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The Doctrine of Command Responsibility: Current Problems1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Bing Bing Jia
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Extract

This article follows on an earlier study of the topic of command responsibility. When that previous analysis was made, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) in this area was nascent. A number of issues have since been considered and decided upon by the two Tribunals in several judgements, which have already attracted some scholarly attention. It is proposed to examine herein the doctrine of command responsibility in the light of the evolving case law of the Tribunals and other evidence of practice outside these judicial fora. The aim is to discover whether customary law has progressed or developed, and what questions recent practice has raised.

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Articles
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Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law , Volume 3 , December 2000 , pp. 131 - 165
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Instituut and the Authors 2000

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References

3. Jia, B.B., ‘The Doctrine of Command Responsibility in International Law (with Emphasis on Liability for Failure to Punish)’, 45 NILR (1998) pp. 325–347CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. Bantekas, I., ‘The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility’, 93 AJIL (1999) p. 573CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sunga, L., ‘The Čelebići Case: A Comment on the Main Legal Issues in the ICTY's Trial Chamber Judgement’, 13 Leiden JIL (2000) p. 105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lippman, M., ‘The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility’, 13 Leiden JIL (2000) p. 139CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Part 2.

6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted at Rome on 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (‘Rome Statute’). Cf., Schabas, W., ‘Principios generales del derecho penal en el Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional (parte III)’, in Ambos, K. and Guerrero, O.J., eds., El Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional (Bogota, Universida Externado de Colombia 1999) pp. 269 at 297Google Scholar, where it is said that, at the Rome Conference, the US proposed the two types of persons covered under the superior responsibility article.

7. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić and Others, Case No. IT-96–21-T, Judgement, 16 November 1998, (Čelebići Judgement).

8. The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95–14/1-T, Judgement, 25 June 1999 (Aleksovski Judgement).

9. Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95–14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000 (Aleksovski Appeal Judgement).

10. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95–14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000 (Blaškić Judgement).

11. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96–23-T and IT-96–23/1-T, Judgement, 22 February 2001 (Kunarac Judgement).

12. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić and Others, Case No. 1T-96–21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001 (Čelebići Appeal Judgement).

13. Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95–14/2-T, Judgement, 26 February 2001 (Kordić Judgement).

14. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96–4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998 (Akayesu Judgement).

15. The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97–23-S, Judgement and Sentence, 4 September 1998 (Kambanda Judgement).

16. The Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98–39-S, 5 February 1999, English translation filed on 25 February 1999 (Serushago Judgement).

17. The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishima and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95–1-T, Judgement, dated 21 May 1999, filed on 25 May 1999 (Kayishima and Ruzindana Judgement).

18. No official records of the Rome Conference have been published.

19. Art. 1(1), Annex to the Convention, titled ‘Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land’.

20. Serbia and its successor states therefore remained party to the 1899 Convention. See Roberts, A. and Guelff, R., Documents on the Laws and War, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1989) p. 44Google Scholar.

21. Report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)(S/25704), presented on 3 May 1993, paras. 41–44.

22. Parks, W., ‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’, 62 Mil. LR (1963) p. 13Google Scholar.

23. Friedman, L., The Law of War, Vol. 1 (New York, Random House 1972) pp. 868 at 870 and 878Google Scholar.

24. Ibid., pp. 880, 882.

25. Cf., Parks, loc. cit. n. 22, at p. 14.

26. Art. 6. Also Art. 5 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East; Regulation No. 5, Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals, issued by the Commander of the United States Armed Forces, Pacific, on 24 September 1945, cited in Parks, loc cit. n. 22, at p. 17.

27. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. IV (selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission (London, H.M. Stationary Office 1947–1949)Google Scholar (hereinafter Law Reports). Cf., Reel, A.F., The Case of General Yamashita (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1949) pp. 41, 84–85Google Scholar. Also Lippman, loc. cit. n. 4, at pp. 142–144.

28. Law Reports, ibid., Vol. IV, p. 35. This has been noted by the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, supra n. 12, para. 228.

29. Parks, loc. cit. n. 22, at pp. 31–32.

30. Cited, ibid., pp. 32–33.

31. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Petitioner, v. Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, 327 U.S. 1, 14–15.

