until November 2002 after a rather unpleasant debate. See Brugger, S., ‘BWC Conference Suspended after Controversial End’, Arms Control Today (01/02 2002)Google Scholar. (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/).

43. For example, at the closing session, the representative of Pakistan stated: ‘the successful outcome of the Conference was largely due to the leadership and diplomatic skills of its President and the dedication and diligence of the Australian delegation and the secretariat’. The representative of USA ‘credited the extraordinary leadership of the President and officers of the Conference with the fact that the session had been a success in many respects. It had made a lasting contribution to international humanitarian law …’. Several other speakers, including representatives of regional groups, echoed sentiments similar to those expressed by Pakistan and USA. (See Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting, CCW/CONF.II/SR4, dated 31 December 2001).

44. This was a role the ICRC had played since the 1950s. See for example, ICRC, ‘Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War’ (Published with commentary, Geneva 1958).

45. In the ICBL statement to the second Preparatory Meeting in April 2001, the ICBL expressed its support for the prohibition of AVMs with anti-handling devices that function like APLs, and in the ICBL statement to the final plenary of the Revcon in December 2001, the ICBL expressed support for the urgent negotiation of a new protocol on explosive remnants of war in the CCW. (Available at http://www.icbl.org/statements/2001_ccw_apr.php and http://www.icbl.org/statements/2001/137.php)

46. Mathews, R.J., ‘The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: A Useful Framework Despite Earlier Disappointments’, 83 IRRC (12 2001) pp. 991–1012Google Scholar. (Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/review).

47. Indeed, Preambular Para. 6 of the CCW referred specifically to the importance of ratification by ‘militarily significant States’.

48. However, there are still approximately 90 states that have yet to ratify or accede to the CCW, including many small developing states.

49. For example, in a letter sent to the US Secretary of Defense dated 31 July 1995 by 51 members of the US Congress who supported the prohibition of blinding laser weapons, it was stated: ‘We dread the day when hundreds or thousands of American service men and women return home from combat to face the rest of their lives without eyesight.’ (Letter to Secretary of Defense William Perry from 51 US Members of Congress, 31 July 1995. (Appendix G in ‘Blinding Laser Weapons: The need to ban a cruel and inhumane weapon’, Human Rights Watch Project, Vol. 7, No. 1, September 1995). This line of reasoning, that changed the US position from initially being opposed to Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons to being a strong supporter at the CCW Revcon in 1995, was also echoed by eight high-ranking retired US Generals, including those who commanded in Korea, in a letter they recently sent to President Bush urging that the USA accede to the Ottawa Treaty. In their letter, the retired Generals stated that their recommendation was ‘motivated by a deep concern for the welfare of the men and women of our armed services’ and ‘… most importantly, to protect our nation's sons and daughters when we send them into harm's way’. (The letter to President Bush, dated 19 May 2001, may be viewed at http://www.banminesusa/).

50. Although there was not agreement on annual meetings of States Parties, per se, there was a sense that States Parties would not oppose a meeting of States Parties each year provided there were substantial issues that needed to be discussed.

51. On 12 September 2001, the ICBL released its third annual report on the global landmine situation, detailing substantial results in implementation of the Ottawa Treaty. The major findings of the 2001 report included: decreased use of APLs; a dramatic drop in production of APLs; an almost complete halt in trade of APLs; destruction of millions of stockpiled APLs; increased funding for humanitarian mine action; more land cleared of mines; and most importantly, fewer new APL casualties. (http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001/findings/).

52. For example, the ICRC recently stated that: ‘Although a global assessment may be premature, statistics gathered by the ICRC and mine action organizations show that the average number of monthly casualties due to landmines and unexploded ordnance has decreased significantly in several affected countries.’ (Statement by the ICRC, United Nations General Assembly, 55th Session, November 2000).

53. Although it would be reasonable to conclude that adherence by APL producers to the transfer restrictions in Amended Protocol II would be a major factor in the almost complete halt in trade of APLs.

54. It is interesting to note that 122 states have now ratified the Ottawa Treaty, whereas only 63 states have ratified Amended Protocol II (as of 31 December 2001).

55. For example, at the second annual meeting of States Parties of Amended Protocol II, Canada sought clarification of Russia's compliance with Protocol II, and Russia provided explanations to the effect that it was in full compliance with Protocol II obligations. See CCW/AP.II/CONF. 1, pp. 26 and 41 (Geneva, 2000).

56. With respect to Protocol IV, there have been unofficial reports that the small number of states which were developing laser blinding weapons in the mid 1990s are no longer doing so, and that the blinding laser weapon system which was being advertised in the mid 1990s is no longer available.

57. This was in contrast to the fifth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163; 11 ILM 109 (entered into force 26 March 1975) (Biological Weapons Convention), which took place in Geneva in the three weeks prior to the CCW Revcon. In its national statement at the BWC Revcon, the USA accused several countries of non-compliance with their BWC obligations. See Brugger, S., ‘BWC Conference Suspended after Controversial End’, Arms Control Today (Washington DC, USA) 01/02 2002Google Scholar (Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/bwcjanfeb02.asp).

58. This view accords with a recent statement by the ICRC, which, with reference to international humanitarian law, stated: ‘The effective implementation of existing law, including the obligation to ensure its respect, is indeed the most pressing matter, rather than the development of new rules.’ Statement by the ICRC, United Nations General Assembly, 53rd session, Sixth Committee, 17 November 1998.