32. U.S. 15.

33. U.S. 17, and n. 4.

34. Greenspan, M., The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press 1959) p. 482Google Scholar.

35. U.S. 14.

36. U.S. 14 and 15.

37. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (October 1946-April 1949) (Washington D. C., 15 vols.) (hereinafter Trials) Vol. 11, pp. 543–544.

38. Ibid., p. 544.

39. Ibid., p. 1260.

40. Ibid., p. 1272.

41. Ibid.

42. Official Transcript, pp. 48, 442–447, reproduced in Pritchard, R.J. and Zaide, S.M., eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, Vol. 20 (New York, Garland 1981)Google Scholar. See also Röling, B.V.A. and Rüter, C.F., The Tokyo Judgment, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 1977) pp. 29–31Google Scholar.

43. Official Transcript, ibid., pp. 49, 845–846.

44. UNTS (1950) pp. 31, 85, 135 and 287.

45. Cf., however, Green, L., ‘Command Responsibility in International Law’, 5 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1995) pp. 319, 341Google Scholar.

46. Identical provision in Geneva Convention II (Art. 46).

47. US Department of Army, The Law of Land Warfare (FM 27–10, 1956) para. 501Google Scholar.

48. Report of the Work of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 2nd session, 3 May–3 June 1972, Vol. 1 (hereinafter Report). The Conference drew 400 experts from 77 States Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

49. Ibid., p. 188, para. 4.122.

50. Ibid.

51. Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (hereinafter Official Records) 17 Vols. (Bern, Swiss Federal Political Department 1978)Google Scholar.

52. Ibid., pp. 113–114 (CDDH/I/SR.50, 4 May 1976).

53. Ibid., p. 119, para. 65. The text of the US amendment, see Official Records, Vol. 3, p. 329.

54. Ibid., p. 120, para. 68.

55. Ibid., para. 69.

56. Ibid., para. 70.

57. Ibid., p. 278, para. 59.

58. Ibid., p. 392, para. 20 (CDDH/I/SR.70, 28 April 1977).

59. Ibid., p. 393, paras. 28–29.

60. Ibid., para. 30.

61. Official Records, Vol. 6, p. 307 (CDDH/SR.45, 30 05 1977)Google Scholar.

62. UNTS (1979) 3 and 609Google Scholar. As of 28 March 2001, Additional Protocol I had 157 States Parties, with the United States and France being notable absentees.

63. Cf., Green, L., ‘Command Responsibility in International Law’, 5 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1995) p. 341Google Scholar. Cf., also the US position on Art. 87(3), cited in Eckhardt, W., ‘Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard’, 97 Mil. LR (1982) p. 33Google Scholar.

64. Cf., Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C., and Zimmermann, B., eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, IRCR/ The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1987) (hereinafter Commentary) p. 1015, para. 3548Google Scholar.

65. Cf., Green, loc. cit. n. 45, at p. 342. He considered that liability of the commander for the actual breach would still be regulated by customary law.

66. As to lack of competence, cf., the British Army Act 1955, s. 84(2). As for the structure and jurisdiction of the US military justice system, see CommanderByrne, E.M., Military Law, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis, US Naval Institute Press 1991) pp. 14–15Google Scholar. See also Art. 1213 of the German Manual of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Z Dv 15/2 (Federal Ministry of Defence 1992)Google Scholar.

67. This is the effect of Art. 86(1) requiring the States Parties to repress grave breaches of the Protocol and of Art. 88 concerning mutual assistance between the States Parties in criminal matters.

68. Jia, loc. cit. n. 3, at pp. 325, 347.

69. Aleksovski Judgement, supra n. 8, at paras. 59 and 66.

70. Cf., the similarly worded Art. 6 of the ICTR Statute.

71. Some treat both grounds as branches of command responsibility: US Department of Army, The Low of Land Warfare (FM 27-10, 1956), para. 501; an ICTR Trial Chamber stated that ‘[w]here it can be shown that the accused was the de jure or de facto superior and that pursuant to his orders the atrocities were committed, then the Chamber considers that this must suffice to found command responsibility.’ Kayishima and Ruzindana, supra n. 17, at para. 223. See also Green, loc. cit. n. 45, at p. 320.

72. E.g., the Aleksovski Judgement, supra n. 8, at para. 5 (Aleksovski was charged under both Art. 7(1) and (3) for each relevant count). See also, the Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, Attachment B (Indictment), para. 7 (three of the four defendants were charged with command responsibility for ‘all the crimes set out in this indictment’, while two of the three, Mucić and Delić, were also charged with Art. 7(1) liability.

73. See the Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, Part VI, where Mucić was given a seven-year imprisonment for wilful killing compared to the 20-year jail term imposed on Delić for wilful killing.

74. On the distinction between a prerequisite and an element in respect of a crime, see the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, Separate and Dissenting Opinions of Judge Hunt and Judge Bennouna, paras. 26 and 28.

75. Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, supra n. 9, para. 187.

76. Ibid., para. 183.

77. Judgement and Sentence, supra n. 15, para. 44.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., para. 61.

80. Cf., de Smith, S. and Brazier, R., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8th edn. (London, Penguin 1998) p. 520Google Scholar: the formula in English law is that powers abused are powers exercised ultra vires.

81. Aleksovski Judgement, supra n. 8, paras. 109 and 117.

82. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its forty-eighth Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, UNGA, Official Records, 51st Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10) pp. 9 et seq.

83. Ibid., pp. 22–23.

84. Ibid., p. 24.

85. Cf., a seemingly supportive view, in Arsanjani, M., ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 93 AJIL (1999) p. 37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

86. Bill C–19, 48–49 Elizabeth II, 1999–2000 (An Act respecting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and to implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and to make consequential amendments to other Acts), passed by the House of Commons on 13 June 2000.

87. It is still pending before Parliament, having passed two readings.

88. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, paras. 398 and 400.

89. Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, supra n. 8, para. 76.

90. Cf., Dinstein, Y., The Defence of ‘Obedience to Superior Orders (Leiden, Sijthoff 1965) pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

91. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, para. 370.

92. Queen's Regulations for the Army, HMSO, 1975, para. 2.001, quoted in Rogers, A., Low on the Battlefield (Manchester, Manchester University Press 1996) p. 130Google Scholar.

93. Indictment, Case No. IT-95–5-I, 25 July 1995, para. 9.

94. Law Reports, supra n. 27, Vol. IV, p. 35.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

97. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7 para. 737.

98. Ibid., para. 740.

99. Ibid., para. 743.

100. Ibid., para. 764.

101. Ibid., paras. 765–766.

102. Aleksovski Judgement, supra n. 8, para. 93.

103. Ibid., para. 101.

104. Ibid., para. 93.

105. Ibid., para. 111.

106. Judgement, supra n. 17, para. 219.

107. Ibid., para. 218 (Ruzindana was not charged under Art. 6(3)).

108. Ibid., para. 555.

109. Commentary, op. cit. n. 64, s. 3555.

110. ZČelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, para. 736.

111. The Yamashita Case, Law Reports, Vol. VI, supra n. 27, at p. 35.

112. Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, supra n. 9, para. 108 (armed HVO soldiers forced their way into the prison without the guards being able to stop them) and para. 111 (no finding was made on any existence of command by Aleksovski over the HVO soldiers).

113. Cf., Čelebići Appeal Judgement, supra n. 12, para. 266.

114. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, para. 377.

115. Ibid., para. 378.

116. Blaškić Judgement, supra n. 10, paras. 301–302.

117. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgement (Merits), ICJ Rep. (1986) p. 14.

118. Ibid., para. 115.

119. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94–1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para. 114.

120. Cf., Kunarac Judgement, supra n. 11, para. 397.

121. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, para. 346; Blaškić Judgement, para. 294. See also the Aleksovski Judgement, para. 72.

122. Commentary, op. cit. n. 64, s. 3544.

123. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, para. 391.

124. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 34.

125. Cf., the almost identical wording of Art. 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. The ICTR interprets this provision in light of customary law: Kayishima and Ruzindana, supra n. 17, para. 209.

126. Law Reports, Vol. IV, supra n. 27, at p. 35.

127. Ibid., p. 19. The parties accepted this fact by stipulation.

128. Ibid., p. 94.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid., p. 95.

131. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, para. 383.

132. Ibid., para. 393.

133. Blaškić Judgement, supra n. 10, paras. 324, 328 and 332.

134. Ibid., para. 329, citing the Commentary, op. cit. n. 64, s. 3560. Art. 87(1) provides that ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.’

135. Cf., Note, ‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’, 82 Yale LJ (1973) (Yale Note) pp. 1274 at 1276–1277CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

136. Draft Code, pp. 37–38. Art. 6 concerns superior responsibility.

137. Ibid., p. 38.

138. See the Yamashita Judgement, cited in Law Reports, supra n. 27, Vol. IV, p. 35.

139. Čelebići Judgement, supra n. 7, para. 383.

140. Kayishima and Ruzindana Judgement, supra n. 17, para. 231.

141. Cf., Kordić Judgement, supra n. 13, para. 443.

142. E.g., Note, loc. cit. n. 135, p. 1276. The Chinese Law of 24 October 1946, concerning the Trial of War Criminals, the French Ordinance of 28 August 1944, concerning the Suppression of War Crimes, and the Luxembourg Law of 2 August 1947 on the Suppression of War Crimes, all treated a superior's failure to act as accomplice liability: the relevant parts of these laws may be found in Law Reports, op. cit. n. 27, Vol. IV, pp. 87–88.

143. Halbury's Laws of England, 4th rev. edn., Vol. 11(1) (London, Butterworths 1990) p. 43Google Scholar. But the German law reduces the penalty for an accomplice: Ashworth, A., Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1995) p. 412Google Scholar. So do the Chinese law (Penal Code 1997, Art. 27) and Turkish law. Tansay, A. and Wallace, D. Jr, eds., Introduction to Turkish Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1996) p. 169Google Scholar.

144. See the commentary of the ILC on the Draft Code, p. 24.

145. Cf., Ashworth, op. cit. n. 143, at p. 418. However, the French position is obviously contrary to this: Stefani, G., Levasseur, G., and Bouloc, B., Droit pénal général, 16th edn. (Paris, Dalloz 1997) p. 262Google Scholar. The Judgement in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95–17/1-T, 10 December 1998, tends to suggest that assistance by an accomplice need not be tangible as long as it has a significant effect in the completion of a crime: paras. 232, 234–235.

146. Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 2000, Richardson, P.J. and Thomas, D.A., eds., (London, Sweet and Maxwell 2000) p. 1618, s. 18–34Google Scholar.

147. Cf., Saland, P., ‘International Criminal law Principles’, in Lee, Roy, ed., The International Criminal Court: the Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999) p. 204Google Scholar.

148. Cf., Ibid. Also, n. 97 supra regarding several other jurisdictions’ approach to participation in crime.

149. Cf., LaFave, W. and Scott, A., Substantive Criminal Law (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing 1986) Vol. 1, p. 341Google Scholar. Also Card, R., Cross, R., and Jones, Ph., Criminal Law, 13th edn. (London, Butterworths 1995) p. 122Google Scholar; Ashworth, op. cit. n. 143, at p. 163.

150. Archbold, op. cit. n. 146, at p. 1566, s. 17–25.

151. Card et al., op. cit. n. 149, at p. 570. Also LaFave and Scott, op. cit. n. 149, at p. 353.

152. Cf., Dressler, J., Understanding Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (New York, Matthew and Bender 1995) p. 125, n. 3Google Scholar.

153. Halsbury's, op. cit. n. 143, para. 45. This is shared by some civil law countries: for Turkey, see Tansay and Wallace, op. cit. n. 143, at p. 169.

154. Even though English law and French law share the principle that an accomplice is liable to be punished as a principal offender, this does not mean that in terms of penalty, an accomplice will necessarily obtain the same punishment as a principal: Robert Millar, 34 Cr.App.Rep. (1970) p. 158 (where the procurer of the offence of dangerous driving leading to the deaths of six persons received a harsher penalty than the driver); Stefani et al., op. cit. n. 145, at p. 272, ss. 339–340 (an accomplice may receive a heavier or lighter penalty than the principal).

155. Law Reports, Vol. I, pp. 35, 41.

156. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 54.

157. Ibid., Vol. XI, p. 5.

158. Akayesu Judgement, supra n. 14, at paras. 698–734 (where Akayesu was acquitted of the charge of complicity in genocide); Kambanda Judgement, para. 40(4) (where Kambanda was found guilty of complicity in genocide but the sentence of the Judgement was a composite one of life imprisonment).

159. Case No. IT-95–17/1-T, 10 December 1998, paras. 269 and 275.